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ABSTRACT 
 
Islamic banks‟ operations are guided by the principles and values laid down in Islam (i.e., the 
Shari‟ah). To ensure Shari‟ah compliance on the operations of the bank and to inspire the 
confidence of shareholders and stakeholders, each Islamic bank is required to establish a 
Shari‟ah board. This study empirically investigates the Shari‟ah boards operating in the 
Malaysian Islamic banking industry and specifically examines the influence of the dual-layer 
Shari‟ah governance system on Malaysian Islamic banking practices where, besides the 
regulated Shari‟ah board, Shari‟ah supervision at the highest level is undertaken by the 
Shari‟ah Advisory Council (SAC) of the Central Bank of Malaysia. Two separate 
questionnaire surveys were distributed to banks offering Islamic banking in Malaysia. One 
was sent to the Shari‟ah department of the Islamic banks and the second to the branch 
managers  to assess the current practice and the expectations regarding how the issues 
investigated are being practised by the Shari‟ah board. Furthermore, a series of in-depth 
interviews were undertaken with important stakeholders within the Malaysian Shari‟ah 
governance framework.  
 
Essentially, this study indicates that Shari‟ah boards do in the main undertake a valuable 
Shari‟ah advisory role and reveals the existence of an established structure for Shari‟ah 
reviews. However, the Shari‟ah reviews were found not to be effectively implemented by the 
Shari‟ah boards thus raising concern regarding the quality of the Shari‟ah reports issued by 
the boards highlighting both the importance and need for an external Shari‟ah audit. In 
addition, the composition of the Shari‟ah board members is revealed to have influence over 
the quality of Shari‟ah decisions issued by the board. Moreover, the integrity of the Shari‟ah 
board members, such as their ethical value, reputation and scholarly background, was found 
to be important in influencing its accountability and independence. Interestingly, Shari‟ah 
boards were also perceived by branch managers of not providing the required level of 
involvement. The study also emphasises that branch managers felt the Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council (SAC) to be the most important party within the Malaysian Shari‟ah governance 
framework, and that the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system was viewed as having 
contributed to the standardisation of Islamic banking. Also, it appears that the role played by 
the Shari‟ah Advisory Council (SAC) is not limiting creativity in developing Islamic banking 
products.   
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
 
Arabic Term    Translation  
 
 
„urf   : Customary practice. 
 
Al-ijarah thumma : A contract of lease which subsequently followed by a sale    
al-bay‟    contract. 
  
bay‟ al-„inah : A back to back sale contract or a sale repurchase, usually  
sale is at a higher price while the buying back is at a lower  
price.  
 
bay‟ al-dayn  : A contract of sale of debt. 
 
bay‟ al-salam  : A sales contract where the price is paid in advance and the  
goods are delivered in the future. 
 
bay‟ bithaman ajil : A sales contract on a deferred payment basis. 
 
daruriyyat   : Essentials. 
 
falah    : Success. 
 
fatwa   : Shari‟ah decision. 
 
furu‟   : Branch cases in Islam. 
 
gharar   : Uncertainty. 
 
hajiyyat  :  Complementary requirements. 
 
hajj   : Pilgrimage to Makkah; represent one of the basic tenets in  
Islam. 
 
halal   : Permissible according to the Islamic law.  
 
haram    : Prohibited according to the Islamic law. 
 
harus    : Permissible practice according to the Islamic law. 
 
hibah   : Reward. 
 
hikmah   : Rationale. 
 
ibadat    :  Worship. 
xiv 
 
ibahah   : Permissibility.  
 
ijarah   : A lease contract. 
 
ijarah mawsufah fi  : A lease contract of a specified future asset which is not in    
al-zimmah   existence at the time of contract.  
 
ijtihad   :  Legal opinion. 
 
illah    : The effective cause. 
 
istihsan  : Juristic preference. 
 
khalifah  : Vicegerent. 
 
khilaf   : Differences among the Shari‟ah scholars. 
 
madzahab  : Islamic legal school. 
 
makruh   : Disapproved practice according to the Islamic law. 
 
maqasid al-Shari‟ah :  Objectives of the Shari‟ah.  
 
maslahah mursalah :  Unrestricted public interest. 
 
maslahah  : Benefits on different changed circumstances. 
 
mua‟malat  : Matters pertaining to human relation in Islam. 
 
mudharabah  : It is a form of silent partnership between two parties where one   
provides the capital for a project and the other, mudharib, 
manages the project. Profits are distributed according to a 
predetermined ratio while losses are borne by the provider of 
the capital.  
 
mudharib  : Entrepreneur within the mudharabah contract. 
 
mufti   : A jurist who interprets Muslim religious law. 
 
murabahah  : A sales contract where goods are sold at a price which includes  
a profit margin agree by both parties.  
 
musharakah  : A partnership contract where partners contribute the capital for  
financing the project. All parties share profits on a pre-agreed  
ratio but losses are shared on the basis of equity participation. 
 
musharakah   : A diminishing partnership contract where the partners usually 
mutanaqisah    enter into two types of contracts: a joint ownership contract and  
an ijarah (lease) contract in which the bank will gradually sell 
its shares to the client. In terms of distribution of profit and loss 
xv 
 
in musharakah type of financing, all profits generated will be 
shared among the partners in a proportion which is mutually 
agreed in the contract, while the losses will be shared in 
proportion to the partners‟ capital.  
 
nisab   : A threshold figure specified in Islamic law. 
 
qard al-hasan  : Charitable loan with no interest.  
qiyas   : Analogical reasoning. 
 
riba   : Usury or interest. In a commodity exchange riba denotes the  
disparity in the quantity or time of delivery. Technically, riba  
denotes any increase that must be paid by the borrower to the  
lender along with principal sum as a condition for the loan or  
loan extension.  
 
ribawi    : Usurious items. 
 
s.a.w   : Peace be upon him. 
 
Shari‟ah  : Islamic law. 
 
sunnah   : The traditions of Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.; the recommended  
practice of Prophet Muhammad s.a.w. 
 
tahsiniyyat  :  Desirables.  
 
Takaful  : Islamic insurance. 
 
tawarruq  : A sales contract where the financial institution will buy an asset  
and immediately sell it to a customer on a deferred payment  
basis. The customer then sells the same asset to a third party for  
immediate delivery and payment, the end result being that the  
customer receives a cash amount and has a deferred payment  
obligation for the marked-up price to the financial institution.  
 
ummah  : Nation.  
 
usul-fiqh  : The methodology of Islamic jurisprudence. 
 
wadi‟ah  : Safekeeping of deposit by customers in financial institution. 
 
wadi‟ah yad   : Safekeeping of deposit by customers in financial institution 
dhamanah    where the deposit is guaranteed by the financial institution. 
 
wajib   : Obligatory practice according to the Islamic law. 
 
zakat   : Alms-giving; represent one of the five basic tenets in Islam. 
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AAOIFI  :  Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial  
Institutions 
 
BNM   :  Bank Negara Malaysia 
 
CEO   : Chief Executive Officer 
 
GPS1   : Guidelines on the Governance of Shari‟ah Committee for the  
Islamic Financial Institutions 
 
IB   : Islamic Banking 
 
IFI   :  Islamic Financial Institution 
 
IFSB   : Islamic Financial Services Board 
 
ISR   : Internal Shari‟ah Review 
 
MIFC   : Malaysian International Islamic Finance Centre 
 
QS1   : Questionnaire Survey 1 
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RM   :  Ringgit Malaysia  
 
SC   : Shari‟ah Committee 
 
SGF   : Shari‟ah Governance Framework 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Good corporate governance might not be confined to a prescribed standardised set of Code of 
Practice that fits all but could rather be unique to the type of business operation (Prowse 
1994; Mayer 2000; Monks and Minow 2001). It is well accepted that the corporate 
governance for financial institutions such as banks entail distinct features due to the opacity 
and regulatory nature of the industry and calls for a separate scope of analysis from its 
counterpart, i.e., non-financial corporations (Ciancanelli and Gonzalez 2001; Levine 2004; 
Andres and Vallelado 2008). As for Islamic financial institutions (IFIs), such as Islamic 
banks, their corporate governance features Shari‟ah governance mechanisms, which ensures 
adherence to the Islamic Shari‟ah principles in their business operations. 
 
One of the Shari‟ah governance mechanisms apparent in Islamic banks is the Shari‟ah board.1 
It is argued that the Shari‟ah board ensures the credibility of Islamic banks by ascertaining 
the Shari‟ah compliance of the banks‟ operations (Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and 
Karim 1987; Karim 1990a; Karim 1990b; Banaga et al. 1994; Rammal 2006; Ghayad 2008; 
Laldin 2008a). To strengthen further the Shari‟ah governance mechanism in the Islamic 
banking operation, Malaysia, as well as several other countries, has established a centralised 
Shari‟ah board at the national level. In this light, the present study empirically investigates 
the governance function of the Shari‟ah board in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry. In 
particular, this study offers an examination of the influence of the dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system on Malaysian Islamic banking practices.  
 
The importance of a thorough evaluation of the governance mechanism within IFIs could be 
ascertained from the recent global financial crisis. It has emerged that the financial turmoil 
that began in 2007 affected various financial and economic activities worldwide including the 
failure of financial institutions due to the global impact of the financial crisis. The focus of 
the prevalent argument on what caused the crisis has been on the weaknesses of institutions‟ 
                                                 
1
 The term Shari‟ah board is used interchangeably with Shari‟ah Supervisory Board (SSB) and Shari‟ah 
Committee (SC). The SSB refers to the designation of the Shari‟ah board used by AAOIFI and IFSB in their 
standards, whilst the SC is the designation of Shari‟ah Committee used in the Malaysian regulatory guidelines. 
Commonly, this Shari‟ah governance authority is known as the Shari‟ah board. 
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corporate governance and regulations, underlining that they proved to be insufficient 
(Kirkpatrick 2009). Importantly, the financial crisis calls for discussion about and the urgent 
evaluation of existing governance mechanisms that holds the financial institutions. Hence, 
investigation of the governance function of Shari‟ah boards in the Islamic banking industry 
attempted in this study is deemed to be crucial. 
 
1.2 Motivation and Rationale of the Study 
This study investigates the governance function of the Shari‟ah board in Islamic banks. A 
review of the literature indicates that there is a lack of extensive research in this area. The 
studies that are available tend to be limited in scope and provide only a narrow understanding 
of the issues surrounding the Shari‟ah board. The main motivation for conducting this study 
is to address this gap by examining the crucial issues concerning the role, independence and 
effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board. With regard to the development of the Shari‟ah 
governance structure, Malaysia is recognised by many as having the most established 
regulatory and supervisory framework for the Islamic banking industry in the Islamic world. 
In addition, the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia also includes the range of fully-fledged 
Islamic banks as well as conventional banks offering an Islamic banking window. The 
competitive environment created by this dual banking system is argued to have resulted in the 
availability of a wide range of sophisticated products from banks offering Islamic banking 
operations (Bakar 2008a, pp. 69-70) of which the Shari‟ah boards are involved. Hence, 
investigation of the Shari‟ah board issues above for the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia 
would provide an indication of the present state of the Shari‟ah governance of the Malaysian 
Islamic banking industry. 
 
Additionally, Malaysia implements a dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system for its Islamic 
banking industry. This is where, besides the regulated Shari‟ah board, Shari‟ah supervision at 
the highest level is undertaken by the Shari‟ah Advisory Council (SAC) of the Central Bank 
of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM)), which acts as the centralised Shari‟ah board 
and the supreme authority governing the Islamic finance industry. One important task of the 
SAC is to attempt to standardise Islamic banking practices through coordination of the 
fatwas
2
 and Islamic finance products and services (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Laldin 2008a; 
                                                 
2
 Fatwa is the Arabic translation for „Islamic verdict‟. The term fatwa is used interchangeably with Shari‟ah 
decisions throughout this thesis.  
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Shaffaii 2008). This is supported by Wilson (2009) who argued that consistencies in the IFIs 
are more likely in jurisdictions where there exists a centralised Shari‟ah board. The 
fundamental issue to be addressed is whether the presence of a dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system actually enhances the Shari‟ah governance and, therefore, ensures the 
credibility of the Islamic banking industry. Hence, this study expands the understanding of 
the issues surrounding the Shari‟ah boards that operate within a dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system.  
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
The principal aim of this study is to evaluate the Shari‟ah governance of the Malaysian 
Islamic banking industry by examining the role, independence and effectiveness of the 
Shari‟ah board. Thus, the objectives of this study are: 
 
a) To ascertain and evaluate the present role of the Shari‟ah boards of Islamic banks 
in Malaysia in ensuring the credibility of the Islamic banking industry and in 
attending to the needs of the investors and stakeholders. 
b) To evaluate the independence and effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance role of 
the Shari‟ah board in the context of the Malaysian dual-layer Islamic banking 
Shari‟ah governance system and to assess its influence on the coherence of 
Islamic banking practice.  
 
Against the above research objectives, the following research questions have been formulated 
and will be addressed by the researcher:  
 
a) What is the current role of the Shari‟ah board members in the Islamic banking 
industry in Malaysia? 
b) What are the perceptions of the stakeholders regarding the expected role of the 
Shari‟ah board members in the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia? 
c) How does the role played by the Shari‟ah board and the SAC members influence 
the credibility of Islamic banks and safeguard the Shari‟ah banking needs of 
investors and stakeholders?  
d) How independent are Shari‟ah board members in performing their functions? 
What are the factors that influence their independence? 
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e) What are the factors that influence the integrity of Shari‟ah board members? To 
whom are they accountable? 
f) How do the Shari‟ah board members interact with other parties within the 
Shari‟ah governance mechanisms of an Islamic bank? 
g) What are the perceptions of the stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of a dual-
layer Shari‟ah governance system of Islamic banks, as they are implemented in 
Malaysia? 
h) What are the perceptions of the stakeholders regarding the influence of the dual-
layer Shari‟ah governance system of Islamic banks in promoting coherence of the 
Islamic banking practice in Malaysia? 
i) What is the extent of Shari‟ah board members‟ involvement in the accounting 
aspects of Islamic banking operations?  
j) How is the Shari‟ah governance mechanism, as it is practiced in Malaysia, 
associated with the quality of an Islamic bank‟s Shari‟ah report? 
 
1.4 Scope of the Study 
This research principally involves an examination of the role, independence and effectiveness 
of the Shari‟ah board amongst participating banks in the Malaysian International Islamic 
Finance Centre (MIFC) of BNM. The MIFC makes apparent three main categories of Islamic 
banking operations: (1) local, fully-fledged Islamic banks; (2) international Islamic banks; 
and (3) other banks offering Islamic banking window.  
 
 
 
1.5 Methodology 
In order to accomplish the research objectives mentioned above, firstly, a review of the 
literature on the corporate governance of banks in general was undertaken and this was 
followed by a literature review of corporate governance of Islamic banks. In addition, this 
study also made a crucial review of the governance function of the Shari‟ah board in Islamic 
banks. Important debates are discussed, as well as empirical research that specifically 
examined the role, independence and effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board. With regard to the 
research design, a two-stage data collection procedure was undertaken. The first stage was 
the administration of questionnaire surveys, which were aimed at gaining a general picture of 
the issues under investigation. Two questionnaire surveys were undertaken and both were 
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conducted between mid-January and the end of February 2010. To assess how the issues 
investigated are being practiced by the Shari‟ah board, the first questionnaire survey was 
distributed to heads of Shari‟ah departments of the banks offering Islamic banking products 
and services in Malaysia. Also, in order to determine how the issues investigated are expected 
to be practiced by the Shari‟ah board, a second questionnaire survey was distributed to the 
branch managers of the banks under study. Furthermore, the second stage of the research was 
to undertake a series of in-depth interviews, which were conducted between March and the 
end of May 2010. At this stage, the researcher was interested in gaining further understanding 
of the results derived from the questionnaire surveys and to discover the „social process‟ that 
is involved in the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board.  
 
The two-stage research design and the use of both the quantitative and qualitative research 
instruments presented above highlights that this research is a „sequential explanatory design‟, 
and employs a mixed-method research strategy, respectively. It is argued that the collection 
of data using this research design, which incorporates a mixed-method research strategy, 
would enhance the validity of the overall analysis and enable the building of a rounded and 
overall picture of the issues under investigation (Mason 1994). Hence, it is deemed that the 
research method used in this study would provide an in-depth review and broaden the 
understanding of the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. 
 
1.6 Contribution of the Study 
In addition to implementation of best practice for effective corporate governance, an essential 
requirement for Islamic banks is the establishment of a Shari‟ah governance mechanism that 
ensures the operations are Shari‟ah compliant. The Shari‟ah board, in this case, is the 
backbone and the Shari‟ah governance authority of an Islamic bank. The current research also 
investigates issues surrounding the role of the Shari‟ah board, which, in Malaysia, serves as a 
regulated Shari‟ah governance authority. In addition, this research also offers an examination 
of Malaysian Shari‟ah governance system for the operation of Islamic banking that is 
recognised by many to be the most established and comprehensive in the Islamic world.  
 
Since the aim of this study is to evaluate the role, independence and effectiveness of the 
Shari‟ah board, it is therefore hoped that it will contribute to a better understanding of the 
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present Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. It is also hoped that it will 
provide evidence of the efficacy of the Shari‟ah governance framework (SGF) in ensuring 
Shari‟ah compliance and shed light on possible avenues for strengthening Shari‟ah 
governance within the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia. It is, therefore, anticipated that 
this study will not only have policy implications for the Malaysian Islamic finance industry 
but will also be useful to other countries intending to develop the necessary regulatory 
infrastructure for their Islamic banking industry.  
 
1.7 The Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter has provided the background of the study, outlined the objectives and has briefly 
discussed the research methodology. Chapter Two provides the review of the literature on the 
corporate governance of the banks. This chapter highlights the three theories used in the 
current research as the theoretical framework for the study of corporate governance. These 
theories are the agency theory, the transaction cost theory and the stakeholders‟ theory. 
Several governance mechanisms for the banking industry have been discussed. In particular, 
this chapter emphasises that regulatory intervention, through policies, prudential standards 
and guidelines, is a crucial governance mechanism function of the regulators to protect the 
banking industry from possible financial failure, which may open up the possibility of 
systemic risk.  
 
Chapter Three reviews the literature on the corporate governance of Islamic banks. Distinctly, 
this chapter discusses the principles governing Islamic banking practices, with Shari‟ah 
compliance assurance as central and intrinsic to the governance mechanism implemented in 
the industry. Besides explaining the various Islamic financial contracts, this chapter also 
discusses the role of the regulatory bodies in promulgating standards and guidelines used in 
the IFIs and standardising the Islamic banking practices. As the background of the study is 
the Malaysian Islamic banking industry, this chapter also focuses on the Malaysian Islamic 
banking environment.   
 
Chapter Four draws attention to the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. In 
particular, this chapter discusses the two spheres of the Shari‟ah board‟s role, i.e., Shari‟ah 
advisory and Shari‟ah review, the independence and the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board‟s 
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governance function. Relevant standards and guidelines on these aspects of interest have also 
been highlighted. As the current research represents a study from the Malaysian perspective, 
discussion of the Malaysian Islamic banking regulatory framework and the relevant 
guidelines on the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board have been emphasised.   
 
Chapter Five is concerned with the research methodology, describing the research objectives 
and the processes used in this study. It presents, in detail, the rationale for adopting a 
combination of methods and issues related to data collection. Regarding the questionnaire 
survey, the methods used to collect the data are presented, including the questionnaire design, 
pilot study and distribution procedures. As regards the in-depth interviews, negotiating access 
and interview strategies are discussed. The relevant analysis to be employed is also 
highlighted.  
 
The results of the study are detailed in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. Chapters Six and 
Seven focus on the results of the analysis of the questionnaires surveys with, respectively, the 
Shari‟ah department and the branch managers of banks offering Islamic banking in Malaysia. 
Meanwhile, Chapter Eight presents the analysis of the in-depth interviews with the Shari‟ah 
board members, heads of Shari‟ah departments, Chief Executive Officer (CEOs) and senior 
executives of Islamic banks, the SAC of BNM and BNM officers. Chapter Nine presents a 
brief summary of the overall study and discusses its conclusions and implications for theory 
and practice. The limitations of the study are also highlighted and, additionally, a number of 
recommendations and suggestions for future research are proposed.  
 
A framework for the thesis has been constructed to assist in navigating the various parts and 
chapters. This is displayed in Figure 1.1 below. 
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Figure 1.1: A Framework for the Thesis 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS   
 
2.1 Introduction  
There has been a series of high profile failures from Enron, Parmalat and WorldCom through 
to Global Crossing and others, despite the presence of a code of good governance and its 
requirement for businesses to comply or explain their failure to do so. It is, therefore, argued 
that, given the need to restore public confidence in the corporate governance of organisations, 
policy makers will need to produce improved guidelines that will at least prevent similar 
scandals from recurring. Ideally, corporations, in pursuing their aims and objectives, ought to 
implement what is normally referred to when discussing corporate governance as the „best 
practices‟, which lead to shareholders‟ and other stakeholders‟ rights being fulfilled. Hence, a 
good corporate governance mechanism for corporate success is deemed vital, and its 
importance cannot be underestimated. As for financial institutions, such as banks, their 
opaque and regulated nature represents additional dimensions that make their corporate 
governance different from their counterparts, i.e., non-financial corporations (Ciancanelli and 
Gonzalez 2001; Adams and Mehran 2003; Levine 2004; Hagendorff et al. 2007; Andres and 
Vallelado 2008; Mülbert 2009). This could be explained by the nature of the banking 
business, which collect funds from customers and then uses those funds; this makes it 
essential to embed a highly regulated governance feature that will uphold the integrity of the 
financial market and preserve the socio-economic well-being as a whole. On the other hand, 
one could anticipate that improper and weak governance in banks would lead to catastrophic 
consequences such as the destruction of the economy and reduced market confidence.  
 
The failure of the banking business and the impact it has had on the economy could be 
understood from banks‟ and financial institutions‟ position in the financial system, which has 
been described as “a network of interdependent funds flows” by Ciancanelli and Gonzalez 
(2001p. 11). The present global financial crisis, which began in July 2007, has seen how the 
failure of financial institutions like Northern Rock of the United Kingdom, which received 
liquidity support from the Bank of England on 14 September 2007 and later was nationalised 
on 22 February 2008, and the bankruptcy of United States‟ Lehman Brothers on 14 
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September 2008, led to an acute phase of financial failures as witnessed by the subsequent 
failure of banks, mortgage lenders and insurance companies, the fall of the global stock 
market and the devaluation of local currencies. Hence, these developments explain the need 
for and the significance of effective corporate governance for financial institutions and the 
socio-economic implication such governance would bring.   
 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section, i.e. Section 2.2, discusses the 
theoretical framework of the study of corporate governance, with specific emphasis on the 
agency theory, the transaction cost theory and the stakeholder theory. This is followed by a 
literature review of the corporate governance of banks in Section 2.3. Then, an explanation of 
several international regulatory bodies governing the banking industry is offered in Section 
2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 offers the summary of the chapter. 
 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance Theories: The Agency Theory, the Transaction 
Cost Theory and the Stakeholder Theory Perspective  
This section discusses the corporate governance theories underpinning the present study 
undertaken by the researcher: the agency theory, the transaction cost theory, and the 
stakeholder theory. An understanding of the theoretical explanation of corporate governance 
is deemed vital as it makes apparent the related parties‟ involvement within a business 
environment and the recognition of whose rights need to be addressed along with the 
identification of the governance mechanism required to ensure the attainment of that 
objective. The following paragraphs discuss these theories in more detail. 
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory  
Historically, the limitation of funding on the operation of family-owned traditional businesses 
leads owners to invite others into capital participation in what consequently evolves into a 
corporation.  The emergence of corporate ownership through shareholding and the dispute 
that can develop over the separation of ownership and corporate control, as discussed by 
Berle and Means (1932), produces an important economic-based theoretical framework to the 
concept of corporate governance, i.e., agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
proponents of the agency theory, define the agency relationship as a contractual relationship 
between the shareholder as the principal and the managers as the agent who are given some 
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authority to perform services on behalf of the principal. One of the primary concerns over this 
contractual relationship is the conflict of interest between the two parties. The underlying 
assumption of this agency problem is that, because a management‟s pay-related benefits are 
based on the firm‟s performance, they tend to behave in a manner that would fulfil their self 
interests (see for example Guidry et al. 1998; Boatright 1999; Ryan and Schneider 2003; Kim 
and Mahoney 2005). Such behaviour amongst the management serves as an opportunity cost 
to the firm as it contradicts the long term wealth maximization aim of the shareholders 
(Demirag and Tylecote 1992). Although this contractual aim of enhancing the corporation 
value might appear to be implicit, the fiduciary duties that the management owes to the 
shareholders are deemed to be legally manifested as could be judged from legal prohibitions 
on activities such as managements‟ self-dealing, acceptance of bribes, private use of 
confidential information and the like.  
 
There is a notion that the agency problem above is associated with information asymmetry 
between the shareholders and the managements (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). Essentially, 
the separation of ownership and control concept explained by Berle and Means (1932) has 
introduced a new form of ownership in doing business, i.e., an ownership that is dispersed 
amongst the shareholders. This ownership structure gives rise to the challenge of how the 
shareholders could exercise monitoring and control of corporate management, which is often 
costly (Eisenhardt 1989). The dispute arises because the management has the upper hand 
regarding the information available to them, in that the latter is able to make some 
observations that the former are not in a position to make. This information advantage on the 
part of the management has been used to make decisions that best serve their interests, as 
may be reflected by the choices managers make regarding effort, risk exposure and time 
horizons (Jensen and Smith 1985). Thus, shareholders aspire to wealth maximization while 
managements incline towards opportunistic behaviours that satisfy their self interests.  
 
Among the agency costs involved in aligning the interests of both parties are the introduction 
of incentive schemes and contracts for the management, and shareholders‟ use of voting 
rights in a way that might influence the direction of the firm (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985). 
Through voting, shareholders could exert corporate governance on issues pertaining to 
corporation faith, such as liquidation and mergers, or even on matters that would enhance 
their ownership via the election of a board of directors that represents the shareholders‟ 
interests, besides monitoring the management. Nevertheless, for the minority shareholders, 
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who are synonymous with the „free rider‟ label in the corporate governance literature, the 
inferiority of their position in comparison with that of large investors and the intensified 
information asymmetry problem make mechanisms such as voting exercises ineffective at 
representing their rights and curbing expropriation by the management (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997).  
 
On the other hand, contracts are being used to establish the rights of the contracting parties 
(shareholders and managements) with performance measurement and pay-off being specified 
(Evan and Weir 1995). Some theorists describe two ways in which shareholders can improve 
the efficiency of contracts (see for example Ouchi 1978; Eisenhardt 1989). The first method 
is aimed at reducing the information asymmetry problem of the agent as well as imposing 
sanctions on an agent‟s deviated behaviour through a mechanism that would monitor agent 
behaviour so that it is in accordance with what is stipulated in the contract. Meanwhile, a 
management appraisal that is based on actual performance in comparison with expected 
outcome, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), represents the alternative.  
 
2.2.2 Transaction Cost Theory  
Similar to agency theory, transaction cost theory is another economic-based theory of 
organizational corporate governance that was expanded from the work of (Coase 1937) and a 
series of publications by Oliver Williamson. However, differences such as the fundamental 
theoretical assumption as to what constitutes a firm are noted. For example, Williamson 
(1998) argued that the theoretical proposition brought by agency theory considers a firm as a 
production function (as with price and output) between the principal and the agent as can be 
deduced from the phrase „nexus for contracting relationship‟ used by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976, p. 311). In agency theory, the notion of governance lies in an ex ante efficient 
incentive alignment between both contracting parties in anticipation of risk aversion 
behaviour and the potential moral hazard of the agent. On the other hand, the firm as 
theoretically manifested in transaction cost theory is regarded as an organizational 
construction in which the efficient boundaries could be derived by aligning different 
transactions with governance structures (firm or market) in a discriminating mechanism 
(Williamson 1985, 1991b, 1998). This difference also highlights a clear distinction between 
the units of analysis used between agency theory and transaction cost theory whereby the 
former uses the individual agent and the latter uses transaction.  
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What makes up a transaction cost and what is its association with the governance structure 
underlying transaction cost theory are important points for discussion. Typically, transaction 
costs relate to all aspects of a transaction, including negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing 
the exchange. In a market organization, this would tend to encompass discovering what the 
relevant prices are, the costs associated with the terms of the trade and negotiating and 
concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction. Alternatively, Coase (1937) 
argued that as the transaction cost of performing the activities in the market is substantial, a 
firm emerges and workers surrender the right to use their labour by contract. Besides 
economizing transaction costs, internalizing activities by the firm (which is also known as 
vertical integration) gives a different set of transaction costs which include coordinating 
purchases, production activities and the costs of motivating and monitoring the workforce.  
 
In Williamson‟s work (see for example Williamson 1975; 1979, 1981) and in the light of the 
transaction cost description above, he suggested three generic governance structures, namely, 
the market, hierarchy (i.e., vertical integration), and hybrid (a combination of market and 
hierarchy). It is noteworthy that there are two factors considered as the postulates 
underpinning the theoretical idea behind transaction cost theory that produce ambiguity in the 
contracting process and which give rise to transaction costs: „bounded rationality‟ and 
opportunism (Williamson 1975, 1985). The assumption of „bounded rationality‟ or 
contractual incompleteness follows Simon's (1961, p. xxiv) interpretation of human action as 
„intendedly rational, but only limitedly so‟, which describes the rationality of human 
behaviour as being limited by the ability to process information and, so exposes the 
contracting parties to certain risks. If, for example, circumstances change unexpectedly, not 
only will the original governing agreement no longer be effective, but this will also force the 
firm to be adaptive; failure do so imposes „maladaptation costs‟ (Williamson 1991a). 
Meanwhile, opportunism is the assumption of human behaviour that is described as „self-
interest seeking with guile‟ (Williamson 1975). It is the perceived hazards of an agent that 
would attempt to organize transactions in their best interests, thereby adding to the existing 
contractual complications. As a result of assuming bounded rationality and opportunism, 
transaction cost theory focuses on how ex ante choices of governance structure could be 
exercised in order to safeguard against ex post hazards of opportunism (Williams 1993). 
Hence, similar to agency theory, transaction cost theory also seeks the best governance 
structure that would control the agents‟ opportunistic behaviour in pursuit of shareholders‟ 
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profit maximization motive. As such, from the theoretical perspective, both agency theory 
and transaction cost theory have been regarded as complementary (Williamson 1998).   
 
 
2.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
Many studies have argued about the narrow governance relationship underlying agency 
theory between the board of directors, the shareholders and the management in understanding 
the complexities within an organisation (see for example Eisenhardt 1989; Aguilera et al. 
2008; Christopher 2010), and its inability to explain accurately the diversity of corporate 
governance arrangements in different institutional contexts (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; 
Filatotchev et al. 2008). Stakeholder theory, as a governance theory, refutes the claim of the 
limited impact of corporations‟ activities on shareholders. The essence of stakeholder theory 
is the exposition that the corporate governance and accountability of the management is 
wider than that offered by agency theory, i.e., shareholders, and is extended to incorporate 
other stakeholders. By broadening the corporate governance spectrum, stakeholder theory 
examines situations where management, in addition to shareholders, also pursue the interests 
of other stakeholders (Berry and Rondinelli 1998; Caldwell and Karri 2005; Solomon 2007; 
Collier 2008). In this regard, Freeman (1994, p. 46) offers clarity by defining stakeholders as 
„any group of individuals who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization‟s objectives‟. Meanwhile, Waddock et al. (2002) categorized stakeholders into 
primary stakeholders (such as the employees and customers of an organization) and 
secondary stakeholders (such as non-government organizations, activists, communities and 
governments).  
 
In relation to agency theory, the theoretical exposition of corporate governance in stakeholder 
theory implicitly rejects the notion that shareholders‟ wealth maximization is the only aim of 
a corporation, as is claimed by agency theory. The management, as the agent within 
stakeholder theory, is argued to have the responsibility to select activities and direct resources 
to obtain benefits for all legitimate stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston 1995). This is 
supported by Carroll and Buchholtz (1999, p. 23) who asserted that „the task of management 
is not only to deal with the various stakeholder groups in an ethical fashion but also to 
reconcile the conflicts of interests that occur between the organisation and the stakeholder 
groups‟. Hence, the fiduciary duty of the management has to suit the interests of all parties 
  
15 
 
under the ambit of stakeholder theory. In this respect, stakeholder theory has been considered 
as complementing agency theory with regard to corporate governance (Solomon 2007).  
 
Besides the three theories mentioned above, there are other theoretical perspectives on 
corporate governance. These include resource dependency theory, managerial-class 
hegemony theory and stewardship theory. Resource dependency theory, for example, posits 
that the board of directors is valuable in facilitating, securing and easing the process of 
acquiring scarce and essential resources (Selznick 1949; Zald 1969; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Pennings 1980; Zahra and Pearce 1989; Boyd 1990; Kesner and Johnson 1990; Daily 
and Dalton 1993; Goodstein et al. 1994; Johnson et al. 1996; Kula 2005). Under this theory, 
the board of directors is viewed as the mechanism for reducing environmental uncertainty 
(Pfeffer 1972) where such uncertainty could affect an organization‟s control of resources and 
choice of strategies. Another role of the board of directors explained in resource dependency 
theory is reducing the transaction cost resulting from the inter-dependencies between the firm 
and various institutions within the environment (Williamson 1984). Meanwhile, managerial-
class hegemony theory advocates that the board of directors is an ineffective mechanism of 
corporate governance, as the board plays only a passive role in strategy or directing the 
corporation; these activities are dominated by the management (Mace 1971; Lorsch and 
Maclver 1989). Under this theory, the role of the board of directors in the strategic 
management of the firm is said to be contingent upon the firm facing a crisis (Mace 1971; 
Clendenin 1972). Accordingly, managerial-class hegemony theory posits that the real 
responsibility of running and controlling an organisation is actually assumed by corporate 
management (Scott 1997).  
 
Stewardship theory, on the other hand, holds a contrasting view to agency theory. Unlike 
agency theory, stewardship theory assumes that there is no conflict of interest resulting from 
the separation of ownership and that the goal of governance is basically to find mechanisms 
and structures that facilitate the most effective coordination between the management and the 
owners (Donaldson 1990; Davis et al. 1997). Furthermore, stewardship theory views people 
in an organization as collectivist and pro-organisational and not opportunist (Davis et al. 
1997). With regard to transaction cost, it is expected that the transaction costs under 
stewardship theory will be lower as there is a reduced need for costs associated with 
incentives and the monitoring of behaviour (Davis et al. 1997).  
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In summary, this section offers insights into important governance elements embedded in 
corporate governance theories which are rooted in the separation of ownership and corporate 
control in a corporation. As highlighted in the beginning of this section, the theoretical 
perspectives of corporate governance underpinning the present study are agency theory, 
transaction cost theory, and stakeholder theory. As will be discussed later in Chapter Three, 
the liberal market policies that exist in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry have 
encouraged economic and market development and have created a competitive environment 
for the industry. In this regard, an economic-based corporate governance theory, such as the 
three selected theories mentioned, is deemed to be the pertinent type of theory for elucidating 
the corporate governance of banks and the corporate governance environment and 
circumstances in the Malaysian context. Additionally, in the context of the present study, the 
term „corporate governance‟ takes the definition used by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)
3: „a set of relationships between a company‟s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined‟ (OECD 2004).  
 
The following section discusses corporate governance with a special focus on the banking 
industry. It highlights the governance issues surrounding certain corporate governance 
mechanisms of banks, as highlighted in the literature.  
 
 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance of Banks 
The governance attributes for non-financial institutions are similarly relevant when 
discussing the corporate governance of banks (Peni and Vähämaa 2011). Indeed, the banking 
institutions incorporate special features which continue to exert corporate governance 
challenges to a greater extent than do its counterparts, i.e. the non-financial institutions. For 
example, the information asymmetry problem is claimed to be heightened in banks (Furfine 
2001), as could be evaluated by examining two factors. First, Levine (2004) asserted that the 
volatility of a bank‟s financial position and its quality are usually at the discretion and in the 
consciousness of the management, though not observable by the shareholders. The financial 
                                                 
3
 More discussion on OECD is given in Section 2.4.1 below. 
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intermediary role of the banks through the use of financial instruments has made liquidity one 
of the most important features associated with this industry. Yet, the risk quality and the 
nature of the business resulting from the transactions that take place within banks, as a whole, 
is deemed to be known only to the management. Secondly, Ciancanelli and Gonzalez (2001), 
in disagreement with the underlying assumption of a competitive market for non-financial 
corporations in agency theory, assert that the multi-contractual relationship that exists in 
banks expands the scope of information asymmetry beyond what is usually described 
between owners and managers to include depositors, borrowers and regulators. Hence, these 
arguments show how the agency problem poses more corporate governance challenges in the 
banking industry whilst indicating the hefty agency costs associated with the resulting 
divergence between the principal‟s and the agent‟s objectives. In addition, the contractual 
relationship that exists between the management and non-shareholders, such as in the case of 
bank depositors, could demand greater protection than that exists between the management 
and shareholders. In this regard, the government and the regulator are the two stakeholders 
that, although not directly involved in the contractual relationship as the agent or the 
principal, signify their important stakehold in banks‟ highly regulated environment.  
 
In light of the above discussion, the shareholders and the stakeholders in the banking 
industry, in comparison with those in non-financial institutions, are deemed to face 
intensified difficulties associated with the monitoring and control of the management as a 
result of banks‟ unique characteristics, as noted earlier. The following subsections discuss the 
corporate governance issues surrounding certain corporate governance mechanisms of banks. 
 
 
2.3.1 Issues Surrounding the Role of the Board in Banks 
The corporate governance theories discussed in the preceding section have described how the 
agents carry a significant responsibility to execute a corporation‟s functions in fulfilling the 
rights of the shareholders as well as of the stakeholders. Commonly, the structure of a 
corporation, including banks, exhibits the distinctive designation of the board of directors that 
displays authority over the operation of the business through its decision-making capacity. 
The board also monitors the management, which is usually headed by the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), and how the management discharge their responsibility as the agent in the 
contractual relationship with the shareholders. There is an ongoing debate in the corporate 
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governance literature over the negative impact of the duality issue of the CEO and chairman 
of the board. Fama and Jensen (1983) were amongst the earliest to argue that the CEO- 
chairman duality could result in a concentration of power, leading the board to be influenced 
by a single person. In such circumstances, they asserted that the board could be deprived of 
an effective monitoring role over the management of the corporation.  
 
Recent research on bank governance, for example, Adams and Mehran (2008) and Andress 
and Vallelado (2008), advocates a large size of board of directors for banks. This 
presupposition was made after it was found that board size is positively associated with bank 
performance, which implies that a bigger board would allow for efficient monitoring and 
advising of managers, thereby creating value for shareholders. However, the finding of 
Andress and Vallelado (2008) also recommends exercising caution on the size of the board, 
suggesting it should not to be oversized and should be limited to 19 directors, after which an 
increase in the number of directors would diminish the bank‟s performance. More 
specifically, this result was obtained after controlling for several factors including the 
regulatory and institutional setting amongst the sample data used on banks from developed 
countries. Hence, the possibility that regulation and supervision differences among the 
countries studied would influence the results was addressed and it was concluded that a „one-
size-fits-all board‟ is implausible for banking corporations. Additionally, the finding 
regarding the drawbacks of an oversized board implies that disputes amongst the directors are 
likely to occur, as the authors suggest that coordination and communication difficulties are 
likely to arise within a bigger board.   
 
Importantly, the board has to be independent to be effective in mitigating the opportunistic 
behaviour of the management (Fama and Jensen 1983). One way to promote independence is 
by maintaining an optimal balance between the inside and outside directors (Rutherford et al. 
2007). Indeed, studies also indicate that the monitoring role of the outside directors is crucial, 
as without them, the inside executive directors are likely to manipulate their position in 
fulfilling their own self-interests (Morck et al. 1988). In the corporate governance of bank 
literature, Andress and Vallelado (2008) recommend the composition of the board be 
balanced between insiders and outsiders. Again, they found that directorships among 
outsiders in banks are positively associated with bank performance, but however, reach a 
peak after which performance is reduced if more outsiders are included in the board.  Hence, 
although the presence of non-executive directors is meant to enhance the governance of the 
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bank, the finding indicates that the effectiveness and efficiency of the board to execute 
control over management does not necessarily depend on the board being overloaded with 
outsiders. Apart from the right balance of the directorship, a study by Adams and Mehran 
(2008) also shed light on how outsiders‟ association with the bank could affect others‟ 
interpretation of the outsiders‟ performance. They pointed out that outsiders‟ lending 
relationship with their bank could jeopardise the directors‟ true independence and, thus, raises 
the concern of whether, under such circumstances, the outsiders would really perform in the 
best interests of either the shareholders or the stakeholders. Additionally, Adams and Mehran 
(2008) showed evidence of how the diverse directorships the board members hold could 
hinder effective corporate governance of the board. Factors such as the external directorship 
of the insiders and outsiders as well as interlocks amongst the bank‟s CEO or the board‟s 
chairman were found to be significantly negatively associated with the bank‟s performance.  
 
Meanwhile, Prowse (1997) discussed the influence of regulatory intervention on the 
effectiveness of the governance mechanism of the board. He asserted that regulators have 
imposed certain restrictions on the operation of banks which consequently deflate the 
market‟s role in disciplining bank managers. One of the apparent regulatory restrictions 
discussed by the author is the likelihood of hostile takeovers amongst banks, which is deemed 
common in non-financial institutions. While such a restriction could be seen as an escape for 
the management from the likelihood of a management turnover threat, and, as a result would 
arguably escalate the agency problem discussed earlier, Prowse (1997) believes that, in such 
circumstances, regulators have taken over the role of the board by becoming the primary tool 
in disciplining the management. However, recent studies have challenged suggestions that 
regulation is a substitute for the firm‟s governance mechanism as suggested by Prowse 
(1997). For example, Hagendorff et al. (2010) studied the interaction of board monitoring 
with bank regulation amongst 204 US and European bidding banks in a merger and 
acquisition setting. Three board monitoring mechanisms were tested: board independence; 
board diversity (which includes occupational, age, tenure and expertise diversity), and CEO 
and chairman duality, in different regulatory regimes. Board independence and board 
diversity were found to be associated with higher bidder announcements in a strict regulatory 
regime (in the US and the UK), but they were irrelevant in a less strict regulatory 
environment (other European countries). These results led Hagendorff et al. (2010) to 
conclude that there exists a complementary relationship between regulation and some 
governance mechanisms (in this case, the board‟s monitoring role).  
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Meanwhile, Cornett et al. (2009) give insights into the impact of the corporate governance 
mechanism and the opportunistic behaviour of the management. Specifically, their study 
examines the relationship between board independence and CEO payment incentives and the 
effect on earnings and earnings management of 46 of the largest bank holding companies that 
had head-quarters in the US in the period 1994 to 2002. The results of their study reveal that 
an independent board is associated with loan losses and fewer recorded securities gains; 
hence, an independent board constrains earnings management. In addition, they found 
evidence that when the CEO payment incentive is high, managers record fewer loan loss 
provisions and more securities gains; hence, CEO payment incentives lead to earnings 
management. Accordingly, Cornett et al. (2009) suggest that any attempt to structure the 
corporate governance of banks should consider the collective effect on the action of the 
management of all the corporate governance mechanisms employed.  
 
 
2.3.2 Issues Surrounding the Ownership of Banks 
Several studies, such as Prowse (1997), Caprio et al. (2007), Leaven and Levine (2009) and 
Barry et al. (2011), discuss how the ownership structure of banks affects certain governance 
mechanisms of banks. Prowse (1997), in his empirical study on the determinants of the form 
of control change in US banks, found evidence that banks which encounter regulatory 
intervention exhibit poor bank performance and lower equity stakes of large shareholders. He 
argued that regulatory intervention has repercussions that result in the board being less 
motivated to impose disciplinary action on the management due to low directors‟ ownership. 
This finding, which measured ownership concentration based on shareholding of more than 
five percent from the total outstanding shares, lends support to the view that ownership 
concentration is associated with the monitoring incentives of the management and that the 
bank‟s board tends to be represented by large equity shareholders to ensure the bank‟s high 
performance. Alternatively, this evidence suggests that the banking industry could be 
deprived of an important governance mechanism that would reduce the agency problem in 
banks through the monitoring role played by large equity holders. It is worth noting that the 
significance of the large shareholders in exerting effective corporate governance through 
efforts such as pressuring or even removing management using their voting rights is also 
evident in the literature for non-financial firms (for example Shleifer and Vishny 1986). 
Notwithstanding regulators‟ policy in discouraging large equity stakes by shareholders in 
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banks, as indicated by Prowse (1997), an analysis of 244 banks across 44 countries by Caprio 
et al. (2007), who used a stricter percentage of ownership control through the selection of at 
least 10 percent shareholders‟ voting rights, revealed that most publicly listed banks are 
concentrated and display a pattern of family-controlled ownership. Furthermore, in 
circumstances where the controlling owner holds greater cash-flow rights and where banks 
are operated in countries with only weak legal protection of shareholders, they found that 
concentrated ownership would increase the valuation of banks. Evidence provided by Caprio 
et al. (2007) implied the „survival‟ of large equity shareholders, despite banks‟ highly 
regulated business environment, and simultaneously demonstrated its‟ potential role in the 
governance of banks.  
 
On the other hand, Laeven and Levine (2009) provide an analysis of how a bank‟s ownership 
structure would influence shareholders‟ risk taking in the bank. Their findings revealed that 
large shareholders with high voting and cash-flow rights would be more inclined to indulge in 
higher risk taking than would debt holders and non-shareholders managers, although, in the 
short run, the ownership structure does not explain the fluctuation in bank risk. The 
perturbing implication is that large shareholders in the banking industry would use their 
control rights for their private benefit. For non-financial firms, Morck et al. (1988) found 
evidence that the firm‟s performance increases with an increase in ownership, after which it 
falls, as an increase in ownership implies that large shareholders play a significant role in 
reducing the agency problem but there is the concern that too much control in their hands 
could generate a hazardous impact due to the misallocation of benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Nevertheless, Laeven and Levine (2009) and Caprio et al. (2007) 
share the same conclusion with evidence derived from studies of non-financial firms (for 
example Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 2002b) in which a law that provides 
effective protection for shareholders would mitigate large shareholders‟ consumption of risk, 
thereby serving as legal protection for small shareholders. Although it is noted that a large 
stake of shares in the banking sector could be hampered by the presence of regulators where 
regulatory intervention is deemed to be common in banks, as indicated by Prowse (1997), the 
existence of shareholders‟ legal protection is seen as a possible governance mechanism 
solution that could curb the risk-taking behaviour of the (large) shareholders.   
 
More recently, Barry et al. (2011) studied the association between the different levels of risk 
and profitability in privately owned and publicly held European commercial banks with five 
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different ownership structures of banks: managers or directors, institutional investors, non-
financial companies, individuals or families, and banks. Their findings revealed that different 
ownership structures demonstrate different risk-taking incentives, though this is true only for 
privately owned banks. For example, their findings indicated that ownership in the form of 
individuals, families, or banking institutions leads to a decrease in asset risk and default risk 
but no change in profitability. Meanwhile, both the institutional investor and non-financial 
companies indicated similar risk-return objectives, as their ownership does not result in 
changes in risk and profitability. They also observed that a higher level of involvement 
amongst individuals or families in countries which exhibit low shareholder protection law 
leads to lower risk-taking behaviour. For publicly held banks, Barry et al. (2011) indicated 
that market forces, such as minimum capital requirement, regulator supervision and 
disclosure requirement, imposed by Basel II
4
 could result in constraint and so mitigate the 
risk-taking behaviour of the owner. This is because the ownership structure changes were 
revealed as not affecting the risk taking of the owners.      
 
 
2.3.3 Issues Surrounding the Regulation in Banks 
Generally, the intervention of external forces, called regulators, affects all sectors of the 
economy. As noted earlier, the specificities of the banking business result in characteristics 
unique to the industry, in which the opaque nature of the banking business is likely to present 
financial dealings and financial positions considered observable by the management but not 
observable to the shareholders or investors. Because investors are risking their wealth when 
consuming financial instruments from the bank, regulators usually intervene by imposing 
enforcement, requiring banks to provide adequate information so that investors make 
informed decisions. Moreover, the common notion found in the literature is that a bank‟s 
business performance has a significant impact in the form of either stability or otherwise, in 
the event of a bank‟s failure, the downfall of the economy, lending support for the claim 
regarding regulators‟ pursuit of public interest (Ciancanelli and Gonzalez 2001; Levine 
2004). The regulation imposed on banks could see the intervention of government authorities, 
such as the central bank and other monetary or financial agencies. Meanwhile, in the 
international setting, global coordination efforts on banking have seen institutions such as the 
Bank for International Settlement, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
                                                 
4
 More discussion on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Basel II is provided in Section 2.4.2. 
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Basel Committee and the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation Development (OECD), 
which promote certain benchmarks on banking business practices, playing an important role. 
In either a domestic or an international setting, regulation efforts, such as the issuance of 
prudential standards and guidelines, and their importance in forcing banking institutions to 
implement and comply with them, signify the vital role played by the regulators in the 
industry. Among other instruments imposed or roles performed by the regulators in the 
banking system are the market restrictions on banking and financial activities, acting as a 
lender of last resort, offering a platform for deposit insurance, developing financial policies, 
and so on. However, the literature presents arguments both in favour and critical of the 
intervention of regulators in banks, as will be discussed below.  
 
2.3.3.1 The Positive Impact of Regulation on the Corporate Governance of Banks 
Arguably, one solution to the agency problem specifically relating to information asymmetry 
in the banking business works best with the intervention of external forces called regulators. 
As discussed in the preceding sections, there appears to be a multiple-contractual relationship 
between the shareholders, managers, depositors, borrowers and regulators. Hence, it could be 
argued that the information privilege the management holds would be likely to affect more 
contractual parties than would be affected in non-financial corporations.  Several scholars are 
of the opinion that the information asymmetry problem coupled with the possibility of 
negative externalities that banks could produce, such as the contagion effect resulting from 
bank failures, requires outside forces to intervene on the grounds of economic stability and 
public welfare (Ciancanelli and Gonzalez 2001; Levine 2004). In order to achieve these aims, 
the regulators produce rules or ordinances, thus, simultaneously exhibiting the monitoring 
role of the regulators and that of the shareholders in controlling the management. In such a 
manner, the involvement of regulators in monitoring the agents could be viewed as a 
mechanism to control the misconduct or moral hazard behaviour of the agents. In addition, 
the implication of the regulators‟ intervention would be for the management to fulfil the 
interests of two parties, namely, the shareholders and the regulators, through the set of 
regulations applied to them.  
 
Another important function of the regulators in the banking business is the role they play in 
controlling systemic risk. Systemic risk is the risk that could causes the contagion effect that 
spreads to the entire financial system, resulting in bank runs by depositors and possible 
  
24 
 
macroeconomic implications, such as the collapse of the banking system and government 
monetary policy (Heffernan 2006). In such circumstances, regulators are said to have the 
upper hand in comparison with other parties on undertaking measurements including control 
over banks‟ new entries, takeovers and acquisitions (Macey and O'Hara 2003). Additionally, 
such an effort could be seen as a mechanism to control another potential moral hazard in the 
banking system by means of the market concentration of certain groups that have the 
potential to dominate the financial system. Evidence indicates that the power of the insiders 
to expropriate bank resources could be limited through a restriction on the range of activities 
in which banks participate (Boyd et al. 1998). There is also a view that regulation through 
efforts such as the enforcement of financial policies could serve as the „last resort‟ in 
disciplining the management, since a market instrument that results in corporate control 
change fails to improve banks‟ poor performance (Prowse 1997, p. 515). Ciancanelli and 
Gonzalez (2001) are of the opinion that the best mechanisms imposed by the regulators to 
reduce or control the systemic risk of banks are via the lender of last resort and deposit 
insurance. They argue that the regulators‟ arrival on the banking scene and their concern 
about the soundness of the banking system through control of the market has offered the 
shareholders relief from having to bear the total risk of their investment. 
 
To sum up, the range of the regulators‟ intervention in the banking industry varies and has 
different objectives. They could cover an impediment on bank ownership concentration 
through the requirement of regulatory approval as on the substantial purchase of banks‟ 
shares, a measurement seen to hinder the banks‟ control of power over the economy. 
Regulators could also limit banks‟ operation and investing activities, such as the hostile 
takeovers of banks and having ownership in nonbank firms, to limit the competition in banks. 
There are also common financial regulations by the regulators in the financial and banking 
industry, such as the mechanism of capital adequacy, liquidity requirements, control of 
interest rates and fees, obstructing a bank from engaging in non-lending activities and 
underwriting its equity to ensure stability in the banking business. Clearly, the regulators, 
through their intervention, have affected this industry in two ways: (1) the banking operations 
are being administered, and (2) intervention has limited the market competition that normally 
exists in non-financial corporations.  
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2.3.3.2 The Adverse Impact of Regulation on the Corporate Governance of Banks 
Despite the supportive enforcement brought by the regulators, the literature also indicates that 
some of the instruments imposed by the regulators in the banking system appear to represent 
a drawback to the industry itself. Although it is acknowledged that the barrier on market 
concentration has been made through the intervention of the regulators by a market control 
mechanism, and in some instances, by government ownership of banks, it also gives rise to 
difficulties associated with the loss of market discipline on managers (Prowse 1997; 
Ciancanelli and Gonzalez 2001; La Porta et al. 2002; Macey and O'Hara 2003; Barth et al. 
2004; Andres and Vallelado 2008). The requirement for market discipline is specific to the 
following banking operations: excessive risk-taking, such as results from demands for higher 
returns and the threat of deposit withdrawal by depositors (Berger 1991; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga 1999); or the deemed increase of the cost of funding due to a demand for higher 
yields by debt holders; or even shareholders threatening to sell their shares, which would lead 
to a reduction in share prices (Berger 1991). These are now being presented to the 
government as a consequence of its intervention through the regulations imposed on the 
industry. Hence, these findings indicate that the regulators‟ presence on the banking scene 
has set limits on the power of the market to discipline banks. 
  
Another area of controversy regarding government intervention in banks relates to the issue 
of deposit insurance. Government initiatives to insure deposits, although effective in 
preventing bank runs, have been the subject of criticism of the adverse impact their loop hole 
has on the governance of banks. Macey and O‟Hara (2003) and Prowse (1997), for example, 
explain that deposit insurance fosters a moral hazard through the risk taking of the 
shareholders at the expense of the deposit insurance fund and the taxpayers that replenish the 
fund, while another recent empirical finding by Laeven and Levine (2008) reveals that the 
risk taking behaviour created by deposit insurance is associated only with that of large equity 
holders.  
 
Meanwhile, government ownership in banks, besides contributing to the loss of market 
discipline of bank managers, also institutes another setback associated with the supervision of 
banks. Initially, the government is positioned amongst the stakeholders who all share 
incentives to control managers. However, when a stakeholder, i.e., a regulator, becomes a 
shareholder in the bank, there arises a conflict that casts doubt on the efficiency of the 
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supervision (La Porta et al. 2002). The foreseen weakness in the supervision, coupled with 
the increased information asymmetry as a result of the regulators‟ intervention in the banking 
system, would trigger questions about the realization of the regulators‟ role in curbing the 
moral hazard in the banking business (Ciancanelli and Gonzalez 2001). A further confusion 
that deepens the supervision crisis of the regulators is one such as that found by Boot and 
Thakor (1993), where regulators also indulge in activities that pursue their own interests. 
Studies have indicated the dilemma has given rise to a new agency problem and has become 
an opportunity cost to public welfare. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) asserted that 
governments, instead of maximizing the social welfare, make regulations that maximize their 
own welfare. Meanwhile, Rajan and Zingales (2003) discussed how political power might 
influence the credit flow of banks, as well as bankers capturing politician to serve the 
interests of banks. Later, Barth et al. (2004) found that the more extensive the power held by 
the regulators, the more likely it is that it will increase the national levels of corruption and 
become negatively associated with overall levels of bank development.  
 
Based on the above arguments, and because the existence of powerful regulators (i.e., the 
existence of regulators as shareholders) might jeopardise the regulators‟ independence in 
their monitoring capacity, there have been studies such as that by Levine (2004) to express 
the need to reduce the political interference and increase the installation of independent 
monitoring and supervision of banks through an autonomous regulation, such as in the private 
empowerment of a regulatory agency. Several studies have found a positive correlation 
between private regulatory agency mechanisms and effective corporate governance. For 
example, Barth et al. (2004) found that enforcement through the disclosure of information 
and subsequent penalties are associated with banks‟ efficiency. Similarly, Beck et al. (2006) 
revealed that the private empowerment of banks through the enforcement of accurate 
information disclosure reduces corrupt ties with bank officials on credit applications. 
Meanwhile, Nier and Baumann (2006) offer insights on the influence of market discipline, 
disclosure and the risk-taking behaviour of banks. Using a cross-country panel data set from 
1993 till 2000 that includes banks from 32 countries, their findings indicate that uninsured 
liabilities and greater information disclosure induce banks to hold larger capital buffers, but 
the effect of this is weakened by an extensive government safety net. Interbank competition 
was also revealed to increase the risk-taking behaviour of banks, with market discipline 
indicated as being more effective in controlling such incentives in countries where there is 
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strong interbank competition. Hence, the findings derived from Nier and Baumann (2006) 
seem to call for increased disclosure combined with a low government safety net and greater 
interbank competition. More recently, Pasiouras et al. (2009) studied the impact of the 
regulatory environment on the cost and profit efficiencies of banks. Specifically, they 
examined Basel II requirements on minimum capital, supervisory authority and market 
discipline mechanisms. Their findings indicate that greater supervisory power and the 
requirement for disclosures and incentives that enhance market discipline influence a bank‟s 
cost and profit efficiency. Stricter capital requirement has been indicated as resulting in 
positive cost efficiency but negative profit efficiency. Meanwhile, restrictions on bank 
activities have a negative effect on cost efficiency but a positive effect on profit efficiency. In 
addition, Pasiouras et al.‟s (2009) findings suggest that market discipline is associated with 
accurate and timely disclosure and accordingly helps private agents to monitor banks 
effectively. On the other hand, a powerful supervisor could set out the conditions for the 
enforcement of an accurate and timely disclosure for use by private agents in monitoring 
banks and, hence, enhance market discipline. However, increased disclosure requirements for 
banks have also been associated with inefficiencies. Duarte et al. (2008) revealed that such 
requirements resulted in additional costs for additional disclosures, maintaining investor 
relations departments, costs relating to time and effort in preparing formal disclosure 
documents, and the release of sensitive information to competitors. 
  
 
2.4 International Regulatory Bodies 
As stated earlier, the regulation of banks also takes place at the global level through the 
establishment of international standard setting bodies. These international regulatory bodies 
carry the responsibility for overseeing and promoting sound practices as well as introducing 
regulation through prudential standards for implementation in banks. Their significance could 
be judged from the need to ensure financial stability in the international financial system 
which otherwise could see potential contagion effect in the case of the failure of financial 
institutions, leading to a possible global economic crisis. In addition, these international 
regulatory bodies serve as a platform for international coordination and integration among 
supervisory authorities to arrive at agreement especially when considering the liberalization 
of a globalized financial system which witnesses the penetration of banks into other 
countries, such as the setting up of offshore branches or subsidiaries. Hence, this section 
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discusses the role of international regulatory bodies that have a significant role in the 
governance of banks. 
 
2.4.1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), established in 
1961, is the international organisation concerned primarily with economic growth and 
financial stability to help its member countries whilst it develops and oversees the strategic 
orientation of global relations through the establishment of OECD‟s Centre for Co-operation 
with Non-Members. OECD has been actively engaged in promoting the corporate governance 
agenda, as can be seen from the joint effort with other regulatory bodies on the establishment 
of global corporate governance forums and regional roundtables that promote an effective 
and continuing dialogue on the subject. Additionally, OECD has produced prudential 
standards to assist the governments of member and non-member countries to evaluate the 
legal, institutional and regulatory framework in developing and promoting good corporate 
governance in their respective countries. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
which was first released in May 1999 and later revised in 2004, is one example of such an 
effort; it has gained worldwide recognition as an international benchmark for sound corporate 
governance. The standards outlined in this governance framework recommendation have 
been used by governments, regulators, investors, corporations and stakeholders and have 
been adopted by the Financial Stability Forum as one of the Twelve Key Standards for Sound 
Financial Systems.  
 
Apparently, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance offers general principles of 
corporate governance for all corporations. Since the banking business entails unique features, 
as described earlier, guidelines on corporate governance for banking institutions require 
modifications that best suit the specificities of the industry. In this regard, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision published guidance about governance in 1999 entitled 
„Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organisations‟, which was later revised in 
2006 to assist banking supervisors in promoting the adoption of sound corporate governance 
practices by banking organisations in their countries. Interestingly, this guidance is drawn 
from the principles of corporate governance that were published by the OECD.   
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2.4.2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  
Another significant governance effort in the arena of banking is the prescriptive, regulatory 
approach and rule-based capital adequacy provision of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS). BCBS is the committee of Bank for International Settlements, an 
international organization that promotes financial and monetary cooperation and acts as a 
bank for the central banks. BCBS, created in 1974, serves as the forum to discuss banking 
supervisory matters amongst its membership countries, consisting of Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.
5
 It is 
actively engaged in producing prudential standards and guidelines on effective banking 
supervision, though they are broad and advisory in nature, for implementation 
recommendation and to be suited as deemed appropriate amongst its member countries as 
well as for supervisory authorities that are not directly participating. Primarily, the work of 
BCBS is executed through its four subcommittees: the Standards Implementation Group, the 
Policy Development Group, the Accounting Task Force, and the Basel Consultative Group.  
 
In 1988, BCBS introduced the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards or what is commonly known as the Basel Capital Accord, a capital 
measurement system that provided the implementation of a credit risk measurement 
framework with a minimum capital standard of 8% by the end of 1992. Later, in June 2004, a 
revised framework to the Basel Capital Accord, Basel II, was published as a guideline that 
shifted from sole reliance on the capital adequacy ratio to an approach that ensures bank 
solvency based on its „three pillars‟ concept. While emphasis on the minimum capital ratio 
remains, it is now calculated for credit risk through “risk bucketing” approaches and serves as 
the first pillar. Meanwhile, the second pillar deals with supervisory review of banks‟ risk 
management systems and requires that major banks adopt comprehensive internal economic 
capital models, whereas the third pillar focuses on the enhancement of market discipline 
through improved disclosure standards and practices. Figure 2.1 below illustrates the three 
pillars encompassing Basel II. 
 
                                                 
5
 These are the membership countries as at 15
th
 of September 2011.  
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Figure 2.1: The Three Pillars of Basel II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The work on Basel II has been continuously revised and, following the recent global 
economic crisis, BCBS has striven to incorporate more rigorous measures to enhance the 
three pillars detailed in the Basel II framework issued previously in 2004.
6
 In response to the 
recent global financial crisis, the BCBS introduced Basel III in December 2010. While Basel 
III does not supplant the basic three pillars in Basel II, it does include a series of amendments 
to the latter. Basel III now requires banks to hold 4.5% of common equity (an increase from 
the existing 2% requirement in Basel II) and 6% of Tier 1 capital (an increase from the 
existing 4% requirement in Basel II) while the remaining ratio of total capital of 8% required 
in Basel II stays unchanged. In addition, Basel III introduces additional capital buffers: (1) a 
mandatory capital conservation buffer made up of common equity and amounting to 2.5%, 
and (2) a discretionary countercyclical buffer which allows regulators to require up to another 
2.5% of capital made up of common equity during periods of high credit growth. Other 
changes imposed by Basel III include a minimum of 3% leverage ratio and two required 
liquidity ratios: (1) the liquidity coverage ratio, which requires a bank to hold sufficient high 
quality liquid assets to cover its total net cash flow over a 30-day stress period, and (2) the net 
stable funding ratio, which requires a bank to have stable funding to address funding needs 
over a stressed one-year period. Some aspects of Basel III are scheduled to be implemented 
by January 2013 while others will be phased in over several years.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 For the latest list of works by BCBS please refer to http://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/tid_22/index.htm.  
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2.4.3 International Accounting Standards Board 
In 1973, the International Standards Committee (IASC) was the first international accounting 
standard setting body to be established following the proposals put forward by the 
Accountants International Study Group‟s (AISG) representatives from Canada, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Mexico. 
Later on, in 2001, it was reorganised into the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) where 41 standards, known as the International Accounting Standards (IASs), 
previously issued by IASC were adopted. These accounting standards have undergone a 
number of changes from having been previously revised, superseded, or merged with other 
standards. Nonetheless, since IASB‟s inception in 2001, these standards have again been 
revised besides the issuance of a new series of standards called the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
 
Various international bodies including the World Bank, the United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the G7 finance ministers, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), the OECD and BCBS have strongly advocated for the adoption of a 
single set of accounting standards to be practised worldwide. Particularly, the accounting 
harmonisation effort on the financial reporting for banks has seen how IASB has been 
collaborating with organisations like BCBS since 1977 and the European Economic 
Community
7
 in the 1980s, who aimed at establishing the European Economic Community 
Bank Accounts Directive.  
 
 
2.5 Summary  
This chapter began with a review of three theories and their repercussions for the subject of 
corporate governance, namely, the agency theory, the transaction cost theory and the 
stakeholder theory. It appears that the principal and the agent are the two key roles that serve 
as the basis of a corporation‟s contractual relationship. However, the accountability spectrum 
of these theories differs from one to another with the stakeholder theory considering 
responsibility to extend beyond that of the shareholders. Despite this difference, agency 
problems, which exert a challenge to sound corporate governance in corporations, are not 
                                                 
7
 The European Economic Community, which was later transformed into European Community when the 
European Union was created in 1993, is described as becoming one of the EU‟s three pillars.  
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exclusive to any of the discussed theoretical explanations or any particular organisation. In 
addition, it has been made clear that the agency problems associated with the banking 
business are intensified due to the opaque nature and the multi-contractual relationships that 
exist within the industry. All in all, there is a need for a governance solution that will monitor 
and control the performance of the management through the establishment of a corporate 
governance mechanism that will ensure that the rights of both the shareholders and the 
stakeholders will be protected.  
 
It is argued that the governance mechanisms for the banking industry are similar to those of 
non-financial firms. Nevertheless, this chapter has drawn attention to the grave implications 
of the systemic risk caused by financial failure, which sees the intervention of an external 
force called regulators. Hence, regulators represent one of the crucial governance 
mechanisms in banks‟ highly regulated business environment, although the literature presents 
both the positive and the adverse impact of regulators‟ intervention in the industry. Also 
discussed was the role of international regulatory bodies of certain international standard 
setting bodies whose continued development in the corporate governance of banks is well 
acknowledged globally, as could be judged from the nationwide acceptance of their 
prudential standards, guidelines, policies and the like.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
33 
 
CHAPTER THREE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF 
ISLAMIC BANKS AND THE MALAYSIAN ISLAMIC 
BANKING BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, there has been a rapid expansion of Islamic banks in Islamic 
countries. The operation of these banks also presents as an example where faith is being 
integrated with banking. Its emergence, alongside the more established conventional interest-
based banking, is meant to serve as an alternative financial system to a segment of society 
whose preference is for financial products and services which are consistent with Islamic 
principles. Moreover, Islamic finance has not only spark the interest of the adherents of Islam 
but is also becoming popular amongst many non-Muslims (Iqbal and Molyneux 2005). 
Currently, the Islamic finance industry is well accepted on the global platform and its 
significance has been mutually acknowledged with organisation like the World Bank 
declaring it a priority area (Parker 2011). Apparently, what is of crucial importance for an 
industry that is relatively young is a robust corporate governance framework that would 
ensure the soundness and stability of the industry by distinctly recognising the specificities of 
the Islamic banking operations.  
 
Essentially, Islamic banks carry out the same functions as a conventional bank, however, they 
have a strict requirement for all their transactions to follow the principles which are laid 
down in Islam (Henry and Wilson 2004; Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007); this means that the 
integrity of the industry, and the confidence of its stakeholders, rests on the adherence to 
Islamic ethics and values which the bank represents. Accordingly, Islamic banks and the 
corporate governance they feature make a presence not by alienating itself within the existing 
financial system but, rather, by being distinctly comprehensive by integrating the regulation 
and requirement imposed by others and with that of Islam. It is for this reason that Islamic 
banks utilise the function of the Shari‟ah board as an additional layer of governance which is 
responsible for ensuring that the Islamic banking operation comply with the requirements of 
Islam and, hence, gaining the confidence of the stakeholders (Briston and El-Ashker 1986; 
  
34 
 
Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 1990b; Karim 1990a; Banaga et al. 1994; Rammal 2006; 
Laldin 2008a).  
 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce the unique features of corporate governance for 
Islamic banks. After the introduction, Section 3.2 provides a brief historical background of 
the Islamic banking industry. Next, in Section 3.3, the topic on corporate governance of 
Islamic banks is discussed by introducing Shari‟ah, mua‟malat (human relation), maqasid al-
Shari‟ah (objectives of the Shari‟ah), the concept of accountability from the Islamic 
perspective, the basic principles on the operation of Islamic banking, the sources and the 
application of funds in Islamic banking operations. Meanwhile, Section 3.4 discusses the 
concept of Shari‟ah compliance in corporate governance of Islamic banks. Since the interest 
of the present study is on the aspect of Shari‟ah governance of the Malaysian Islamic banking 
business, Section 3.5 offers an explanation on the Islamic banking business environment in 
Malaysia. Finally, the last section, i.e. Section 3.6, is a summary.  
 
3.2 Historical Background of Islamic Banks 
The idea for banking on the basis of profit sharing rather than interest has emerged since late 
1940s (Siddiqi 1976). The pioneering effort in bringing Islamic banking principles into 
practice emerged later, in 1963, with the development of the Mit Ghamer Saving Bank and 
the Nasser Social Bank in Egypt. However, the activities of these two banks were attuned to 
collecting small savings and making a direct investment in agricultural and industrial 
activities or to small local businesses; hence, they were more akin to a social bank.  Twelve 
years later, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) inaugurated an inter-governmental 
Islamic bank, known as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), which was established with 
the purpose of fostering economic development and social progress among member countries 
and their Muslim communities in accordance with the principles of Shari‟ah. As the IDB was 
meant to be the financial backbone for the Muslim nations, it had no precedence for the 
procedures and the mode of financing that would be compatible with Shari‟ah because the 
IDB, until 2003, did not have any formal Shari‟ah board to supervise them. It was only in 
1976 that the IDB made its first murabahah (mark-up financing) transactions with the 
government of Algeria.   
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Following the establishment of IDB, many commercial Islamic banks were established 
including: the Dubai Islamic Bank in the United Arab Emirates (1975), Faisal Islamic Bank 
of Sudan (1977), Kuwait Finance House (1977), Jordan Islamic Bank (1979), Dar al-Mal al-
Islami (1981), Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (1983). Islamic banking was then expanded to 
several other countries, including: Turkey, Pakistan and Bangladesh. During this period, the 
expansion that Islamic banks experienced was partly caused by the oil revenue boom which 
was experienced in the Gulf countries (Wilson 1995). Meanwhile, the alliance between 
Shari‟ah scholars and bankers by means of formal appointment of a Shari‟ah board that is 
responsible for looking into the Shari‟ah aspects of Islamic bank activities first occurred in 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt in 1976 (Kahf 2002). This practice was later continued along 
with the development of other Islamic banks and Islamic investment companies as a medium 
to gain the acceptance and legitimacy of investors and depositors (Kahf 2002).  
 
Assisted by the Shari‟ah board, Islamic banking in the modern world generally aims at 
applying the principles of Islamic finance in its financial and banking transactions. This has 
given rise to various Islamic financial contracts that are acceptable and consistent within the 
Shari‟ah precept. At present, Islamic banking practices have been extended beyond the 
boundaries of Muslim countries and currently receive wide acceptance from both Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike (Iqbal and Molyneux 2005). Not surprisingly, the development of 
Islamic finance in Western countries signifies the respective government‟s recognition of the 
industry as a business opportunity (Wilson 2011).  
 
3.3 Corporate Governance of Islamic Banks 
The importance of best practice as a governance mechanism (such as has been discussed for 
corporate governance of banks in Chapter Two) is equally relevant when discussing its 
application for the Islamic banking industry. Nonetheless, the corporate governance of 
Islamic banks features characteristics which are unique to the specificities of the Islamic 
banking operation. At this point, it is appropriate to provide a brief introduction to aspects of 
the Shari‟ah, which will be the subject of discussion in the next section.  
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3.3.1 Shari’ah 
Islam as a monotheistic religion which typifies submission, surrender, obedience, as well as 
peace (Al-Faruqi 1982). The Islamic law, or Shari‟ah, is a divinely revealed law which 
encompasses an all comprehensive and all embracing system that serves as the blueprint for 
human conduct. The adherents of Islam, called a Muslim, express his tawheed by submitting 
that there is no God except Allah and that the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) is His messenger 
(Bilal 1994). In the Shari‟ah, both the Qur‟an and the Sunnah (the traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad s.a.w.) serve as the ultimate, or primary, sources of the divine law, which are 
basically textual in character. Meanwhile, ijtihad, or legal reasoning, is the interpretation of 
the Shari‟ah by the Muslim jurists who formulate a rule of law on the basis of evidence found 
from its ultimate sources, i.e. the Qur‟an and the Sunnah. Because the incidents of human 
daily life are unlimited, judgment on matters that are considered as furu‟ (branch cases) and 
not specified in the Qur‟an and Sunnah are derived through legal reasoning that is based on 
the spirit of wisdom and justice in Islam. Accordingly, this gives rise to the importance of 
subsidiary sources for ijtihad as the secondary divine Islamic knowledge in the development 
of Islamic legal theory. These secondary sources of the Shari‟ah include: qiyas (analogical 
reasoning), istihsan (juristic preference), maslahah mursalah (unrestricted public interest), 
and „urf (customary practice). 
 
The end result of the interpretation process is known as fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, and 
how both the Shari‟ah and fiqh are appreciated can be derived from the words of Faruki 
(1962) cited in Bakar (2008b, p. 28) who asserted that „the difference between Shari‟ah and 
fiqh is between the divine law as it is and the divine law as human beings understand it‟. Usul 
al-fiqh or the Islamic legal theory, on the other hand, is the study of sources and principles 
upon which Islamic jurisprudence is based. Hence, usul al-fiqh is the methodology of Islamic 
jurisprudence whose aim is to provide a legitimate basis and proof for the Islamic legal 
rulings. These Islamic legal rulings can be assigned into one of the five main categories, 
which are: wajib (obligatory), sunnah (recommended), haram (prohibited), makruh 
(disapproved), and harus (permissible). Later, in the middle of the eight century, several 
Islamic legal schools, called madzahib
8
, evolved. These legal schools basically correspond to 
the differences in conducting Islamic jurisprudence; however, they usually make decisions 
based on those matters which are considered as the details and not the principles of the 
                                                 
8
 Madzahib is the Arabic plural for madzhab. 
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Shari‟ah application (Kamali 2008). Importantly, these differences, which are called khilaf, 
arise not because of disputes against the divine sources of Islamic knowledge but rather 
because of differences in the interpretation of the Qur‟an and the Sunnah on the basis of local 
customary law. Named after the founding scholars, the surviving madzahib are the Hanafi, 
Maliki, Shafi‟i and Hanbali. Since ijtihad is an important tool in formulating the fiqh, khilaf 
or differences among the Shari‟ah scholars seems inevitable. Khilaf occurs in many spheres 
of the Shari‟ah, including mua‟malat which is the subject of discussion in the next section.  
 
3.3.2 Mua’malat (Human Relations) 
The Qur‟an, the divine source of Islamic knowledge, was gradually revealed to Prophet 
Muhammad (s.a.w.) with attention first given on the aspect of aqidah (belief) which was then 
followed by the expositions of two broad sets of rules: ibadat (i.e. worship), and mua‟malat 
(i.e. human relations) (Kamali 2003, p. 20). The general Shari‟ah principles of the rulings of 
ibadat are that anything which is not validated by the Shari‟ah is taken as prohibited, whereas 
the opposite is true for mua‟malat in which everything is permitted except those explicitly 
forbidden by the Shari‟ah. The exercise of ijtihad (legal reasoning) in coming out with the 
Shari‟ah ruling on mua‟malat, which constitute the fiqh al-mua‟malat, has a great deal of 
significance in Islam.
9
 This is given the fact that the divine revealed knowledge (i.e. the 
Qur‟an and the Sunnah) are finite in text while the incidents of human life are indefinite in 
nature (as has been explained in the preceding section). However, the process for arriving at a 
new ruling requires an understanding of the effective cause (illah) and rationale (hikmah) of 
the original rulings and consideration of maslahah (benefits) on different changed 
circumstances (Kamali 2000, p. 78).    
 
The use of ijtihad in the development of the contemporary Islamic banking and finance has 
been significantly acknowledged. Kamali (2000, pp. 69-70), for example, explained the basic 
rules for which the present Islamic financial product, such as futures and option should be 
founded is that all Islamic commercial laws should be accepted on the basis of permissibility 
                                                 
9
 The terms mua‟malat and fiqh al-mua‟malat encompass a wide range of human relationship issues and the 
respective Shari‟ah rulings concerning these issues. For the purpose of this thesis, the terms mua‟malat and fiqh 
al-mua‟malat are confined to matters concerning commercial issues and Islamic commercial law respectively.   
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(ibahah) as long as they are not in contradiction to the principles of Shari‟ah.10 This rule 
provides the Islamic economic system with the ijtihad facility in meeting the financial needs 
of the Muslims in the modern world while remaining within the boundaries of the Shari‟ah. 
Meanwhile, Ahmed (2006) observed that, as a result of Shari‟ah board‟s exercise of ijtihad, 
the classical financial contract found in the Shari‟ah (example of these financial contracts will 
be explained in Section 3.3.5.5 and 3.3.5.6) has been revamped, leading to the emergence of 
contemporary Islamic financial contracts whose nature can be explained by one of the 
following three categories: a classical contract with contemporary application; a hybrid of 
multiple classical contract resulting in new financial contract; and, a conventional product 
which has been made Shari‟ah-compliant by removing its non-Shari‟ah component.  
 
Due to its importance (such as described above), ijtihad is believed to be a dynamic tool in 
the development of Islamic banking and finance. However, concern has also been raised over 
a liberal approach in undertaking ijtihad as having the potential of ruining the integrity and 
viability of the Islamic financial system (Bakar 2008b, pp. 39-42). In this regard, the exercise 
of ijtihad is believed to have a strong connotation with the maqasid al-Shari‟ah, a topic 
which will be presented in the next section.  
 
3.3.3 Maqasid al- Shari’ah (Objectives of the Shari’ah) 
Maqasid al-Shari‟ah, which literally means the objectives of Shari‟ah, has had significant 
development in the formulation of its theory by al-Ghazali and later by al-Shatibi (Kamali 
2008, p. 124). Al-Shatibi in his work Al-Muwafaqat fi Usul al-Shari‟ah (The Congruences of 
the Sources of the Divine Law) has singled out maslahah (benefits) as the overriding overall 
maqasid al-Shari‟ah (Kamali 2008, p. 32), a concept achieved by promoting essentials 
(daruriyyat), complementary requirements (hajiyyat), and desirables (tahsiniyyat). 
Meanwhile, the objectives pursued by the Shari‟ah have been given a more precise 
clarification by Al-Ghazali as: faith; life; intellect; lineage; and, property. However, there is 
evolving evidence amongst the Shari‟ah scholars as to other objectives which extends this 
existing list (Kamali 2008, pp. 124-126).  
 
                                                 
10
 Further discussion on the Shari‟ah concepts applied in developing contemporary products such as Islamic 
futures and options can be found, for example, in Hassan, M. K. and Lewis, M. K. 2007. Handbook of Islamic 
banking. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
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The concept of maqasid al-Shari‟ah (objectives of the Shari‟ah) has been applied in the 
context of Islamic economic system and the operation of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) 
in various dimensions. Siddiqi (2004), for example, asserts that the overall aim of the Islamic 
economic system is the realization of maqasid al-Shari‟ah, which can be accomplished by 
allowing growth and justice. This is further supported by Kahf (2006) who asserted that the 
implications behind the maqasid al-Shari‟ah on the prohibition of riba11 in the Islamic 
financial system is to enable growth and to ensure that the transaction meets the objectives of 
what it is meant for.  
 
On the other hand, Dusuki and Abozaid (2007) have analysed the challenges of the use of 
daruriyyat (essentials) in Islamic financial products. Indeed, daruriyyat as the underlying 
principle on the theory of maslahah (benefits), and its use in authorising Islamic financial 
products such as bay‟ al-‟inah, has recently emerged as a delicate and controversial issue. It 
is worth noting that the general rule on the principal of daruriyyat is that dire necessity, or 
darurrah in Arabic, could lead to exceptions of things established as unlawful in the Shari‟ah, 
which would then become unlawful again as the necessity ceases (Laldin 2006). Delicate as it 
is, Dusuki and Abozaid (2007) observed that failure to understand the concept of maslahah, 
and its inappropriate use in justifying daruriyyat, could lead to the authorisation of Islamic 
financial products whose form is Islamically permissible but whose substance is highly 
questionable because the economic outcome is tantamount to riba.  
 
More recently, Ahmed (2011) used maqasid al-Shari‟ah to develop a framework for 
classifying Islamic financial products. Asserting that maqasid al-Shari‟ah is implied in the 
legal and social requirements, Ahmed  ascertained the former using an analysis of the form 
and substance of an Islamic financial product and using the principle of maslahah in defining 
the latter into survival (daruriyyat), security (hajiyyat), and growth (tahsiniyyat) in three 
different market segments. Using this framework of analysis Ahmed  asserts that an Islamic 
financial product whose form is legal but whose substance is questionable because it features 
an economic outcome similar to the practice of riba does not meet the social requirement and 
as such it is classified as a pseudo-Islamic product. Meanwhile, a product which satisfies the 
form and substance requirement but which does not meet the survival and security needs 
                                                 
11
 More discussion on riba is provided in Section 3.3.5.1. 
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adequately is classified as a Shari‟ah-compliant product. A Shari‟ah-based product, on the 
other hand, is an Islamic financial product which meets all legal requirements and satisfies all 
of societies needs (i.e. survival, security and growth).  
 
3.3.4 Accountability from the Islamic Perspective 
Affirming the tawheed concept (submission to the oneness of God) mentioned earlier, 
Muslim leaders and subordinates within an Islamic institution should render themselves as 
the khalifah (i.e. vicegerent) to Allah; thereby, signifying that all their activities are ultimately 
accountable to Allah (Abdul Rahman 1998; Bardai 2002). When the accountability and 
khalifah framework of Islam is translated into the practice of corporations various injunctions 
of the Shari‟ah imply that all concerned parties within the organisation and its operation 
should exercise and promote basic Islamic values, such as: trustworthiness
12
, justice
13
, and 
transparency
14
. Additionally, the Islamic concepts of adalah (social justice) and ihsan 
(beneficence) also provide the rationale for corporations (such as an Islamic bank) to promote 
an ethical and socially oriented method of financing. On the basis of these financing 
principles, some writers have argued that it will be inappropriate for these corporations to aim 
at solely maximisation of profit (see for example Siddiqi 1992a, b; Abdul Rahman 1998). 
What is similarly essential is to endeavour for social optimality (Naqvi 1994; Abdul Rahman 
1998; Iqbal and Mirakhor 2004; Yusof and Amin 2007; Asutay 2008). In fact, IFIs, such as 
Islamic banks, have been accorded a greater corporate social responsibility role, which can 
sometimes exceed the need to generate profits for the various stakeholders (Dusuki 2008). 
 
In light of the above, the accountability spectrum and the fiduciary duty the management of 
an Islamic corporation has to the shareholders and all stakeholders must be attuned to the 
tawheed, adalah and ihsan concepts discussed above. Hence, corporations such as Islamic 
banks should assume the duties and liabilities of fulfilling the aims arising from the legal 
ownership of the shareholders while protecting the interests of other stakeholders. In addition, 
Islamic banks should observe the Islamic ethical values and precepts which are taught in 
                                                 
12
 Based on the Islamic revelation, for example, Qur‟an (8: 27): “O ye who believe! Betray not the trust of God 
and the Apostle, nor misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you.” 
13
 Based on the Islamic revelation, for example, Qur‟an (49: 9): “Then make peace between them with justice, 
and be fair: for Allah loves those who are fair (and just).”   
14
 Based on the Islamic revelation, for example, Qur‟an (2: 282): “O you who believe! When ye deal with each 
other, in transactions involving future obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing. Let a scribe 
write down faithfully as between the parties.” 
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Islam while simultaneously recognising their transcendental accountability to God (Abdul 
Rahman 1998; Abod 2002; Iqbal and Mirakhor 2004). Consequently, all concerned parties 
within an Islamic bank should be pragmatic and conceive the right consciousness on the 
responsibilities and accountabilities in their everyday Islamic banking operation. It is deemed 
that this human-God transcendental paradigm has a significant association with Islamic 
corporations (such as Islamic banks) which leads to the accomplishment of maqasid al-
Shari‟ah (objectives of the Shari‟ah). 
 
Given the ethical objectives of the establishment Islamic banks and the importance of 
stakeholders highlighted in the Islamic accountability framework discussed above, it seems 
appropriate to assert that Islam promotes a stakeholder-centric governing corporation. 
However, what is deemed to a significant difference between the interests and needs of the 
stakeholders of an Islamic bank from those of other corporations is the emphasis the 
stakeholders of an Islamic bank place on it complying to the Islamic Shari‟ah. The Islamic 
banks, in this regard, are expected to face pressure from their stakeholders as they are held 
responsible for ensuring that the activities of Islamic bank are Shari‟ah compliant. The topic 
of Shari‟ah compliance, its significance and the consequences for not complying will be 
discussed further in Section 3.4 below.  
 
3.3.5 The Principles of Islamic Finance  
According to Khan and Mirakhor (1986, p. 36), the Islamic economic system defines a 
complete financial system and prescribes the specific patterns of economic behaviour for all 
individuals within an Islamic way of life. The principles governing the Islamic economic 
system are drawn from the Islamic Shari‟ah and include: risk sharing, individual‟s rights and 
duties, property rights, and the sanctity of contracts (Iqbal 1997; Zaher and Kabir Hassan 
2001). Within this boundary of Islamic Shari‟ah financing lies the intrinsic principle which 
serves as the cornerstone and the nucleus of the Islamic economic system, i.e. the prohibition 
of riba (Iqbal 1997, p. 42). The establishment of Islamic banks represents a hallmark and 
institutionalisation which is a consequence of the realisation of an Islamic financial system. 
With Shari‟ah compliance as the backbone to the Islamic finance system, IFIs such as Islamic 
banks provide the platform for Muslims to engage in their financial dealings based on the 
principles of Islamic financing as has been laid down in the Qur‟an and the Sunnah. Indeed, 
the realisation of an inspired Islamic financial system (such Islamic banks) would protect the 
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interest of all contracting parties and promote social harmony amongst stakeholders (Ahmad 
2000; Warde 2000). These principles are discussed in further detail in the following sections.  
 
3.3.5.1 Prohibition of Receipt and Payment of Riba 
The prohibition on the receipt and payment of riba has been explicitly mentioned in many 
parts of the Qur‟an and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.). For example, God 
says in the Qur‟an “Ye, who believe, fear God and leave up what remains of your demand for 
riba if you are indeed believers. If you do not do it, take a notice of war from God and his 
apostle, but if you turn back, you shall have your principal; deal not unjustly and not be dealt 
with unjustly” (Quran, 2: 278-279). In another verse of the Qur‟an, God says “O, you who 
believe, devour not riba, doubling and redoubling, and keep your duty with Allah, that you 
may be successful” (Qur‟an, 3: 129). Similarly, there are numerous ahadith15 pertaining the 
prohibition and condemnation of riba. For example, there is a hadith recorded on the 
authority of Jabir that the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) cursed the receiver and the payer of 
riba, the one who records it, and the two witnesses to the transaction and said: “They are all 
alike (in sin)”.  
 
In Arabic, riba literally means increase, growth, addition, or rise. From the Shari‟ah 
perspective, the most precise and comprehensive meaning on what constitutes riba could be 
derived from the hadith reported on the authority of Ubadah bin Samith in which the Prophet 
Muhammad (s.a.w.) said: “Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, 
dates for dates and salt for salt, like for like, equal for equal, and hand-to-hand. If the 
commodities differ, then you (may) sell as you wish provided that (the exchange) is hand-to-
hand”. Hence, from the point of view of Islamic legal theory, the hadith introduces two 
elements of riba, which are: deferment in the time of exchange, and different counter values 
in the exchange of two similar ribawi or usurious items (the commodities mentioned in the 
hadith). The Shari‟ah defines riba by virtue of deferment in the time of exchange as riba al-
nasiah, and riba by virtue of excess in terms of the quantity of the counter values as riba al-
fadl. In the light of the hadith mentioned, many Shari‟ah scholars have also agreed that all 
commodities that are used as a medium of exchange are to be treated similarly as ribawi 
                                                 
15
 Ahadith is the Arabic plural for hadith. Meanwhile, hadith is the documented part of the Sunnah or tradition 
of Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.) 
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items. It is against this brief background that transactions involving one or both of the riba 
types mentioned is prohibited in Islam, leaving writers (for example Mirza and Baydoun 
2000; Bakar 2008c) to debate the elements of social injustice and misappropriation of other‟s 
assets as a result of engaging in riba.    
 
Bakar (2008c, pp. 17-18) underlines that for a property to be Islamically lawful to be 
transferred to another, one of the following five conditions specified in the theory of transfer 
of property in Islamic commercial law has to be fulfilled:  
(1) Property earned by one party as a result of individual‟s labour and entrepreneurship or 
natural resources or capital;  
(2) Property whose title has been transferred by its owner as a result of a bilateral 
exchange;  
(3) Property whose title has been transferred by its owner by virtue of remittance of rights 
of others in the owner‟s property;  
(4) Property whose title has been transferred by virtue of donation and grant by the owner 
or donor; and,  
(5) Property transferred following the law of inheritance.  
 
According to Bakar, these conditions set forward the importance for both wealth creation and 
wealth transfer to be present from the point of view of Islamic commercial law. In addition, 
the conditions mentioned also make it significant for the commodity transaction in Islam to 
have the attributes of capital and effort, thus justifying profit derived with risk and liability.   
 
While it has been described above that riba is prohibited, profit resulting from trading 
activity should not be mistakenly confused with the meaning of growth or increase carried by 
the term riba. The permissibility of trade and prohibition of riba have been clearly ordained 
by God when He says that “God has permitted trading and forbidden riba” (Qur‟an, 2: 275). 
Indeed, the Majallah al-Ahkam al-„Adliyyah incorporated the principles associating profit 
with liability (Bakar 2008c, pp. 19-20). Hence, the injunctions of the Shari‟ah and earlier 
Muslim civil law are evidence of the decree for benefits received by one or both contracting 
parties in a particular transaction with some degree of risk and liability to be lawful while 
lending activities without liability commensurate by the lender are considered to be unlawful. 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the Islamic financial contracts found in the literature 
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and available in the market feature both elements (i.e. profit with element of risk, as apparent 
in the case of mudharabah and musharakah in the light of their profit and sharing ratio 
feature). Importantly, this creates a distinction on the concept of „predetermined‟ in finance 
between conventional and the Islamic practice. Based on the explanation given earlier, 
financial contracts in Islam make it evident that it is profit and sharing ratio that is 
predetermined but not the return itself (Ghayad 2008). At this juncture, it is important to 
explain how Islam regards the concept of time value of money generally applied in the book 
of finance, and how this concept is applied in the institutions offering Islamic banking and 
finance in the present day.  
 
It has been explicitly mentioned in the hadith above that deferment in the time of exchange 
constitutes riba. Similarly, it has also been highlighted that Islam permits transactions arising 
from the engagement of capital and effort, and the profit that is derived from it, so long as it 
is justified with risk and liability. After clarifying this it is appropriate to make a distinction 
in that, while capital and effort are both accepted in Islam as a production factor, it is not 
accepted for time (Gambling and Karim 1991; Hamid et al. 1993; Khan 1994). Indeed, the 
acceptance of an increase in price for a deferred payment (such in an Islamic sales contract) is 
permitted because of the existence of the element of risk (Saadallah 1994; El-Gamal 2000). 
This element of risk has also been considered by Shari‟ah scholars in the form of opportunity 
cost arising from the deferment on the receipt of payment, thus justifying a price increase as 
compensation to the traders and financial intermediaries (El-Gamal 2000, p. 34). These 
explanations shed light in justifying the legality of yield earned from both debt financing and 
equity financing offered by Islamic banking and finance operations, which basically feature 
transactions that is legal in its nature and which enjoins profit and loss sharing amongst 
contracting parties.  
 
3.3.5.2 Prohibition of Gharar (Uncertainty) 
Gharar could be briefly described as trading with excessive risk from an unknown factor or 
unpredictable outcome. Some examples of prohibited business transactions stem from the 
concept of gharar or uncertainty includes gambling, the purchase of unborn animals, or sales 
of assets before possession. Clearly, transactions involving gharar are highly risky and could 
lead to undesirable consequences. Hence, it can be understood that the prohibition behind the 
sale before possession is due to the risk that the seller may fail to deliver the object of 
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transaction in the future. However, it is worth mentioning at this stage that the prohibition of 
gharar does not mean that Islamic financial contracts are free from risk and that the element 
of risk is not favoured in Islam. As will be explained later in Sections 3.3.5.5 and 3.3.5.6 
below, the Islamic financial contract mudharabah and musharakah are both based on the 
profit and loss sharing mode of finance, thereby, signifying the risk engagement amongst the 
contracting parties. Indeed, it will be explained later that a forward sale contract called bay‟ 
al-salam features an element of uncertainty but is still regarded as permissible in Islam.  
 
3.3.5.3 Zakat 
Zakat is a term derived from the Arabic zaka, meaning „pure‟, and it is an Islamic tax. As one 
of the five basic tenets of Islam, zakat is a compulsory levy and a mechanism for the 
redistribution of income and wealth to ensure that every Muslim is guaranteed a fair standard 
of living. The zakat should be paid to certain recipients specified in the Qur‟an, which 
include: the poor and the needy, debtors in financial difficulty and not able to pay their debt, 
persons who have recently accepted Islam and are in need of basic necessities that would 
benefit from encouragement by Muslims, volunteers who have dedicated their effort and time 
in spreading the Muslim religion, and the people appointed to collect zakat. The generally 
accepted minimum amount of zakat is one fortieth (2.5 %) of Muslim's annual income in cash 
or kind from all forms of assessed wealth exceeding nisab (i.e. a threshold figure). It is in the 
light of promoting social justice that Islam also requires Islamic business organisations (such 
as Islamic banks) to make zakat payments annually on behalf of the shareholders and 
depositors as a result of the positive return of their contribution (Gambling and Karim 1991).  
 
3.3.5.4 Nature of Business 
Islamic banks, as with other Islamic corporation and individuals, are bound to carry out 
business activities that are consistent with the Shari‟ah. In this regard, the Shari‟ah clearly 
details which activities are not allowed in Islam because they violate the Shari‟ah. To name a 
few, Islam prohibits the sales of alcohol, gambling, casino activities, pork production, and 
pornographic production. Consistent with the spirit of justice in Islam, businesses should also 
be fair to the other party and rule out unjust dealings and oppression, and deceit or fraud. To 
ensure that the business activities are consistent with the Shari‟ah, banks offering Islamic 
banking operation have establish the Shari‟ah board whose duties, among others, include 
ensuring Shari‟ah compliance in all aspects of the banking operation.  
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3.3.5.5 The Sources of Funds for Islamic Banks 
An interest-free bank receives its source of funds from the means of: shareholders equity, 
customers‟ deposits in current account, customers‟ deposits in savings account, and 
customers‟ deposits in general investment accounts, and customers‟ deposits in special 
investment accounts. The application of Islamic financial contracts in these sources of funds 
could be distinctly explained from the operation of a full-fledge Islamic bank and a bank 
operating in a dual platform with an Islamic window operation alongside their conventional 
banking. The Islamic bank can raise its initial paid-up capital using an Islamic equity-
financing contract of musharakah among the initial shareholders, while a bank with an 
Islamic window operation could receive the paid-up capital from the main bank on the basis 
of either mudharabah, musharakah or qard al-hasan. In both banking operations the 
contribution could also come from customers‟ deposits in the Islamic contract of wadi‟ah yad 
dhamanah through the saving and current accounts and the mudharabah contract for the 
investment account. 
 
Basically, the Islamic contract of wadi‟ah and mudharabah are contracts where money is 
deposited into the bank on the basis of safe custody, and profit and loss sharing. Because 
banks offering Islamic banking operations strictly adhere to the principles of Shari‟ah, the 
concept of paying an interest on money deposited by the customers (as is similar to the 
conventional practices) is impermissible. This has caused the Islamic banking business to be 
open to challenges at being competitive with the conventional banking practice who promises 
a return for money deposited by the customers. In this regard, the banks offering Islamic 
banking operations award discretionary rewards called hibah to their depositors; however, 
there is no up-front promise on the hibah rate of return. Hence, this represents the underlying 
concept for the Islamic deposit contract wadi‟ah yad dhamanah (safekeeping with guarantee), 
which is developed based on two separate concepts: wadi‟ah (safe custody) and dhaman 
(surety). Meanwhile, deposit taking through the Islamic contract mudharabah (profit and loss 
sharing) could be made on the basis of either the General Investment Account or the Specific 
Investment Account. The distinction between the two investment accounts lies in the nature 
of the investment project and the ratio of profit distribution. In the general investment 
account the investment project is not defined and the profit distribution ratio is normally 
fixed. On the other hand, the investment project is specifically defined and the ratio for profit 
distribution is usually negotiated in the specific investment account. In addition, the 
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mudharabah contract operates in the form of partnership where the investor or depositor is 
the capital provider and the bank acts as the entrepreneur (mudharib). Any profit arising from 
the business venture will be shared between the parties based on a certain agreed ratio or 
percentage in advance, whereas a loss will result in the investor or depositor bearing all of the 
loss while the bank losses its effort and expected profit.  
 
3.3.5.6 The Application of Funds for Islamic Banks 
Banks offering Islamic banking operations provide financing to customers based on several 
Islamic banking contracts. One type of financing that is deemed heavily practiced because of 
its less risky features is the Islamic contract of murabahah (mark-up financing). To be 
acceptable from the Shari‟ah perspective, the buyer in the contracting parties should know the 
cost and the seller should already possess the goods. In addition, both the seller and the buyer 
must agree on the price of the commodity, with a stated profit known to both parties. As the 
original murabahah in its simplest form is not practical as a financing instrument in banks, 
murabahah of a new form, which is called a murabahah purchase order, is developed. In this 
form of contract, the buyer specifies the goods to be acquired and the supplier. Accordingly, 
the bank would purchase the goods and resell them at a higher price to the customer, in which 
the total amount could be paid in cash or by instalment on a deferred term. Thus, the 
transaction include two sales transactions: the first is between the bank and the supplier, and 
the second is between the bank and the client. Usually, the buyer is also required to sign a 
commitment to buy the goods before the commencement of any transactions.  
 
Bay‟ bithaman ajil (BBA) is another type of Islamic financing which is usually a financing 
facility for a longer term than the murabahah financing. The BBA is commonly used in 
Malaysia as the Islamic financing for purchasing or financing a house. Taking financing of a 
house as an example, the financer will purchase the house identified by the client, who will 
then resell it back to the client at the principal amount and at an agreed profit margin. The 
client would then have to make payment by instalment on the BBA financing based on a 
certain agreed period by the contracting parties. Similar to the murabahah financing above, 
the BBA financing also involves two sales transactions.  
 
Meanwhile, ijarah or leasing is an alternative mode of financing to the murabahah and BBA 
above. Generally, ijarah involves a bank purchasing certain assets which are required by the 
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client, who will then lease it to customers at an agreed charge or rent. The ijarah contract 
may contain a promise to transfer ownership of the assets from the lessor to the lessee. 
Financing using such a premise is completed through the al-ijarah thumma al-bay‟ (AITAB) 
contract. The underlying principles of AITAB contract lies in the leasing of a particular asset, 
which after meeting a certain period of time is followed by the sale of that asset at an agreed 
selling price.  
 
Also generally practiced amongst Islamic banks is qard al-hasan. This Islamic contract 
represents a non-interest bearing loan which is intended to allow the borrower to use the loan 
for a period of time, which will then be repaid at the end of the period at same amount of 
money. However, banks are permitted to charge a minimum service fee to cover the cost of 
administration. In addition, the bank may also ask for collateral from the client to ensure that 
the loan granted is repaid.  
 
On the other hand, bay‟ al-salam is a forward sale contract. This type of financing takes place 
when the buyer makes an immediate payment for an asset-to be delivered. The uncertainty 
element, or gharar, that constitutes bay‟ al-salam, although criticised by some Shari‟ah 
scholars, is permitted by others on the basis of the economic benefits that would have been 
lost if the contract was not made available (El-Gamal 2001). This can be explained as in a 
case where the seller upon receipt of money from bay‟ al-salam financing would use it to 
produce the object of sale.  
 
An Islamic financial contract on a sale of debt is called a bay‟ al-dayn. The debt in bay‟ al-
dayn can either be at the price of an asset, or services, whose settlement is being deferred. In 
addition, the seller of the debt can be the creditor or the party who has the right over the debt; 
for example, one who has purchased the debt from the creditor. Another type of financing 
that is subject to much criticism is bay‟ al-‟inah and tawarruq. Bay‟ al-‟inah contract 
represents a sale-repurchase financing where an asset is first sold at a deferred price and then 
repurchased from the buyer with cash but at a lower price than the initial selling price. 
Almost similar to bay‟ al-‟inah is the Islamic contract tawarruq. Distinctly categorised into 
real tawarruq and organized tawarruq, the real tawarruq is a transaction where a person buys 
a commodity from a bank on a deferred basis and then sells it to a different person or bank 
for cash. On the other hand, organised tawarruq is a transaction where the bank arranges to 
sell a commodity to a client by deferred payment, and then becomes an agent on behalf of the 
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client to sell the commodity to a third party, whereupon, the institution pays the price to the 
client.  
 
Some scholars argue that the Islamic banking industry should concentrate in financing with a 
profit and loss sharing feature, such as mudharabah and musharakah (see for example 
Ghayad 2008). In mudharabah financing, the bank will act as the principal who provides the 
funds to the entrepreneur (mudharib) in undertaking a business venture. Profits generated 
from the venture will be shared by both the bank and the mudharib according to the 
percentage specified in the contract. In contrast, any loss will be borne exclusively by the 
bank. On the other hand, musharakah financing represents a partnership or a joint venture 
arrangement. Hence, in this type of financing both the bank and the client jointly finance and 
manage the business venture. One type of musharakah that is currently practice in Islamic 
banks specifically for the purpose of house financing is in the form a diminishing partnership, 
which is an Islamic financing contract based on the concept musharakah mutanaqisah. In this 
type of financing, the partners usually enter into two types of contracts: a joint ownership 
contract and an ijarah (lease) contract in which the bank will gradually sell its shares to the 
client. In terms of distribution of profit and loss in musharakah type of financing, all profits 
generated will be shared among the partners in a proportion which is mutually agreed in the 
contract, while the losses will be shared in proportion to the partners‟ capital.  
 
 
 
3.4 Shari’ah Compliance of Islamic Banks 
Earlier, it was discussed that the main distinction between Islamic banks and conventional 
banks lies in the requirement for the operations of Islamic banks to be in accordance with the 
Islamic Shari‟ah. This requirement provides the foundation for the operation of Islamic banks 
to be guided by the principles and values laid down in Islam, i.e. the Shari‟ah (Siddiqi 1983; 
Ahmad 1984; Siddiqi 1985; Khan and Mirakhor 1986; Ahmad 2000; Siddiqui 2001). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the integrity of an Islamic bank would be undermined, 
and stakeholders would lose confidence, if its operation are found to be non-compliant to the 
Shari‟ah (Bhambra 2002). In this regard, the management of an Islamic bank should ensure 
that the principles of Islamic finance discussed in Section 3.3.5 above are implemented in its 
everyday banking business. Arguably, this responsibility on the part of the management of 
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Islamic banks has a strong connotation with the Islamic accountability framework discussed 
earlier in Section 3.3.4.  
 
As the main objective of the establishment of an Islamic bank is the provision of financial 
activities that are Shari‟ah compliant, the shareholders and stakeholders of an Islamic bank 
are expected to put pressure on the bank to accomplish this objective. The investment 
decision of the shareholders, for example, is deemed to be influenced by the assurance that 
the activities of the bank and the profit generated from them are Shari‟ah compliant. In 
addition, institutional investors who usually hold a large stake in the shareholding of a 
corporation could exercise their voting power to decide on the policies and business 
operations that would provide a positive return on their investment while ensuring the ethical 
aspect of the Islamic banking operation remains intact. Meanwhile, to ensure that the 
credibility of the bank is preserved in accordance with the expectations of these shareholders, 
the board of directors would monitor the management and require the latter to report to them 
that the activities of the bank are Shari‟ah compliant. These tasks are undertaken with the 
assistance of an external and independent Shari‟ah board which comprises experts on 
Shari‟ah and on fiqh al-mua‟malat-related knowledge. The Shari‟ah board advises the board 
of directors on the Shari‟ah aspects of the Islamic banking operation and the latter carry out a 
Shari‟ah compliance review of the bank. The conclusions drawn by the Shari‟ah board based 
on the results of the Shari‟ah compliance review are published in a Shari‟ah report that is 
issued annually along with the financial statements of the bank. Hence, the Shari‟ah boards of 
Islamic banks serve as an important governance mechanism because the assurance of the 
bank‟s level of Shari‟ah compliance guarantees the credibility of these banks and instils 
confidence in the shareholders and stakeholders (Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and 
Karim 1987; Karim 1990b; Karim 1990a; Banaga et al. 1994; Rammal 2006; Ghayad 2008; 
Laldin 2008a). Others also claim that the Shari‟ah board has an implicit role of monitoring 
the behaviour of Islamic bank‟s management and to ensure the good image and reputation of 
the bank (see for example Ghayad 2008).
16
  
 
In addition to the above, there are other stakeholders who address the need for the Islamic 
banking industry to comply with Shari‟ah. The government, for example, provides the 
legislation through enactment of laws and the pronouncement of standards and guidelines on 
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 Further discussion on the roles and functions of the Shari‟ah board in ensuring Shari‟ah compliance and the 
issues surrounding its Shari‟ah governance function is the focus of Chapter Four.  
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the operation of Islamic banks. These regulations are aimed at ensuring stability and 
maintaining the supervision that shall uphold the integrity of this banking industry. There are 
also other regulatory bodies who play an important role at the international level as the 
standard-setting and governing bodies for the Islamic banking industry. For instance, the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) are actively engaged in the development of 
standards and guidelines for use in IFI, although the implementation of their standards is 
voluntary in nature.
17
 Meanwhile, the Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) is the 
rating agency that provides a rating benchmark on the capital instruments and financial 
products issued by IFIs. Amongst others, the benchmarks put forward by IIRA are compliant 
to the Shari‟ah standards produced by the AAOIFI. On the other hand, the International 
Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) is the market and global standardisation body that 
encourages self-regulation for the development of the Islamic capital and money markets. It 
focuses on the standardisation, documentation, and the related processes of Islamic financial 
products by issuing guidelines, best practices procedures, standardisation of financial 
contracts, market recommendations and infrastructure development. Another institution that 
supports the requirement for the operation of Islamic banks and financial institutions to 
maintain Shari‟ah compliance is the Liquidity Management Centre (LMC). The LMC assists 
IFIs in managing their short-term liquidity by investing them in quality short and medium 
term financial instruments which are structured in accordance with the Shari'ah principles. 
 
The above paragraphs have highlighted how Shari‟ah compliance is an essential feature of 
the Islamic banking industry. Furthermore, the concept of Shari‟ah compliance in Islamic 
banks could be concluded as being broad in scope, from ensuring the Islamic legality of the 
product and services which Islamic banks provide, to the profit that the banks make, and the 
moral and ethical behaviour of their employees. There are various governance mechanisms in 
place to ensure that the integrity of the industry is being upheld, including the establishment 
of regulatory bodies that serve as the key drivers for the advancement and sustenance of the 
industry. Hence, it should be fundamentally acknowledged that the Islamic banking industry 
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 The AAOIFI issues standards and guidelines for use by IFI while the IFSB issues standards, guidelines and 
technical notes for use by regulatory and supervisory agencies, as well as market players and professional 
institutions. 
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requires Shari‟ah governance as an overarching body above the corporate governance which 
is usually discussed with regard to other corporations.  
 
 
3.5 The Malaysian Islamic Banking Environment  
Historically, the idea of establishing an Islamic financial institution evolved due to the rising 
need to collect and manage funds used by the Malaysian citizens to perform the hajj. This 
resulted in the establishment of Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (LUTH)
18
 or The 
Pilgrim‟s Fund Board in 1969. Following the successful establishment of LUTH and other 
Islamic banks in the Muslim countries, the Malaysian government has built up the necessary 
foundation for the establishment of the nation first own Islamic bank. This includes the 
enactment of dedicated acts for the establishment and operation of Islamic banking (for 
example the Islamic Banking Act (IBA) 1983), Takaful or Islamic insurance (for example the 
Takaful Act 1984) and Shari‟ah compliant government funding. In terms of the banking 
operations, the first fully-fledged Islamic bank was established and started operating in 
Malaysia in March 1983; it was incorporated as the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). 
Unlike other banking institutions which are bounded by the Banks and Financial Institution 
Act (BAFIA) 1989, the BIMB is governed by IBA 1983, being monitored and regulated by 
the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM).   
 
Further progress to initiate market vibrancy of the Islamic financial system can be seen to 
include amendments to legislation. In 1993, the BNM introduced the Interest Free Banking 
Scheme, currently known as the Islamic Banking Scheme (IBS), which allows conventional 
banks to offer Islamic banking products and services without having to apply for an Islamic 
banking license. As a result, these commercial banks were given a platform to promote and 
offer Islamic banking products alongside their conventional banking system. In addition, the 
Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) was introduced in 1994. It provides a ready source 
of short-term investment outlets based on Shari‟ah principles, thus facilitating Islamic 
banking institutions and those participating in the IBS to solve their liquidity and investment 
problems. Malaysia also took another milestone in establishing an Islamic financial system 
                                                 
18
 With the effect of Act 535 of the Pilgrimage Fund Board Act 1995, the Board has been renamed to Lembaga 
Tabung Haji from August 28, 1997. 
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when it established the national Shari‟ah Advisory Council (SAC) in May 1997. Comprised 
of qualified individuals with vast experience in the areas of Islamic economics and finance, 
the SAC as the Shari‟ah apex body ascertains the Islamic law and issues rulings on Islamic 
financial business, it advises BNM on any Shari‟ah issue relating to Islamic financial 
business or transactions of BNM, it advises IFIs or any other person on Islamic financial 
business pursuant, and it issues rulings following the pursuant from the request of courts and 
arbitrators (BNM 2010). In addition, Malaysia also offers a holistic set of Islamic capital 
market infrastructure to complement the role of the Islamic banking system, and the Islamic 
financial markets as a whole. In April 1999, the Kuala Lumpur Shari‟ah Index (KLSI) was 
launched to assist local and foreign investors to invest in securities which are consistent with 
the Shari‟ah. The KLSI acts as a benchmark to track the performance of Shari‟ah compliant 
securities and it helps in making informed decisions.  
 
Furthermore, since 2001, there has been an initiative towards strategic positioning and the 
international integration of the Malaysian Islamic finance sector. In March 2001, the BNM 
launched the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP), which incorporated a 10 years master 
plan for Islamic banking and a Takaful aiming at creating an efficient, progressive and 
comprehensive Islamic financial system. The FSMP also sought to open new markets and 
encourage the internationalisation of the Islamic finance sector. This enabled many global 
players to enter the Malaysian market. In 2002, Malaysia hosted the establishment of the 
IFSB, an international regulatory standard setting body that is responsible for ensuring the 
soundness and stability of the Islamic finance industry. In order to protect the legal rights of 
the contracting parties and to provide a quick settlement that shall increase investor 
confidence, Malaysia installed three dispute resolution mechanisms: (1) a dedicated high 
court
19
, (2) the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration
20
, and (3) the Financial 
Mediation Bureau
21
. 2004 saw the liberalisation of the Malaysian Islamic banking market 
when BNM granted three new Islamic bank licences to foreign institutions.
22
 Later, in 
December 2004, the BNM issued the Guidelines on the Governance of Shari‟ah Committee 
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 BNM. 2010. Annual Report 2010. Bank Negara Malaysia.  
20
 The Governor of BNM, Tan Sri Dr Zeti Akhtar has been quoted in Starbiz dated 26 August 2004 as saying 
that disputes involving Islamic banking and financial services could be referred to the arbitration centre for 
resolution to complement the court system. 
21
 BNM. 2010. Annual Report 2010. Bank Negara Malaysia. 
22
 The three foreign institutions that were granted Islamic banking license are all from middle-eastern countries, 
namely: Kuwait Finance House, Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation, and a consortium of IFI 
represented by Qatar Islamic Bank, RUSD Bank Inc and Global Investment House.  
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for the Islamic Financial Institutions, or the GPS1, to rationalise and streamline the functions 
and duties of the Shari‟ah board in IFIs. This guideline, which became effective on the 1st of 
April 2005, represents the Malaysian Shari‟ah Governance Framework (SGF) and 
complements the role of the SAC of BNM. Also in 2005, the BNM approved the Islamic 
banking subsidiary structure to replace the Islamic window structure. 
 
In addition, the liberal economic policy of the government of Malaysia allowed foreign 
Islamic banks to operate in the country, including foreign international Islamic banks. To 
promote the country as a hub for international Islamic finance further, Malaysia launched the 
Malaysian International Islamic Finance Centre (MIFC) in August 2006. Specifically, MIFC 
initiatives consist of:  
(1) Financial and market regulatory bodies;  
(2) Government ministries and agencies;  
(3) Financial institutions;  
(4) Human capital development institutions; and,  
(5) Professional services companies that are participating in the field of Islamic finance.23  
 
Participating financial institutions in the MIFC initiative would benefit, among others, from 
new licenses for conducting foreign currency businesses, attractive tax incentives and 
facilitative immigration policies. In conjunction with the MIFC initiative, a new category of 
licenses, the international Islamic bank under the IBA 1983, were issued to qualifying foreign 
and Malaysian financial institutions to conduct business in international currencies in 2006. 
Approval for the setting up of an International Currency Business Unit (ICBU) within these 
financial institutions was awarded in the same year. With regard to the licensed international 
Islamic banks, these financial institutions are allowed to undertake a wide-range of business 
of Islamic commercial banking, Islamic investment banking and other banking business as 
specified by BNM (2008). To date, the MIFC has listed the operation of 17 full-fledge 
Islamic banks, 5 international Islamic banks, and 15 conventional banks offering Islamic 
banking window.
24
  
 
                                                 
23
 http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=menu_exp&pg=menu_exp_ovr.  
24
 For an update on the list of banks offering Islamic banking services in Malaysia please visit 
http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=menu_know_ibt_ib&pg=menu_know_ibt_ib_list.  
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Another milestone in Malaysian comprehensive Islamic financial system is the enhancement 
of knowledge and expertise through BNM‟s establishment of institutions, such as: the Global 
University of Islamic finance (INCEIF) in 2006 and the International Shari‟ah Research 
Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) in 2008. These two institutions represent BNM‟s 
significant role in establishing a human capital infrastructure and giving added value to 
existing institutions, such as: the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia (IBFIM), 
Securities Industry Development Corporation (SIDC), International Centre for Leadership in 
Finance (ICLIF), Financial Sector Talent Enrichment Programme (FSTEP) and other 
institutions of higher learning. More recently, in October 2010, the BNM introduced the new 
SGF where the role of important parties within the IFIs in ensuring compliance has been 
enhanced. The new SGF, which took effect June 2011,
25
 offers clarity on the accountability 
and responsibility of these parties, imposes new regulations on the appointment of Shari‟ah 
board members, and requires IFIs to establish Shari‟ah compliance and Shari‟ah research 
function.  
 
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter commenced by offering the distinction between Islamic banks and their 
conventional counterparts. It has been emphasised that, although Islamic banks carry the 
same financial intermediary function as conventional banks, the operation of Islamic banks is 
guided by the principles which are laid down in Islam. It was further highlighted that the 
Shari‟ah is an all comprehensive and all embracing system for humankind not only on 
matters pertaining to ibadat (worship) but also on mua‟malat (human relations). It has been 
made clear that since matters pertaining to Islamic commercial law, or fiqh-mua‟malat, are 
founded on the basis of permissibility (ibahah), the Shari‟ah allows the use of ijtihad, or legal 
reasoning by a Muslim jurist based on the interpretation of the revealed law, (i.e. the Qur‟an 
and Sunnah). In this regard, the practice of contemporary Islamic banking and finance has 
been highlighted to have gained benefit from the exercise of ijtihad, which serves as a 
dynamic tool for the invention of Islamic financial products and the development of an 
Islamic economy. Essentially, the ijtihad facility should be exercised by ensuring that the 
maqasid al-Shari‟ah (objectives of the Shari‟ah) of the Islamic economy are accomplished by 
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 The new Shari‟ah Governance Framework is effective from 1 January 2011 but IFI are given 6 months from 
the effective date to comply.  
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ascertaining what constitutes the maslahah (benefits) of the public while observing basic 
principles, such as: avoiding charging or receipt of riba, transactions that comprise element 
of gharar (uncertainty), and business activities which have been explicitly forbidden in Islam.   
 
It is against these sets of rules that Islamic banks ensure that their operations are in 
compliance with the Shari‟ah. Shari‟ah compliance, to Islamic financial institutions such as 
Islamic banks, is not only fundamental but also crucial because its assurance will boost the 
confidence of the shareholders and other stakeholders. On the other hand, Shari‟ah non-
compliance will give an opposite effect to Islamic banks, which in accounting and finance 
terms, can be represented as Shari‟ah non-compliance risk, fiduciary risk, and reputational 
risk, whilst also leading to the non-recognition of income. This provides justification that the 
central and intrinsic governance for the industry is a requirement for all its financial activities 
to be supervised and controlled in accordance with the rules of Islamic Shari‟ah. To ensure 
good Islamic governance, that their activities are Shari‟ah compliant, Islamic banks have 
established Shari‟ah board comprised of experts in Shari‟ah and other related fields, whose 
Shari‟ah governance function is the focus of discussion in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SHARI’AH GOVERNANCE FUNCTION 
OF SHARI’AH BOARDS IN ISLAMIC BANKS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The Shari‟ah compliance review of an Islamic bank‟s activities is considered to be a crucial 
governance mechanism to ensure the credibility and viability of the financial institutions 
because of the requirement for Islamic banks to adhere to the Islamic Shari‟ah principles. For 
this reason, many banks offering Islamic banking products and services have established a 
Shari‟ah board whose membership and hierarchical position in the bank is deemed to stand 
no comparison to other types of supervisory boards. The available literature presents a 
growing interest on the issue of Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board in Islamic 
banks. For example, despite the esteem that is given to the highly authoritative governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board, several studies have questioned their role and monitoring 
effectiveness (Kahf 2002; Khan 2007). In addition, a considerable amount of the previous 
studies have accounted for the dilemmas facing Islamic banks with respect to Shari‟ah 
board‟s function (for example Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Rammal 2006; Siddiqi 2006; Khan 
2007) and its association with Islamic banks‟ transparency in financial reporting (for example 
Karim 1996; Iqbal et al. 1998) and socio-economic consequences (for example Karim 1996). 
However, there seems to be a scarcity in the literature of research that provides empirical 
evidence on the Shari‟ah governance functions of the Shari‟ah board. Furthermore, empirical 
studies on this subject are limited in scope and provide only a general understanding on the 
issue. In this regard, an in-depth examination on the crucial aspect on the role, independence, 
and effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board in a country such as Malaysia (where the Islamic 
banking industry exhibits a dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system) seems to be warranted. 
Additionally, the scope of such a study provides an evaluation of the Shari‟ah board where its 
governance function is demonstrated to be highly regulated.  
 
In light of the above, this chapter aims to critically review the literature on the Shari‟ah 
governance function of the Shari‟ah board. Of importance and consistent with the objectives 
of this study, the issues on the role and independence of the Shari‟ah board and their 
association with the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance function of the board will be 
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discussed. Relevant standards on the role and independence of the Shari‟ah board as 
promulgated by the regulatory bodies governing Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) (namely 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)) will be examined. In addition, the issue of the 
standardisation of Islamic banking practice and its association with the role of the Shari‟ah 
board and the centralised Shari‟ah board will be reviewed and addressed.  
 
This chapter is organised into nine sections. The first section is this introduction. The next 
section, i.e. Section 4.2, will examine issues on the qualification, competency and 
appointment of the Shari‟ah board members. Then, the role and independence of the Shari‟ah 
board in the Islamic banking industry are discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. This 
is followed by an examination on the role of centralised Shari‟ah board in Section 4.5. Since 
the issue of the standardisation of Islamic banking practice is regarded as a major challenge 
for the industry, important debates surrounding this subject are provided in Section 4.6. 
Section 4.7 offers an explanation of the Shari‟ah governance function of Shari‟ah board and 
Shari‟ah Advisory Council in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry. Section 4.8 examines 
the previous empirical studies of the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. 
Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary in Section 4.9.  
 
4.2 Qualification, Competency, and Appointment of the Shari’ah Board 
Members 
As discussed earlier, amongst the salient features of Islamic banks is the requirement for the 
bank to operate in a manner consistent with the divine Islamic Shari‟ah. To uphold this 
distinct feature the Islamic banks generally exhibit a Shari‟ah governance mechanism through 
the establishment of a Shari‟ah board. A clear definition on the qualification, appointment 
and scope of responsibilities of the Shari‟ah board would normally be stipulated in the 
articles of association of the respective Islamic banks (Briston and El-Ashker 1986). 
Interestingly, the previous literature also presents a debate on whether the Shari‟ah board 
should consist of members merely from Shari‟ah qualification backgrounds or a mixture of 
members drawn from diverse backgrounds.  
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Arbouna (2007), for example, asserts that a possible Shari‟ah conflict could cause the Islamic 
financial product to be invalid, albeit in the case of a financial product that is comprised of a 
hybrid contract, which could be identified by someone from a Shari‟ah qualification 
background. Arguments such as those provided by Arbouna (2007) imply that the Shari‟ah 
board of IFIs should be limited to experts from Shari‟ah and fiqh al-mua‟malat related 
knowledge. A preference for Shari‟ah board members with these qualifications is believed to 
have a strong connotation with the expert‟s ability to relate the Shari‟ah knowledge and 
maqasid al-Shari‟ah (objectives of the Shari‟ah) in the context of modern Islamic banking 
and finance. However, there are also some arguments that raise the question of the Shari‟ah 
experts‟ ability to look at the macro perspective of Islamic banking and finance product 
development beyond their theoretical knowledge of Shari‟ah. For example, Siddiqi (2006) 
argued that the training received by the Shari‟ah experts does not provide them with an 
evaluation of Islamic banking product development beyond the technicalities of the Shari‟ah. 
According to Siddiqi (2006), the Shari‟ah experts did not look at the overall macroeconomic 
consequences, as in the case of the widespread Islamic financial product tawarruq. Siddiqi 
asserts that by approving tawarruq the maqasid al-Shari‟ah could not be accomplished 
because the macroeconomic outcome from tawarruq would result in greater mafasadah 
(harms) than maslahah (benefits).   
 
Meanwhile, there are other researchers who have advocated that the Shari‟ah board should 
consist of members from various qualification backgrounds (for example Gambling et al. 
1993; Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Ghayad 2008; Laldin 2008b). These researchers advise that 
Shari‟ah board members should be well versed in both Islamic Shari‟ah knowledge 
(particularly in the field of fiqh al-mua‟malat) as well as in the subjects of accounting, 
finance, economics, and law. A Shari‟ah board which is made of members who have various 
expertises is seen by these researchers to be more competent in handling various dynamic 
issues surrounding the contemporary Islamic banking business, although this could also 
trigger potential disputes and communication failure because of the different perspectives 
held by the Shari‟ah board members (Grais and Pellegrini 2006). Ghayad (2008), for 
example, asserts that a Shari‟ah board drawn from a mixture of qualification backgrounds 
would help to provide better oversights on Islamic banking and finance whose issues could be 
overlapping between Shari‟ah and non-Shari‟ah related matters.  
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In addition, the modern banking feature of Islamic banks has set another level of skills 
requirement from the Islamic scholars. Exposure in the banking industry, proficiency in the 
English and Arabic languages, being dynamistic and capable of synergising between the 
Shari‟ah and legal aspects of financing are now regarded by many as the necessary skills to 
boost the industry and to be able to separate Islamic banks genuinely from the conventional 
banks (Laldin 2008a, b). Laldin (2008b) believes that a Shari‟ah board of this type of 
membership, and who also receives good cooperation from various parties within the bank, 
will not only speed up but also ensure a better Shari‟ah decision is made by this governance 
authority. As a matter of fact, the Islamic banking industry is not unusual in presently facing 
a shortage of competent scholars who are well versed in both the Islamic fiqh al-mua‟malat 
and accounting and finance knowledge, the financial industry as a whole is experiencing a 
shortage of scholars who are able to supervise the activities of Islamic banks. As the Islamic 
banking industry keeps evolving, the Shari‟ah board members should keep pace with its 
development by updating and strengthening their training and getting involved in continuous 
professional education (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Siddiqi 2006).  
 
Regardless of their qualification background, the ethical nature of this governance authority 
means that this institution should be comprised of members who have a good character and 
who uphold high ethical standards and noble characteristics such as trustworthiness, honesty, 
responsibility and accountability (Laldin 2008a). In this regard, the effectiveness of the 
Shari‟ah board governance function could be viewed as dependent on the integrity of the 
board members because the Shari‟ah board members of Islamic banks are commonly 
individuals who have a good reputation and significant role in their society (Ghayad 2008).  
 
Meanwhile, the hierarchical position of the Shari‟ah board in Islamic banks could be seen as 
a mechanism to instil the confidence of the public and the investor community in those 
Islamic banks which have a Shari‟ah governance authority. The literature seems to promote 
the approach where the Shari‟ah board members are appointed by the shareholders (see for 
example Karim 1990a; Rammal 2006; Laldin 2008b). Laldin (2008b) views that this 
appointment approach is meant to preserve the integrity of the Shari‟ah board and to cater to 
any possible conflict of interest on the role of Shari‟ah board in monitoring the Islamic 
bank‟s management side by side with that of the bank‟s corporate board. Additionally, the 
appointment of a Shari‟ah board by shareholders is consistent with protecting the interest of 
shareholders within the principal-agent relationship (as discussed in Chapter Two).  Although 
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this would be the ideal approach for Shari‟ah board members appointment, there are 
variations in terms of the appointment of Shari‟ah board members across countries. For 
instance, Abdallah (1994), besides giving an example of the formation of a Shari‟ah board as 
a board, also mentioned the existence of Islamic banks whose operation are supervised and 
monitored by only one Shari‟ah scholar, as is the case in Sudan. Later, Khan (1997), who 
cited findings from the International Institute of Islamic Thought, stated that 58.4% of a 
corpus of members of Shari‟ah board is elected by the board of directors. Furthermore, Khan 
argued that such an approach to the appointment of Shari‟ah board members could give rise 
to a conflict of interest because the Shari‟ah board members are positioned as being 
subordinate to the bank‟s board of directors.   
 
The issue on appointment and composition of Shari‟ah board members have been given 
attention by AAOIFI and IFSB. AAOIFI, in its „Governance Standards for Islamic Financial 
Institutions No. 1 Shari‟a Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report‟ define 
the Shari‟ah board as consisting of members with an expertise in the field of fiqh al-
mua‟malat (AAOIFI 1997 para. 3). However, they also suggest that Shari‟ah board‟s 
membership could include experts from the field of business, accounting, economics, laws 
and others (AAOIFI 1997 para. 7). In addition, AAOIFI also made clear reference to the need 
for the appointment and remuneration of Shari‟ah board members to be approved by the 
shareholders (AAOIFI 1997 para. 3). Moreover,  the number of Shari‟ah board members has 
been specified to be at least three persons (AAOIFI 1997 para. 7), thereby suggesting that it is 
up to the individual Islamic banks to appoint the number of Shari‟ah board‟s membership 
depending on the services required. Meanwhile, the AAOIFI and IFSB have made 
recommendations for the establishment of certain „fit and proper‟ criteria on the appointment 
of Shari‟ah board members. This recommendation is part of AAOIFI‟s „Governance 
Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 6: Statement on Governance Principles for 
Islamic Financial Institutions‟ (AAOIFI 2010b para. 45-46) and IFSB‟s „Guiding Principles 
on Corporate Governance for Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services‟ (IFSB 
2006 para. 53), respectively. In addition, the IFSB in its „Guiding Principles on Shari'ah 
Governance System for Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services‟ standard also clearly 
stipulates that banks offering Islamic banking products and services should ensure that the 
Shari‟ah board is authorised with adequate power to undertake its roles and functions (IFSB 
2009 principle 1.2).  
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As mentioned earlier, the Islamic banking industry is presently faced with a number of 
challenges concerning the shortage of competent scholars to undertake the Shari‟ah board 
function. In order to cater for the need of this expertise, the Shari‟ah scholars tend to serve as 
members of the Shari‟ah board in a number of other Islamic banks, either in their respective 
country or they can even serve on Shari‟ah boards across national boundaries. On the one 
hand, the cross board representation of the Shari‟ah scholars could be seen to be 
advantageous because it assists the harmonisation effort of the Shari‟ah interpretation of the 
Islamic banking and finance principles, and it can promote the standardisation of Islamic 
banking practices across national boundaries (Alhabshi and Bakar 2008; Wilson 2009). 
However, on the other hand, there are several negative aspects of the various placements of 
Shari‟ah board members. The first concerns the point that the oversight function quality is 
likely to be compromised due to the time constraint of the Shari‟ah scholars (Antonio 2008). 
Already, there is a contention that the Shari‟ah board members would be conducting Shari‟ah 
audit sampling instead of using a full Shari‟ah audit of the operation of the Islamic banks 
(Karim 1990a). With more and more tasks being handed over to the Shari‟ah board members 
due to various Shari‟ah board sittings, the time spent on the Shari‟ah compliance review can 
be expected to be excessively limited, hence, leading one to question the review quality or the 
amount of time spent by the Shari‟ah board members in their duties. Another crucial 
implication which arises from the cross representation of Shari‟ah board members is the risk 
of confidentiality of proprietary information exposure held by the Shari‟ah board members, 
which arises as a result of the multiple associations that they have with the Islamic banks they 
serve (see for example Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Alhabshi and Bakar 2008). Equally, the 
various  multiple placements of the Shari‟ah board members could also affect the quality of 
Shari‟ah board members‟ work considering their possible lack of rigorous training in 
accounting and auditing (Abdul Rahman 2008) which characterises the  membership of this 
institution (as mentioned above). 
 
 
4.3 The Role of Shari’ah Boards in the Islamic Banking Industry 
The Islamic banking industry exhibits the importance of the governance role of Shari‟ah 
boards. It can be argued that the boards‟ hierarchical position in Islamic banks is unique and 
has no parallel in other board models. Countries influenced by the Anglo-Saxon style of 
corporate governance, for example, practice a unitary board model whereas some European 
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countries practice a two-tier board model comprising a supervisory board and the 
management board. Despite the differences in the board models, the aim of the board in the 
unitary board model as well as that of the supervisory board in the two-tier model are argued 
to be the same, i.e. overseeing the management of the corporation. The Shari‟ah board of 
Islamic banks, on the other hand, is an additional governance structure, on top of the existing 
board of directors, responsible for overseeing the Shari‟ah aspects of the Islamic banking 
operations. Indeed, the literature seems to establish a consensus that the Shari‟ah board 
ensures the credibility of Islamic bank by ascertaining the Shari‟ah compliance of the bank‟s 
operations (Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 1990a; Karim 
1990b; Banaga et al. 1994; Rammal 2006; Ghayad 2008; Laldin 2008a). Briston and El-
Ashker (1986) were among the first to establish the foundation of the roles and 
responsibilities of the Shari‟ah board. Specifically, Briston and El-Ashker (1986) asserted 
that the Shari‟ah board members are responsible to perform duties in the area of ex ante 
auditing and ex post auditing. Ex ante auditing means that the Shari‟ah board members would 
have the Shari‟ah advisory role to the board of directors to ensure that aspects of the 
institution‟s operation, contract of sale, and compliance procedure are consistent with the 
Shari‟ah (Briston and El-Ashker 1986). Meanwhile, reviewing management of Islamic bank 
compliance to the Shari‟ah procedures and highlighting this in the form of Shari‟ah 
compliance report and ensuring  proper administration of zakat (such as assisting the 
calculation on the payment of zakat) are illustrated by the authors as the ex post auditing 
required from the Shari‟ah board.  
 
The leading studies on the role and function of the Shari‟ah board (such as Briston and El-
Ashker (1986)) tend to indicate that the traditional role of the Shari‟ah board is to: provide 
Shari‟ah advice to the board of directors; develop Islamic banking products; review an 
Islamic bank‟s activities; work out the calculation and payment of zakat; and, report their 
Shari‟ah compliance in the Shari‟ah report. In addition, categorising the role of the Shari‟ah 
board into Shari‟ah advisory and Shari‟ah review, as suggested by Briston and El-Ashker 
(1986), appears to be useful in providing a clear division on the two spheres of Shari‟ah 
governance responsibilities of the Shari‟ah board. Most of the later studies either advocate or 
expand the roles of the Shari‟ah board that were described by Briston and El-Ashker (1986). 
The following sections will offer an explanation on the role of the Shari‟ah board as found in 
the literature as well as those prescribed in AAOIFI governance standards and IFSB 
prudential standards.  
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4.3.1 Shari’ah Advisory Role of Shari’ah Boards  
In essence, the literature on the Shari‟ah governance of Islamic banks explains that the 
Shari‟ah board would have the advisory role on the Shari‟ah aspects of the Islamic banks‟ 
operations (see for example Tomkins and Karim 1987; Banaga et al. 1994; Haniffa and 
Hudaib 2007; Ghayad 2008). This Shari‟ah advisory role of the Shari‟ah board covers a 
number of Shari‟ah matters, including: Islamic financial products and services (Briston and 
El-Ashker 1986; Banaga et al. 1994; Ahmed 2006; Alhabshi and Bakar 2008; Ahmed 2011); 
advising and designing operational procedures (Banaga et al. 1994; Alhabshi and Bakar 
2008); advising and designing corporate strategic issues (Alhabshi and Bakar 2008); and, 
monitoring and ensuring good organisational image and reputation (Ghayad 2008). In 
addition, the Shari‟ah board was also associated with giving legitimacy to the IFIs when the 
industry was first introduced to the Muslim society (Siddiqi 2006). Meanwhile, other 
researchers have also discussed the need for the Shari‟ah board to balance meeting the 
shareholder‟s desire for profits and ensuring the Shari‟ah compliance of the Islamic banks 
operations (Ghayad 2008; Ahmed 2011), although this task can frequently be challenging to 
the Shari‟ah board. Ahmed (2011) asserts that the Shari‟ah should prevail when a conflict 
between economic factors and Shari‟ah principles arises when developing an Islamic 
financial product to be offered to consumers. The pervasive Shari‟ah influence, which 
encompasses all aspects of Islamic banking operations, indicates an implicit task of the 
Shari‟ah board to ensure that the application and implementation of the Shari‟ah in Islamic 
banks remains dominant (Ahmed 2011). In the course of Islamic banking operations there 
might be some developments which make some of the earlier Shari‟ah decisions made by the 
Shari‟ah board inapplicable. In this regard, and in light of maqasid al-Shari‟ah (objectives of 
the Shari‟ah), Siddiqi (2006) asserts that the Shari‟ah board can make corrective actions, 
which could mean issuing a new and more relevant Shari‟ah decision. This presents an 
example where the Shari‟ah advisory role of the Shari‟ah board is to be considered as 
dynamic in nature and has to suit the developments of the Islamic banking industry.  
 
Apart from the direct functional Shari‟ah advisory of the Shari‟ah board members discussed 
above, this Shari‟ah governance authority also holds the responsibility to promote the 
Shari‟ah based Islamic finance to the general public by educating them on the distinct 
features of the bank as well as to enjoin Muslim consumers to opt to the Islamic way of 
financing as a means of ibadat (worship) and achieving falah (success) (Laldin 2008a). In 
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addition, the Shari‟ah board will also need to respond to any queries given by the community, 
possibly on the operation of Islamic bank or on Islamic banking product related matters 
(Banaga et al. 1994). The present modern Islamic finance, within which the Islamic banks 
practice, continues to exert challenges on the role of the Shari‟ah board members. In 
particular, the Shari‟ah board members are expected to be actively engaged in shaping 
Islamic banks by developing modern Islamic financial products and services based on the 
interpretation of the Islamic Shari‟ah principles (Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 1996; 
Laldin 2008a). Laldin (2008a) emphasises that the Shari‟ah board, as well as the centralised 
Shari‟ah board, are the apparent distinctive governance mechanism between Islamic banks 
and their counterparts (i.e. the conventional banks). In addition, Laldin (2008a) stresses that 
innovation on modern Islamic finance and services by Islamic banks should also be guided by 
the Shari‟ah board based on the Shari‟ah principles and they should not indiscriminately 
replicate the conventional banking operations. Of importance is the point that the Shari‟ah 
board members should ascertain that the designed Islamic financial product and services will 
have the objective of delivering the benefit to the ummah
26
 and not merely be a means to 
Shari‟ah forbidden ends (Siddiqi 2006; Laldin 2008a). Clearly, the significance of the 
Shari‟ah board stands no comparison with other organs within the bank and justifies the 
immense accountability that the Shari‟ah scholars carry. 
 
4.3.1.1 AAOIFI and IFSB Standards on the Shari’ah Advisory Role of Shari’ah Boards 
AAOIFI, in its „Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 1 Shari‟a 
Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report‟ broadly outlined that the Shari‟ah 
board as the governance authority “entrusted with the duty of directing, reviewing and 
supervising the activities of the Islamic financial institutions in order to ensure that they are 
in compliance with Islamic Shari‟a Rules and Principles” (AAOIFI 1997 para. 2). In 
addition, the AAOIFI‟s „Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 2 
Shari‟a Review‟, although specifically designed for the Shari‟ah review role of the Shari‟ah 
board, also indicates the further scope of the Shari‟ah advisory that is required from the 
Shari‟ah board. The standard identifies that “the SSB shall assist (the management) by 
providing guidance, advice, and training relating to compliance with the Shari‟a” (AAOIFI 
                                                 
26
 Ummah is the Arabic word meaning nation. In the context of the present study, the term ummah is meant to 
cater the interest of, but not limited to, the Muslim population.  
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1998 para. 5). Similar recommendations are given by IFSB in its „Guiding Principles on 
Corporate Governance for Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services‟ for Islamic 
Financial Services to develop mechanism for obtaining rulings from Shari‟ah scholars, 
applying fatwa and monitoring Shari‟ah compliance on aspects including the ex ante and ex 
post of financial transactions and the operations of Islamic Financial Services (IFSB 2006 
para. 47). Such a requirement implies that the Shari‟ah board would use its capacity as the 
Shari‟ah authority in the IFIs to ensure the IFI‟s management compliance with the fatwa and 
rulings issued by the Shari‟ah board. In addition, these fatwas could range from various 
activities of the IFI, including its daily operational aspect, and in the development of products 
and services to be launched to consumers. Similarly 
 
 
4.3.2 Shari’ah Review Role of Shari’ah Boards 
It has been made clear in the previous section that one of the Shari‟ah board members‟ roles 
is to review the Shari‟ah compliance aspect of the Islamic banks‟ operation. Basically, this 
requires the Shari‟ah board members to evaluate the implementation of the Shari‟ah decisions 
made earlier at the Shari‟ah advisory stage by the Islamic bank‟s management. Hence, this 
Shari‟ah review role of the Shari‟ah board could be regarded as significant and central within 
the Shari‟ah governance mechanism of the Islamic banking industry because the essence for 
the establishment of this banking business is to assist the Muslims in adhering to their 
religious values (i.e. the Shari‟ah) in their financial dealings (Karim 1990a). An important 
repercussion to such conformity is that the Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board provides 
assurance to the investors and the stakeholders on Islamic banks‟ commitment in abiding to 
the Shari‟ah (Alhabshi and Bakar 2008).  
 
In simple terms, the Shari‟ah board ensures that the profit earned by the bank conforms to the 
Shari‟ah (Haniffa and Hudaib 2007; Ghayad 2008). However, the Shari‟ah review task of the 
Shari‟ah board is rather broad and complex. It is broad because it encompasses a wide range 
of Islamic banking activities that needs to be confirmed on its compliance to the Shari‟ah. 
Meanwhile, the Shari‟ah review is regarded as complex because it requires the involvement 
of various parties within the Islamic bank to ensure the task is executed successfully. Based 
on these explanations, it is imperative for the Shari‟ah review mechanism to be appropriately 
established and effectively carried out. Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) make a distinction 
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between two categories of Shari‟ah review, which are: product review and institution review. 
The Islamic banking product review by the Shari‟ah board should be carried out throughout 
the product‟s life cycle (Antonio 2008). This relates to the different stages of product 
development (i.e. product conception, product design, product documentation, and product 
testing) as well as to the product implementation and final product review stage (Alhabshi 
and Bakar 2008). The institution review, on the other hand, is statutory driven and holistic in 
nature because it includes a review of the Islamic banks operation, management, transactions 
and financial records. Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) argued that both the Shari‟ah product 
review and the Shari‟ah institution review would give a different kind of assurance to the 
investors and stakeholders. Since the emphasis and scope of the Shari‟ah review in both 
categories are different, the assurance delivered and the likely perceived credibility imposed 
on these interested parties is a matter between the products and services of the institution 
itself.  
 
Associated with the product review, many scholars have argued that the Islamic financial 
products and services that an Islamic bank offers should meet the maqasid al-Shari‟ah 
(objectives of the Shari‟ah) (for example Kamali 2000; Kahf 2006; Siddiqi 2006; Dusuki and 
Abozaid 2007; Dusuki 2010; Ahmed 2011). In light of maqasid al-Shari‟ah, Ahmed (2011) 
also highlighted that the board of directors and top management as being the parties 
responsible in determining the type of Islamic financial products that would meet society‟s 
needs; however, it is the Shari‟ah board‟s responsibility to ensure that the financial product is 
not pseudo-Islamic (i.e. an Islamic financial product whose form is Islamically permissible 
but whose substance is questionable and which features an economic outcome that is 
tantamount to riba). In addition, Siddiqi (2006) and Ahmed (2011) also indicated that the 
failure to evaluate the macro-economic consequences of maqasid al-Shari‟ah could lead the 
Shari‟ah board to authorise a financial product which is pseudo-Islamic in nature, such as the 
controversial Islamic product tawarruq which is argued would result in debt proliferation.  
 
The challenge mentioned above on the Shari‟ah board‟s ability to evaluate the maqasid al-
Shari‟ah at the macro level seem to be located in a chain of dilemma facing the Islamic 
banking industry. It was mentioned earlier that the industry is experiencing a shortfall in the 
number of competent scholars to hold governorship of the Shari‟ah board. Another setback 
on the side of its development is that the Islamic banking industry has been associated with a 
lack of innovation of Islamic financial products and those products that it does offer tend to 
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resembles those of a conventional bank (Laldin 2008b), an argument in which the Shari‟ah 
board is deemed to share the responsibility. However, Siddiqi (2006) takes a different point 
of view. He asserts that emphasis loaded on to the Shari‟ah board to strive for innovation in 
Islamic banking products has led to the initial halal assurance function that the board 
provides to the Islamic banking industry to be declined. Siddiqi (2006) identifies this 
development and the occurrence of Shari‟ah board‟s failure to evaluate the macroeconomic 
consequences of Islamic banking product development and offering (such as in the case of 
tawarruq) as the „malfunction of Shari‟ah advisement‟ of the Shari‟ah board. 
 
Regarding the institution review, some scholars have argued for the Shari‟ah board‟s 
involvement in the accounting aspects of Islamic banks; for example, by determining the 
formula on profit distribution to be shared between Islamic banks and the entrepreneur as in 
mudharabah financing (see for example Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 1990a; Abdallah 
1994). In addition, the Shari‟ah board also ascertains that the Islamic bank‟s profit has been 
earned lawfully according to the Shari‟ah (see for example Haniffa and Hudaib 2007; Ghayad 
2008). This would mean that the Shari‟ah board would have to validate the Islamic financial 
contract transactions and the relevant documentations used by Islamic bank for that purpose. 
Some scholars have also highlighted that the Shari‟ah board could also have an influence on 
the accounting policy of Islamic banks; such as, deciding whether to use accrual or cash 
accounting basis as in the case for murabahah financing (see for example Tomkins and 
Karim 1987; Karim 1990a; Abdallah 1994; Karim 1996). The Shari‟ah board is also held 
responsible to produce an annual Shari‟ah report on the Shari‟ah compliance of Islamic bank 
(Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 1990a; Karim 1990b; Haniffa 
and Hudaib 2007). This report concludes the Shari‟ah review task of the board in which the 
board members will express their opinion on the level of Shari‟ah compliance in the 
operation of Islamic bank. Hence, this report provides reasonable assurance to the 
stakeholders on the ethicality of the Islamic bank‟s institution as well as assisting the 
investors in their investment decisions (see for example Briston and El-Ashker 1986; 
Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 1990b; Karim 1990a; Maali et al. 2006; Rammal 2006; 
Laldin 2008a).  
 
The Shari‟ah review task usually requires the cooperation between the Shari‟ah board and 
other parties within an Islamic bank. Among the important parties involved in assisting the 
Shari‟ah board in Shari‟ah reviewing the activities of the bank is the internal Shari‟ah 
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compliance officer and the internal Shari‟ah review officer.27 Both the Shari‟ah compliance 
officers and internal Shari‟ah reviewer (ISR) are usually competent staff with a Shari‟ah 
education background and who are regarded as an important internal Shari‟ah control system 
within Islamic banks (Abdul Rahman 2008; Zaidi 2008). Zaidi (2008) considered them as the 
most essential element of Shari‟ah compliance outside of the Shari‟ah board. Their close ties 
with the management and the responsibilities they carry through which the Shari‟ah board 
mirror Shari‟ah compliance of the Islamic bank requires them to be competent, hold high 
integrity and independence (which is similar to the Shari‟ah board). As such, the 
establishment of this internal Shari‟ah control system within Islamic banks is seen as a self 
Shari‟ah governance mechanism to facilitate the Shari‟ah board in Shari‟ah compliance 
aspect of this ethically established financial institution.  
 
It is also imperative for the Shari‟ah board to collaborate with the management, accountants 
and legal advisers when developing contracts on Islamic financial products and services and 
when preparing the relevant documentations to be used between the contracting parties 
(Banaga et al. 1994). Of importance is the point that the Shari‟ah board should be given 
access to all financial records and documentation used between the contracting parties, and to 
validate these against the Shari‟ah decisions made by the Shari‟ah board if it is to execute the 
Shari‟ah compliance review independently and effectively (Briston and El-Ashker 1986; 
Tomkins and Karim 1987). Equally important is that the Shari‟ah board would have to 
organise periodical meetings amongst its members and to work closely with other parties 
(such as the board of directors, management, Shari‟ah compliance officers, internal auditor, 
audit committee, external auditors and other concern parties) to evaluate and deliberate on 
any Shari‟ah issues pertaining to the implementation of the Shari‟ah decision made by the 
Shari‟ah board (Banaga et al. 1994; Ghayad 2008). It is apparent that the Shari‟ah review on 
the operation of Islamic banks would review the interrelated functions of the Shari‟ah board, 
board of directors, Shari‟ah compliance officers, ISR, audit committee and external auditor. 
Hence, it could be suggested that any failure on the part of these parties to carry out this task 
                                                 
27
 The IFSB differentiate between the role of internal Shari‟ah compliance officer and the internal Shari‟ah 
review officers IFSB. 2009. Guiding Principles on Shari'ah Governance System for Institutions offering Islamic 
Financial Services. Islamic Financial Services Board. The internal Shari‟ah compliance officer is similar to 
Shari‟ah officer as widely practice in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry; hence, these two terms are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. On the other hand the internal Shari‟ah review officer refers to the internal officer 
who conduct internal Shari‟ah audit on Islamic bank‟s activities. 
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can portray weak Shari‟ah governance and would result in ineffective Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board. 
 
4.3.2.1 AAOIFI and IFSB Standards on the Shari’ah Review Role of Shari’ah Boards 
In AAOIFI, the Shari‟ah board‟s responsibilities concerning the Shari‟ah review mainly 
refers to the „Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 2 Shari‟a Review‟, 
although issues on Shari‟ah report and the elements to be included in the report are specified 
in „Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 1 Shari‟a Supervisory 
Board: Appointment, Composition and Report‟. In essence, the former standard deals with 
the requirement for Shari‟ah board to execute Shari‟ah review procedures and to conclude the 
Shari‟ah compliance of IFI by documenting it in the form of a report. In order to carry out 
these functions, the standard provides clear provision for the Shari‟ah board to have a 
complete access to records, transactions and information kept by the IFI, including acquiring 
them from the IFI‟s employees (AAOIFI 1998 para. 3). Amongst the Shari‟ah review 
procedures required from the Shari‟ah board are: ascertaining IFI‟s management awareness 
on and compliance procedures of the Shari‟ah; reviewing documents and reports, including 
the IFI‟s policies, and deliberating on Shari‟ah issues through interaction with concerned 
parties. The detailed Shari‟ah review procedures expected from the Shari‟ah board can be 
seen from the following excerpt of the standard (AAOIFI 1998 para. 12):  
The SSB review procedures shall normally include: 
 Obtaining an understanding of the management‟s awareness, commitment 
and compliance control procedures for adherence to the Shari‟a; 
 Reviewing of contracts, agreement, etc.; 
 Ascertaining whether transactions entered into during the year were for 
products authorised by the SSB; 
 Reviewing other information and reports such as circulars, minutes, 
operating and financial reports, policies and procedures, etc.; 
 Consultation/co-ordination with advisors such as external auditors; and 
 Discussing findings with an IFI‟s management. 
 
The AAOIFI and IFSB have responded to the need for a proper Shari‟ah review framework 
for application in Islamic financial institutions with prescribed standards on this important 
issue. The AAOIFI‟s „Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 3: 
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Internal Shari‟a Review‟ specifically deals with issues relating to internal Shari‟ah review in 
IFI. Some of the important issues highlighted in the standard include: an independent attitude 
of the internal Shari‟ah review officers when carrying out the Shari‟ah review task, a step by 
step guide to undertake the task and the need to establish a good communication with other 
organs of the IFI such as the Shari‟ah board, board of directors, internal auditor and external 
auditor (AAOIFI 2000). Meanwhile, the AAOIFI in its „Governance Standards for Islamic 
Financial Institutions No. 4: Audit & Governance Committee for Islamic Financial 
Institutions‟ requires that the audit and governance committee, amongst others, review the 
effectiveness of IFI‟s existing Shari‟ah compliance monitoring system (para. 4) as well as to 
facilitate the Shari‟ah review task conducted by the Shari‟ah board and the internal auditor 
(para. 7). In addition, the AAOIFI require an external auditor to express their opinion as to 
whether the financial statements are prepared in accordance with the Shari'ah rules and 
principles (AAOIFI 1996 para. 17). This explains the need for an external auditor to work 
closely with parties such as the Shari‟ah board and the officers in charge of the internal 
Shari‟ah control system of the IFI. IFSB also gives similar recommendation for the audit 
committee of Islamic Financial Services to communicate and coordinate with both the 
Shari‟ah board and a proposed Governance Committee (IFSB 2006). 
 
In addition, the AAOIFI and IFSB require the Shari‟ah board to issue a report on IFI‟s 
adherence to the Islamic Shari‟ah rules and principles. Essential elements to be included in 
this compliance report have been specified in AAOIFI (1998 para. 10-25). Of importance is 
the point that this report should make apparent the scope of Shari‟ah board‟s responsibilities, 
the Shari‟ah review procedures undertaken, a clear statement on the examination of IFI‟s 
transactions, profit earned and the approval on IFI‟s calculation of zakat as well as declaring 
that the earnings realised from sources prohibited in Islam has been disposed of to charity 
causes. In addition, this report, as with the fatwas and rulings issued by Shari‟ah board, are 
recommended to be published in the annual report of the respective IFI (AAOIFI 1998 para. 
25-26; IFSB 2006 para. 49). It is also worth noting that while the Shari‟ah board is 
responsible for forming and expressing an opinion on the extent of an Islamic bank‟s 
compliance with the Shari‟ah, the responsibility for compliance rests with the management of 
the Islamic bank (AAOIFI 1998 para. 5). 
 
Notwithstanding the above explanations, there are concerns as to the effectiveness of the 
Shari‟ah review performed by the Shari‟ah board members. One of the apparent issues on this 
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subject is the structure for Shari‟ah review in Islamic banks. The Shari‟ah board‟s role, first, 
endorsing and, later, reviewing and giving assurance on Shari‟ah compliance of the activities 
of Islamic banks highlights the absence of segregation of duties on the role of the Shari‟ah 
board (Alhabshi and Bakar 2008; Antonio 2008). This conflict of interest on the Shari‟ah 
governance function of the Shari‟ah board can be confusing to regulators who are keen for 
Islamic banking and finance but sceptical about the modus operandi of this banking business 
(Antonio 2008). There are also criticisms on the practice of Islamic banks which raise the 
question of the implementation of Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board. For example, a 
survey conducted by Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) revealed a significant decreasing role of the 
Shari‟ah board members in performing Shari‟ah review on Islamic financial product 
development, especially in areas deemed critical, specifically on product testing and product 
implementation. More recently Hasan (2011) has revealed that many Shari‟ah boards did not 
undertake this function. Of the Shari‟ah board in the IFIs studied by Hasan (2011), 58% 
delegate this task to the Shari‟ah compliance unit.  
 
Meanwhile, Abdul Rahman (2008) argued that, despite the deficiency in Shari‟ah review 
described above, the Shari‟ah board members report their Shari‟ah opinion on an Islamic 
bank‟s full conformity with the Shari‟ah. In such circumstances, the Shari‟ah report is 
deemed to portray partial instead of complete assurance on the Shari‟ah compliance of the 
Islamic bank‟s activities. Besides Abdul Rahman‟s (2008) criticism on the Shari‟ah board‟s 
Shari‟ah report, there are others who have questioned the Shari‟ah board‟s responsibilities on 
the accounting aspects of Islamic banking operations, this includes: the lack of transparency 
on the calculation of profit sharing among investment holders (Grais and Pellegrini 2006), the 
details of the uses of funds which have not been declared to the depositors and investors of 
the bank (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Maali et al. 2006), and the fatwa or resolutions issued by 
the Shari‟ah board (Grais and Pellegrini 2006). Indeed, the annual report of some Islamic 
banks was revealed to have not included the Shari‟ah report that was issued by the Shari‟ah 
board (Grais and Pellegrini 2006).  
 
Interestingly, the literature also presents evidence on arguments that view the Shari‟ah review 
task of the Shari‟ah board as not constituting Shari‟ah audit (see for example Mohamed 
Ibrahim and Mulyany 2007; Abdul Rahman 2008). A study conducted by Mohamed Ibrahim 
and Mulyany (2007) revealed that the Shari‟ah review task of the Shari‟ah board is not 
perceived to include a Shari‟ah audit. In addition, this study also indicates variations in terms 
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of the scope and level of Shari‟ah audit required on the operation of Islamic bank. 
Meanwhile, Abdul Rahman‟s (2008) criticism on the level of Shari‟ah compliant assurance 
which was mentioned above contradicts with the role of the Shari‟ah board because the board 
is arguably not required to conduct an audit. Furthermore, Abdul Rahman (2008) asserts that 
the complete assurance of Shari‟ah compliance reported in the Shari‟ah report mentioned 
above is in an overstatement on the part of the Shari‟ah board considering that even a 
professional external auditor which is structurally more independent provides only a 
reasonable assurance on the true and fair presentation of the financial statement. Therefore, 
there is a call for Shari‟ah audit to be conducted by an external Shari‟ah audit in order to 
accomplish a more independent and quality Shari‟ah compliance assurance (see for example 
Chapra and Ahmed 2002). However, Grais and Pellegrini (2006) believe that such a move 
would not improve the existing practice of Shari‟ah compliance assurance as provided by the 
Shari‟ah board with the assistance of the bank‟s ISR which is more familiar with the internal 
Shari‟ah governance system of the bank. Similarly, the idea to overcome the challenge on the 
quality of Shari‟ah compliance assurance through Shari‟ah board rotation (similar to the 
suggestion forwarded for the practice of external auditors) was not welcomed. Grais and 
Pellegrini (2006) further assert that such a practice is inefficient and could cause problems 
with Shari‟ah compliance verification, an issue deemed to have resulted from the exercise of 
ijtihad (which is the authority and prerogative of each Shari‟ah scholar based on individual‟s 
Shari‟ah knowledge depth and wisdom). In fact, Wilson (2009) observes instances where 
Shari‟ah board members serve in a non-renewable term in their respective IFI. Such 
organisational behaviour was explained by Wilson (2009) as indicating IFI‟s preference to 
retain scholars with extensive experience and who have demonstrated integrity in their 
Shari‟ah governance function. 
 
Arguably, the shortcomings in the structure and implementation of Shari‟ah review in Islamic 
banks mentioned above could run the risk of jeopardising the confidence of Islamic bank 
customers and other stakeholders. An apparent governance issue from these debates is the 
independence of the Shari‟ah board, which will be discussed in the next section.  
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4.4 Independence of Shari’ah Boards  
Another issue of importance when discussing the Shari‟ah governance of Islamic banks is the 
independence of the Shari‟ah board members. Similar to the external auditor of any 
organisations, the Shari‟ah board is required to be independent in performing their task if the 
oversight function on the Islamic banks is to be effectively carried out. In this regard, Karim 
(1990a) provides a useful guide on the conceptual perception required on the independence of 
the Shari‟ah board members. Karim (1990a) argued that the concept of independence on the 
Shari‟ah board members should be viewed from the ethical perspective whereby the Islamic 
Shari‟ah scholars are required to be committed to their moral beliefs and Islamic precepts, as 
reflected from their Shari‟ah educational background, when performing their duties. In this 
regard, the independent concept of the Shari‟ah board presents the religious commitment 
requirement of the Shari‟ah board members and exposes their greater and ultimate 
transcendental accountability to God. Karim (1990a) also described how religious 
commitment as the independence feature of an ethically established institution (such as 
Islamic banks) could be significant in determining the publicly perceived credibility of the 
institution‟s operation. This is consistent with the belief that the Islamic banks‟ management 
is also keen to adhere to the Islamic Shari‟ah in the operation of the bank because a reported 
violation of the Shari‟ah by the Shari‟ah board could be detrimental to the perceived 
credibility of the bank. A further crucial criteria for an independent function of the Shari‟ah 
board members is to be free from the influence of economic interest or being pressurised by 
the Islamic banks' management (Karim 1990a).   
 
An interesting debut on the independence of Shari‟ah board is the absence of proper 
segregation of Shari‟ah board duties pertaining to their product endorsement function and, 
later, when they perform Shari‟ah review, as has been mentioned in the previous section. 
Also discussed was Abdul Rahman‟s (2008) argument on the Shari‟ah compliance assurance 
in the Shari‟ah report which was made by the Shari‟ah board in the absence of an external 
Shari‟ah auditor. These dilemmas do not only display the apparent loophole in the 
independence of the Shari‟ah governance authority of Islamic banks, but they might also 
impair the Shari‟ah opinion as expressed by the Shari‟ah board members. In addition, since 
both stages are held responsible by the same monitoring body (i.e. the Shari‟ah board), this 
brings forward a further concern on the monitoring effectiveness within Islamic bank‟s 
Shari‟ah governance authority. Equally crucial is the need for Shari‟ah board members to be 
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able to attend general meetings, and gain accessibility and means to Islamic banks‟ 
documents and accounts when performing their duty as religious auditors as would external 
auditors when examining the financial statements of an organisation (Briston and El-Ashker 
1986; Tomkins and Karim 1987; Gambling et al. 1993; Rammal 2006). Clearly, these 
requirements are vital for the Shari‟ah board to produce a truthful and unbiased Shari‟ah 
compliance report on the operation of the Islamic banks because if the operation of Islamic 
banks are found to be non-compliant to the Shari‟ah then the integrity of the Islamic banking 
industry would be undermined and stakeholders would lose confidence (Bhambra 2002).  
 
4.4.1 AAOIFI and IFSB Standards on the Independence of Shari’ah Boards 
AAOIFI and IFSB raise the issue of the independence of the Shari‟ah board by addressing 
aspects of Shari‟ah board members‟ appointment, remuneration and the need for a clearly 
defined scope of duties. In relation to the Shari‟ah board‟s terms of appointment, there are 
several factors which are considered by both the AAOIFI and IFSB as influencing the 
independence of the Shari‟ah board. Among these it is suggested that the Shari‟ah board 
members should not become involved in the managerial decisions of the IFI and that they or 
their family members should not be employed as a senior executive officer or have  a 
substantial shareholding in the IFI (IFSB 2009 para. 41-45; AAOIFI 2010a para. 47, 
Appendix A). In addition, IFSB also made clear the need for the board of directors to be 
ultimately responsible for the appointment of Shari‟ah board members and that this 
appointment should be made by the board of directors with approval from the shareholders in 
the general meeting (IFSB 2009). Indeed, the shareholders are seen as the ideal party to 
appoint Shari‟ah board members because this approach is deemed to be consistent with the 
earlier discussion on the appointment of board of directors over the principal-agent 
relationship on the need for monitoring of the agents‟ activities. However, the apparent 
distinction of the Shari‟ah board will be its specialisation on the Shari‟ah compliance 
monitoring capacity. The IFSB (2009), under principle, 1.2 also clearly spells out 
recommendations for institutions such as Islamic banks to provide clear terms of reference 
regarding the responsibilities and mandated authority of the Shari‟ah board. These terms of 
reference should also specify well-defined operating procedures, the line of reporting and the 
remuneration of Shari‟ah board members (IFSB 2009 Appendix 1). Such initiatives, if taken, 
are deemed to be capable of enhancing the independence of the Shari‟ah board in carrying 
out its duties.  
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Despite the explanation and recommendations of the AAOIFI and IFSB above, the literature 
presents a number of arguments that raise questions on the independence of Shari‟ah boards. 
For example, the recruitment of Islamic scholars to serve on the Shari‟ah governance 
authority in the Islamic banking industry has made a dramatic change in their lifestyle. From 
the social well-being perspective, these scholars are currently highly paid for their 
governance role (Kahf 2002; Siddiqi 2006). Additionally, the fact that the Shari‟ah board 
members are being remunerated by the bank and at the same time carrying out the Shari‟ah 
compliance monitoring role on the bank‟s activities points to the dual relationship of the 
Shari‟ah board members and, hence, could  jeopardise the independence of this Shari‟ah 
governance authority (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Rammal 2006; Khan 2007). Other 
criticisms go further by arguing that the Shari‟ah board members would, in return for the 
monetary value they gain by sitting in the Shari‟ah board, legitimise dubious operations 
(Rammal 2006) or provide an easy fatwa to the management of the Islamic banks (Grais and 
Pellegrini 2006), thus, becoming a window dresser to Islamic banks (Kahf 2002).  
 
4.5 The Role of Centralised Shari’ah Board 
Another Shari‟ah governance model apparent in the Islamic banking industry is the 
establishment of a centralised Shari‟ah board that co-exists with bank‟s in-house Shari‟ah 
board. While the Shari‟ah board is the Shari‟ah governance authority in-charge of the 
Shari‟ah governance at the bank‟s level, the centralised Shari‟ah board is in-charge of the 
Shari‟ah governance at the macro level, i.e. at the national level. The countries that exhibit a 
centralised Shari‟ah board governing the Islamic banking industry are Jordan, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, Malaysia, Sudan, Kuwait, Qatar, Pakistan, and Indonesia. However, the 
authority of this centralised Shari‟ah board and the mechanism of how this board would 
operate might not be identical amongst the countries mentioned (see, for example, Hasan 
2009). For example, the centralised Shari‟ah board for the Islamic banking industry in 
Malaysia is established at the level of the central bank, whose resolutions are binding and 
whose members are restricted from becoming a Shari‟ah board member of IFI. Meanwhile, 
Kuwait has a Fatwa Board at the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs which acts as the 
centralised Shari‟ah board for the Islamic banking industry, and its members are not restricted 
from serving as a Shari‟ah board member in any of the country‟s IFIs. Despite these 
differences, the central argument on the tasks of a centralised Shari‟ah board is to attempt to 
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standardise the Islamic banking practices through coordination of the fatwas and the Islamic 
financing products and services (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Laldin 2008a; Shaffaii 2008).   
 
One of the apparent features of the centralised Shari‟ah board is its Shari‟ah compliance 
facilitative feature (Shaffaii 2008). The centralised Shari‟ah board, which is usually 
comprised of experts in the field of fiqh al-mua‟malat, is deemed significant in assisting the 
related parties (i.e. the Islamic banks themselves, the regulators and the supervisors) in 
understanding the Shari‟ah principles applied in the operation of Islamic banks, thus easing 
any possible regulatory conflicts amongst them. On the question of membership, Wilson 
(2009) asserts that a centralised Shari‟ah board should also include experts from other fields 
(such as finance) because this will ensure that the fiqh scholars in the same board are aware 
of the financial consequences and will make better informed decisions and approvals on the 
Islamic financial contracts that could be complex in nature. However, he also agreed that the 
centralised Shari‟ah board with limited knowledge in fiqh could dilute the influence of the 
Islamic jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the establishment of a centralised Shari‟ah board could 
be seen as a regulator‟s intervention to further strengthen the Shari‟ah governance of Islamic 
banks and as one measurement of mitigating possibilities of non-compliant Shari‟ah risk. 
Such a move by the regulators signifies a positive contribution towards a standardised 
approach and pushes for acceptance of the Islamic banking practices at a global platform. It is 
also noteworthy that the setup of a centralised Shari‟ah board as the governance mechanism 
for overseeing the national Islamic banking practices is also recommended by AAOIFI
28
 and 
the Organisation of Islamic Conference‟s (OIC) Fiqh Academy29.  
 
The centralised Shari‟ah board could also play an intermediary role in resolving any 
difference of opinions or any disputes that arise between the in-house Shari‟ah board 
members of particular Islamic banks (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Alhabshi and Bakar 2008; 
                                                 
28
 AAOIFI, Certified Shari‟a Advisor and Auditor (CSAA) textbook, p. 326. 
29
 The International Council of Fiqh Academy in its Decision Number 177 (19/3) recommends the set up of a 
central Shari‟ah authority to supervise the operations of Shari‟ah board of all Islamic financial institutions in the 
country. Additionally, the resolution also includes a suggestion that the appointment and removal of the Shari‟ah 
board should be done by the central Shari‟ah authority and that the later should structure the function of, and 
audit the work done by, the former. It is also worth noting that many of the recommendations included in the 
resolutions, such as on the role of the Shari‟ah board and the internal Shari‟ah review process of Islamic 
financial institutions, are similar to those of AAOIFI. The resolution of the fiqh academy can be accessed at 
http://www.iefpedia.com/english/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/The-Role-of-Shariah-Supervision-in-Regulating-
the-Operations-of-Islami-Banks.pdf  
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Laldin 2008a). Since there are likely to be differences in the ijtihad (legal reasoning) of the 
Shari‟ah board on the operation of Islamic banks, these differences could be referred to the 
centralised Shari‟ah board in order to arrive at an agreement between the Shari‟ah board 
members. In this light, Wilson (2009) concludes that consistencies in the IFI are more likely 
in jurisdictions where there exists a centralised Shari‟ah board. Hence, the Shari‟ah reference 
role of the centralised Shari‟ah governance authority is seen as crucial in harmonising the 
Islamic banking practices worldwide as well as in preserving the integrity of the Shari‟ah 
board itself (Laldin 2008b). 
 
The next section will discuss further one of the main challenges in the Islamic banking 
industry worldwide, which is the standardisation of Islamic banking practices. 
 
 
4.6 Standardization of Islamic Banking Practices 
It has been discussed earlier that the scope of the present modern Islamic banking operation 
requires the Shari‟ah board members to use the ijtihad facility in coming up with their fatwa 
on its application in the Islamic banks. However, this provision opens room for differences of 
opinion amongst the scholars with regard to the permissibility on the operational or product 
innovation aspect of Islamic banks. Also deemed unavoidable because of the expansion of 
Islamic banks operation worldwide is the likelihood that the operation of Islamic banks will 
be influenced by the cultural background and the diversity provided by the different 
madzahib. Hence, differences in Islamic banking practices seem inevitable because they are 
the natural outcome of ijtihad (legal reasoning) by the Shari‟ah body, who governs the 
industry, and the effect of the domestic condition and circumstances on Islamic banks (Laldin 
2008b). 
 
Apparently, the situations described above lead to a series of un-standardised Islamic banking 
practices across the globe. Several studies present an argument that a different verdict by the 
Shari‟ah board members on similar practices impacts on the financial reporting of Islamic 
banks (Karim 1990b, 1996; see for example El-Gamal 1997; El-Hawary et al. 2007; Khan 
2007). For instance, Karim (1996) asserts that the diverse recognition and measurement 
policies suggested by an individual Islamic bank‟s in-house Shari‟ah board members could 
eventually make Islamic banks disclose differently from one another on the same issues.  
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Meanwhile, Karbhari et al. (2004) asserted that the lack of standardisation on the Islamic 
scholars‟ opinions on issues relating to the practice of Islamic banks has created tension 
between Islamic bank and the regulators, which has contributed to Al-Baraka‟s (the first 
Islamic bank in the UK) loss its bank license. Hence, standardisation and consistency can be 
considered as key elements for the penetration and establishment of Islamic banking products 
and practices, especially in the non-Islamic regulatory setting of Western countries. 
Additionally, it makes it obvious that standardisation is attributed to ease of regulatory 
control in terms of monitoring activities, examining fulfilment against certain authority‟s 
requirement, and enhanced comparability and transparency of the reporting practices by 
Islamic banks.  
 
Shaffaii (2008) provides three examples which are regarded as the key drivers in 
standardising and harmonising the Shari‟ah for Islamic banks. The first example could be 
considered as the market influence of disciplining the industry (a corporate governance 
mechanism which was mentioned in Chapter Two). Since there are many industry players in 
the market, the high competition in the market will force Islamic banks to standardise their 
practices to ensure their survival. Secondly, the establishment of IFI regulatory bodies such 
as AAOIFI and IFSB have been recognised for their outstanding effort in producing 
governance, reporting and Shari‟ah standards for use in institutions like Islamic banks. 
Indeed, both institutions have worked on reconciling and harmonising the Shari‟ah 
jurisdiction used in Islamic financial services through the set-up of their Shari‟ah board and 
Shari‟ah working group respectively. Thirdly, there has been an ongoing Shari‟ah forums and 
discussion initiated by various parties, including reputable organisations (such as the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy of Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and Multaqa Dallah al-Barakah) 
and the more recent forums (such as Muzakarah Cendekiawan Shari‟ah Nusantara (MCSN), a 
gathering of prominent Shari‟ah scholars from the South East Asian region (ASEAN) 
comprising of countries from Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore and Thailand) which 
have aimed at becoming the platform to find a common ground for harmonising the 
application of the Shari‟ah in the Islamic banking industry of the region.  
 
In addition to those responsible organisations put forward by Shaffaii (2008) above, there are 
other initiatives towards standardising Islamic banking practice which can be judged by the 
objectives of the establishment of these respective bodies. They include the work done by the 
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), the Islamic International Rating Agency 
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(IIRA), monetary agencies and Islamic indices in the stock market. The role of the IIFM and 
IIRA in promoting standardization of Islamic banking practices has been highlighted in 
Section 3.4 of Chapter Three. Meanwhile, monetary authorities have also put their effort to 
ensuring uniformity and harmonisation of the Shari‟ah interpretation by establishing a 
centralised Shari‟ah board as well as the issuance of guidelines for implementation in IFIs 
such as Islamic banks. Over the past few decades a number of Islamic Market Indices have 
also been developed, such as the FTSE Global Islamic Index, Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Indexes, Malaysian Securities Commission‟s Islamic Capital Market (ICM), and the Jakarta 
Islamic Indexes. These indices provide investment opportunities by identifying and filtering 
out those companies whose operations are not consistent with the Shari‟ah. Thus, companies 
who seek funds through investment in these indices would have to be abide by the Shari‟ah 
guidelines which are issued by the respective indices‟ Shari‟ah board. 
 
At the other extreme, Zaidi (2008) pointed out that standardisation of the Shari‟ah opinion 
would be contrary to the objective of the Shari‟ah for several reasons. Firstly, he noted that in 
the event where rules are being imposed to force the Shari‟ah to be standardised this would 
restrict the use of ijtihad (legal reasoning) which allows for the application of Shari‟ah at 
different times and circumstances. Wilson (2009) shares the same concern when he asserts 
that standardisation would only slow the innovation of Islamic banking development. In 
addition to the first counter argument by Zaidi (2008), the standardisation of Shari‟ah rulings 
could also result in the opinion of certain madzhab to take precedence over other madzhab. 
On the other hand, the Shari‟ah principle of „al-ijtihad la yanqudu bi al-ijtihad‟ means that 
the interpretation of the Shari‟ah by the scholars or the ijtihad cannot be nullified by another 
ijtihad (Laldin 2008b). Hence, when there are conflicting opinions on the permissibility of 
certain Islamic finance products by different Shari‟ah scholars, this does not mean that 
Islamic banks should close their doors on the innovation of Islamic finance products and 
services.  
 
Moreover, the Islamic banking industry operates under the ambit of the national Shari‟ah 
governance framework (SGF). This SGF might comprise a centralised Shari‟ah board acting 
as the supreme authority of the Islamic banking industry whose resolutions serve as the point 
of reference for Shari‟ah boards of IFI within that national jurisdiction. As the highest 
Shari‟ah authority in the SGF, the centralised Shari‟ah board would issue certain Shari‟ah 
resolutions by accommodating the local and cultural circumstances of the country. However, 
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this resolution could be contrary to the resolutions of the centralised Shari‟ah board of 
another country. This scenario makes it apparent that the flexibility given in Shari‟ah itself 
serves as the contributing factor that makes the SGF of one country unique. This is also the 
reason for the prevalent differences on the opinion of the Shari‟ah scholars on whether there 
should be a penalty imposed on a defaulting debtor (which is argued as being tantamount to 
riba or usury) and the permissibility of certain Islamic financial products in some countries 
while it is considered impermissible in others (such as the common use of bay‟ bithaman ajil 
in Malaysia as discussed in Chapter Three). 
 
The above arguments provide some indication of the difficulty associated with standardising 
Islamic banking practices. Despite the emerging challenge of differences in Islamic banking 
practice, Grais and Pellegrini (2006) cited the findings of the Council for Islamic Banks and 
Financial Institutions (CIBAFI) (as reported in the proceedings of the Fourth Harvard 
University on Islamic Finance) in which out of 6000 fatwas sampled by CIBAFI, 90% were 
found to be consistent across banks. Thus, this finding shows an inclination on the 
consistency of Shari‟ah interpretation used in Islamic banks by the scholars over the legal 
Shari‟ah sources and implies that overall differences in Shari‟ah opinion will be on broad and 
not specific matters, as has been suggested by Karim (1990b). Significant efforts on 
standardising Islamic banking practices have taken place, and many are still consistently 
working towards this goal. 
 
 
4.7 Shari’ah Governance Function of Shari’ah Boards and Shari’ah 
Advisory Council in the Malaysian Islamic Banking Industry  
It was been mentioned earlier that Malaysia is one of the countries which implements a dual-
layer Shari‟ah governance system in their Islamic banking industry. Every bank offering 
Islamic banking products and services in Malaysia has an in-house Shari‟ah board, called 
Shari‟ah Committee, who holds a non-executive role and who is the sole authority of 
Shari‟ah matters in that particular bank. Meanwhile, another level of Shari‟ah governance is 
undertaken at the central bank level by the centralised Shari‟ah board, which is called the 
Shari‟ah Advisory Council (SAC). The SAC acts as the sole authoritative body to advise the 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) for Islamic banking and Takaful operations, hence, making 
apparent its role as a regulator and supervisor. As the Shari‟ah apex body, the SAC has been 
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authorised with mandated power on its Shari‟ah governance role, as can be seen from the 
recent amendment to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 in which the Shari‟ah 
resolutions issued by the SAC are binding to all Malaysian IFIs (BNM 2009). This 
enforcement demonstrates that the role of the regulators in ensuring that the governance 
system implemented in Islamic banking system is robust due to the strict requirement for the 
banks to adhere to the Shari‟ah. It is also noteworthy that as a central Shari‟ah reference the 
SAC could overcome or minimise inconsistencies in Islamic banking practices in Malaysia. 
  
The regulatory setup for the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia seems to be partly 
consistent with the recommendation made by AAOIFI. For instance, under the provision of 
BNM‟s „Guidelines on the Governance of Shariah Committee for Islamic Financial 
Institutions‟ (or GPS1) the Islamic banks should establish a Shari‟ah board of at least three 
members (BNM 2004). However, in practice, the approach of appointing Shari‟ah board 
members appeared to be contrary to the AAOIFI‟s recommendation because the members to 
this Shari‟ah governance authority are currently appointed by the bank‟s board of directors. 
Nevertheless, the GPS1 also highlights that the procedure of appointing Shari‟ah board 
member is heightened by the requirement for this appointment to gain the approval of BNM. 
The GPS1 also limits the number of Shari‟ah board members sitting in a bank to be not more 
than one. It has also been argued that a limitation imposed on Shari‟ah board‟s membership, 
such as that required by the GPS1, can potentially protect the confidentiality of banking 
information and documents to rival institutions (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Wilson 2009). In 
addition, the GPS1 includes guidelines on matters pertaining to the procedures, qualifications, 
composition, secretariat, disqualification, resignation and termination, restrictions, duties and 
responsibilities of the Shari‟ah board members. Indeed, under the provision of Section 3 (5) 
(b) of the Malaysian Islamic Bank Act 1983, the BNM is required to disallow the grant of a 
license, and that the Minister shall not grant the license, unless they are satisfied that there is, 
in the articles of association of the bank concerned, provision for the establishment of a 
Shari‟ah board (Malaysia 1983). Similarly, Section 124 of the Malaysian Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) 1989 spells out the requirement for other banks (i.e. 
conventional banks) or licensed institutions offering Islamic banking business to be subject to 
the same enforcement of BNM in relation to the Islamic banking business, which necessitates 
the bank to establish a Shari‟ah board and to work in consultation with the SAC (Malaysia 
1989).  
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Clearly, under the Malaysian regulatory environment the establishment of a Shari‟ah board is 
mandatory and the appointment of its members requires the approval of the regulator. 
Malaysia can also be seen to have taken an initiative to ensure the independence of the 
Shari‟ah board since any concern on conflict of interest, or the capability of the Shari‟ah 
board member in performing a Shari‟ah governance function, can be addressed before the 
Shari‟ah board member is formally appointed. Hence, this prevailing regulatory framework 
can be seen as a filtering mechanism on Shari‟ah board‟s appointment and demonstrates the 
influence of the regulator in shaping the Shari‟ah governance structure of the Islamic banking 
industry in Malaysia.  
 
The GPS1 also outlines an important regulation on the Shari‟ah board over its Shari‟ah 
governance functions in Malaysian Islamic banks. In tandem with its Shari‟ah advisory role, 
the guidelines states a provision for the Shari‟ah board to advice the board of directors on 
Shari‟ah matters and to report functionally to the board of directors. Also specified in GPS1 
is the need for the Shari‟ah board to establish auditing procedures by developing contracts on 
Islamic financial products and services to be launched to consumers, and to also endorse its 
related documentation. Also required from the Shari‟ah board is endorsing the Shari‟ah 
manual that is developed and used by the Islamic bank that the Shari‟ah board serves, and to 
organise periodical Shari‟ah meetings to discuss any issue involving operational or product 
matters of their respective bank. Moreover, the GPS1 also specifies the need for the Shari‟ah 
board to validate the documentation used within the contracting parties and to ensure that 
there is a proper record of those documents for easy reference on Shari‟ah decision to be 
made by the Shari‟ah board. The Shari‟ah compliance report on the Islamic bank‟s adherence 
to the Shari‟ah represents another important task of the Shari‟ah board which is set out in the 
guideline. In addition, the GPS1 also requires IFIs offering Islamic banking and Takaful to 
recruit a minimum of one Shari‟ah compliance officer (who is called the Shari‟ah officer) 
who will serve as the secretariat to the Shari‟ah board. 
 
4.8 Empirical Studies on the Shari’ah Governance Function of the Shari’ah 
Board 
The preceding sections have thoroughly discussed the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board. These sections have highlighted a number of significant Shari‟ah board issues 
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found in the literature, including: its membership, its diverse scope of responsibilities, the 
accountability and independence of the Shari‟ah board and the factors influencing these two 
attributes, as well as the standardisation of Islamic banking practice. In addition, the role of 
the Shari‟ah board and the SAC in the context of Malaysian Islamic banking business has 
also been described. The interest of this current section is to examine prior empirical studies 
on these issues. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, empirical studies on the 
Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board can be considered as still lacking and 
they leave much to be desired, although the few which are available such as Abumouamer 
(1989), Abdul Rahman et al. (2005), Al-Sadah (2007), Alhabshi and Bakar (2008), Faizullah 
(2009), Safieddine (2009), Hassan et al. (2010), Rammal (2010) and Hasan (2011) provide an 
indication of the extent of empirical work done on this subject.  
 
Abumouamer‟s (1989) study on the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board is the 
earliest study to be found on this subject. Using a questionnaire survey and interview as his 
research instruments, Abumouamer (1989) studied the role of Shari‟ah board members in 
fifteen Islamic banks and Islamic finance houses from different countries. His findings 
revealed that the majority of the Shari‟ah board members perceived that they are independent 
and that they have a coordinated relationship with the management. The Shari‟ah board was 
also indicated as receiving authority from the shareholders and a Shari‟ah board whose 
remuneration is determined by the shareholders perceived that they are more independent. In 
addition, the Shari‟ah board members who are placed on the management and the board of 
directors were found to have more access to financial books and documents than those 
Shari‟ah board members who hold a non-executive role.  
 
Meanwhile, there is no clear definition on the Shari‟ah advisory role of the Shari‟ah board as 
reported by Abumouamer (1989). On the other hand, the Shari‟ah review role of the Shari‟ah 
board, called „Shari‟ah auditing‟ by Abumouamer (1989) was categorised as: the pre-audit, 
during the work audit, and the post-audit. It was revealed that information for Shari‟ah 
auditing was collected by asking the bank‟s staff (65.9%) or from financial books and 
documents (34.1%). Abumouamer (1989) also examined Shari‟ah auditing on financial 
statements and the various accounts in an Islamic bank (e.g. investment account, deposit 
account and current account). This Shari‟ah auditing was undertaken despite the fact that the 
Shari‟ah board members were reported as mainly comprising of Shari‟ah scholars who did 
not have the ability to audit accounting documents. Moreover, the Shari‟ah board members 
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were reported as mostly working part-time in the Islamic banks, and as such their time to 
conduct a post-audit after they had declared their fatwa was limited. Interestingly, 
Abumouamer (1989) also revealed that although clients tend to be unaware of a Shari‟ah 
report issued by the Shari‟ah board, they still have confidence in the activities of Islamic 
banks as being halal through the dependence on Islamic bank‟s management and 
publications.  
 
On the other hand, Abdul Rahman et al. (2005) provide an empirical work on the 
independence of the Shari‟ah board from the perspective of commercial bank managers who 
work in Islamic banks and Islamic banking divisions of conventional local commercial banks 
in Malaysia. The study by Abdul Rahman et al. (2005) employed a mail questionnaire survey 
which was distributed to two fully-fledged Islamic banks and ten conventional banks offering 
Islamic banking products and services. Investigation of the Shari‟ah board‟s responsibilities 
was undertaken by briefly soliciting the perceptions of the respondents of the parties to whom 
the Shari‟ah boards are responsible legally, as well as religiously and socially. Based on the 
descriptive analysis performed on the central tendencies of mean data aggregated, Abdul 
Rahman et al. (2005) concluded that the Shari‟ah board‟ responsibilities were perceived by 
the respondents to be more important to depositors, shareholders, regulatory agencies, 
customers and the Muslim public than to creditors and managers. In addition, an analysis of 
the mean values revealed five factors which were able to increase the level of the Shari‟ah 
board‟s independence. These five factors include the level of Shari‟ah background and the 
reputation of the Shari‟ah board members, which is consistent with the independence 
concepts that were forwarded by Karim (1990a). The respondents also indicate that the 
existence of institutions such as Shari‟ah board, who are also members of the SAC and who 
take on a non-executive role, as other factors which are deemed crucial to increase the 
independence of the Shari‟ah board members.  
 
Meanwhile, Al-Sadah (2007) examined several issues on the corporate governance of Islamic 
banks through case studies of four Islamic banks in three different Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries. Al-Sadah (2007) exposed that the Shari‟ah board was mainly undertaking 
its Shari‟ah advisory role and it relied on the ISR for the Shari‟ah review function of the 
respective Islamic banks. In addition, he reported that all four of the Islamic banks studied 
reported no formal communication between the audit committee and the Shari‟ah board. 
Indeed, a Shari‟ah violation of an investment that is not compatible to the Shari‟ah occurred 
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in one of the Islamic banks and was reported by the Shari‟ah board but was not mentioned in 
the external auditor‟s report. Interestingly, the same violation had been reported for four 
consecutive years and, despite the disclosure, the total deposit of the said bank showed an 
increasing trend during the same period. Al-Sadah (2007) associated the failure of such a 
revelation to the ineffective market discipline depicted by the passive role of the investment 
account holders through their unconcerned deposits in the respective Islamic bank. 
Meanwhile, Al-Sadah (2007) briefly draws attention to the independence issue of the 
Shari‟ah board with regard to its remuneration. Al-Sadah (2007) reported that the Shari‟ah 
board members in all four Islamic banks studied are appointed and remunerated based on the 
decision of the board of directors, which is in turn made upon the recommendation of the 
management. Al-Sadah (2007) argued that in these circumstances the independence and 
effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board could be jeopardised because this Shari‟ah governance 
authority could be subject to the influence of the management. 
 
Another study on Shari‟ah governance of IFIs is by Alhabshi and Bakar (2008). This study 
examined various governance issues on 67 IFIs mostly form Middle East and Southeast Asia 
countries including Malaysia and produce findings that reveal varying Shari‟ah governance 
practices in the countries studied. The majority of the respondents in this study indicate the 
involvement of the Shari‟ah board in its traditional role of formulating as well as adopting 
Shari‟ah opinion and the exercise of Shari‟ah compliance monitoring on the IFI‟s system, 
documents, and products. This finding corresponds to the evidence which shows that 95% of 
the respondents regarded the Shari‟ah board as the highest decision making authority on 
Shari‟ah matters. Majority of the respondents also felt that Shari‟ah matters are reported to 
the Shari‟ah board and that the Shari‟ah board is a platform to resolve differences in Shari‟ah 
matters. They also found that less than 50% of the respondents incorporate Shari‟ah goals in 
the IFIs‟ vision, mission, and overall institutional goals. In addition, six different stages of 
product development were tested, which are: conception, design, documentation, testing, 
implementation and review. The highest involvement of the Shari‟ah board in Islamic bank‟s 
product development based on these stages was reported from Bahrain and UAE. Meanwhile, 
countries like Malaysia, Qatar, and Sudan indicated a high level of Shari‟ah board roles only 
in the conception, product design and product documentation stages.  
 
Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) also observed a varying emphasis on the scope of the Shari‟ah 
report prepared by the Shari‟ah board. It was found that about 95% of the respondents 
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reported on the Shari‟ah compliance of the products offered by the Islamic banks. A lower 
percentage of respondents included emphasis on the reliance on an internal Shari‟ah control 
system (76%), governance issues in the interest of investment account holders (71%), as well 
as other issues addressing the interest of stakeholders (68%). Meanwhile, the shareholders 
role in approving the Shari‟ah report issued by the Shari‟ah board seems to be weak in 
practice. Malaysia and Indonesia have both shown the lowest levels of involvement of 
shareholders in giving approval to the Shari‟ah report, with a response rate lower than 40%. 
This is deemed to have resulted from the country specific mechanism on the appointment of 
the Shari‟ah board members. In addition, evidence from all of the investigated countries 
indicated that the Shari‟ah matters are deliberated by the Shari‟ah board. However, there are 
differences in the concentration level on the deliberation by the Shari‟ah board; for example, 
Islamic banks in Bahrain, Brunei, Jordan and Malaysia have reported a higher involvement of 
the Shari‟ah board in this process when compared to other countries.  
 
In addition, Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) found that the presence of the centralised Shari‟ah 
board influenced the authority, appointment and Shari‟ah reporting mechanism of the 
Shari‟ah board. Such an inference is made on the basis that the final say on the appointment 
of the Shari‟ah board rests on the centralised Shari‟ah board whom the majority of the 
respondents considered as the highest authority in the Shari‟ah governance of Islamic banks 
within the sovereigns. Their findings also revealed that the primary role of the centralised 
Shari‟ah board was regarded as establishing the national SGF by 56% of the respondent, 
while another 49% regarded it to be formulating national policy and rulings for the Islamic 
financial industry.  
 
Meanwhile, Faizullah‟s (2009) study pertaining to the role of the Shari‟ah board relates to the 
reported questionnaire survey findings of ten IFIs in Bangladesh. He briefly reported that the 
main role of the Shari‟ah board was: to give advice on all aspects of Shari‟ah law (70%); 
advising on formulating products (40%); and, issuing Shari‟ah certification (30%). He also 
briefly studied the Shari‟ah board members involvement on the accounting aspects of the 
IFI‟s operation. These are issues pertaining to: the paying or receiving of interest (of which 
the Shari‟ah boards are generally unaware); the segregation of funds (of which 40% believe 
that it is segregated); profit distribution (of which 80% believe that it is based on actual 
profit); and, loss distribution (of which 50% believe that it is based on actual loss).  Faizullah 
(2009) also briefly indicated the independence of the Shari‟ah board. In addition to revealing 
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that the chairman of one bank was also the Shari‟ah board member of that particular bank, 
Faizullah (2009) also reported that the Shari‟ah board members mostly do not hold an 
executive position in the bank.  In addition, he also found that 40% of the Shari‟ah board 
members are also on the board of other IFIs and that the Shari‟ah decision is made mainly 
based on a majority (80%). 
 
In 2009, Safieddine examined the practices of IFIs from five GCC countries together with 
their implications in mitigating the agency problems, as well as their influence on the 
operations and performance of Islamic banks. In undertaking his study, Safieddine (2009) 
collected data from 40 IFIs using both a questionnaire survey and interviews with senior 
managers from 3 IFIs. He highlighted the issue of the independence of the Shari‟ah board in 
its appointment mechanism (83% of the IFIs appointed their Shari‟ah board through a general 
assembly), possible conflict of interest (the Shari‟ah boards were reported as not holding 
executive position or owning any shares in their respective IFIs), its reporting line (73% of 
the IFIs reported that their Shari‟ah board reports to the board of directors and the 
shareholders while the remaining 27% reported to the board of directors only), and its 
decision making (all of the IFIs reported that their decisions are approved by majority of the 
Shari‟ah board members, and 85% of the IFIs reported that decisions made by the Shari‟ah 
board is mandatory and binding). While these findings offer some insights into the 
independence of the Shari‟ah board, other important aspects of the Shari‟ah governance 
function of this governance authority were not included in Safieddine‟s (2009) study.  
 
Later, Hassan et al. (2010) looked to the role of the Shari‟ah board in Malaysian Islamic 
banking and Takaful industries by conducting interviews with 37 participants, which 
included: Shari‟ah board members (23); Shari‟ah officers (11 ), and regulators (3). This study 
indicated that the role of the Shari‟ah board members were limited to: product approval 
(91.4%), as a decision making body (85.7%), and as researchers and experts in Islamic 
banking and finance (97%). In addition, they also report that the Shari‟ah review task of the 
Shari‟ah board was to: review any new products and their structures, concepts, and 
documentation; existing Shari‟ah matters, and their implementation of Shari‟ah decisions and 
resolutions; hold regular monthly meetings and ad-hoc meetings when necessary; and, to 
ensure that IFIs have their own Shari‟ah manual. Furthermore, Hassan et al. (2010) reported 
that the Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board members are binding to the IFIs and 
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that if Shari‟ah violations are found corrective actions should be taken to the extent of 
withholding or terminating the product if it cannot be rectified.  
 
Additionally, Hassan et al. (2010) also revealed the importance of proper operative 
procedures, appropriate qualifications and relevant experience for Shari‟ah board members as 
being amongst the factors influencing the effectiveness of this Shari‟ah governance authority. 
Interestingly, their findings also reported that the amount of remuneration received by the 
Shari‟ah board members influenced their effectiveness (76.5%) and that remuneration does 
not affect their independence (75%). Meanwhile, the effective structure of the Shari‟ah board 
was indicated as comprising a combination of both Shari‟ah and non-Shari‟ah experts (71%), 
with between three to five expert members (79%). Factors that might impede the 
effectiveness of Shari‟ah review function of the Shari‟ah board were also indicated in their 
findings. These are: 
1. Time constraint due to the part-time working nature of the Shari‟ah board;  
2. Incompetency (in knowledge and experience) of the Shari‟ah board members;  
3. Inadequate communication between Shari‟ah board members with internal parties 
within the bank;  
4. Shortage of human resources; and,  
5. Interference from the board of directors.  
 
Rammal‟s (2010) study on the role of the Shari‟ah board for the Islamic banking industry in 
Pakistan used case studies of two fully-fledge Islamic banks and four banks offering Islamic 
window. It is argued that Rammal‟s (2010) study offers a narrow understanding on the 
Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. The diverse range of Shari‟ah advisory 
and Shari‟ah review role of the Shari‟ah board was not ascertained. For instance, Rammal 
(2010) revealed that the roles and function of the Shari‟ah board include developing Islamic 
banking products. If a new product is to be developed then this requires the approval of the 
Shari‟ah board of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), which is noted as a mechanism to 
standardise Islamic banking products. However, Rammal (2010) did not specify the 
involvement of Shari‟ah board members in the different stages of developing the product. 
Meanwhile, Rammal (2010) briefly described the structure of the Shari‟ah review task of the 
Shari‟ah board by differentiating it between Islamic banks and banks with an Islamic 
window. Rammal (2010) revealed that, unlike the case of banks with an Islamic window, the 
Shari‟ah board members find it difficult to review Islamic banks because they have many 
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branches across the country. This has resulted in the need for the Shari‟ah review of Islamic 
banks to be undertaken by the Shari‟ah board at the bank‟s headquarter due to time and cost 
constraints. In addition, Rammal (2010) also indicated that the role of Shari‟ah board 
members are regarded as simple „rubber stamping‟ because most of the decisions have 
already been made by the bank itself. Furthermore, the board members were argued by 
Rammal (2010) to be unlikely to reject the decisions made by the bank because they are 
compensated by the bank. 
 
More recently, Hasan (2011) attempted to study aspects of Shari‟ah governance in IFIs from 
the regulatory framework perspective. Insights on the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board offered by Hasan (2011) were derived from 31 IFIs, which were drawn from: 
Malaysia (17), UK (1) and GCC (13) countries. Hasan (2011) indicated that the majority of 
the Shari‟ah board in the IFIs studied undertook a Shari‟ah advisory and Shari‟ah review role. 
However, it was noted that the Shari‟ah advisory role of the Shari‟ah board was not clearly 
defined. For example, the Shari‟ah board‟s involvement in advising the board of directors or 
other parties within the bank, in designing the strategic issues of the bank, or in training the 
bank staff have not been ascertained. Also, there was no indication of whether the Shari‟ah 
board members receive any assistance from relevant parties within the bank in order to 
undertake their Shari‟ah advisory role.  
 
In addition, it has been observed that Hasan (2011) also looked at the involvement of the 
Shari‟ah board in developing Islamic banking products, in undertaking institution review (for 
example, the accounting aspects of the IFIs), the structure of Shari‟ah review (for example, 
the operative procedures), and in the implementation of Shari‟ah review (for example, the 
communication between the Shari‟ah board and other parties within the bank and evaluation 
of IFI‟s Shari‟ah governance system). However, the precise involvement of the Shari‟ah 
board in different stages of product development, the commitments in innovating and 
standardising products, and in the operation of IFI and the role and influence of the 
centralised Shari‟ah board are amongst the apparent loopholes which are identified in 
Hasan‟s (2011) study on the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. Meanwhile, 
aspects of Shari‟ah board member‟s independence were limited to the regulatory framework 
applied in the jurisdiction of the IFIs studied. This leaves important factors found in the 
literature and which were discussed in Section 4.4 not being identified by Hasan (2011) as 
influencing the independence of the Shari‟ah board. Similarly, Hasan (2011) overlooks the 
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importance of ascertaining factors influencing the accountability of the Shari‟ah board 
members, although it is noted that he studied those parties to whom the board is deemed to be 
accountable. Also worth noting is that aspects of the Shari‟ah board‟s appointment and 
authority were studied by Hasan (2011). This includes establishing the existence of „fit and 
proper‟ criteria for the appointment of the Shari‟ah board, communication channel and an 
evaluation of the appointment and authority of the Shari‟ah board members.  
 
This section has thoroughly examined prior empirical studies on the Shari‟ah governance 
function of Shari‟ah board. Table 4.1 below provides a summary of this. It can be concluded 
that these studies are rather limited in scope principally because the Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board in terms of its role, accountability, independence and 
effectiveness are rather broad (as reviewed in Sections 4.2 to 4.6 above). Similarly, studies 
that examine Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board in its association with the 
centralised Shari‟ah board are also limited. Hence, there is a gap in the literature that 
evaluates and provides an in-depth understanding on the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board in pace with the rapid development of the Islamic banking industry and with 
the increasing demand of the customers for these services.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of Empirical Studies relating to the Shari’ah Governance Function of Shari’ah Boards 
Note:   + tested or studied, - not tested or not studied, Limited- limited in scope, not defined by the author(s)  
Literature 
Defining the Role of 
the Shari’ah Board  
Defining  Shari'ah Review Role of 
the Shari’ah Board  
Defining Shari’ah Board’s 
Accountability 
Defining Shari’ah Board’s 
Independence 
Author 
Sample 
Study 
Country /  
Countries 
Research  
Method 
Target 
Respondents 
Ascertain the 
Diverse Shari'ah 
Advisory & Shari’ah 
Review Role 
Ascertain the 
Structure for 
Shari'ah Review 
Ascertain the 
Implementation 
of Shari'ah 
Review 
Ascertain  
Factors 
Influencing 
Accountability 
Ascertain 
Parties whom 
Shari’ah Board 
is Accountable 
Ascertain 
Factors 
Influencing 
Independence 
Ascertain the 
Nature of 
Appointment 
and Mandated 
Authority  
Hasan  
(2011) 
Malaysia, 
GCC 
and UK 
Questionnaire 
survey 
IFIs Limited + Limited - + - + 
Hassan et al. 
(2010) 
Malaysia Interview  
Shari‟ah board 
members, 
Shari‟ah officers 
& regulators 
Limited + + - - Limited + 
Rammal  
(2010) 
Pakistan 
Interview, 
secondary data 
Managers of IFIs, 
Shari‟ah board 
members, 
executives and 
researchers 
involved in 
Islamic banking 
industry  
(all interviews) 
Limited Limited Limited - - Limited + 
Safieddine 
(2009) 
Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, 
Qatar, Bahrain 
& UAE 
Questionnaire 
survey, 
interview 
 
IFIs 
(questionnaire), 
Senior managers 
(interview) 
 
- - - - - - + 
Faizullah 
(2009) 
Bangladesh  
Questionnaire 
survey  
IFIs Limited - Limited - - - Limited 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Shari’ah Governance Function of the Shari’ah Board (continued) 
Literature 
Defining the Role of 
the Shari’ah Board  
Defining  Shari'ah Review Role of 
the Shari’ah Board  
Defining Shari’ah Board’s 
Accountability 
Defining Shari’ah Board’s 
Independence 
Author 
Sample 
Study 
Country /  
Countries 
Research  
Method 
Target 
Respondents 
Ascertain the 
Diverse Shari'ah 
Advisory & Shari’ah 
Review Role 
Ascertain the 
Structure for 
Shari'ah Review 
Ascertain the 
Implementation 
of Shari'ah 
Review 
Ascertain  
Factors 
Influencing 
Accountability 
Ascertain 
Parties whom 
Shari’ah Board 
is Accountable 
Ascertain 
Factors 
Influencing 
Independence 
Ascertain the 
Nature of 
Appointment 
and Mandated 
Authority  
Alhabshi and 
Bakar (2008) 
 
10 countries 
including 
Malaysia 
 
Questionnaire 
survey, 
secondary data 
IFIs + + + - Limited Limited + 
Al-Sadah 
(2007) 
Kuwait, 
Bahrain & 
Qatar 
Interview, 
secondary data,  
 
Bank‟s Shari‟ah 
officers, 
Shari‟ah board 
members, 
external auditors 
 
Limited Limited Limited - - Limited Limited 
Abdul Rahman 
et. al (2005) 
Malaysia 
Questionnaire 
survey 
 
Branch managers 
from local full-
fledge Islamic 
banks & banks 
with Islamic 
window 
 
- Limited - - + + Limited 
Abumouamer 
(1989) 
Including 
Kuwait, 
Qatar, 
Bahrain, 
Egypt, 
Luxembourg, 
Denmark, 
Sudan  
 
Questionnaire 
survey, 
interview 
 
Islamic banks 
(questionnaire); 
Shari‟ah board 
members, board 
of directors, the 
management and 
clients of Islamic 
banks 
(interviews) 
Limited Limited Limited - limited Limited limited 
Note:   + tested or studied, - not tested or not studied, Limited- limited in scope, not defined by the author(s)  
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4.9 Summary 
This chapter has provided a literature review on the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board. Various issues concerning this governance mechanism offered by the 
Shari‟ah board members (particularly on their role, independence and effectiveness) have 
been discussed. While there is a consensus in the literature that the Shari‟ah board is held 
responsible for the oversight governance function of Islamic banks, the main 
responsibility of Shari‟ah compliance lies with the management. However, these Shari‟ah 
board members are expected to carry out their function independently and effectively. 
How these are perceived by the investors and the public community would determine the 
credibility of the Islamic banks and the Shari‟ah board itself.  In addition, the present 
modern Islamic banking operation demands that the Shari‟ah scholars be dynamic in 
terms of innovating Islamic finance products and services that would satisfy the need of 
the present consumers. In doing so, the Shari‟ah scholars have to ensure that the new 
finance instruments will be developed based on the guidelines and interpretations of the 
Shari‟ah and they should not merely imitate the practices of conventional banks and 
financial institutions. 
 
It has also been pointed that diverse Shari‟ah interpretations by Shari‟ah scholars have 
caused inconsistencies in the practice of Islamic banks as well as other associated 
difficulties with relevant parties, such as the regulators, investors, and the public. As 
argued in this chapter, a standardised Islamic banking practice is essential because it 
helps in the formation of efficient oversights, either by the Shari‟ah board members or by 
the regulators who are not experts in the Shari‟ah field. It also enhances the financial 
reporting quality of Islamic banks and it contributes to the confidence needed for the 
industry as a whole. This chapter has also discussed the reasons why the challenge 
towards standardisation effort persists. In addition, the role of the centralised Shari‟ah 
board has also been examined in this chapter. Of importance is that this centralised 
Shari‟ah board, in its regulatory and supervisory role, also carries a significant role in 
standardising the practice of Islamic banking within a particular jurisdiction.  
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It has been highlighted that the Malaysian regulatory environment presents that the 
Shari‟ah board as a regulated Shari‟ah governance authority. The GPS1, the guidelines on 
the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board issued by BNM, clearly stipulated 
that the establishment of a Shari‟ah board is mandated and the appointment of its 
members requires the approval of the regulator. In addition, the GPS1 also clearly 
stipulated that Shari‟ah board membership is limited to one local bank only, an initiative 
seen to ensure the independence of the Shari‟ah board. Also included in the GPS1 are the 
specified roles and functions of the Shari‟ah board. This chapter has also discussed 
previous empirical studies on the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. It 
has been brought into attention that these previous studies have been limited in scope and 
restricted to investigation of several parties associated with the Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board. Hence, there is a gap in the literature that provides an in-
depth understanding on this subject.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have reviewed the literature on the pertinent issues underlying the 
present scope of this research. This chapter aims to discuss the purpose of this study, 
describing the selection of Islamic banks in Malaysia (which are the research subject) as 
well as detailing the methodology which was designed within the researcher‟s ontological 
and epistemological framework. The design of this study involved the use of data which 
was collected predominantly from primary sources through questionnaires and in-depth 
interviews. In addition, the researcher also used annual reports to find descriptive 
information about the institutions investigated and the participants involved; 
consequently, this chapter will also describe secondary data sources used in this study. 
Details of the research methods used in this study will be explained later in this chapter. 
Also included in this chapter is a discussion on the limitations of following the research 
method which is employed in this study.   
 
5.2 Purpose of the Study 
As mentioned at the outset of the previous chapter, there is a growing interest in the 
literature on the subject of Islamic banking and finance. However, the empirical literature 
which specialises in corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) tends to 
be very limited, which, in contrast to the more established conventional interest-based 
banking and finance, is comparatively well studied. Several empirical studies relevant to 
the present scope of research include: Abumouamer (1989), Abdul Rahman et al. (2005), 
Al-Sadah (2007), Alhabshi and Bakar (2008), Faizullah (2009), Safieddine (2009), 
Hassan et al. (2010), Rammal (2010) and Hasan (2011). These studies are an important 
source of knowledge on this subject and they have contributed to the development of 
empirical work in this area. Nonetheless, a critical review of these studies indicates that 
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they are limited in scope and restricted to investigation of several parties associated with 
the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. In order to explore beyond the 
surface understanding of the subject of Shari‟ah governance in Islamic banks which has 
been provided by previous studies, the present research attempts to extend the breadth 
and depth on the fundamental issues concerning the role, independence, and effectiveness 
of the Shari‟ah board in Islamic banks.  
 
Furthermore, the Islamic finance industry has marked a steady progress. In 2007, the 
global annual growth of the industry was reported as 15-20% (McKinsey 2007). This 
indicates that Islamic finance is a fast developing industry and demonstrates an increase 
in the demanding needs of the investors and stakeholders. As such, investigations of the 
above subjects are deemed crucial because they would provide an indication of the 
present state of the Shari‟ah governance of the Malaysian Islamic banking industry. It is 
believed that research on the subject of the Malaysian Islamic banking business would 
help to offer an evaluation of the Shari‟ah governance for an industry which was 
developed more than 25 years ago.  
 
Additionally, the regulatory set-up for the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia exhibits a 
dual-layer of Shari‟ah governance (i.e. at both the banking level and the regulatory level) 
which falls under the authority of the Shari‟ah board and the centralised Shari‟ah board, 
which are the Shari‟ah Advisory Council (SAC) of the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), 
respectively. Hence, by investigating the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board in the context of Malaysian dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system, this study 
offers an assessment of both the Shari‟ah board and the SAC of BNM. Drawing from this 
background, the researcher defines the research objectives of this study as follows: 
 
a) To ascertain and evaluate the present role of the Shari‟ah board of Islamic 
banks in Malaysia in ensuring the credibility of the Islamic banking industry 
and in attending to the needs of the investors and stakeholders. 
b) To evaluate the independence and effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance 
role of the Shari‟ah board in the context of the Malaysian dual-layer Islamic 
  
98 
 
banking Shari‟ah governance system and to assess its influence on the 
coherence of Islamic banking practice.  
 
Of interest, this study aims at meeting the research objectives above by addressing them 
to various stakeholders associated with the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board (as will be defined in Section 5.4 below). It is deemed that by expanding the 
research parameter such as attempted in this study would allow a holistic view on the 
Shari‟ah board issues under investigation. In this regard, the following research questions 
have been formulated:  
 
a) What is the current role of the Shari‟ah board members in the Islamic banking 
industry in Malaysia? 
b) What are the perceptions of the stakeholders regarding the expected role of 
the Shari‟ah board members in the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia? 
c) How does the role played by the Shari‟ah board and the SAC members 
influence the credibility of Islamic banks and safeguard the Shari‟ah banking 
needs of investors and stakeholders?  
d) How independent are Shari‟ah board members in performing their functions? 
What are the factors that influence their independence? 
e) What are the factors that influence the integrity of Shari‟ah board members? 
To whom are they accountable? 
f) How do the Shari‟ah board members interact with other parties within the 
Shari‟ah governance mechanisms of an Islamic bank? 
g) What are the perceptions of the stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of a 
dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system of Islamic banks, as they are 
implemented in Malaysia? 
h) What are the perceptions of the stakeholders regarding the influence of the 
dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system of Islamic banks in promoting 
coherence of the Islamic banking practice in Malaysia? 
i) What is the extent of Shari‟ah board members‟ involvement in the accounting 
aspects of Islamic banking operation?  
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j) How is the Shari‟ah governance mechanism, as it is practiced in Malaysia, 
associated with the quality of an Islamic bank‟s Shari‟ah report? 
 
 
5.3 Study Population 
The Islamic banking industry in Malaysia emerged as early as 1983. Since then, the 
number of banks offering Shari‟ah finance and services has steadily increased. This 
occurred as a result of participation from a number of conventional banks who have 
established their own fully-fledged Islamic banking subsidiary, as well as those banks 
who offer an Islamic banking service in addition to their conventional banking activities. 
In addition, the liberal economic policy of the government of Malaysia has provided 
room for foreign Islamic banks to operate in the country, including foreign international 
Islamic banks. It was mentioned in Chapter Three, Malaysia has launched the Malaysian 
International Islamic Finance Centre (MIFC) as part of an initiative to promote the 
country as a hub for international Islamic finance. To date, the MIFC has listed the 
operation of 17 fully-fledged Islamic banks, 5 international Islamic banks, and 15 
conventional banks offering Islamic banking window.  
 
Since one of the areas of the present research is to examine the Shari‟ah governance 
issues of the Shari‟ah board members, the selection of the banks to be used as research 
subjects should be representative of the Shari‟ah board‟s respective banking institution. 
In this regard, where several banks are from the same bank holding company, only one 
bank was selected to be used in this research whilst the remaining banks were excluded 
because they are also under the prerogative of the same Shari‟ah board.30 After a careful 
review of the list of all banks offering Islamic banking services in Malaysia it was found 
                                                 
30
 It is worth noting that the new Shari‟ah governance framework for Islamic financial institutions which 
became effective 1
st
 of January 2011stipulate clearly that a financial group could establish a single SC for 
the entire licensed institutions within that group. Hence, the BNM‟s consent for the establishment of single 
SC for the entire financial group give credence to the short listing procedure for the selection of bank 
represented by the SC used in this study.  
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that four pairs of banks were found to be subsidiaries of the same holding companies.
31
 
As such, instead of investigating all eight banks, only four banks were selected and 
included in this research. Consequently, there are a total of 32 banks that are considered 
relevant to the present research, ranging from fully-fledged Islamic banks to international 
Islamic banks and conventional banks offering Islamic banking window. Table 5.1 below 
displays the short-listed banks which represent the research subject of this study.  
  
                                                 
31
 The four pairs of banks are CIMB Islamic Bank and CIMB Investment Bank; Maybank Islamic Bank and 
Maybank Investment Bank; Alliance Islamic Bank and Alliance Investment Bank; and, AmIslamic Bank 
and AmInvestment Bank. 
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Table 5.1: List of Banks Included in the Present Research by Bank Types and Ownership 
 
List of Islamic Banks Operating in Malaysia 
Fully-fledge 
Islamic Banks 
Banks with 
Islamic Window 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
A. Fully-fledged Islamic Banks 
1 Affin Islamic Bank Berhad     
2 Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation 
(Malaysia) Berhad 
    
3 Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad     
4 AmIslamic Bank Berhad     
5 Asian Finance Bank Berhad     
6 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad     
7 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad     
8 CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad     
9 EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad     
10
0 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad     
11 HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad     
12 Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad     
13 Maybank Islamic Berhad     
14 OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad     
15 Public Islamic Bank Berhad     
16 RHB Islamic Bank Berhad     
17 Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad     
B. International Islamic Banks  
  
1 Unicorn International Islamic Bank Malaysia 
Berhad 
    
2 PT Bank Syariah Muamalat Indonesia, Tbk     
3 Al Rajhi Bank KSA     
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Table 5.1 List of Banks Included in the Present Research by Bank Types and Ownership (Continued) 
 
List of Islamic Banks Operating in Malaysia 
Fully-fledge 
Islamic Banks 
Banks with 
Islamic Window 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
C. Banks Participating In Islamic Banking Scheme: 
Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) Offering Islamic Banking Services 
1 Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad     
2 Bank Perusahaan Kecil & Sederhana Malaysia 
Berhad (SME Bank) 
    
3 Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad     
4 Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Berhad      
5 Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad (Agrobank)     
6 Bank Simpanan Nasional Berhad     
Investment Banks 
1 KAF Investment Bank Berhad     
2 MIDF Amanah Investment Bank Berhad     
3 OSK Investment Bank Berhad     
Commercial Banks 
1 Citibank Berhad     
2 The Royal Bank of Scotland Berhad      
3 Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Berhad     
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5.4 Research Design 
This study is undertaken in the form of questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews. 
This research design make apparent that this study benefits from a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative mixed method research strategies. Tashakori and Teddlie 
(2003) assert that research designed in the form of a mixed method approach is popular 
because it represents a more efficient way of answering research questions and means 
that the researcher can produce results that are stronger in inferences than that of a single 
method. Indeed, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative research methods can 
provide an overall picture of the issues under investigation because the use of one 
approach can explain and broaden the understanding on the results of the other approach 
(Mason 1994). The mixed method strategy used in this research follows what Creswell 
(2009) identified as „sequential explanatory design‟, a two-stage research design that is 
characterised by the collection and analysis of quantitative data first which is followed by 
the collection and analysis of qualitative data. In addition, this study explores the Shari‟ah 
governance function of the Shari‟ah board in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry 
setting. Hence, this research is a study on the Shari‟ah governance system of the 
Malaysian Islamic banking industry. Figure 5.1 below illustrates the mixed method 
strategy used by the researcher. 
 
Figure 5.1: The Explanatory Sequential Mixed Method Strategy Used by the 
Researcher 
 
Stage 1: Questionnaire Surveys 
(Mid January 2010 – February 2010) 
Stage 2: In-depth Interviews 
(March 2010 - May 2010) 
 Questionnaire Survey 1:  
Targeted Respondent 
Heads of Shari‟ah departments 
 
 Questionnaire Survey 2: 
Targeted respondent 
Branch managers of banks offering 
Islamic banking products and services 
 In-depth Interviews 
 Shari‟ah board members 
 Heads of Shari‟ah departments  
 CEO of Islamic banks 
 Shari‟ah Advisory Council members 
of Bank Negara Malaysia  
 Bank Negara Malaysia officers 
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As illustrated in Figure 5.1 above, the research surveys constitute the first stage of the 
research design for this study. A survey research has the property of enabling the 
generalisation of the results to a population from a study on certain characteristics, 
attitude, and behaviour of a sample (Babbie 1990; Creswell 2009). In addition, survey 
research is considered to be the most prevalent and the most economic research technique 
in determining public policy that is often conducted by studying a sample of people about 
certain issues (Fowler 2002). Parallel with the survey research form which is used in the 
present study is the formulation of a descriptive inquiry nature of the research questions. 
It is worth noting that a descriptive research design attempts to answer who, what, when, 
and how questions (Zikmund 2000, p. 50; DeVaus 2001, p. 1). In the context of the 
present mixed method research strategy, the research survey was aimed at measuring the 
level of agreement and disagreement in order to build a general picture of the Shari‟ah 
governance function of the Shari‟ah board under investigation. Hence, the result 
produced from the research survey represents a reflection of the general population only 
and it offers one facet of understanding the overall issues surrounding the Shari‟ah board. 
Additionally, the approach taken in this study (where investigation on the issues outlined 
in the research question has been conducted over different banks and various parties 
involved in the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board) makes it apparent 
that the present research is a cross-sectional study. A cross-sectional study has also been 
considered to be well suited for use in a descriptive study (Babbie 1990; DeVaus 2001). 
It is also predominantly used in the social sciences (Oppenheim 1992, p. 24; Nachmias 
and Nachmias 1996, p. 129) which benefit from its efficient way of collecting data and 
economical features (DeVaus 2001, p. 176).  
 
For the purposes of this study, the researcher has selected the use of a self-administered 
questionnaire survey based on the argument that this research instrument is considered to 
be a practical and efficient way of data collection (Ary 1972). Besides the relatively low 
cost feature of a questionnaire survey, many have argued that its use would allow 
respondents time to reflect and consult on the issues raised (Oppenheim 1992; Fowler 
2002). Moreover, a questionnaire survey also enables all research participants to be 
exposed to the same questions and so avoid any opportunity for the researcher to be 
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biased (Oppenheim 1992). Prior studies on the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board have also recorded the use of questionnaire survey as the research 
instruments employed in their study (for example Abumouamer 1989; Abdul Rahman et 
al. 2005; Alhabshi and Bakar 2008; Faizullah 2009; Safieddine 2009; Hasan 2011). In 
this regard, from mid January 2010 until the end of February 2010 the researcher has 
distributed two sets of questionnaires which were aimed at two different types of targeted 
respondents. The first questionnaire survey (hereafter termed as Questionnaire Survey 1 
or QS1) was targeted at the heads of Shari‟ah departments of all 32 Malaysian banks 
offering Islamic banking services which are listed in Table 5.2. Concurrently, the 
researcher also distributed a second questionnaire survey (hereafter termed as 
Questionnaire Survey 2 or QS2) which was targeted at eliciting the opinion of the 
stakeholder, which in this survey is the branch managers of these 32 banks, on similar 
Shari‟ah board issues with some modification tailored at meeting the Shari‟ah governance 
exposure of this group of respondent. It may be argued that the use of questionnaire 
surveys would enable the researcher to make a reflection of the study population involved 
based on the counting and aggregation of the results produced; however, this 
generalisation only provides the researcher with the general picture and, therefore, it 
offers only one facet of understanding of the issues surrounding the Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board. 
 
Meanwhile, Figure 5.1 above illustrates that the second stage of the research design was 
conducted through the use of a series of qualitative in-depth interviews. The use of an 
interview as a qualitative research instrument has the advantage of eliciting the opinion of 
busy people who are used to making appointments and schedules (Fowler 2002). It also 
helps build up the kind of trust needed through interactive communication between the 
researcher and respondents, which could be essential in the case of investigation of 
sensitive issues (Fowler 2002). The use of an interview as a research instrument has also 
been documented in previous studies on Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board Islamic banks (for example Abumouamer 1989; 2007; Safieddine 2009; Hassan et 
al. 2010; Rammal 2010). In the context of the present mixed method research strategy, 
the use of in-depth interview as the second stage of the research design is aimed at 
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discovering what Mason (1994) termed the „social process‟ that is involved in the 
Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. Indeed, using qualitative methods 
(such as an in-depth interview) allows the researcher to focus on the dynamics of the 
process; however, there is a requirement for the researcher to gauge deeper understanding 
of behaviour and meaning in the context of complex phenomena (Snape and Spencer 
2003; Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009). In this regard, the second stage of the research 
design is aimed at understanding the complex process of the Shari‟ah governance of the 
Shari‟ah board in the context of dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system which is 
implemented in Malaysia. The researcher conducted interviews between March and May 
2010 with important and inter-related parties of the Shari‟ah governance system for the 
Malaysian Islamic banking industry, they were asked about how they experience this 
process. These interviewees included: the Shari‟ah board members; the stakeholders, as 
represented by the heads of Shari‟ah departments and the banks‟ CEOs; and the 
regulators, as represented by the SAC of BNM and BNM officers.  
 
From the explanation on the two-stage research design above, it is apparent that the two-
stage research design aimed at two different level of understanding of the issues under 
investigation. First, the quantitative research surveys were aimed at enabling the 
researcher to gain a general picture on the role, independence and effectiveness of the 
Shari‟ah board. Secondly, the qualitative in-depth interviews were distinctly aimed at 
discovering an understanding pertaining to the process involved on the issues under 
investigation from the experience of the parties concerned. Mason (1994, pp. 104-105) 
concluded that when the data from two-stage research design (such as the present study) 
is put together it would enhance the validity of the overall analysis and enable the 
building of a rounded and overall picture. It is worth noting, however, that integration of 
the data from the mixed method sources features some challenges, namely: a requirement 
for the researcher to gather an extensive amount of data for collection, and the intensive 
time spent and the skills required to analyse the different data nature of the inquiry. For 
the purposes of this study, the researcher has integrated the data from the two-stage 
research design following the suggestions as outlined by Mason (1994, p. 105) below:  
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a) Linking the data by following up similar themes in the different data sets; and, 
b) Developing propositions and questions from a variety of angles to address a 
particular topic by using the data set.  
 
The above discussion illustrates that this study has adopted a „realism‟ perspective of 
knowledge which influences the selection of the research tools. An ontological view of 
the realist perspective acknowledges that reality exists in actuality and is independent 
from human perceptions (Williams and May 1996, p. 81). This knowledge perspective 
views that the task of the researcher is to „uncover the structures of social relations in 
order to understand why we then have the policies and practices that we do‟ (May 2001, 
p. 12). Knowledge in this perspective is, thus, seen as stratified and derived from an 
understanding of what lies behind people‟s actions. In addition, Wass and Wells (1994) 
have asserted that most research has used the realist perspective because it reconciles 
positivist and naturalist epistemologies and methods. Because realism recognises both the 
existence of actual reality and that its realities can be comprehended through the human 
mind, the selection of questionnaire survey and in-depth interview explained above is 
viewed as acceptable.  
 
 
5.5 Research Method 
This section discusses the research method, i.e., both the questionnaire survey and the in-
depth interview, in further detail.  
 
5.5.1 The Questionnaire Survey 
Another important consideration of the research method of a particular study is the design 
of the research instrument which will be used for data collection. This section offers 
relevant discussion on the design and development of the questionnaire as one of the 
research instrument used in this study. It includes an explanation on the type of question, 
the language of the questionnaire, piloting of the questionnaire, and the questionnaire 
rationale and administration. 
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5.5.1.1 Questionnaire Design and Development 
One of the challenges associated with the use of a questionnaire survey is the need to be 
especially careful when designing the questionnaire due to the fact that the respondent is 
left with absolute reliance on the questions already designed for them to respond (Fowler 
2002). In the absence of someone for the respondents to refer to (such as an interviewer 
in an interview survey), they are made dependent on the quality of the questionnaire that 
has been designed and developed by the researcher. Hence, essential considerations 
underlying the characteristics and the features of a good questionnaire have been made to 
ensure that the use of questionnaire survey will achieve its objective in addressing the 
research questions of this study.   
 
It is worth noting that the prime function of the questionnaire is to collect a measurement 
(Oppenheim, 1992, p. 100). Together with this facilitative nature of the questionnaire, the 
researcher will have to appropriately consider the design and development of the 
questionnaire. A useful guide to the construction of questionnaires is given by Evans 
(1984), who identified four important steps to be considered: firstly, there should be a 
clear definition of the purpose of the questionnaire; secondly, the researcher has to decide 
the data that is required from the questionnaire; thirdly, the component parts of the 
questionnaire need to be analysed; and finally, a series of questions should be structured 
in order to elicit the appropriate responds from the respondents. When structuring the 
questions Fowler (2002) suggest that respondents should be allowed to get started with 
relatively easy questions and the more sensitive and thoughtful questions should be kept 
for use in the middle or in the end. He also called for the design of the questionnaire to be 
laid out in a manner that is clear and uncluttered from the point of view of the 
respondents. Importantly, the features discussed will have to be incorporated within the 
sampling frame of the present research, which includes the banks listed in Table 5.1 
above and the different parties involved in the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board that were mentioned earlier.  
 
The purpose of the questionnaires used in this research is to address the research 
questions that are outlined in Section 5.2 above. Because this research is aimed at 
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eliciting the opinion of the respondents on the role, independence and effectiveness of the 
Shari‟ah board, the researcher has developed two sets of questionnaire (i.e. QS1 and 
QS2) for two targeted respondents: heads of Shari‟ah departments32 and bank‟s branch 
manager
33
, respectively.  
 
Both questionnaire surveys were designed and structured to address the research 
questions for this study based on: the role of the Shari‟ah board, the accountability and 
independence of the Shari‟ah board, and the nature of Shari‟ah review in banks offering 
Islamic banking products and services. These three themes have been identified as the 
fundamental components underlying the scope of the present research corresponding to 
the role, independence and effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board under investigation. 
Furthermore, the questions developed in these two sets of questionnaire surveys are 
formulated to elicit the opinions of the respondents on the matters described above, 
against the arguments put forward in the literature and the regulatory requirement 
prescribed in AAOIFI, IFSB as well as the „Guidelines on the Governance of the Shariah 
Committee for the Islamic Financial Institutions‟ or GPS1 issued by BNM. Hence, when 
developing the questions in both questionnaire surveys attention has been made to 
address the above themes that were found in the literature and which are given as 
requirements in the regulatory standards and guidelines. Because QS1 and QS2 involve 
different categories of targeted respondents, emphasis was also made to ensure that the 
questions addressed would cater for the different Shari‟ah governance exposure of the 
respondents on the technicality aspect of the structure and implementation of the Shari‟ah 
review function of the Shari‟ah board. As such, some of the questions developed in QS1 
have no matching question in QS2, and vice versa, because they are personalised to those 
targeted respondents. By designing the questionnaire in this approach the researcher aims 
at evaluating how the Shari‟ah governance is being practiced, and is expected to be 
practiced, amongst the participating banks in the MIFC. A copy of both questionnaire 
surveys along with the covering letter to the research participants are attached in 
Appendix 1. 
                                                 
32
 QS1 was sent to the heads of Shari‟ah department at the headquarters level amongst banks offering 
Islamic banking products and services 
33
 QS2 was sent to the branch manager of banks offering Islamic banking products and services.  
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Generally, both questionnaire surveys contained four sections, of which three encompass 
the three themes mentioned above. The remaining section asked about the respondent‟s 
demographic details.  When set out on a single sided A4 paper, both questionnaire 
surveys consisted of eight pages. A method of identification for the purpose of data 
analysis is essential to identify the 32 Malaysian banks included in this study (as listed in 
Table 5.1 above). Alphanumerical coding has been assigned to the questionnaire surveys 
for the purpose of identification. Additionally, the cover page of both questionnaire 
surveys also contained other essential information, such as the title of the research and the 
name and address of the researcher as well as the researcher‟s supervisor. Also included 
along with the questionnaire and the cover letter is the Cardiff Business School‟s 
standardised anonymous and consent letter to the research participants which gave an 
assurance that the privacy of the research participants and their respective organisations 
would remain confidential.  
 
5.5.1.2 Types of Questions 
Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) advised that when formulating the questions to be 
included in the questionnaire consideration should be given to its content, structure, 
format, and the sequence of the questions. In addition, the design of these questions 
should enable the respondents to respond in a minimum time, with a minimum effort, 
while not underestimating the need to uphold the quality of their answers. In general, this 
study has used closed-ended questions where alternative answers on the questions raised 
are given to the respondents. Fowler (2002) argued that, besides being more convenient 
to respondents, closed-ended types of questions would be appropriate for use when the 
research involves asking respondents a large number of item in a similar form. A survey 
in the form of closed-ended questions also have the characteristics of being more 
meaningful for analytical purposes in comparison to the array of answers provided from 
open-ended type of questions (DeVaus 1996; Fowler 2002). Nevertheless, questions 
designed as closed-ended also pose some challenges. For example, Oppenheim (1992) 
asserts that this type of question could result in the researcher loosing the respondent‟s 
sense of spontaneity and expressiveness. As such, he suggests that a space should be left 
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in the questionnaire for respondents to include their further comments or opinions on the 
subject raised in the questionnaire, and this has been included in the questionnaire design 
of this research.  
 
In addition, the researcher used an ordinal measure of collecting and analysing the data 
through the use of a Likert scale type of questions to elicit the opinion and attitude of the 
respondents on the issues under investigation. Amongst the various Likert scale 
measurements normally used in research projects, and which are implemented in the 
present study, are: the continuous scale, where respondents are asked on questions such 
as measuring between strongly agree to strongly disagree; and the categorical scale, 
which measures respondents‟ ranking on certain issues from highest to lowest importance 
and ranking by numbers. The use of both types of Likert scales in the present research are 
deemed suitable because it allows the researcher to make a relative measurement that is 
necessary on the relationship between the present practice of the interrelated parties on 
the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board with the issues on the role, 
independence and effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board. This use of the Likert scale in 
measuring these attitudinal relationships is supported by Fowler (2002, p. 93) when he 
says that „Only comparative statements (or statements about relationships) are justifiable 
when one is using ordinal measures.‟ In this regard, both questionnaire surveys mainly 
consist of questions designed in the form of Likert scales. Generally, Section A, B and C 
in QS1 and QS2 comprise of questions which requires research participants to respond 
using the scale: (1) strongly disagree; (2) disagree; (3) uncertain; (4) agree and (5) 
strongly agree. Meanwhile, questions B1, B2 and B3 in Section B, in both questionnaire 
surveys, also contain questions that measure respondents‟ attitude using the scales: (1) 
very unimportant; (2) unimportant; (3) uncertain; (4) important and (5) very important. In 
question C3 of QS2 the research participants are required to rank the importance of the 
related parties in the Shari‟ah governance of Islamic banks from 1 to 5.   
 
Section D also constitutes part of both questionnaire surveys. This section requires the 
respondents to provide some of their demographic details, such as their gender, age 
range, qualification and aspects of training received. These questions have been designed 
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in a manner that requires respondents to tick the alternative answers provided by the 
researcher.  
 
5.5.1.3 Piloting the Questionnaire  
Both questionnaires have undergone several stages of improvement before they were 
distributed to the targeted respondents. Firstly, the questionnaires were developed and 
refined with intense consultation with the researcher‟s principal supervisor. After the 
principal supervisor was satisfied with the content, wording and format of the 
questionnaires, the researcher took the initiative to send both questionnaire surveys to a 
qualified proof-reader. This was done to ensure that the quality and readability of the 
questionnaires is of the required standard. After the adjustment based on the proofreading 
exercise was made, the researcher conducted pilot testing to establish the content validity 
of the issues raised and to improve the structure and overall format of the questions in the 
questionnaire.  According to Fowler (2002), the best way to pre-test a self-administered 
questionnaire is to conduct it in person with the targeted group of respondents. 
Consequently, in this study the researcher has approached eight individuals, of whom: 
three are PhD candidates in Islamic banking and finance; another three are academicians 
who teach this subject in Malaysian public universities (of which 1 has an experience 
working in an Islamic bank); and one person each came from the Shari‟ah board 
members and Shari‟ah department officer who serve in two different Malaysian Islamic 
banks. These different categories of people were chosen because they have knowledge 
and understanding of the Malaysian Islamic banking environment, hence, they were able 
to contribute and provide necessary input for the improvement of the questionnaires. 
During this exercise they were asked whether the instructions and questions are 
consistently clear and understandable. They were also asked to evaluate and make 
comments on the questionnaires as a whole and to indicate the time spent filling in the 
questionnaire.  
 
The pilot testing of the questionnaires was found to be very beneficial indeed. In 
particular, the discussion and comments received from the practitioner (the Shari‟ah 
board member and the Shari‟ah department officer) were very useful and clarified further 
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the Islamic banking practice in Malaysia. For example, the terminology „Shari‟ah 
Committee‟ (SC) used throughout QS1 and QS2 was indicated to be more suitable than 
the common „Shari‟ah board‟ term to refer to the authority in charge of individual bank‟s 
Shari‟ah governance system in Malaysia because of the fact that the guidelines issued by 
the regulator (i.e. BNM, such as the GPS1) use the term SC to refer to this Shari‟ah 
authority. Another example of the terminology changes which were made following the 
pilot test can be seen when referring the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board. The term „Shari‟ah review‟ instead of „Shari‟ah supervision‟ was suggested 
because of the possibility that the term „supervision‟ in the latter could be mistakenly 
considered by the respondent to be the authority of the regulator and, hence, refer to that 
of the SAC of BNM. However, overall, no major amendment on the content of the 
questionnaires was required.  
 
5.5.1.4 Questionnaire Rationale 
As mentioned earlier, both questionnaire surveys attempt to measure the same three 
themes, which are: (1) the role of the Shari‟ah board; (2) the accountability and 
independence of the Shari‟ah board; and, (3) the nature of the Shari‟ah review in banks 
offering Islamic banking products and services. Additionally, as discussed above, these 
questionnaires were targeted at two different respondents with the objective of capturing 
how these themes are being practiced (QS1) vs. how they are expected to be practiced 
(QS2). These three themes which correspond to Section A, Section B and Section C are 
identical in both questionnaires and carry similar content for ease of inference based on 
the themes identified when interpreting the results later. However, as mentioned earlier, 
several questions in these questionnaires have been specifically tailored to the different 
Shari‟ah governance exposure of both targeted respondents. For instance, there is one 
additional question in Section A in QS1 which has no matching question in the same 
section of QS2. The main differences are in Section C where the questions are more 
technical in nature (pertaining to the structure and implementation aspect of Shari‟ah 
review by the Shari‟ah board). Hence, some of the questions in Section C have no 
matching questions in the other questionnaire because they have been personalised for 
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each respondent group. However, these questions deal with the same subject and, 
therefore, enable the researcher to analyse the issue under investigation. Meanwhile, 
Section D consists of questions on the demographic details which allow the researcher to 
analyse the different background of the respondents. Again, it is stressed that the 
benchmark used when formulating the questions in QS1 and QS2 are based on the 
standards and guidelines issued by AAOIFI, IFSB and GPS1. The details of the 
questionnaires rationale are provided below. 
 
Section A 
This section was designed to elicit opinions of respondents on matters relating to the role 
of the Shari‟ah board based on the previous literature as well as in the standards and 
guidelines of the regulator (AAOIFI‟s governance standards, IFSB prudential standards 
and GPS1 guidelines of BNM) which has been discussed in Chapter Four. As mentioned 
above, there is a pertinent question on this section for the QS1, which is question A1. 
This question asks the respondents (i.e. the heads of Shari‟ah departments) to ascertain 
whether the standards and guidelines used by the Shari‟ah board in their respective bank 
were consistent with AAOIFI, IFSB and the GPS1 by indicating them on a five-point 
Likert scale between 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree). The remaining 
questions on this section for the QS1 are matched with those in QS2 in which the 
respondents were required to indicate their agreement on a similar Likert scale on six 
different categorisations on the role of the Shari‟ah board:  
 
(1) Scope of Shari‟ah advisory role;  
(2) Corporate objectives of Islamic banks;  
(3) Development of Islamic banking products and services;  
(4) Accounting issues of banks;  
(5) Relevant parties who assist the Shari‟ah board; and,  
(6) General commitments of the Shari‟ah board. 
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Section B 
This section relates on the important issue of accountability and independence of the 
Shari‟ah board. Although the two might seem to be closely associated, the researcher has 
attempted to gauge the factors that influence accountability and independence separately 
because this could assist in ascertaining whether accountability could be a determining 
factor that influences the independence of the Shari‟ah board.  
 
Question 1 
This question is concerned with eliciting the perception of the respondents on factors 
influencing the accountability of the Shari‟ah board. In Chapter Four, it has been 
discussed how various studies have regarded the highly perceived ethical authority of the 
Shari‟ah board to be associated with the ethical values, reputation  and scholarly 
background of the Shari‟ah board members (see for example Karim 1990a; Laldin 
2008a). Furthermore, it has been argued that the stakeholders put reliance on the roles 
and function of the Shari‟ah board to ascertain the Shari‟ah compliance of Islamic bank‟s 
activities, especially in connection with Shari‟ah board‟s role in producing annual 
Shari‟ah compliance report (see for example Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and 
Karim 1987; Karim 1990b; Karim 1990a; Rammal 2006; Laldin 2008a). Therefore, these 
factors have been listed as influencing Shari‟ah board‟s accountability and were asked to 
the respondents on their importance based on a five-point Likert scale between 1 (very 
unimportant) and 5 (very important).  
 
Question 2  
As with Question 1 above, the ethical values, reputation and scholarly background of the 
Shari‟ah board members can be argued as influencing Shari‟ah board‟s independence. 
This is supported by Karim (1990a) who asserted that the independence of the Shari‟ah 
board members should be viewed from the ethical perspective whereby the Shari‟ah 
scholars are required to be committed to their moral beliefs and Islamic precepts, as 
reflected from their Shari‟ah educational background. However, these three integrity 
factors could be further categorized as the ethical status (representing the ethical values 
and reputation of the Shari‟ah scholars) and the scholarly background of the Shari‟ah 
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board members. As such, only these two factors were considered and forwarded to the 
respondents as possibly influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members. 
Meanwhile, the third factor considered is a clearly defined scope of Shari‟ah board‟s 
responsibility. It has been mentioned in Chapter Four that Briston and El-Ashker (1986) 
suggest that a clearly defined scope of Shari‟ah board‟s responsibility should be 
stipulated in the bank‟s article of association. In fact, the IFSB has also recommended a 
clear term of reference to be written in Shari‟ah board members appointment letter (IFSB 
2009 principle 1.2) while AAOIFI has specified it as one of the items suggested to be 
included in the Shari‟ah report issued by the Shari‟ah board (AAOIFI 1998 para. 10-25).  
 
The fourth and fifth factors considered as influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board 
relate to IFSB recommendations for the Shari‟ah board member to be equipped with 
adequate power and for the top management to participate in the Shari‟ah board‟s 
meeting (IFSB 2009) respectively. The need for the former could be understood as an 
important requisite for independent and effective Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board in undertaking its roles and functions. On the other hand, the researcher 
has taken account the recommendation of the latter as positively influencing the 
independence of the Shari‟ah board since any likelihood of information asymmetry on the 
Shari‟ah decisions issued by this Shari‟ah governance authority could be resolved. This 
possibility is upheld because the decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board could be directly 
communicated to the top management, thus strengthen the Shari‟ah governance of the 
bank and install the independence of the Shari‟ah board.  
 
The above five factors were considered based on their possible positive influence on the 
independence of the Shari‟ah board. However, the literature also presents arguments on 
factors that have an opposite effect on the independence of the Shari‟ah board. In Chapter 
Four, the factors highlighted as negatively influencing independence of Shari‟ah board 
members are relating to remuneration (see for example Grais and Pellegrini 2006; 
Rammal 2006; Khan 2007) and various placements of the Shari‟ah board (Alhabshi and 
Bakar 2008). Hence, these two represent the sixth and the seventh factor negatively 
associated and detrimental on the independence of the Shari‟ah board. While the 
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Malaysian Islamic banking environment restricted Shari‟ah board members sitting in 
local bank to be not more than one (as has been highlighted in Section 4.7 of Chapter 
Four), this study consider possibility of additional Shari‟ah board membership in other 
industry (for example Takaful companies) as the factor likely influencing the 
independence of the Shari‟ah board member.  
 
All in all, seven factors deemed to have influence on the independence of Shari‟ah board 
were outlined and the respondents were asked for their thoughts on their importance, 
based on a five-point Likert scale (i.e. between 1 (very unimportant) and 5 (very 
important)). 
 
Question 3 
This question asks the respondents who they feel the Shari‟ah board should be 
accountable. It has been discussed throughout Chapters Three and Four  that the 
assurance on the bank‟s level of Shari‟ah compliance that Shari‟ah board provides 
ensures the credibility of Islamic banks and instils the confidence of the shareholders and 
stakeholders (see for example Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and Karim 1987; 
Karim 1990b; Karim 1990a; Banaga et al. 1994; Rammal 2006; Ghayad 2008; Laldin 
2008a). On the other hand, the integrity of the Islamic banking industry would be 
undermined, and stakeholders would lose confidence, if the operation of Islamic banks 
are found to be non-compliant to the Shari‟ah (Bhambra 2002). In addition, GPS1 has 
clearly stipulated that the Shari‟ah board will report functionally to the board of directors 
while the recent amendment to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 specifies that the 
Shari‟ah resolutions issued by the SAC as binding to all Malaysian Islamic financial 
institutions. In this regard, the relevant parties whom the Shari‟ah board is deemed 
accountable are the: (1) shareholders; (2) consumers; (3) boards of directors; (4) public; 
and, (5) SAC of BNM. Similarly, the respondents were asked to indicate the level of 
importance they placed on these five identified parties based on a five-point Likert scale 
(i.e. between 1 (very unimportant) and 5 (very important)).  
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Question 4 
In this question the respondents were asked to indicate their agreement based on a five-
point Likert scale (i.e. between 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree)) on six 
different natures of Shari‟ah board appointment and mandated authority. Firstly, the 
respondents were asked to consider whether the appointment of the Shari‟ah board 
members is made based on certain „fit and proper‟ qualification criteria as recommended 
by AAOIFI (2010b para. 45-46) and IFSB (2006 para. 53). The IFSB also gives caution 
on the perceived lack of independence if the Shari‟ah board or its family members have 
an intimate relationship with a senior executive employee, or if any of them are holding a 
substantial shareholding in the bank where the Shari‟ah board is serving (IFSB 2009 para. 
42); therefore, this question was also posed to the respondents. 
 
The respondents were then asked on their agreement about whether the Shari‟ah board 
members are subject to any assessment by the bank the Shari‟ah board is serving or by 
the BNM. This is because the nature of Shari‟ah board‟s appointment in the Malaysian 
Islamic banking environment initially requires the Shari‟ah board to be appointed by the 
respective bank‟s board of directors but subject to the approval of the BNM at the later 
stage. This is followed by a question on whether adequate power has been mandated to 
the Shari‟ah board in performing its role (IFSB 2009 principle 1.2), which is deemed 
important when evaluating the independence of the Shari‟ah board. The IFSB also 
stressed the importance of avoiding any kind of conflict of interest on the role of the 
Shari‟ah board and it requires the settlement of possible conflicts among the Shari‟ah 
board members, or between the Shari‟ah board members and the management (see IFSB 
2009). Hence, the respondents were asked about the existence of a reporting channel for 
settlement of such a conflict.  
 
Finally, the respondents were asked if the nature of Shari‟ah board‟s mandated authority 
made it clear that there should be a proper segregation of Shari‟ah board duties (e.g. 
product endorsement) and later when carrying out the Shari‟ah compliance review 
function. This is in line with the argument raised by Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) on the 
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apparent loophole on the independence of the Shari‟ah board with regard to the absence 
of segregation between the two Shari‟ah board duties.   
 
Section C 
This section of the questionnaire aims to elicit the perceptions of the respondents 
pertaining to the nature of the Shari‟ah review undertaken by the Shari‟ah board based on 
the structure of the Shari‟ah review and on the implementation of the Shari‟ah review. As 
mentioned earlier, the questions in this section are tailored to meet the different Shari‟ah 
governance exposures of the two different groups of respondents. Hence, explanations on 
the rationale of the questions included in this section are provided based on each of the 
questions included in individual questionnaire. 
 
Question 1 in Questionnaire Survey 1 (QS1) 
In this question, respondents were asked to indicate their agreement based on a five-point 
Likert scale (between 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree)) on several structures 
of the Shari‟ah review. Chapter Four discussed that the literature suggests that the role of 
Shari‟ah board is to ensure the credibility of Islamic banks by ascertaining the Shari‟ah 
compliance of the bank‟s operations (see for example Briston and El-Ashker 1986; 
Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 1990b; Karim 1990a; Banaga et al. 1994; Rammal 
2006; Laldin 2008a). In light of this, the respondents were asked whether they regarded 
the Shari‟ah board as the sole authority of the Shari‟ah review system of individual banks 
that offer Islamic banking products and services. Next, the respondents were asked about 
the existence of a prescribed operative procedure for the Shari‟ah board to perform its 
role and function as suggested by IFSB (IFSB 2009 principle 1.2) 
 
In addition, Chapter Four also explained that several studies have advocated that the 
membership of the Shari‟ah board should include experts from various fields (such as 
accountants, lawyers and economics) and should not be merely limited to experts in 
Shari‟ah or fiqh al-mua‟malat (Gambling et al. 1993; Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Laldin 
2008b). Indeed, a similar recommendation has also been forwarded by AAOIFI (AAOIFI 
1997 para. 7). Hence, the respondents were asked whether the membership of their 
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Shari‟ah board consists of various experts. The next question related to the existence of 
an effective communication channel for the Shari‟ah board to deliberate Shari‟ah issues. 
It is argued that in order for the Shari‟ah board to perform its role and functions 
effectively the Shari‟ah board would have to work closely with various parties to evaluate 
and deliberate any Shari‟ah issues pertaining to the implementation of the Shari‟ah 
decision made by the Shari‟ah board (Banaga et al. 1994). Similar importance has been 
laid down by the AAOIFI (AAOIFI 1998 para. 12). 
 
Meanwhile, the Malaysian Islamic banking environment exhibits the regulatory role of 
the SAC as the national centralised Shari‟ah board. Indeed, recently the SAC has been 
authorised with mandated power whereby the Shari‟ah resolutions issued by the 
institution will be binding to all Malaysian Islamic financial institutions (BNM 2009). 
Hence, in this study a question has been posed to the respondents to evaluate whether 
adequate and apparent guidelines have been issued by this supreme Shari‟ah authority for 
use in the Islamic banking industry.  
 
Question 1 in Questionnaire Survey 2 (QS2) 
Similarly to question 1 in QS1, the branch managers were asked to indicate their 
agreement based on a five-point Likert scale, of between 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 
(strongly agree), on the same subject (i.e. the structures of the Shari‟ah review). Among 
the five questions asked of these respondents two are similar to that in QS1. These 
questions are asked to find out if they consider that the Shari‟ah board is the sole 
authority on the Shari‟ah review system within the individual banks that offer Islamic 
banking services. The respondents are then asked if adequate and apparent guidelines 
should be issued by the SAC for use in the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia. The 
issue raised in these two questions challenges the branch manager to evaluate the general 
structure of Shari‟ah review mechanism on the part of the Shari‟ah board at the level of 
individual banks and the SAC at the regulator‟s level. These questions relate to the 
general Shari‟ah governance structure.  
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The remaining three questions require the branch managers to make an assessment of the 
dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system applied in the Islamic banking industry in 
Malaysia. First, the branch managers were asked the question whether the Shari‟ah 
reference role of the SAC as the supreme authority on the Shari‟ah governance system in 
Malaysia enhances the standardisation of Islamic banking practices. This question 
evaluates the claim that such a centralised Shari‟ah body promotes standardisation 
through coordination of fatwa and the Islamic banking products and services offered at 
the national level (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Laldin 2008a; Shaffaii 2008). Their 
experience at the operational level means that the branch managers could provide 
feedback on this question by reflecting on the Islamic banking products and services 
available in the market, including those offered by their own bank. In association with the 
Shari‟ah reference role of the SAC, the branch managers were then asked whether the 
dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system in Malaysia is effective in ensuring the stability of 
the Islamic banking industry. It has been discussed in Chapter Two that the opacity 
feature of the banking business requires the intervention of the regulator in pursuit of 
public interest to promote stability and prevent any downfall in the economy (Ciancanelli 
and Gonzalez 2001; Levine 2004). Hence, this question aims to explore whether the 
intervention of the regulator through the establishment of a dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance mechanism promotes stability in the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia.  
 
Finally, the branch managers were asked to consider whether the dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system is capable of harmonising Islamic banking practices in Malaysia and 
across national boundaries. It has been discussed in Chapter Four that a lack of 
standardisation in Islamic banking practices could be detrimental to the growth of Islamic 
banking and finance (see for example Karbhari et al. 2004). In addition, Chapter Four 
also highlighted that one important task of the centralised Shari‟ah board is to attempt to 
standardise Islamic banking practices through coordination of the fatwas and Islamic 
finance products and services (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; Laldin 2008a; Shaffaii 2008). 
In this regard, efforts such as the establishment of dual-layers of Shari‟ah governance 
system could be seen as harmonising Islamic banking practices both domestically and 
internationally. Hence, this question asked the branch managers to evaluate whether the 
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dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system currently implemented in Malaysia and the role 
played by the SAC have contributed towards harmonising Islamic banking practice in 
Malaysia and achieved standardization at the international level.  
 
Question 2 in Questionnaire Survey 1 (QS1)  
This question relates to several aspects of the implementation of Shari‟ah review by the 
Shari‟ah board. The respondents were asked to consider their agreement on a similar five-
point Likert scale. Since the Shari‟ah board is held to be the sole authority on the Shari‟ah 
governance mechanism of individual Islamic banks (as mentioned above) it would be 
interesting to find out whether the Shari‟ah board also has the full authority to stop the 
bank from undertaking non-Shari‟ah compliant activities. Hence, this question aims to 
explore the quality of the decision making process and review function by the Shari‟ah 
board. It is also equally important to the purposes of this study to learn whether the 
Shari‟ah board has been given ample time for making certain decisions. It has been 
mentioned in Chapter Four that the Shari‟ah review role of the Shari‟ah board could be 
regarded as significant and central within the Shari‟ah governance mechanism of the 
Islamic banking industry. This is due to the fact that the essence for the establishment of 
this banking business is to assist the Muslims in adhering to their religious values in their 
financial dealings (Karim 1990a). However, as the Shari‟ah review requires Shari‟ah 
board members to evaluate the implementation of array of Shari‟ah decisions at the 
Shari‟ah advisory stage by the Islamic bank‟s management, it is expected that the board 
would have to be diligent to ensure effective implementation of the Shari‟ah review. In 
addition, Chapter Four has described how the Shari‟ah board is expected to organise 
periodical meetings with relevant parties within the bank (Banaga et al. 1994; BNM 
2004). Hence, the question on whether the board has been given ample time in its 
decision making process and review function could also be reflected in the frequency of 
these meetings or in similar sittings.  
 
In addition to the two questions above, it is important to find out from the respondents 
whether the Shari‟ah board gets the necessary professional advice in performing its 
function. It has been mentioned earlier that the Shari‟ah board is expected to work closely 
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with various parties within the Islamic banks (Banaga et al. 1994; AAOIFI 1998 para. 
12); hence, this question aims to assess the contribution of other parties in the Shari‟ah 
decisions issued by the board. It is also interesting to learn whether the Shari‟ah board 
receives direct access to relevant, accurate, adequate and timely information so that it can 
effectively carry out its functions as has been clearly stipulated by AAOIFI (AAOIFI 
1998 para. 3) as well as the GPS1 (BNM 2004 para. 21); therefore, this question was also 
posed to the respondents.   
 
Next, the respondents were asked whether they consider that the part-time working nature 
of the Shari‟ah board members hinders the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah review function.  
This question challenges the respondents to evaluate the quality of the Shari‟ah review 
function of the Shari‟ah board and the nature of Shari‟ah board‟s engagement in the bank. 
The rational for this question is based on the argument that the non-executive role and 
part-time engagement of the Shari‟ah board‟s could results in a compromise of the 
oversight quality function of the Shari‟ah board. 
 
To evaluate the cooperation of important parties within the Shari‟ah governance 
framework (SGF) in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry as a whole, the respondents 
were asked whether there has been active communication and consultation between the 
Shari‟ah board, the bank, and the SAC of BNM. The response to this question can imply 
the effectiveness of the existing dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system that is put in 
place for the Malaysian Islamic banking industry.  
 
 
Question 2 in Questionnaire Survey 2 (QS2)  
There are six issues on the implementation of Shari‟ah review which were raised in this 
question. The branch managers were required to indicate their agreement based on a five-
point Likert scale. Two of the questions posed to the respondents in QS2 is similar to 
Question 2 of QS1 in that the branch managers were asked whether they think that the 
Shari‟ah board has the authority to stop banks from undertaking non-Shari‟ah compliant 
transactions and if the part-time working nature of the Shari‟ah board hinders the 
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effectiveness of the Shari‟ah review function of the Shari‟ah board. The rationale of these 
questions is to ascertain how the branch mangers perceive the implementation of the 
Shari‟ah review from their operational point of view and it challenges them to evaluate 
the power authorised to the Shari‟ah board and the working nature engagement of 
Shari‟ah board and their association with the quality of Shari‟ah review function 
undertaken by the board.  
 
Additionally, there are two more questions on the function of the Shari‟ah board which 
have been issued to the branch managers. In one of the questions the branch managers are 
required to consider whether the Shari‟ah compliance activities of the bank have been 
adequately reflected in the Shari‟ah report issued by the Shari‟ah board. It has been 
discussed in Chapter Four that the Shari‟ah report issued by the Shari‟ah board would 
provide the necessary assurance in determining the ethicality of the banking institution 
and assisting the investors and stakeholders to make their investment decision (see for 
example Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 1990b; Karim 
1990a; Rammal 2006; Laldin 2008a). Hence, by asking this question the researcher is 
able to discover whether the branch managers consider the Shari‟ah report produced by 
the banks can achieve its said objective. The other question requires the branch managers 
to ascertain whether the Shari‟ah board has satisfactorily disclosed the bank‟s accounting 
issues. This question reflects once again on how the branch managers perceive the quality 
of the Shari‟ah reporting by the Shari‟ah board; however, this time the question is asked 
in terms of the accounting aspect of the bank to which the Shari‟ah board is made 
responsible (as has been highlighted and discussed in Chapter Four). Finally, the branch 
managers were asked whether the SAC should adopt rigorous procedures to examine and 
endorse the application of the Islamic financial products which are submitted by the bank. 
By asking this question the researcher aims to explore how the branch managers perceive 
the effectiveness of the SAC institution in overseeing the national Islamic banking 
practices and in mitigating possible non-Shari‟ah compliance risk within the Islamic 
banking industry.  
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Question 3 in Questionnaire Survey 2 (QS2) 
This question is unique to QS2. The branch managers were asked to rank in order of 
importance from 1 to 5 on the function of several parties whose involvement in the 
Shari‟ah governance of banks offering Islamic banking services has been discussed in 
Chapter Four. These parties are: the SAC of BNM, the Shari‟ah board, the Shari‟ah 
department officer of banks, the board of directors and the management. By asking this 
question the researcher is able to evaluate how the branch managers perceive the role and 
significance of each party in the overall framework of the Shari‟ah governance in Islamic 
banks.  
 
Section D 
Both questionnaire surveys contain Section D, which has been designed to ascertain the 
background of the respondents and the characteristics of their banking institution. 
Information derived from this section would explain the individual as well as the 
organisational behaviour towards the Shari‟ah governance implementation within banks 
offering Islamic banking products and services.   
 
5.5.1.5 Questionnaire Administration 
The researcher self-administered the questionnaire surveys by distributing the 
questionnaires through both the mail, and the delivery and collection method, between 
mid-January 2010 until the end of February 2010. Fowler (2002) recommended that these 
methods are relatively low in cost, require minimal staff and facilities, and they also give 
respondents the time required to provide thoughtful answers. Considering the constraint 
on funds and time faced by the researcher in this study, these administration procedures 
were carried out with the agreement of the researcher‟s principal supervisor. In addition, 
the researcher developed an access strategy so that the questionnaire could reach the 
targeted respondents in order to gain the highest possible response rate. This enabled the 
researcher to gain assistance from the responsible authorities for the Islamic banking 
industry in Malaysia. On QS1, the researcher received the assistance of the Association of 
Islamic Banking Institution Malaysia (AIBIM) to get the contact details of the head of 
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Shari‟ah department of those banks offering Islamic banking products and services. Once 
this information had been gathered QS1 was directly mailed to the respondents. However, 
a small number of targeted banks in QS1 are not members of the AIBIM, hence; the 
researcher went to those banks which are conveniently located in Kuala Lumpur, the 
capital, to deliver the questionnaire personally. At the bank, the researcher approached 
the head of the Shari‟ah department, explained the purpose of the research and handed 
over the questionnaire to be filled by the respondent for later collection. In total, all 32 
banks (which represent the total population of participating banks in the MIFC) were 
approached and QS1 was successfully distributed.   
 
Meanwhile, QS2 (which is targeted at the branch managers of banks offering Islamic 
banking products and services) was distributed at the same time as the QS1 (as illustrated 
in Figure 5.1 above). An analysis was carried out to ascertain the number of branches 
available for each of the thirty-two banks mentioned above, together with its distribution 
in the thirteen states and three federal territories that constitute Malaysia. It was found 
that some full-fledged Islamic banks are well established with operations scattered all 
over the country, while others (particularly banks which operate as an Islamic window) 
have only few or merely minimal numbers of branches. Indeed, it was revealed that some 
full-fledge Islamic banks (Islamic banking subsidiary) operated in a dual platform 
alongside its conventional banking system. This observation is not unusual because many 
of the fully-fledged Islamic banks are still relatively new and they operate as a subsidiary 
to its conventional parent bank, hence, they either share a similar platform for their 
Islamic banking operation or they have limited numbers of dedicated Islamic banking 
branches.  
 
It was also found that two foreign banks are from the same parent bank but operate under 
a separate license from the BNM (i.e. Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation 
(Malaysia) Bhd and Al Rajhi Bank KSA). The latter, who holds an international bank 
license, operates at the former‟s headquarters, which has a license to operate as a foreign 
Malaysian publicly listed bank. Thus, at the same premises, the two banks are operating 
together with two different licenses from the BNM and, therefore, they qualified as one 
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bank for the purpose of QS2. As a result, the total number of different banks to be 
considered for distribution of QS2 by mail has been short listed to 31 banks. The 
selection for the branches from these thirty-one banks is based on the number of branches 
available for each bank and it was capped to a maximum of sixteen to represent the 
location for each of the thirteen states and three federal territories that constitute 
Malaysia. In order to meet the capped number of 16 branches, all of the dedicated Islamic 
banking branches were chosen first and then the balance was randomly selected, subject 
to branch availability of each bank, based on the remaining locations within Malaysia. 
The branch location for each bank was determined from the bank‟s website and with 
consultation with the respective bank‟s officer at the headquarters level.  
 
The respondents of both questionnaire surveys were given two weeks to complete and 
return the questionnaire. Then, the non-respondents were identified and they were 
followed-up through phone calls which were used as a gentle reminder with due care and 
diligence on the importance of their feedbacks for the success of the research project. 
Where there had been non-receipt of QS2 the researcher once again sent the questionnaire 
together with a personalised cover letter and preaddressed return envelope. After one 
week another followed-up was made to the non-respondents through phone calls stressing 
the importance of the respondents‟ participation as mentioned before. In total the 
researcher concluded the administration of the questionnaires in six weeks after they 
started (i.e. the end of February 2010) for both questionnaire surveys.  
 
One of the important considerations to be made when conducting a questionnaire survey, 
such as the present research, is the number of responses received by the researcher to 
make a meaningful interpretation when analysing the data. Nachmias and Nachmias 
(1996, p. 226) advise that the general response rate for a mail questionnaire survey is 
between 20% and 40%. Nevertheless, the drop-off method of distributing the 
questionnaire (QS1), in addition to the follow-up measurement taken explained above, 
helped to ensure that the response rates of the present research was well above 20%. In 
summary, twenty-four out of thirty-two questionnaires were returned and a usable 
response of QS1 was received, indicating a response rate of 75%. Further analysis based 
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on the ownership of the banks represented by the heads of Shari‟ah departments revealed 
that 19 banks are domestic banks while the remaining 5 banks are foreign banks 
operating as Malaysian public listed companies. Also, categorisation of the responses by 
the types of banks indicates that fourteen banks are fully-fledged Islamic banks while 
another ten are banks with Islamic windows. Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 below provide 
details on the response from the QS1 survey by the types of banks and ownership and by 
total assets categorizations respectively.  
 
Table 5.2: Analysis Showing the Responses from Questionnaire Survey 1  
Types of Bank 
Ownership 
Domestic Foreign Total 
No % No % No % 
Full-fledge Islamic Banks 11 78.6 3 21.4 14 100.0 
Banks with Islamic Window 8 80.0 2 20.0 10 100.0 
Total 19 79.2 5 20.8 24 100.0 
 
Table 5.3: Analysis Showing the Total Assets of Banks Participating in 
Questionnaire Survey 1  
Type of 
Bank 
Total Asset by Category 
Small 
 (Less than RM1,000 
million assets) 
Medium 
 (between RM1,000 
million to RM10,000 
million assets) 
Large 
 (More than 
RM10,000 million 
assets) 
Total 
No % No % No % No % 
Full-fledge 
Islamic Bank 
0 .0 6 42.9 8 57.1 14 100.0 
Bank with 
Islamic Window 
4 44.4 6 60.0 0 .0 10 100.0 
Total 4 17.4 12 50.0 8 34.8 24 100.0 
 
 
Meanwhile, a total of 350 QS2 have been distributed from which 79 were returned with 1 
unanswered. Thus, the response rate based on the usable returned and completed QS2 is 
22.3%. Table 5.4 below summarizes the sample size of QS2 distribution and its response 
rate.  
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Table 5.4: Sample Size of Questionnaire Survey 2 and Analysis of Responses 
 
Banking Institutions 
No of Questionnaire Survey 2 
Distributed 
Usable Returned  
and  
Completed  
Dedicated 
Islamic Bank 
Branch 
Dual 
Platform 
Branch 
Total No % 
1 Affin Islamic Bank Bhd 5 11 16  3 18.75  
2 Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Bhd 16 - 16  1  6.25 
3 Alliance Islamic Bank Bhd 8 8 16  1 6.25  
4 AmIslamic Bank Bhd 2 14 16  -  - 
5 Asian Finance Bank Bhd 2 - 2  -  - 
6 Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd 16 - 16  10 62.5  
7 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd 16 - 16  11 68.75  
8 CIMB Islamic Bank Bhd - 16 16  6 37.5  
9 EONCAP Islamic Bank Bhd 5 11 16  1 6.25 
10 Hong Leong Islamic Bank Bhd - 16 16  1 6.25 
11 HSBC Amanah Malaysia Bhd 4 12 16  -  - 
12 Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Bhd 8 - 8  3 18.75   
13 Maybank Islamic Bhd 12 4 16  4 25  
14 OCBC Al-Amin Bank Bhd 6 10 16  -  - 
15 Public Islamic Bank Bhd - 16 16  2 12.5  
16 RHB Islamic Bank Bhd 16 - 16  -  - 
17 Standard Chartered Saadiq Bhd 1 15 16  -  - 
18 Unicorn International Islamic Bank Malaysia Bhd 1 - 1  -  - 
19 PT Bank Syariah Muamalat Indonesia, Tbk 1 - 1  -  - 
20 Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd  16 - 16 12 75  
21 Bank Perusahaan Kecil & Sederhana Malaysia Bhd (SME Bank) - 16 16  5  41.67 
22 Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Bhd  - 1 1  -  - 
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Table 5.4: Sample Size of Questionnaire Survey 2 and Analysis of Responses (Continued) 
 
Banking Institutions 
No of Questionnaire Survey 2 
Distributed 
Usable Returned  
and  
Completed  
Dedicated 
Islamic Bank 
Branch 
Dual 
Platform 
Branch 
Total No % 
23 Export-Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd  - 3 3  -  - 
24 Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd (Agrobank) - 16 16  8 50  
25 Bank Simpanan Nasional Bhd  - 16 16  7 43.75  
26 KAF Investment Bank Bhd - 1 1  -  - 
27 MIDF Amanah Investment Bank Bhd - 6 6  1 6.25 
28 OSK Investment Bank Bhd - 16 16  3 18.75   
29 Citibank Bhd - 5 5  -  - 
30 The Royal Bank of Scotland Bhd  - 1 1  -  - 
31 Deutsche Bank (Malaysia) Bhd - 1 1  -  - 
TOTAL 135 215 350 78 22.3 
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5.5.1.6 Statistical Analysis Techniques Employed 
The next step after the data collection process is to analyse and interpret the data. 
Statistical packages have generally been used as a major tool for analytical purposes in 
social science research because they offer various statistical analysis techniques for use in 
questionnaire survey data. There are three main purposes for using statistical analysis, as 
noted by Kerlinger (1986):  
(1) To reduce large quantities of data to a manageable and understandable form;  
(2) To assist the study of the population and samples; and,  
(3) To assist in making reliable inferences. 
 
As noted earlier, this research investigates the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board amongst the banks participated in the MIFC, hence, the design of this 
research feature a cross-sectional study. Nachmias and Nachmias (1996, p. 129) assert 
that the statistical analysis which is used in research design tests the kinds of relationship 
between variables. Meanwhile, DeVaus (1996) cautions that there are three factors of 
how data are analysed:  
(1) The number of variables examined at a time;  
(2) The level of measurement of variables; and,  
(3) The used of the data whether for descriptive or inferential purposes.  
 
Two main analytical steps were conducted in the present research project. Firstly, the 
researcher has undertaken a descriptive analysis of each variable. DeVaus (1996) claims 
that descriptive analysis is ideally suited for a cross-sectional survey design and involves 
establishing the counts of a particular opinion among the respondents. There are two 
methods of descriptive analysis referred by Zikmund (2000) which have been used in this 
research: using tabulation to summarize data and using measures of central tendency (i.e. 
mean, median or mode). Zikmund (2000) also asserts that the use of counts and 
percentages when summarizing the data in the former could be extremely useful when 
comparing trends. Secondly, the researcher analyse the result of each variable by using 
organisations variables. This would allow the researcher to test any statistically 
significant differences between subgroups within the control variable. The control 
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variables used in this study are similar to the control variables used in previous studies on 
Islamic banking, for example, total assets to measure the size of the banks (see for 
example Safieddine 2009); types of banks, i.e. full-fledge Islamic banks or bank with 
Islamic windows (see for example Hamim et al. 2008);  and, ownership of banks, i.e. 
domestic or foreign banks (see for example Hamim et al. 2008). In addition, the 
researcher includes the number of years banks have been offering Islamic banking 
products and services as additional control variable to be used in this study. Data 
pertaining to the first three control variables were derived from the annual reports and 
website of the respective banks whereas data for the last control variable were gathered 
from QS1.
34
 
  
In addition, a decision has to be made between using a parametric or non-parametric 
statistical test when analysing control variables. The selection of the appropriate 
statistical test to use depends on the conditions of the data available. Siegel and Castellan 
(1988, p. 34) identifies that the conditions that must be satisfied to use parametric test are: 
the observation must be independent; the observation must be drawn from normally 
distributed populations; the populations must have the same variance if there are two 
groups; and, the variables must measured on at least an interval scale. On the other hand, 
Siegel and Castellan (1988) asserts that a non-parametric statistical test is based on 
general conditions and does not specifically require any form of distribution of scores in 
the population. Moreover, there is no requirement for the data to meet the assumption of 
normality and homogeneity of variance nor the measurement need to be on an interval 
scale as argued by Berenson et al. (2002). The present study used the ordinal scale to 
gauge respondents‟ attitudes and opinions, although this scale is recognised to be weaker 
than an interval scale. Besides being more appropriate for a small sample size, Berenson 
et al. (2002) also claims that non-parametric methods can be almost or equally as 
powerful as the parametric test when the assumptions of the latter are not met and it can 
be more powerful when the assumptions of the parametric procedures are not met.  
 
                                                 
34
 The total assets value of the sample banks was derived from the latest annual report published at the time 
of data collection. Similarly, data pertaining to the type and ownership of bank are based on the respective 
bank‟s website at the time of data collection, hence presented the status quo of the bank at that time.  
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The discussion above has led the researcher to employ the non-parametric test in this 
study when analysing the questionnaires surveys data as it was clearly preferable. The 
relevant non-parametric techniques which were used for the analyses of the control data 
were the Mann-Whitney U and Kruskal-Wallis H test. In addition, the researcher also 
performed cross-tabulation to present the result of the analysis by control variables 
because it is the simplest and most frequently used method of demonstrating the presence 
or absence of a relationship (Bryman and Cramer, 1990; Zikmund 2000). Also, the 
statistical analysis by control variables was conducted based on the five-point Likert 
scale, but for presentational purposes the responses would be collapsed into three 
categories.   
 
5.5.2 The In-depth Interview  
As mentioned earlier, the in-depth interview which was conducted in this research forms 
the second stage of the research design. An interview is defined as a verbal interaction 
that is purposeful and directed in which „one person takes responsibility for the 
development of the conversation‟ (Molyneaux and Lane 1982, p. 1). In addition, an 
interview makes it possible for us to know what the interviewee knows (i.e. knowledge or 
information), discover what the interviewee likes or dislikes (i.e. values and preferences), 
and to discover what the interviewee thinks (i.e. attitudes and beliefs) (Gorden 1975, p. 
39). Meanwhile, in-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves 
conducting intensive individual interviews. More precisely, an in-depth interview is a 
detailed investigation of an individual‟s personal perspective where in-depth 
understanding within the context of personal experience on delicate, complex system and 
process can be explored at a detailed level (Lewis 2009, pp. 57-61).  
 
In this study, a series of in-depth interviews took place between March and May 2010 
with individuals deemed important within the Malaysian Islamic banking industry‟s SGF. 
Basically, the researcher has conducted interviews with the Shari‟ah board members, 
heads of Shari‟ah departments, the SAC of BNM, and the managers from the Department 
of Islamic Banking and Takaful of BNM (Jabatan Perbankan Islam and Takaful or JPIT). 
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This jointly constructed discourse effort emulates elite interviewing because the 
interviewees represent the major players of the Islamic banking business and they are 
considered to be directly associated with the function of Shari‟ah board under 
investigation. Such features of elite interviewing would enable the researcher to gain the 
insights from the individuals concerned, which will help to produce an explanation of the 
subject of interest (Richards 1996). Elite interviewing exemplifies issues of power 
relations in which the interviewee attempts to dominate the interview most of the time 
(Richard 1996). The appropriate format or approach for the conduct of these types of 
interview would be „facilitative and neutral‟ (Rapley 2007). This approach requires the 
interviewer to carefully construct the wording when questioning and probing so as to 
indicate the neutral position of the interviewer. 
 
The interview approach used in this study is the semi-structured interview where the 
participants were given some degree of freedom to explain their thoughts and experiences 
without following sequenced questions and predetermined specific answer categories. 
The absence of sequenced pre-designed questions makes the semi-structured interview 
more like a guided conversation; however, a list of possible questions to be asked is 
normally specified. May (2001) pointed that these sets of specified questions in semi-
structured interview allow participants to speak out or answer freely on the issues 
forwarded and subsequently enables the researcher to form standardisation and 
comparability analysis between the samples of the study. Nevertheless, although this type 
of interview allows respondents some degree of freedom to answer the questions, there is 
still a possibility that some issues listed in the series of questions might have been tackled 
and, thus, would be left behind. Moreover, Wengraf (2001, p. 5) asserts that the demand 
for the interviewer to have no preconceived expectations of what could be the response of 
the participants in a semi-structured interview may require the interviewer to modify the 
procedures of the interview in response to the participant‟s replies to the initially prepared 
questions.  
 
The participants in the interview were asked three main types of question: open-ended 
questions, fixed alternative and funnel questions, and probing questions. During the 
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conversation open-ended questions were used to start a new topic and they provided an 
opportunity for the participants to freely reveal their thoughts so that the feedback given 
was not biased in a certain direction. Meanwhile, the fixed alternative questions were 
used to confirm the questionnaire‟s findings, whereas probing questions benefits the 
researcher in discovering the motivation and reasons behind certain responses. The 
questions were discussed with the researcher‟s primary supervisor and a Shari‟ah board 
member for approval and possible amendment in order to ensure that the interview 
questions were understandable and unambiguous. 
 
Table 5.5 below reports that interviews with participants from banks offering Islamic 
banking products and services comprise of 23 interview sessions with the Shari‟ah board 
members, 5 interviews sessions with the CEOs of Islamic banks, 3 interview sessions 
with the senior executives of banks (2 are from the same bank) and 7 interview sessions 
with the heads of Shari‟ah departments. From these interview sessions, the researcher 
managed to cover 25 banks, i.e., more than 78% of the 32 banks in the MIFC sample. In 
addition, eight interview sessions were held between the researcher and regulators as 
shown in Table 5.6 below. These represent 4 interviews sessions with the SAC 
members
35
, 1 interview session with ex-SAC member and 2 interviews sessions with the 
JPIT managers. It is also worth noting that the researcher believes that the interview 
sessions with the ex-SAC member can provide invaluable insights on the different phases 
of the development of national SGF for the Malaysian Islamic banking industry, as well 
as enriching the understanding of the role and functions of the SAC. All in all, the 
researcher held discussions on the issues surrounding the governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board with 46 interview participants who hold a significant role in the SGF of 
the Malaysian Islamic banking industry. It is believed that an interview of this intensity 
would provide the researcher with in-depth understanding of the social process involved 
in the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board.   
 
                                                 
35
 The SAC members participated in this study were the current SAC members for the term 2008/2010. In 
November 2010, after this research had been completed, the BNM announced the new membership of the 
SAC for the term 2010-2013. 
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Table 5.5: Analysis of the Respondents of the In-depth Interviews amongst Banks 
Participating in the Malaysian Islamic Finance Centre (MIFC) 
Banking  
Institutions/ 
Institutions 
Shari’ah Board 
Members 
Interviewed 
Head of Shari’ah 
Department 
Interviewed   
CEO/ 
Senior Executives 
(SE) Interviewed 
A. Full-fledge Islamic Banks (IB) 
IB1 2 1 2 (both SE) 
IB2 1 1 1 (CEO) 
IB3  1 1 1 (CEO) 
IB4  1 - 2 (CEO & SE) 
IB5 1 - 1 (CEO) 
IB6  1 - - 
IB7  1 - - 
IB8  1 - 1 (CEO) 
IB9  1 - - 
IB10  1 - - 
IB11  1 1 - 
IB12  1 - - 
IB13 1 - - 
IB14  - 1 - 
IB15  1 1 - 
1B16  1 1 - 
B. Development Financial Institutions Offering Islamic Banking Services (DFI) 
DFI1 1 - - 
DFI2  1 1 - 
DFI3  1 - - 
DFI4 1 - - 
DFI5  1 - - 
C. Investment Banks (Inv.B.) 
Inv.B.1  1 - - 
D. Commercial Banks (Comm.B.) 
Comm.B.1  1 - - 
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Table 5.6: Analysis of the Respondents of the In-depth Interviews amongst 
Regulatory Authorities 
Regulatory Authorities: Interview Participants 
Shari‟ah Advisory Council (SAC) 
of Bank Negara Malaysia 
 
SAC 1  
SAC 2 
SAC 3 
SAC 4 
 Ex-SAC 
 
 
 
Department of Islamic Banking 
and Takaful (or JPIT) of Bank 
Negara Malaysia 
 
 
JPIT 1 
JPIT 2 
 
The researcher also analysed the qualification background of certain groups of interview 
participants, namely the Shari‟ah board members, who are mainly academics in 
Malaysian universities, and the SAC members. Specifically, the researcher identified the 
qualification background by ascertaining the first degree obtained by these interview 
participants. Information pertaining to this qualification was gathered from the annual 
reports and websites of financial institutions and other affiliations where the interview 
participants are attached, as well as from the interview sessions held. However, as there 
are many degrees offered in the field of Shari‟ah (for example degree in Shari‟ah; 
Usuluddin; Fiqh and Usul-fiqh, Qur‟an and Sunnah) the degrees have all been clustered 
as Shari‟ah. The researcher also ascertained whether the interview participants hold a 
higher degree qualification, using a similar approach as for the first degree. This 
qualification background was used to describe the qualification and expertise of the 
interview participants when reporting analysis of the interviews later.
36
  
                                                 
36
 The interview participants were classified as Shari‟ah experts or non-Shari‟ah experts mainly based on 
their higher degree qualification background. Classification as Shari‟ah experts were made based on 
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It is worth noting that each interview commenced with a brief explanation about the 
objectives of the research and the interviewees were assured of the complete 
confidentiality of their responses. In addition, the interviewees were asked general 
questions about their employment, such as their position in the organisation and the 
length of time in that position. These questions helped to start the interview in a relaxed 
mood and it established rapport before discussion moved on to more detailed and serious 
issues. Generally, the questions brought into discussion followed a specific order, 
however, on several interviews the order depended on the emerging issues raised by the 
interviewees. Since the issues on Shari‟ah governance of Islamic banks and the role and 
function of the Shari‟ah board are deemed to be important many interviewees appeared to 
be interested and enjoyed expressing their opinion on the issues raised during the 
interview. Most of the interviews lasted about an hour, while a few lasted about forty-five 
minutes. The interview questions to all respondent groups for this in-depth interview are 
provided in Appendix 2.  
 
Meanwhile, the selection of the interviewees was generally based on convenience 
sampling. In this regard, the selection of interview participants was made based on the 
first to agree for the interview once the invitation has been offered by the researcher. For 
instance, an invitation for an interview to the Shari‟ah board members and the CEO was 
made on a bank by bank basis amongst all those banks who participated in the MIFC (i.e. 
the study population). The approach taken by the researcher was to first contact these 
respondents by telephone, whereupon, the study on Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board undertaken by the researcher was explained and a request for interview 
participation was made. This would normally be followed up by an email which includes 
an attached covering letter explaining the objective of the study and a letter from 
International Shari‟ah Research Academy (ISRA‟) which is the Shari‟ah research entity 
of the regulator (i.e. BNM) indicating support for the research. When the Shari‟ah board 
member, or the CEO, expressed their unwillingness to be interviewed the researcher 
contacted the next member within the bank‟s Shari‟ah board or the CEO of the following 
                                                                                                                                                 
qualification background in the field of Shari‟ah and Shari‟ah law. Interview participants holding other than 
these two fields were reported as non-Shari‟ah experts.   
  
 139 
bank and this process continued to all 32 banks in the MIFC sample. However, due to the 
researcher‟s limitation of time and funding, the selection of the Shari‟ah board and the 
CEO for the in-depth interview was limited to those who are based in Malaysia. 
 
5.5.2.1 Analysis of the Interview Data 
The in-depth interview was meant to provide the researcher with an in-depth 
understanding of the „social process‟ involved in the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board, which when integrated with the findings of the questionnaire surveys 
would provide a rounded and overall picture of the issues under investigation. This 
requires the researcher to make a critical and in-depth assessment of the participants‟ 
comments in relation to the general understanding of the issues under investigation, as 
provided by the questionnaire surveys findings. The first step of analysing the data from 
the in-depth interviews was to transcribe the interview in order to enable the researcher to 
analyse the data thoroughly. An important step following this is to read through all 
transcribed interviews in order to obtain general ideas of what the interviewees are saying 
and to reflect on its meaning before coding the textual data. Rossman and Rallis (1998, p. 
171) define coding as the process of organising the material into chunks or segments of 
text before bringing meaning to information. Consequently, the researcher began to 
collect text data by segmenting sentences or paragraphs, which were then labelled using a 
specific term to generate themes. Boyatzis (1998) identified two ways of generating 
themes: firstly, inductively from the raw information; and secondly, deductively from 
theory and prior research. Following the latter method, the main themes for interview 
data analysis are similar to the issues investigated in the questionnaire survey, which 
include: the role of the Shari‟ah board, the accountability and independence of the 
Shari‟ah board, the structure of Shari‟ah review for the Shari‟ah board, and the 
implementation of Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board. However, coding into themes 
in such a pre-structured manner where the themes have been predetermined prior to data 
analysis raises a risk that the conclusions are being drawn too early. As a measurement to 
reduce this risk, the researcher in this study identified possible emerging themes as a 
result of using coding techniques, as suggested by Creswell (2009, pp. 186-187), which 
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includes: codes that are surprising and not anticipated; codes that are unusual; and, codes 
that address a larger theoretical perspective in the research. 
 
In this study, the researcher decided to use Atlas.ti version 6.2 software to analyse the 
interview data. Atlas.ti is a computer software and one of the Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) available for analysing qualitative data. 
Analysis of qualitative data through the use of CAQDAS is the intellectual task of the 
researcher because the software itself could not function on its own unless instructed by 
the researcher (Hwang 2008; Konopásek 2008). Moreover, using qualitative data analysis 
software such as Atlas.ti also brings the benefit of easier management and coding of the 
data (Wickham and Woods 2005; Konopásek 2008). The researcher has obtained the 
necessary skills (up to the advanced level) on how to use the software after attending 
several training workshops which are offered by the university.  
 
Basically, the transcribed interviews and the memos on thoughts developed throughout 
the study serve as the Primary Documents (PD). This PD has to be assigned in a single 
platform known as „hermeneutic unit‟. After the PD has been assigned, the next step is to 
extract segments of the PD into pieces of information, known as a „quotation‟, which are 
deemed important and relevant to the topic under investigation. Atlas.ti makes the 
separation of quotations from the original source (PD) as „self-contained objects‟ for ease 
of analysis by the researcher; however, it is not difficult to trace them back to their 
original reference (Konopásek 2008). The quotations were then linked into certain codes 
developed by the researcher so that the quotations extracted earlier would have some 
meaning and relevance. In this regard, Bogdan and Biklen (1982, pp. 166-172) offer 
some useful advice on how to develop code names when analysing qualitative data, the 
code names they suggest include: setting and context codes, codes based on perspective 
held by subjects, codes based on subjects‟ way of thinking about people and objects, 
process codes, activity codes, strategy codes, relationship and social structure codes, and 
pre-assigned coding schemes. Moreover, Atlas.ti provides the users with a comment tool 
that can be attached in many parts of Atlas.ti‟s analytical object, including: the PDs, 
codes, quotations, memos and network view. It serves as a useful tool for the researcher 
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in expressing a personal explanation, description, or idea of the analytical object in a 
more conventional way.  
 
In addition, Konopásek (2008) suggests that relevant information could be judged by 
ascertaining quotations, codes, memos and networks in which the researcher has included 
personal attachment or which possesses a certain quality. Examples of this include codes 
which are attached with researcher‟s comments, quotations that are linked to multiple 
codes or to other quotations, as well as codes that are associated with higher quotations. 
Based on this relevant information, the researcher can then make a continual reflection on 
the meaning brought from interviewees‟ responses for each theme and then compare 
these with the responses from all groups of respondent and with the information gleaned 
from the literature and theory. Meanwhile, Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 243) have 
emphasised the importance of displaying data from the original source when presenting 
the results of qualitative data. Following this recommendation, the researcher used a 
quotation which also mentioned the type of respondents and the organisation that they 
belong to. The researcher has also undertaken methods of drawing a conclusion which 
was suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 253), which includes noting patterns, 
contrasting, comparing, and clustering of the facts within the themes developed to 
provide a deeper understanding of the results found in the questionnaire survey. The 
mapping or networking tools offered in CAQDAS, such as Atlas.ti, could also facilitate 
the researcher in developing the structure and logical writing up of the results on the 
interview analysis (Wickham and Woods 2005). In this regard, the researcher has used 
the family code and super family code facilities in Atlas.ti in order to generate the 
networking view which then becomes the basis of the arguments of the findings and 
presentation structure for the writing-up of the thesis.  
 
The findings from the in-depth interview are presented in Chapter Eight in the form of a 
narrative passage, which includes interpretations and quotes. Where necessary the 
qualification of the interviewee participants, the size of the banking institutions and the 
ownership of the bank was also mentioned in order to emphasise the facts given by the 
interviewee participants on the topic under discussion.  
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5.6 Summary 
In this chapter the research objectives, the rationale for the choice of cross-sectional 
survey design, the questionnaire method, and the interview approach have been critically 
described. The research objectives outlined earlier in this chapter attempt to assess the 
Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board for the Malaysian Islamic banking 
industry in two main ways. First are those questions which relate to the role and functions 
of the Shari‟ah board in ensuring the credibility of banks offering Islamic banking 
products and services, and in attending the need of the investors and stakeholders. Second 
are those questions which investigate the Malaysian dual-layer Shari‟ah governance 
system in promoting stability and coherence in Islamic banking practices (as reflected in 
questions about the accountability and independence of the Shari‟ah board and the 
structure and implementation of Shari‟ah review systems within these banks). The 
process of implementing the questionnaire survey and the in-depth interview as the two 
research instruments used in meeting these research objectives has been described. The 
researcher has also demonstrated the measurement taken to ensure that the research 
design and the data collection methods match the purposes of the study. This chapter has 
also described the types of statistical analysis undertaken to analyse the questionnaire 
data, and how the use of CAQDAS, in this case Atlas.ti software program, assists the 
researcher in analysing the interview data.  
 
Chapter Six and Seven offer discussion on the questionnaire survey findings whilst 
Chapter Eight presents analysis of the in-depth interview findings.  
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CHAPTER SIX:  ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY ON 
SHARI’AH BOARDS: RESPONSES OF THE HEADS OF 
SHARI’AH DEPARTMENTS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the overall responses to the first questionnaire survey, 
Questionnaire Survey 1 (QS1), distributed and undertaken to elicit opinions of the heads 
of Shari‟ah departments amongst 32 banks in the Malaysian International Islamic Finance 
Centre (MIFC) of Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). The aim of the questionnaire was to 
elicit the respondents‟ opinions on three themes regarding the Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board: (1) its role, (2) its accountability and independence, and 
(3) the nature of the Shari‟ah review in banks offering Islamic banking products and 
services. This chapter contains six sections. In Section 6.2, the backgrounds of the 
respondents and the characteristics of the banks offering Islamic banking business are 
provided. The details of the analyses and the discussion of the findings pertaining to these 
three themes are presented in sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 respectively. Finally, section 6.6 
provides the summary. 
 
 
6.2 Profile of Respondents and Characteristics of Banks  
It was mentioned in Chapter Four that the Shari‟ah department of banks that offer Islamic 
banking products and services plays a vital role in assisting the Shari‟ah board. The close 
Shari‟ah governance ties between the Shari‟ah department and the Shari‟ah board 
provided the researcher with insights into the issues under investigation. This is evident 
from the guidelines issued by BNM, namely, „Guidelines on the Governance of the 
Shariah Committee for Islamic Financial Institutions‟ (or GPS1) which make clear the 
role of the Shari‟ah department officer as the secretariat to the Shari‟ah board (BNM 
2004). An important repercussion of the significant role played by the Shari‟ah 
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department officers would be the requirement for the Shari‟ah officer to have the required 
knowledge and competency to carry out his or her duties. Hence, the discussion below 
offers analyses on the background of the heads of Shari‟ah departments participating in 
this research.  
 
 
6.2.1 Gender and Age Range of Heads of Shari’ah Departments   
Among the 24 heads of Shari‟ah departments who responded to the questionnaire, 21 are 
male whereas 3 are female. Furthermore, the age range of these Shari‟ah officers was 
almost equally distributed between the different age categories. There are 9 officers each 
in the range of 25-34 years old and 35-44 years old while the remaining 6 are in the range 
of 45-54 years old. Table 6.2.1 below shows the analysis of the background of the heads 
of Shari‟ah departments by gender and age range.  
 
Table 6.2.1: Analysis Showing Gender and Age Range of Heads of Shari’ah 
Departments 
Head of Shari’ah 
Department’s 
Gender 
Age Range of Heads of Shari’ah Departments  
25-34 35-44 45-54 Total 
Male 8 7 6 21 
Female 1 2 0 3 
Total 9 9 6 24 
 
 
6.2.2 Experience of Heads of Shari’ah Departments  
Table 6.2.2 below shows the analysis of the respondents‟ experience in the Islamic 
banking industry and the distribution of the number of years all the banks in the sample 
have offered Islamic banking products and services. Table 6.2.2 shows the similarity 
between the number of years of working experience amongst the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments and the number of years the bank has offered Islamic banking products and 
services. It was found that 13 heads of Shari‟ah departments fall into the category of 0 to 
5 years experience of working in the Islamic banking industry. They represent the 
majority whereas almost half of that number fall into the categories where the Islamic 
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banking working experience attained ranges from 6-10 years (5 persons) and 15 years and 
above (6 persons).  
 
Interestingly, the table also presents evidence that the frequency of banks in each 
category of the number of years banks have been offering Islamic banking products and 
services is similar to the frequency of respondents for each experience range. These 
findings might be attributed to the fact that many of the long-established conventional 
banks have taken the initiative to participate in the MIFC scheme, launched by the 
Malaysian government in year 2006, by setting up an Islamic banking subsidiary. In 
addition, since the GPS1 mandated that each bank that offers Islamic banking products 
and services should have at least one Shari‟ah officer (BNM 2004), these newly 
established Islamic banking subsidiaries began the task of recruiting these Shari‟ah 
officers. Another observation that could be made is that majority of these heads of 
Shari‟ah departments are from the newly established Islamic banking subsidiaries.  
 
 
Table 6.2.2: Analysis Showing Experience of Heads of Shari’ah Departments and 
the Number of Years Banks have been Offering Islamic Banking (IB) 
Number of 
Years 
Offering IB 
Experience in Islamic Banking Industry 
0-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years 
16 years and 
above 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
0-5 years 8 61.5 2 15.3 0 0 3 23.2 13 100.0 
6-10 years 3 60.0 2 40.0 0 0 0 0 5 100.0 
11-15 years 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 
16 years and 
above 
2 33.3 1 16.7 0 0 3 50.0 6 100.0 
Total 13 54.2 5 20.8 0 0 6 25.0 24 100.0 
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6.2.3 Training Received by the Heads of Shari’ah Departments 
One indicator that could be used to measure the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance 
mechanism is the training exposure received by the heads of Shari‟ah departments. As 
argued earlier, the requirement for these officers to work closely with the Shari‟ah board 
in ensuring that the activities of the bank are Shari‟ah compliant requires them to acquire 
a certain level of competency. Thus, the GPS1 emphasizes that the Shari‟ah officer 
should be „preferably a person with knowledge in Shari‟ah‟ (BNM 2004), although this is 
not mandatory. Nevertheless, knowledge and skills in accountancy, finance or 
management are deemed relevant for the efficiency and competency of a Shari‟ah officer.  
Table 6.2.3 below presents the findings on the aspects of training received by the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments. 
 
Table 6.2.3: Analysis Showing Aspects of Training Received by Heads of Shari’ah 
Departments 
Training Received by Heads of Shari’ah Departments No % 
Shari'ah 1 4.2 
Fiqh al-mua'malat 1 4.2 
Combination of Shari'ah and fiqh al-mua'malat 13 54.1 
Management 1 4.2 
Accounting and Finance 1 4.2 
Combination of Shari'ah or fiqh al-mua'malat with other 
non-Islamic field(s) 
5 20.8 
Others 2 8.3 
Total 24 100.0 
 
 
As can be clearly seen from the above table, more than half of the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments (13 persons) claimed to have knowledge of both Shari‟ah and fiqh al-
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mua‟malat. Meanwhile, a further five heads of Shari‟ah departments had a combination 
of knowledge in either Shari‟ah or fiqh al-mua‟malat with other non-Islamic field(s). 
Emphasis on training in Shari‟ah or/and fiqh al-mua‟malat amongst the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments could be expected, as knowledge of these two fields is deemed essential and 
represents the principles underlying the ethical operation of institutions offering Islamic 
banking and finance. These two knowledge types, combined with other aspects of 
training, would be a valuable addition to their respective banks, as other skills are also 
commonly essential for the smooth operation of banks. On the other hand, the fact that 
there is one person each for training in the field of management and accounting and 
finance while two or more heads of Shari‟ah departments have training in other fields 
reflects the GPS1‟s non-mandatory requirement for Shari‟ah officers to have the 
knowledge of Shari‟ah.  
 
 
6.2.4 Size of Shari’ah Departments 
Another concern regarding the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance mechanism 
amongst banks that offer Islamic banking products and services is the number of Shari‟ah 
officers within the Shari‟ah department. With this in mind, the researcher analyzed the 
size of Shari‟ah departments by categorizing them according to the number of officers 
recruited by the bank. Chart 6.1 below shows the distribution of the number of Shari‟ah 
officers in the Shari‟ah departments run by the 24 respondents. As illustrated in the chart, 
most of the banks have a small number of officers in their Shari‟ah department. Eight 
heads of Shari‟ah departments indicated that the number of Shari‟ah officers in their 
Shari‟ah department falls into the category of 3-4 officers whereas another seven heads of 
Shari‟ah departments indicated that the number of Shari‟ah officers falls into the category 
of 1-2 officers. There are also four heads of Shari‟ah departments indicated that the 
number of Shari‟ah officers in their Shari‟ah department falls into the category of 5-6 
officers. In short, in 19 of the banks, the Shari‟ah department comprises 6 or fewer 
Shari‟ah officers. On the other hand, a small number of banks were revealed to have a 
sizable Shari‟ah department. From the chart below it is evident that only 1 head of 
Shari‟ah department belonged to the category of a Shari‟ah department with 7-8 officers 
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while another 4 heads of Shari‟ah departments belonged to the category of 11-12 Shari‟ah 
officers.  
 
 
Chart 6.1: Number of Shari’ah Officers in Shari’ah Department of Banks Offering 
Islamic Banking  
 
 
 
The above findings also provide an important indication of the effectiveness of the 
Shari‟ah governance mechanism of the banks. As the Shari‟ah officers serve as the 
secretariat to the Shari‟ah board, the role and functions of the Shari‟ah board would 
function more smoothly if assisted by a sizable Shari‟ah department. Hence, the more 
Shari‟ah officers that are recruited by the bank, the more intensive the Shari‟ah 
governance mechanism of the respective bank is expected to be. However, it is argued 
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that the need for a higher number of Shari‟ah officers is dependent on how extensive the 
Islamic banking and finance operation actually is. Therefore, banks that provide a variety 
of Islamic banking products and services and that have a wide operation that spans the 
domestic as well as the international market are expected to require a higher number of 
Shari‟ah officers in their Shari‟ah department. This requirement could be explained by 
the need to assist the Shari‟ah board in its Shari‟ah advisory and Shari‟ah review 
function. As the secretariat to the Shari‟ah board, the Shari‟ah officer could act as an 
intermediary in communicating the Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board to 
other relevant parties within the bank, for example to the management or board of 
directors. Other ways in which Shari‟ah officers could provide assistance to the Shari‟ah 
board are by conducting or joining in with the research activities of the Shari‟ah board 
and by preparing the necessary documentation for new Islamic banking products or 
services developed by the bank. Similarly, Shari‟ah officers are expected to assist the 
Shari‟ah board in ensuring that the Shari‟ah decisions made by the latter are being 
implemented by the management of the bank. In addition, if there are any issues 
stemming from the bank‟s network operation, the Shari‟ah officers would bring this 
matter to the attention of the Shari‟ah board for deliberation by them. On the other hand, 
if the Islamic banking products and services that are offered and the operation of the bank 
are relatively limited, there is no need for a higher number of Shari‟ah officers and 
therefore, the number of officers should not be the basis for the evaluation of the bank‟s 
Shari‟ah governance mechanism.  
 
6.2.4.1 Size of Shari'ah Departments by the Type of Bank 
Table 6.2.4 shows the size of Shari‟ah department by the types of bank represented by the 
respondents. As is evident from the table, 14 of the banks (58.3% of the total banks 
represented by the respondents) surveyed in this study are full-fledged Islamic banks 
while the remaining 10 banks (41.7% of the total banks represented by the respondents) 
are banks with an Islamic window. In addition, it was found that, amongst the fully-
fledged Islamic banks, there was a wide range in the size of the Shari‟ah department. 
From the total of 14 full-fledged Islamic banks, 1 bank was reported to have between 1 to 
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2 Shari‟ah officer(s), 5 banks had 3 to 4 Shari‟ah officers, 4 banks had 5 to 6 Shari‟ah 
officers and another 4 banks had 11 to 12 Shari‟ah officers. On the other hand, most of 
the banks with an Islamic window had only a small Shari‟ah department. From the total 
of 10 banks operating as an Islamic window, 6 banks had 1 to 2 Shari‟ah officer(s), 3 
banks had 3 to 4 Shari‟ah officers and 1 bank had 7 to 8 Shari‟ah officers.  
 
Thus, the fact that banks operate as full-fledged Islamic banks does not necessarily imply 
that the Shari‟ah department of these banks will be large. Evidence from this study 
indicates that the size of Shari‟ah department of the full-fledged Islamic banks varies 
from small to large with the number of Shari‟ah officers ranging from 1 to 12. On the 
other hand, almost all banks with an Islamic window have a small Shari‟ah department 
with the number of Shari‟ah officers ranging from 1 to 4. This could be because the 
banking operations of these banks are dominated by the interest-based banking activities 
whereas the Islamic banking operation constitutes a smaller part of the banking operation.  
 
 
Table 6.2.4: Analysis of Size of Shari’ah Departments by Type of Bank 
Type of 
Bank 
Size of Shari'ah Departments 
1-2 
Shari'ah 
Officers 
3-4 
Shari'ah 
Officers 
5-6 
Shari'ah 
Officers 
7-8 
Shari'ah 
Officers 
9-10 
Shari'ah 
Officers 
11-12 
Shari'ah 
Officers 
Total 
No. % 
Full-fledged 
Islamic 
Banks 
1 5 4 0 0 4 14 58.3 
Bank with 
Islamic 
Window 
6 3 0 1 0 0 10 41.7 
Total 7 8 4 1 0 4 24 100.0 
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6.2.4.2 Size of Shari’ah Departments by Total Assets 
It is equally important to discover whether the size of the Shari‟ah department is 
influenced by the size of the bank. Thus, this study uses total assets as the proxy to 
measure bank size. Table 6.2.5 provides an analysis of the size of Shari‟ah department by 
total assets. As is evident from the table, the size of Shari‟ah department varies with bank 
size. All 4 small banks appeared to have small Shari‟ah departments with 1 to 2 Shari‟ah 
officer(s), while the size of the Shari‟ah department in banks in the medium category 
varied. Amongst the 12 banks in this category, 3 banks had 1 to 2 Shari‟ah officers, 6 
banks had 3 to 4 Shari‟ah officers, 2 banks had 5 to 6 Shari‟ah officers and 1 bank had 7 
to 8 Shari‟ah officers. Hence, it appears that medium-sized banks have a Shari‟ah 
department in the middle of the size range except for 3 banks which had a small number 
of Shari‟ah officers and thus meet the requirement of GPS1 (at least one Shari‟ah officer 
is required) whereas the remaining banks tend to be concentrated in the mid range of the 
category for Shari‟ah department size. On the other hand, large banks appeared to have 
large Shari‟ah departments. Amongst all 8 large banks, half had 11 to 12 Shari‟ah officers 
with another 2 banks each in the categories of 3 to 4 Shari‟ah officers and 5 to 6 Shari‟ah 
officers.  
 
Table 6.2.5: Analysis of Size of Shari’ah Departments by Total Assets 
Total 
Assets 
Size of Shari’ah Departments 
1-2  
Shari'ah 
Officers 
3-4  
Shari'ah 
Officers 
5-6  
Shari'ah 
Officers 
7-8  
Shari'ah 
Officers 
9-10  
Shari'ah 
Officers 
11-12 
Shari'ah 
Officers 
Total 
No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % 
Small  4 100.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 100.0 
Medium  3 25.0 6 50.0 2 16.7 1 8.3 0 0 0 0 12 100.0 
Large  0 0 2 25.0 2 25.0 0 0 0 0 4 50.0 8 100.0 
Total 7 29.1 8 33.3 4 16.7 1 4.2 0 0 4 16.7 24 100.0 
Small: Less than RM1,000 million assets 
Medium: between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 million assets 
 Large: More than RM10,000 million assets 
 
  
 152 
The above findings suggest that the size of Shari‟ah department depends on the size of 
the bank, with small banks having small Shari‟ah departments whereas large banks have 
large Shari‟ah departments. This association between bank size and Shari‟ah department 
size could be explained in the light of the Islamic banking business operation. The larger 
the bank size, the more extensive the Islamic banking business operation is expected to be 
and, therefore, more Shari‟ah officers are required to assist the Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board. Conversely, it could be expected that the Islamic banking 
business operation of small banks would be less extensive and, therefore, there would not 
be the same need for a big number of Shari‟ah officers.  Hence, banks offering Islamic 
banking products and services should determine the size of Shari‟ah department required 
based on the evaluation of their Islamic banking operation, although the requirement 
imposed by the regulator is for each bank to have at least one Shari‟ah officer. 
 
 
6.3 The Role of Shari’ah Boards 
The main aim of this section is to analyse the important issue surrounding the role of the 
Shari‟ah board amongst participating banks in the MIFC. For this purpose, this section is 
divided into seven subsections. First, a brief overview of the standards and guidelines 
used by the Shari‟ah board is provided. This is followed by an analysis and discussion of 
the scope and role of the Shari‟ah board. Third, an analysis is provided regarding the 
involvement of the Shari‟ah board in advising and designing the corporate objectives of 
the banks. Fourth, there is an analysis of the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in the 
development of Islamic banking products and services. The next section analyses the 
involvement of the Shari‟ah board in the accounting issues of the bank. This is followed 
by a subsection which analyses the relevant parties that assist the Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board. Finally, an analysis of the Shari‟ah governance 
commitment undertaken by the Shari‟ah board is provided.  
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6.3.1 Standards and Guidelines Used by Shari’ah Boards 
Chapter Two discussed how the opaque nature of banking has made it one of the most 
highly regulated industries. As mentioned in Chapter Four, several authorities in the 
Islamic banking institutions have produced standards and guidelines for use in the 
industry, including bodies such as the AAOIFI, IFSB and, in the case of the Malaysian 
Islamic banking industry, the guidelines issued by the BNM. In this research, the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert scale their agreement 
on the guidelines and standards used by the Shari‟ah boards in their respective banks. The 
results are highlighted in Table 6.3.1 below.  
 
Table 6.3.1: Analysis Showing the Standards and Guidelines Used by Shari’ah 
Boards 
Standards and 
Guidelines Used by 
Shari’ah Boards 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total 
No % No % No % No % 
AAOIFI 2 8.3 9 37.5 13 54.2 24 100 
IFSB 0 0 6 25 18 75 24 100 
GPS1 0 0 0 0 24 100 24 100 
 
 
It is apparent from the table that the heads of Shari‟ah departments indicated both 
agreement and disagreement on the use of AAOIFI‟s governance standard. For example, 
about 54.2% of the heads of Shari‟ah departments agreed that the Shari‟ah governance 
standard is consistent with AAOIFI‟s governance standard whereas another 8.3% 
disagreed on the use of the same standards. Meanwhile, about 75% of the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments agreed that the Shari‟ah board in their respective bank used the 
prudential standard issued by IFSB while another 25% were uncertain. In addition, all 
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heads of Shari‟ah departments expressed their agreement with the Shari‟ah boards‟ use of 
GPS1 guidelines issued by the BNM.  
 
The above results could be explained in two ways. First, that there is no mandatory 
requirement amongst banks offering Islamic banking products and services to follow the 
standards issued by the AAOIFI and IFSB has resulted in emphasis for adherence by 
these banks being given less consideration even by banks operating in Malaysia. 
However, the fact that some banks were reported to be using these standards could be 
attributed to the nature of their business, as they might also operate in foreign countries, 
and thus be required to consider the use of accepted international standards in the 
industry. Alternatively, this could be the result of banks whose Shari‟ah board members 
are from those Middle Eastern countries that recognized these international standards and 
decided to implement them while simultaneously fulfilling the requirement of GPS1. 
Evidently, the use of these two standards amongst Malaysian banks that offer Islamic 
banking products and services is entirely on a voluntary basis. Participating banks in the 
MIFC may or may not consider the use of standards set out by these authority bodies. In 
addition, the reported adherence to GPS1 guidelines by the Shari‟ah board reflects the 
mandatory requirement issued by the regulator that is directly in charge of the Islamic 
banking industry for participating banks in the MIFC to follow these guidelines. Hence, 
none of the heads of Shari‟ah departments reported their agreement with using GPS1 as 
the Shari‟ah governance guideline to any degree less than the agree category.    
 
6.3.2 The Scope and Role of Shari’ah Boards  
One of the crucial pieces of information required in evaluating the Shari‟ah governance 
mechanism amongst the banks participating in the MIFC pertains to the scope and role of 
the Shari‟ah board. Thus, the respondents were invited to indicate their agreement based 
on a five-point Likert scale between strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5). The 
analysis of the findings is reported in Table 6.3.2 below.  
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Table 6.3.2: Analysis Showing the Scope and Role of Shari’ah Boards  
 
 
The table reveals that the majority of the respondents agreed that the Shari‟ah board in 
their respective banks had undertaken the listed scope of Shari‟ah advisory role. It is 
evident from the table that endorsing the Shari‟ah compliance manual prepared by the 
management of the bank is ranked in first place with a mean score of 4.58, with 92% of 
the respondents indicating their agreement. Meanwhile, advising the board of directors on 
Shari‟ah matters is ranked second with a mean score of 4.54 and with 92% of the 
respondents indicating their agreement. In addition, assisting other parties on Shari‟ah 
matters and advising Shari‟ah department officers on the scope of the Shari‟ah review are 
ranked in third and fourth place respectively, with corresponding mean scores of 4.50 and 
4.38 and with 96% and 83% of the respondents expressing their agreement. As is 
apparent from the table, the mean score of these 4 elements of the Shari‟ah advisory are 
The Scope and 
Role of Shari’ah 
Boards  
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Advise board of 
directors on 
Shari'ah matters 
0 .0 2 8.3 22 91.7 24 100.0 4.54 2 
Assist other parties 
on Shari'ah matters 
1 4.2 0 .0 23 95.8 24 100.0 4.50 3 
Advise Shari‟ah 
department 
officers on scope 
of Shari'ah review 
2 8.3 2 8.3 20 83.3 24 100.0 4.38 4 
Provide training 
for Shari‟ah 
department 
officers 
7 29.2 5 20.8 12 50.0 24 100.0 3.25 6 
Report to Shari‟ah 
Advisory Council 
on Shari'ah matters 
3 12.5 4 16.7 17 70.8 24 100.0 3.83 5 
Prepare Shari'ah 
compliance 
manual 
11 45.8 5 20.8 8 33.3 24 100.0 2.92 7 
Endorse Shari'ah 
compliance 
manual 
1 4.2 1 4.2 22 91.7 24 100.0 4.58 1 
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not substantially different and, thus, show there is almost equal emphasis on the scope of 
Shari‟ah advisory given by the Shari‟ah board. That the scope of the Shari‟ah advisory 
ranked second, third and fourth clearly indicates the direct advisory role of the Shari‟ah 
board. Indeed, endorsing the Shari‟ah compliance manual, which is ranked in first place, 
could also be similarly interpreted as agreeing with the advisory role of the Shari‟ah 
board. This is due to the fact that, in this case, the Shari‟ah board is required only to 
provide their approval of the Shari‟ah manual already prepared by the management and, 
hence, could be considered as advisory in nature. As was discussed in Section 4.3.1 of 
Chapter Four, the literature has described advising on Shari‟ah matters as one of the ex 
ante auditing functions of the Shari‟ah board.  
 
Meanwhile, reporting to the SAC on Shari‟ah matters, providing training for Shari‟ah 
department officers and preparing the Shari‟ah compliance manual were ranked fifth, 
sixth and seventh respectively. Although respondents expressed some level of agreement 
with these three elements of the Shari‟ah advisory, they were also highly weighted in the 
uncertainty and disagreement categories by some respondents. For example, when it 
comes to reporting to SAC on Shari‟ah matters, 13% of the respondents expressed their 
disagreement while another 17% indicated uncertainty on whether this element of the 
Shari‟ah advisory is being undertaken by their respective Shari‟ah boards. It was 
mentioned in Chapter Four that the SAC serves as the regulator and the supreme 
authority on the Shari‟ah governance system in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry. 
However, it is argued that the interaction between this authority and the Islamic banking 
institutions is merely on matters pertaining to the appointment of Shari‟ah boards and 
giving approval to products and services these banks propose offering to the consumers. 
As a result, the respondents might find that the interaction between these two parties is 
confined to the said matters and it is not considered that further involvement is required 
from the Shari‟ah board.  
 
On the other hand, 29% of the respondents expressed their disagreement with the 
Shari‟ah board providing training for the Shari‟ah department officers while another 21% 
reported feeling uncertainty. These findings may be attributable to the fact that the 
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Shari‟ah officers possess the required knowledge in the field of Shari‟ah or fiqh al-
mua‟malat as reflected by the training received by the majority of the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments, as shown in Table 6.2.3 above. It might also be due to this reason that the 
majority of the respondents (46% indicating disagreement and another 21% indicating 
uncertainty) rejected considering preparing the Shari‟ah compliance manual as coming 
within the scope of Shari‟ah advisory and as something that should be undertaken by the 
Shari‟ah board, as this could be done by the management with the assistance of Shari‟ah 
department officers who are knowledgeable in these two fields.  
 
In addition, analysis by all the control variables produced no significant difference in 
response, and thus, is not reported here.  
 
 
6.3.3 Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Corporate Objectives of the 
Banks  
This study also examined the involvement of Shari‟ah boards in advising and designing 
the corporate objectives of the banks by including other corporate objectives tested by 
Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) and discussed in Chapter Four, namely, the bank‟s objectives, 
the bank‟s corporate brand value, and the bank‟s long term strategic direction. Initial 
analysis of the findings of Shari‟ah board involvement in the corporate objectives of the 
banks revealed that the responses provided by the heads of Shari‟ah departments fall into 
all categories of agreement. Table 6.3.3 provides a detailed analysis of the results. 
 
As is evident from Table 6.3.3, the majority of the respondents indicated that they 
disagreed with the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in advising or designing the 
corporate objectives of their respective banks. Meanwhile, the percentages of the 
responses indicated that agreement falls below 40% across all listed corporate objectives. 
A similar low emphasis on a bank‟s strategic issues by the Shari‟ah board was reported 
by Alhabshi and Bakar (2008). Alternatively, these results show that a bank‟s corporate 
objectives are mostly designed by the board of directors without the participation of 
Shari‟ah board members. Although Section 6.3.2 revealed that Shari‟ah board members 
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were given priority in advising the board of directors on Shari‟ah aspects (ranked 
second), strategic issues such as the corporate objectives listed above do not seem to have 
been given emphasis by Shari‟ah board members. Additionally, this also indicates that 
Shari‟ah board members‟ roles and functions tend to be limited to the traditional role 
pertaining to product and service development issues. When analyses by all control 
variables were conducted, they did not produce significant results and, thus, are not 
reported here. 
 
 
Table 6.3.3: Analysis Showing Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Corporate 
Objectives of the Banks 
 
Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards 
in the Corporate 
Objectives of the 
Banks 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total 
No % No % No % Mean Rank 
The bank's 
mission 
12 50.0 3 12.5 9 37.5 2.79 3 
The bank's vision 12 50.0 4 16.7 8 33.3 2.75 6 
The bank's goal 12 50.0 4 16.7 8 33.3 2.79 3 
The bank's 
objective 
11 45.8 4 16.7 9 37.5 2.88 2 
The bank's 
corporate brand 
value 
10 41.7 7 29.2 7 29.2 2.79 3 
The bank's long-
term strategic 
direction 
9 37.5 7 29.2 8 33.3 3.00 1 
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6.3.4 Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Development of Islamic Banking 
Products and Services 
In Chapter Four, it was discussed how developing Islamic banking products and services 
based on Shari‟ah principles is integral to the function of the Shari‟ah board. To ascertain 
the involvement of Shari‟ah board members in this important role, the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments were invited to indicate their stage of agreement on eight different stages of 
developing Shari‟ah products and services. The findings of this analysis are presented in 
Table 6.3.4.  
 
As is evident from the table, there are certain stages of development of Islamic banking 
product and services that seem to be given importance by Shari‟ah board members as 
indicated by none or almost non-disagreement by the respondents. It was reported that 
none of the respondents disagreed with the involvement of Shari‟ah board members 
during the conception stage and legal documentation stage whereas only one respondent 
disagreed with involvement during the review stage. As such, these three stages of 
development of products and services seem to receive full commitment by Shari‟ah board 
members and highlight the crucial stages which require scholarly attention by Shari‟ah 
board members. On the other hand, evidence of disagreement on other stages of 
development of products and services is surprising and raises concerns about the lack of 
attention by this Shari‟ah governance authority. For example, respondents indicated high 
disagreement with the involvement of Shari‟ah board members in the pricing, testing and 
marketing stages. Alternatively, these findings seem to indicate that these three stages of 
product development are being carried out by the management of the bank and not by 
Shari‟ah board members. Earlier findings, which reveal that most of the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments are trained in the field of Shari‟ah or fiqh al-mua‟malat, might suggest that 
Shari‟ah  board  members  relieve themselves from such responsibilities and  delegate  
the responsibility to the secretariat (heads of Shari‟ah departments) for further action.
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Table 6.3.4: Analysis Showing Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Development of Islamic Banking Products and Services 
 
Involvement of Shari’ah 
Boards in the Development 
of Islamic Banking 
Products and Services 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total 
No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Conception stage 0 .0 2 8.3 22 91.7 4.29 1 
Design stage 5 20.8 6 25.0 13 54.2 3.42 4 
Pricing stage 13 54.2 5 20.8 6 25.0 2.63 7 
Legal Documentation stage 0 .0 4 16.7 20 83.3 4.21 2 
Testing stage 17 70.8 5 20.8 2 8.3 2.17 8 
Marketing stage 11 45.8 3 12.5 10 41.7 3.04 6 
Implementation stage 7 29.2 7 29.2 10 41.7 3.08 5 
Review stage 1 4.2 4 16.7 19 79.2 4.04 3 
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Moreover, the above results strengthen earlier findings that Shari‟ah board members tend 
to confine themselves to their traditional role by only specifying the Shari‟ah concepts to 
be applied to the products and services and drafting the contracts in the legal 
documentation stage, but not dealing with technical issues, such as pricing, testing, 
marketing or even designing those products and services.  
 
In addition, analyses by control variables produced significantly different results for types 
of banks and bank‟s total assets. Table 6.3.5 below reports that analyses of responses by 
the types of banks provide significantly different results for the implementation stage 
with the p value of 0.026. The reported mean values in the table also show that the 
proportion of respondents from the full-fledged Islamic banks indicating their agreement 
on the involvement of the Shari‟ah board during the implementation stage is higher than 
that from banks with an Islamic window. Hence, this finding indicates that Shari‟ah board 
members from full-fledged Islamic banks give more emphasis than do their counterparts 
to ensuring that the products and services developed are implemented in accordance with 
decisions made in the earlier development stages.  
 
Meanwhile, the analysis of responses by total assets reported in Table 6.3.6 indicated that 
the distribution of responses pertaining to the design stage and the pricing stage are 
significantly different with p values of 0.037 and 0.019 respectively. As is clearly 
indicated from the reported mean values in the table, the proportion of respondents from 
small banks indicating their agreement with the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in both 
the design and the pricing stage is higher than the proportion of respondents from the 
medium and large banks. The design and pricing stages can be considered as important 
stages in developing Islamic banking products and services after ascertaining the Shari‟ah 
concepts to be applied at the conception stage. Essentially, the bank would have to design 
the product according to the concept laid down in Shari‟ah to ensure its legitimacy from 
the Islamic point of view as a mechanism to distinguish it from the products offered by 
the conventional banks. Equally important is ensuring that Islamic banking products and 
services offered by banks should not be seen as exploiting the consumers due to the 
unreasonable pricing offered to them. Because of these deemed Shari‟ah concerns, the 
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small banks reported a high involvement of Shari‟ah board members during these two 
stages of product development. Furthermore, these significantly different results reported 
for small banks refer to banks with an Islamic window whose Shari‟ah department has 1 
to 2 officers only. This is due to the fact that banks with small total assets feature the 
characteristics of offering Islamic banking as an Islamic window (refer to Table 5.3) and 
of having 1 to 2 Shari‟ah officers (refer to Table 6.2.5). In such circumstances, where the 
capacity of Shari‟ah officers is regarded as weak, the involvement of Shari‟ah board 
members during these stages seems inevitable. The utilization of the Shari‟ah board 
during these stages could also be seen as a strategy for banks with an Islamic window to 
keep up with their counterparts, i.e., the full-fledged Islamic banks. On the other hand, 
the low responses from banks in the medium and large asset categories might be because 
Shari‟ah board members have relieved themselves from such responsibilities, as these 
two categories of bank have the capability to undertake that task, as is shown by the high 
number of Shari‟ah officers in the Shari‟ah department (see Table 6.2.5).  
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Table 6.3.5: Analysis Showing Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Development of Islamic Banking Products and Services 
by Type of Bank 
 
Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards in the 
Development of 
Islamic Banking 
Products and Services 
Full-fledged Islamic Banks Banks with an Islamic Window 
Sig. Disagree Uncertain Agree 
Mean 
Disagree Uncertain Agree 
Mean 
% % % % % % 
Conception stage .0 14.3 85.7 4.21 .0 .0 100.0 4.40 - 
Design stage 28.6 28.6 42.9 3.21 10.0 20.0 70.0 3.70 - 
Pricing stage 50.0 21.4 28.6 2.64 60.0 20.0 20.0 2.60 - 
Legal documentation 
stage 
.0 21.4 78.6 4.14 .0 10.0 90.0 4.30 - 
Testing stage 57.1 28.6 14.3 2.43 90.0 10.0 .0 1.80 - 
Marketing stage 28.6 14.3 57.1 3.43 70.0 10.0 20.0 2.50 - 
Implementation stage 14.3 28.6 57.1 3.57 50.0 30.0 20.0 2.40 *0.026 
Review stage .0 14.3 85.7 4.21 10.0 20.0 70.0 3.80 - 
*Indicates distribution of responses between the two categories of bank types is statistically significantly different using the Mann Whitney U test 
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Table 6.3.6: Analysis Showing Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Development of Islamic Banking Products and Services by Total 
Assets 
 
Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards 
in the 
Development of 
Islamic Banking 
Products and 
Services 
Total Assets by Category 
  
  
  
Sig 
Small  
(Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium  
(RM1,000 million to RM10,000 
million assets) 
Large  
(More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Disagree Uncertain Agree Total 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
Conception stage 0 0 100.0 4.25 0 18.2 81.8 4.17 0 0 100.0 4.5 
- 
Design stage 0 0 100.0 4.25 27.3 45.5 27.3 2.92 12.5 12.5 75.0 3.75 
*0.037 
Pricing stage 25.0 25.0 50.0 3.5 81.8 18.2 0 2.00 25.0 25.0 50.0 3.13 
*0.019 
Legal 
documentation stage 
0 0 100.0 4.25 0 18.2 81.8 4.25 0 25.0 75.0 4.13 
- 
Testing stage 100.0 0 0 1.75 72.7 27.3 0 2.00 50.0 25.0 25.0 2.63 
- 
Marketing stage 75.0 0 25.0 2.75 45.5 18.2 36.4 2.83 25.0 12.5 62.5 3.5 
- 
Implementation 
stage 
50.0 25.0 25.0 2.5 36.4 27.3 36.4 2.75 0 37.5 62.5 3.88 
- 
Review stage 0 0 100.0 4.25 0 27.3 72.7 3.83 0 12.5 87.5 4.25 
- 
*Indicates distribution of responses between the three categories of total assets is statistically significantly different using the Kruskal-Wallis H 
test 
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6.3.5 Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Accounting Issues  
It was highlighted in Chapter Four that the role and function of Shari‟ah board members‟ 
include issues relating to the accounting aspects of the Islamic banking operation. In this 
regard, the heads of Shari‟ah departments were invited to indicate their agreement with 
the involvement of the Shari‟ah board of their respective banks in important accounting 
issues pertaining to the Islamic banking operation. The findings from the analyses are 
provided in Table 6.3.7 below.  
 
 
Table 6.3.7: Analysis Showing Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Accounting 
Issues of the Bank  
 
Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards 
in the 
Accounting 
Issues 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Determine profit 
distribution 
formula 
9 37.5 7 29.2 8 33.3 3.00 7 
Approve 
calculation & 
distribution of 
zakat 
2 8.3 2 8.3 20 83.3 4.12 2 
Approve 
accounting 
policy 
7 29.2 8 33.3 9 37.5 3.25 6 
Validate 
documents in 
contracts  
0 .0 4 16.7 20 83.3 4.37 1 
Validate 
transaction 
records 
5 20.8 6 25.0 13 54.2 3.42 5 
Issue Shari'ah 
report 
5 20.8 6 25.0 13 54.2 3.54 4 
Endorse annual 
report 
3 12.5 3 12.5 18 75.0 4.12 2 
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As is evident from the table, involvement by Shari‟ah board members was highest for 
accounting issues pertaining to validating the documentation on Islamic financing 
contracts, with a reported mean value of 4.37. Indeed, validating the documentation on 
Islamic financing contracts would correspond to the vital stage of ensuring the source 
documents detailing business transactions between the bank and its customers accurately 
stipulated the terms and conditions underlying the Islamic financial contract in 
accordance with the Shari‟ah concept applied. Another example where validating 
documents in Islamic financial contracts is deemed important by the Shari‟ah board is 
ensuring that ownership of assets has been rightly assigned between the contracting 
parties. It is argued that the issue of asset ownership has important repercussions for the 
transaction‟s legality from an Islamic point of view, which will determine whether the 
bank could recognize the income derived from the transaction.  
 
Meanwhile, accounting issues pertaining to approving the calculation and distribution of 
zakat and endorsing the annual report both scored a mean value of 4.12 and shared the 
second position. It is worth noting that zakat has direct links with the Islamic Shari‟ah as 
it is one of the pillars of Islam. Therefore, the high Shari‟ah board involvement in the 
issue of zakat is seen as ensuring that this important Islamic practice on the part of the 
bank on behalf of the shareholders is appropriately upheld. On the other hand, the high 
Shari‟ah board involvement on endorsing the annual report could be associated with the 
need to ensure that any income derived from non-Shari‟ah activities has been 
appropriately channelled to charity organisations and not recognized as profit to the bank 
and, therefore, only the bank‟s legitimate profit is reported.  
 
The next accounting issue deemed important to Shari‟ah board members is producing the 
Shari‟ah compliance report, which had a mean score of 3.54. This is followed by 
validating transaction records (mean value of 3.42), approving accounting policy (mean 
value of 3.25) and, finally, determining the profit distribution formula (mean value of 
3.00). It can be seen from Table 6.3.7 that respondents showed surprisingly high levels of 
disagreement with Shari‟ah board involvement in these four accounting issues. For 
example, 20.8% of the respondents indicated their disagreement with the Shari‟ah board‟s 
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involvement in producing the Shari‟ah compliance report despite its significance in 
giving assurance of the ethicality of the Islamic banking operation and in assisting the 
decision making of the investors (see for example Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins 
and Karim 1987; Karim 1990b; Karim 1990a; Rammal 2006; Laldin 2008a). A similar 
percentage of disagreement was reported for the Shari‟ah board‟s involvement in 
validating transaction records although such auditing practices are deemed to have an 
importance similar to that of validating the documentary records discussed above, albeit 
more specifically regarding the accounting transactions between the bank and its 
customers. Approving accounting policy and determining the formula for profit 
distribution were both responded to with higher levels of disagreement by the 
respondents (29.2% and 37.5% respectively). This is despite the call for the Shari‟ah 
board‟s involvement in such issues (see for example Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 
1990a; Abdallah 1994; Karim 1996) and the recommendation put forward by AAOIFI. 
 
The above findings provide evidence of minimal and selective involvement of the 
Shari‟ah board in the accounting-related issues of Islamic banking activities. Shari‟ah 
board members seem to show particular concern for accounting issues relating to 
validating the documentation of Islamic banking contracts, approving the calculation and 
distribution of zakat and endorsing the annual report. On the other hand, other accounting 
issues seem to be given less emphasis, as they might be delegated to the Shari‟ah officers 
in the bank or handled at the discretion of the management. These findings could have 
resulted from the lack of accounting skills amongst Shari‟ah board members. The fact 
that the standards and guidelines issued by the regulators (for example, AAOIFI and 
BNM) emphasised the need for experts in the Islamic commercial law or fiqh al-
mua‟malat to hold membership in this Shari‟ah governance authority has resulted in there 
being a lack of appropriately qualified people in the accounting aspects of Islamic 
banking operations.  
 
Additionally, analyses using the control variables did not product significant differences 
in responses regarding the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in the accounting issues of 
the bank, and thus they are not reported here.  
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6.3.6 Relevant Parties Assisting the Shari’ah Governance Function of 
Shari’ah Boards 
The Shari‟ah board is the Shari‟ah governance mechanism that is external to the bank and 
is responsible for overseeing the Shari‟ah aspects of the Islamic banking operation. It was 
discussed in Chapter Four that in performing its roles and functions, the Shari‟ah board 
should receive assistance from several relevant parties within the bank. In this regard, the 
respondents were invited to indicate their agreement with the relevant parties whom they 
perceive provide assistance on the important role and functions of this Shari‟ah 
governance authority. Table 6.3.8 below presents the analysis of the findings. 
 
Table 6.3.8: Analysis Showing the Relevant Parties Assisting Shari’ah Boards 
Relevant 
Parties 
Assisting 
Shari’ah 
Boards 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Shari'ah 
department 
0 .0 1 4.2 23 95.8 24 100.0 4.71 1 
Audit 
committee 
6 25.0 9 37.5 9 37.5 24 100.0 3.13 7 
Internal 
auditor 
4 16.7 8 33.3 12 50.0 24 100.0 3.42 4 
External 
auditor 
7 29.2 9 37.5 8 33.3 24 100.0 3.00 8 
Board of 
directors 
4 16.7 3 12.5 17 70.8 24 100.0 3.63 3 
Management 2 8.3 0 .0 22 91.7 24 100.0 4.29 2 
'Shared 
services' 
6 25.0 8 33.3 10 41.7 24 100.0 3.17 6 
Consultants 7 29.2 6 25.0 11 45.8 24 100.0 3.21 5 
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It can be observed from the table that the Shari‟ah department officers provide the highest 
assistance to the Shari‟ah board, with a reported mean value of 4.71. The second highest 
assistance was reported to be from the management, as indicated by a mean value of 4.29. 
In order of highest assistance received, this is followed by the board of directors (mean 
value of 3.63), internal auditor (mean value of 3.42), consultants (mean value of 3.21), 
shared services (mean value of 3.17), audit committee (mean value of 3.13) and external 
auditor (mean value of 3.00).   
 
The above results provide evidence of the crucial role of the Shari‟ah department officers 
and the management in assisting Shari‟ah board members to execute their ethical role in 
ensuring the Shari‟ah adherence of banks offering Islamic banking activities. In other 
words, the support from these two parties is regarded as essential in order for Shari‟ah 
board members to perform their role and functions. These findings could also shed light 
on the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance mechanism amongst banks participating 
in the MIFC. Since the assistance of the Shari‟ah department officers has been found to 
be crucial, the size of the department could reflect the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah 
governance mechanism within each bank that offers Islamic banking products and 
services. The larger the size of the Shari‟ah department, in terms of the number of 
Shari‟ah officers, the more effective the Shari‟ah governance mechanism is expected to 
be. However, it is important for Shari‟ah board members to draw a line regarding the 
involvement of the Shari‟ah department officers and the management so that the Shari‟ah 
decisions made by them are not be influenced by an over reliance on the latter.   
 
Table 6.3.8 also reveals the importance of the board of directors to the Shari‟ah 
governance of Islamic banks. Indeed, this finding on the support of the board of directors 
to the Shari‟ah board could highlight the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance 
mechanism among the participating members of the MIFC. This is because the results 
seem not to indicate any communication gap that might hinder the Shari‟ah board from 
providing Shari‟ah advice to the board of directors. As such, the agency cost and 
opportunistic behaviour of the management, discussed under the agency theory, can be 
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checked by these two governance mechanisms, i.e., the board of directors and the 
Shari‟ah board.  
 
Meanwhile, other parties, namely, the internal auditor, consultants, shared services, audit 
committee and external auditor, scored 50% or below in terms of the assistance they 
provide to the role and function of the Shari‟ah board. These results indicate that the 
support for the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board appeared to be 
incomprehensive and was limited to internal parties which have a direct association with 
the role of the Shari‟ah board, as was discussed above regarding the Shari‟ah department 
officers, the management, and the board of directors. A similar communication gap 
between the Shari‟ah board and the audit committee, internal auditor and external auditor 
was reported by Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) in the various countries that offer Islamic 
banking that they surveyed, including Malaysia. As such, it seems that when the support 
of other relevant parties in the Shari‟ah governance mechanism of the Islamic banking 
operation is studied across the Islamic banking operations in Malaysia, the involvement 
of these supporting parties appears to be weak and insufficient.  
 
When analysis by control variables was conducted, no significant results were produced 
except for the control variable total assets. Analysis by total assets using the Kruskal-
Wallis H test produced a significant result for the external auditor, with a p value of 
0.015, as indicated in the test statistic results in Table 6.3.9 below. This finding indicates 
that the assistance of the external auditor is more apparent for large banks than for 
medium or small banks. Indeed, the AAOIFI in its governance standard recommends that 
the Shari‟ah board coordinates and consults with the external auditor during the important 
stage of the Shari‟ah review (AAOIFI 1998 para. 12). Hence, the cooperation which is 
evident between the Shari‟ah board and the external auditor could suggest that a proper 
governance mechanism has been established, albeit for large-sized Islamic banking 
institutions only.   
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Table 6.3.9: Analysis Showing the Relevant Parties Assisting Shari’ah Boards by Total Assets 
Relevant 
Parties 
Assisting 
Shari’ah 
Boards 
Total Assets by Category 
Sig. 
Small 
 (Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium  
(between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 
million assets) 
Large 
 (More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Disagree Uncertain Agree Total 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
Shari'ah 
department 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 .0 8.3 91.7 4.75 .0 .0 100.0 4.88 - 
Audit 
committee 
50.0 25.0 25.0 2.50 33.3 50.0 16.7 2.92 .0 25.0 75.0 3.75 - 
Internal 
auditor 
25.0 25.0 50.0 3.00 25.0 41.7 33.3 3.17 .0 25.0 75.0 4.00 - 
External 
auditor 
50.0 50.0 .0 2.25 41.7 41.7 16.7 2.75 .0 25.0 75.0 3.75 *.015 
Board of 
directors 
25.0 .0 75.0 3.25 25.0 16.7 58.3 3.50 .0 12.5 87.5 4.00 - 
Management .0 .0 100.0 4.25 16.7 .0 83.3 4.00 .0 .0 100.0 4.75 - 
'Shared 
services' 
25.0 .0 75.0 3.25 41.7 41.7 16.7 2.75 .0 37.5 62.5 3.75 - 
Consultants 50.0 25.0 25.0 2.50 33.3 33.3 33.3 3.17 12.5 12.5 75.0 3.63 - 
*Indicates distribution of responses is statistically different between the three category of total assets using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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6.3.7 Commitments of Shari’ah Board Members  
This study also evaluates the Shari‟ah board members‟ commitments to strengthening the 
Shari‟ah governance of their respective banks as has been recommended by the 
regulatory bodies, namely, AAOIFI and IFSB. Respondents were invited to indicate their 
agreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). Table 6.3.10 and Table 6.3.11 below present an analysis of the findings.  
 
As is evident in Table 6.3.10, most of the respondents indicated agreement with Shari‟ah 
board members‟ commitment to strengthening the Shari‟ah governance practice of their 
respective banks, although there is also some evidence of disagreement and uncertainty in 
their responses. The percentage of the agreement response is highest for Shari‟ah board 
members‟ commitment to engaging themselves in workshops and meetings of scholars of 
fiqh al-mua‟malat to promote consistency in Islamic banking products and services, with 
a mean value of 4.21; 83.3% of the respondents reported their agreement with Shari‟ah 
board members undertaking this commitment. Such practices indicate the prevailing 
concern amongst Shari‟ah board members of banks participating in the MIFC about 
standardizing Islamic banking products and services. The fact that there are many banks 
participating in the MIFC increases the possibility of there being diverse Islamic banking 
products and services that could trigger difficulties associated with a lack of 
standardization and consistency. However, the results derived from this study indicate a 
positive concerted mechanism under the ambit of a dual-layer Shari‟ah governance 
system implemented in Malaysia towards the harmonization of Islamic banking practices. 
In addition, this governance commitment could be a platform for banks new to the 
Islamic banking industry as well as for new Shari‟ah board members to be on a par with 
other established banks by giving and sharing relevant knowledge pertaining to 
contemporary Islamic financing products and services and the issues surrounding them.   
 
The following concern amongst Shari‟ah board members as indicated by the mean value 
of responses received pertains to undertaking commitments regarding (1) analysing 
whether Islamic banking products and services would deliver benefit to the ummah 
before they are launched (mean value of 4.13), and (2) enhancing Shari‟ah review skills 
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by attending appropriate training for the Shari‟ah board‟s continuous professional 
development (mean value of 4.04). These two commitments were reported as having an 
equal percentage of agreement, i.e., 79.2%, for Shari‟ah board members‟ involvement in 
undertaking such responsibilities. Laldin (2008a) asserts that Shari‟ah board members 
should ascertain that the design of the Islamic banking products and services would 
deliver benefit to the ummah and not merely be a means to achieve ends forbidden by 
Shari‟ah. This study provides evidence that Laldin‟s (2008a) concern for quality Islamic 
banking products and services has been on the agenda amongst Shari‟ah board members 
of the Malaysian Islamic banking industry. Shari‟ah board members also seem to give 
equal importance to enhancing their Shari‟ah review skills by attending the necessary 
training. It was mentioned in Chapter Four that the modern Islamic banking business calls 
for Shari‟ah board members to be well versed in the Islamic fiqh al-mua‟malat and 
accounting and finance knowledge (Gambling et al. 1993; Grais and Pellegrini 2006; 
Laldin 2008b). It has been recognized that the Islamic banking industry is facing 
challenges regarding the shortage of competent scholars who possess the expertise to lead 
as the Shari‟ah governance authority within banks that offer Islamic banking products 
and services. However, the development indicated by this study is that Shari‟ah board 
members taking seriously their role in empowering their Shari‟ah review skills represents 
constructive evidence regarding Shari‟ah board members‟ initiative to enhance their 
competency level. 
  
Next, Shari‟ah board members‟ commitment to (1) engaging in the innovation of Islamic 
banking products and services, and (2) responding to the questions pertaining to 
pronouncements and resolutions issued by the Shari‟ah board through discussion with the 
shareholders and the public, were both revealed to have a similar mean value of 3.50 and, 
therefore, are deemed to be given equal importance by Shari‟ah boards. Table 6.3.10 
presents evidence that 62.5% of the respondents indicated their agreement with Shari‟ah 
board members‟ former commitment while 54.2% indicated their agreement with 
Shari‟ah board members‟ latter commitment. It was discussed earlier that Shari‟ah board 
members are responsible for developing contracts on Islamic financial products and 
services based on Shari‟ah principles. Such a responsibility requires Shari‟ah board 
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members to consult and deliberate the Shari‟ah issues with various parties within the 
bank. The finding of this study illustrates that the majority of Shari‟ah board members 
give a positive commitment to making Islamic banking more progressive through efforts 
at innovation and through streamlining the concepts required for this purpose with other 
relevant parties within the bank. However, there are few banks whose Shari‟ah board 
members were indicated not to be involved in such a commitment. Table 6.3.10 shows 
that one quarter of the respondents (25%), which corresponds to six banks, indicated their 
disagreement with their respective Shari‟ah board members undertaking the innovation 
commitment mentioned. Hence, it could be suggested that although Shari‟ah board 
members in the majority of the banks showed an interest in applying Shari‟ah concepts in 
search of new Islamic banking products and services, as indicated by their commitment to 
innovation, there are banks which might be lagging behind, presumably due to the 
conservative ideology of Shari‟ah board members who refuse to expand beyond the 
traditional Islamic finance contracts.  
 
Finally, the Shari‟ah board‟s commitments to publishing to the public their Shari‟ah 
resolutions and rulings and the mechanics of Shari‟ah compliance as applied in their 
Islamic bank reported the lowest mean value of 2.83. Indeed, Table 6.3.10 shows that 
50.0% of the respondents indicated their disagreement with the Shari‟ah board‟s 
commitment to this task. In Chapter Four, it was discussed that Shari‟ah board members 
hold a social responsibility by educating the public about the features of Islamic banking 
and enjoining Muslims to subscribe to this form of banking as it is in keeping with the 
injunctions of the Shari‟ah (Laldin 2008a). Similarly, AAOIFI has put forward its 
recommendation for the pronouncements and resolutions of Shari‟ah board members to 
be disclosed in the Shari‟ah report they issue to enhance the transparency of the Islamic 
banking practices in the bank (see for example AAOIFI 1998 para. 25-26). The finding of 
this study on this issue might indicate Shari‟ah boards‟ difficulties in undertaking this 
commitment at the expense of stakeholders‟ interests. Alternatively, this finding could 
also raise the concern of whether the Shari‟ah board or the management of the bank are 
being transparent on the Shari‟ah issues surrounding the Islamic banking practices of the 
bank. Notwithstanding these possibilities, there is a need for the policy maker to develop 
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a mechanism that could enhance the transparency of the Islamic banking practices, which 
would further increase the confidence of the stakeholders in this banking industry.  
    
Analyses by control variables did not produce significant differences except when 
analysed by the number of years banks have been offering Islamic banking products and 
services. As is evident from Table 6.3.11, the Kruskal Wallis H test produced a 
significant result for Shari‟ah board members‟ commitment to engaging in workshops 
and meetings of scholars of fiqh al-mua‟malat to promote consistency in Islamic banking 
products and services for banks who have been offering Islamic banking business 
between 6-10 years, with a p value of 0.026. Specifically, this Islamic banking experience 
category refers to five banks, who all shared the same responses of strong agreement, as 
can be observed from the mean value of 5 in Table 6.3.11. In other words, all the 
respondents in this category of Islamic banking business experience recognized that the 
Shari‟ah board members of their respective banks gave full commitment to workshops 
and meetings to promote consistency in Islamic banking practices. Additionally, this 
particular range of Islamic banking business experience could be considered as one stage 
between the early and the established level of experience. It can be suggested that in the 
early stage of Islamic bank‟s establishment, the Shari‟ah board, together with the 
management of the bank, would be focusing on developing the Islamic financial products 
and services to be offered to the customers. At the other extreme, banks in the 
„established‟ stage might find it challenging to innovate and introduce new Islamic 
financial products and services to the market. Hence, the period between 6-10 years after 
the establishment of the bank could be suggested as the stage where Shari‟ah board 
members would attempt to find their footing within the industry by aligning the products 
and services offered by their respective banks with that of other banks through 
engagement in workshops and meetings of scholars of fiqh al-mua‟malat in search of 
consistency of Islamic banking practices across the industry.  
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Table 6.3.10: Analysis Showing Commitments of Shari’ah Board Members  
 
Commitments of 
Shari’ah Board Members 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean 
Publish resolutions to the 
public 
12 50.0 4 16.7 8 33.3 24 100.0 2.83 
Engage in innovation of IB 
products & services 
6 25.0 3 12.5 15 62.5 24 100.0 3.50 
Engage in effort on 
promoting consistency of 
IB products & services 
1 4.2 3 12.5 20 83.3 24 100.0 4.21 
Analyze how IB products 
& services would benefit 
ummah before they are 
launched 
0 .0 5 20.8 19 79.2 24 100.0 4.13 
Enhance Shari'ah review 
skills by attending training 
1 4.2 4 16.7 19 79.2 24 100.0 4.04 
Respond to questions 
through discussions with 
the shareholders & the 
public 
4 16.7 7 29.2 13 54.2 24 100.0 3.50 
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Table 6.3.11: Analysis Showing Commitments of Shari’ah Board Members by the Number of Years Banks have been Offering 
Islamic Banking (IB) 
Commitments of 
Shari’ah Board 
Members 
Number of Years Bank have been Offering IB 
0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 Years 
16 Years  
and above 
Overall 
No Mean No Mean No Mean No Mean Total  Sig. 
Publish resolutions to 
the public 
13 2.7 5 3.2 0 0.0 6 2.8 24 - 
Engage in innovation 
of IB products & 
services 
13 3.5 5 3.8 0 0.0 6 3.3 24 - 
Promote consistency 
of IB products & 
services 
13 3.8 5 5.0 0 0.0 6 4.3 24 *0.026 
Analyze how IB 
products & Services 
would benefit ummah 
before they are 
launched 
13 4.2 5 4.2 0 0.0 6 4.0 24 - 
Enhance Shari'ah 
review skills by 
attending training 
13 3.8 5 4.4 0 0.0 6 4.3 24 - 
Respond to questions 
through discussions 
with the shareholders 
& the public 
13 3.2 5 4.2 0 0.0 6 3.7 24 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is statistically different between the four categories of number of years banks offer Islamic 
banking products and services using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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6.4 Accountability and Independence of Shari’ah Boards 
This section analyzes frequently debated issues surrounding the Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board, namely, the accountability and independence of the 
Shari‟ah board. In this section, there are four subsections on the issues of the 
accountability and independence of the Shari‟ah board. The first two subsections cover an 
analysis of the factors influencing the Shari‟ah board‟s accountability and independence 
respectively. These are followed by a subsection on the analysis of the relevant parties to 
whom Shari‟ah board members are deemed accountable. The last part covers an analysis 
of the nature of Shari‟ah board appointments and mandated authority.  
 
6.4.1 Factors Influencing Accountability 
The respondents were invited to provide their feedback on the ethical issues pertaining to 
the accountability of Shari‟ah board members. They were asked to indicate the level of 
importance on a scale that ranged from very unimportant (1) to very important (5) on five 
crucial factors that are believed to influence the accountability of Shari‟ah board 
members. Table 6.4.1 provides an analysis of the findings on the level of importance of 
the factors influencing the accountability of Shari‟ah board members.   
It can be observed from Table 6.4.1 below that none of the respondents provided 
feedback in the „unimportant‟ category. Thus, all the factors listed as influencing the 
accountability of Shari‟ah board members are deemed relevant and important. An 
analysis based on the mean value of the responses revealed that the Shari‟ah board‟s 
ethical value and the Shari‟ah board‟s reputation shared the highest mean value of 4.75 
and were similarly ranked first as the factors influencing the Shari‟ah board‟s 
accountability. In order of importance, this is followed by the Shari‟ah board‟s scholarly 
background, with a mean score value of 4.71 (ranked third); the requirement for the 
Shari‟ah board to ensure the Shari‟ah compliance of the bank, with a mean score value of 
4.63 (ranked fourth); and the stakeholders‟ reliance on the Shari‟ah review of the 
Shari‟ah board factors, with a mean score value of 4.50 (ranked fifth).  
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Table 6.4.1: Analysis Showing the Importance of the Factors Influencing 
Accountability of Shari’ah Boards Members 
Factors 
Influencing 
Accountability 
of Shari’ah 
Board 
Members 
Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Shari‟ah 
board's ethical 
value 
0 .0 0 .0 24 100.0 24 100.0 4.75 1 
Shari‟ah 
board's 
scholarly 
background 
0 .0 0 .0 24 100.0 24 100.0 4.71 3 
Shari‟ah 
board's 
reputation 
0 .0 1 4.2 23 95.8 24 100.0 4.75 1 
Stakeholders' 
reliance on 
Shari‟ah board 
0 .0 2 8.3 22 91.7 24 100.0 4.50 5 
Shari‟ah 
board's 
requirement to 
ensure Shari'ah 
compliance 
0 .0 2 8.3 22 91.7 24 100.0 4.63 4 
 
When the first three factors considered as most important by respondents, i.e., the 
Shari‟ah board‟s ethical value, the Shari‟ah board‟s reputation, and the scholarly 
background of the Shari‟ah board, were further analysed, it seemed that they represented 
the factors pertaining to the personal integrity of individual members of the Shari‟ah 
board. On the other hand, the last two factors, i.e., the requirement for the Shari‟ah board 
to ensure the Shari‟ah compliance of the bank and the stakeholders‟ reliance on the 
Shari‟ah review of the Shari‟ah board, could be considered as factors pertaining to the 
fiduciary duties of Shari‟ah board members. Hence, it seems that the respondents 
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believed that personal integrity rather than fiduciary duties is the most important factor 
influencing the accountability of Shari‟ah board members. Indeed, the importance of 
good personal integrity and its association with high accountability amongst Shari‟ah 
board members is consistent with the arguments raised by various studies (see for 
example Karim 1990a; Kahf 2002; Laldin 2008a), as was discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
The only control variable that was found to produce significantly different results is total 
assets. As is evident from Table 6.4.2 below, the Kruskal-Wallis H test results are 
significantly different for the Shari‟ah board‟s ethical value factor, with a p value of 
0.033.  It can be seen from Table 6.4.2 that the mean values for banks in the medium-
sized and large categories are 4.9 and 4.8 respectively. These mean values are relatively 
higher than the mean value for banks in the small category, i.e., 4.3. In other words, the 
respondents in the medium-sized and large banks felt more strongly that the Shari‟ah 
board‟s ethical value was a very important factor in influencing the Shari‟ah board‟s 
accountability than did respondents in small banks. This suggests that as the size of the 
banks increases, so does the importance of Shari‟ah board members being faithful to their 
ethical values when undertaking their roles and functions. This finding illustrates how the 
integrity of the Shari‟ah governance authority is crucial for the success of financial 
institutions whose establishment and operations are based on ethical values. In addition, 
this finding lends support to the need for Shari‟ah boards, as the Shari‟ah governance 
authority, to be regulated in order for this alternative ethical banking to avoid a financial 
crisis similar to that suffered by the western financial system, as a result of proper 
monitoring and regulation from the authority.  
 
  
 181 
 
 
Table 6.4.2: Analysis Showing the Factors Influencing Accountability of Shari’ah Board Members by Total Assets 
 
Factors 
Influencing 
Accountability 
of Shari’ah 
Board 
Members 
Total Assets by Category 
Sig. 
Small 
(Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium 
(between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 million 
assets) 
Large 
(More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Unimportant Uncertain Important Total 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
Shari‟ah 
board's ethical 
value 
.0 .0 100.0 4.30 .0 .0 100.0 4.90 .0 .0 100.0 4.80 *0.033 
Shari‟ah 
board's 
scholarly 
background 
.0 .0 100.0 4.50 .0 .0 100.0 4.70 .0 .0 100.0 4.80 - 
Shari‟ah 
board's 
reputation 
.0 25.0 75.0 4.30 .0 .0 100.0 4.80 .0 .0 100.0 4.90 - 
Stakeholders' 
reliance on 
Shari‟ah board 
.0 .0 100.0 4.30 .0 8.3 91.7 4.60 .0 12.5 87.5 4.40 - 
Shari‟ah 
board's 
requirement to 
ensure Shari‟ah 
compliance 
.0 .0 100.0 4.80 .0 8.3 91.7 4.60 .0 12.5 87.5 4.50 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is statistically different between the three categories of total assets using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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6.4.2 Factors Influencing Independence 
It was discussed in Chapter Four that Shari‟ah board members are expected to be 
independent if the oversight function on the Islamic banks is to be effectively carried out.  
In this regard, this study investigated the factors considered important by the respondents 
as influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members. Table 6.4.3 and Table 6.4.4 
below provide an analysis of the findings on the subject of Shari‟ah boards‟ 
independence.  
 
Table 6.4.3: Analysis Showing the Importance of the Factors Influencing 
Independence of Shari’ah Board Members  
 
 
Factors 
Influencing 
Independence of 
Shari’ah Board 
Members 
Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean Rank 
A clearly defined 
scope of 
responsibility 
0 .0 0 .0 24 100.0 24 100.0 4.71 1 
The remuneration 
received  
5 20.8 4 16.7 15 62.5 24 100.0 3.5 7 
The scholarly 
background  
0 .0 1 4.2 23 95.8 24 100.0 4.58 3 
The perceived high 
ethical status  
0 .0 1 4.2 23 95.8 24 100.0 4.63 2 
Adequate powers 
being mandated 
0 .0 1 4.2 23 95.8 24 100.0 4.5 4 
Participation of top 
management in the 
Shari‟ah board's 
meeting 
5 20.8 2 8.3 17 70.8 24 100.0 3.83 6 
Involvement of the 
Shari‟ah board as 
Shari‟ah board 
members in other 
industries 
3 12.5 4 16.7 17 70.8 24 100.0 3.87 5 
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In Table 6.4.3, the feedback on the respondents‟ perceived importance of factors 
identified as influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members is given. The table 
also presents the mean value of the responses for each identified factor; this was then 
used as a basis to rank them in order of importance. Several observations could be made 
from the analysis shown in Table 6.4.3. First, there are four factors with mean values 
exceeding 4.0, indicating that they were perceived as being very important in influencing 
the independence of Shari‟ah board members. In order of importance, these factors are 
the Shari‟ah board‟s clearly defined scope of responsibilities (mean value of 4.71), the 
perceived high ethical status of the Shari‟ah board (mean value of 4.63), the scholarly 
background of the Shari‟ah board (mean value of 4.58), and adequate powers being 
mandated to the Shari‟ah board (mean value of 4.50). Second, the table also highlights 
that none of the respondents perceived any of these four factors as unimportant, albeit 
there is some evidence of respondents indicating uncertainty about their influence on the 
independence of Shari‟ah board members. This implies that these factors are crucial in 
determining the independence of Shari‟ah board members and that their non-observance 
could lead to questions being raised about the independence of this Shari‟ah governance 
authority. Third, the three remaining identified factors received mixed feedback from 
respondents regarding their perceived importance in influencing the independence of 
Shari‟ah board members. The involvement of Shari‟ah board members in the Shari‟ah 
Committee in other industries (mean value of 3.87), the participation of top management 
in the Shari‟ah board‟s meetings (mean value of 3.83), and the remuneration received by 
the Shari‟ah board (mean value of 3.50) were ranked fifth, sixth and seventh respectively 
in importance as influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members. Nevertheless, 
these factors were not perceived as being of absolute importance, as they were also 
regarded by some respondents as unimportant, as is seen in Table 6.4.3.   
 
The existence of a clearly defined scope of responsibilities, which is ranked first in 
importance and regarded as important by all respondents, would serve as a term of 
reference and a guideline for Shari‟ah boards when undertaking their roles and functions. 
It can also be used to specify the accountability of Shari‟ah boards as well as other 
relevant parties within the Shari‟ah governance framework (SGF) thereby enabling them 
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to become liable for the success of each party‟s task accomplishment. Indeed, the need 
for a clearly defined scope of responsibilities as a mechanism to ensure the independence 
of the Shari‟ah board is consistent with the requirement put forward by the regulatory 
bodies of the Islamic banking industry (AAOIFI 1997, 1998; BNM 2004; IFSB 2009). A 
clearly defined scope of responsibilities might have been undermined in previous studies 
investigating the factors influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members; 
however, it is highlighted as an important factor in this study. It would also be intriguing 
to find out whether the banks as well as Shari‟ah board members themselves are being 
transparent in disclosing the responsibilities of the Shari‟ah board to the stakeholders of 
the Islamic banking industry. This finding suggests that, in the absence of this important 
independence tool, it would be difficult to hold the Shari‟ah board accountable for any 
negligence or breach of duty on their part.  
 
Meanwhile, the perceived high ethical status of Shari‟ah board members and the 
scholarly background of Shari‟ah board members, which were ranked second and third 
respectively, reflect the importance of the personal integrity of Shari‟ah board members 
in the independence of their Shari‟ah governance function. In influencing the 
independence of Shari‟ah board members, both factors were perceived as important by 
95.8% of the respondents. Additionally, it is worth noting that Abdul Rahman et al. 
(2005) found these two factors as highly important in increasing the independence of 
Shari‟ah board members. It was mentioned in Chapter Four that Karim (1990a) asserted 
that the independence of the Shari‟ah board should be viewed from the ethical 
perspective whereby Shari‟ah board members are expected to be committed to their 
moral beliefs and Islamic precepts as reflected in their educational background. Hence, 
the evidence found on these two factors supports the argument put forward by Karim 
(1990a) in which it is important for Shari‟ah board members to present a good character 
and to practice their faith in accordance with their Shari‟ah educational background and 
high ethical position, as how they are perceived determines their independence. These 
findings also highlight the importance of establishing a mechanism whereby a continuous 
performance appraisal of Shari‟ah board members could be conducted which would be 
used in determining their contract renewal. It is also high time for the regulators to 
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establish certain guidelines that would serve as a code of conduct for Shari‟ah board 
members similar to those available to other professionals, such as accountants.  
 
On the other hand, adequate powers being mandated to Shari‟ah board members, which is 
ranked fourth, was similarly perceived as important by 95.8%. Indeed, the importance 
perceived by the respondents on this issue is consistent with the recommendation 
forwarded by IFSB (IFSB 2009 principle 1.2). However, it would be is interesting to find 
out whether the considerably high percentage of importance given by the respondents to 
this factor is an indication that the present level of authority awarded to Shari‟ah board 
members is not sufficient for them to carry out their Shari‟ah governance function. If this 
were the case, it would mean that there is a gap between the roles and functions of 
Shari‟ah board members as stipulated in the present guidelines issued by the regulator 
(for example, the GPS1 issued by BNM) and the present governance role carried out by 
Shari‟ah board members. In such circumstances, the policy maker would have to review 
the existing guidelines and make the necessary amendments in order to ensure that the 
present scope of the Shari‟ah governance function of Shari‟ah boards has been taken into 
account and stipulated in the guidelines.  
 
Although the factors that ranked fifth, sixth and seventh, i.e., involvement of the Shari‟ah 
board as the Shari‟ah Committee in other industries, the participation of top management 
in the Shari‟ah board‟s meeting, and the remuneration received by the Shari‟ah board, 
received a mixed perception of their importance from the respondents, this also highlights 
several issues. For example, the factor of the involvement of Shari‟ah board members in 
Shari‟ah Committees in other industries was perceived by 70.8% of the respondents as 
important in influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members. In Chapter Four, 
it was discussed that a lack of competent scholars has resulted in Shari‟ah scholars 
holding Shari‟ah board membership in various banks, which could potentially lead to 
problems associated with Shari‟ah review quality (see for example Antonio 2008) and the 
independence of Shari‟ah board members (see for example Grais and Pellegrini 2006; 
Alhabshi and Bakar 2008). In order to tackle the placement of Shari‟ah board members in 
multiple banks, the Malaysian regulator has imposed limitations on the membership of 
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the Shari‟ah board to only one bank within the same industry (BNM 2004). However, the 
evidence derived from this study suggests that the representation of Shari‟ah board 
members even from a different industry (for example, the Takaful or Islamic insurance 
industry) is important in influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members. 
Hence, the present restriction imposed by BNM for Shari‟ah board members to hold a 
position in just one bank within the same industry but not in another industry seems to 
have the potential of jeopardising the independence of Shari‟ah board members. 
Although this finding calls for the regulator to review existing policy regarding the 
membership of the scholars in the Shari‟ah board within the same or different industries, 
it also highlights the need to produce more competent scholars to serve the Islamic 
financial services industry as a whole. 
  
Meanwhile, the factor of the participation of the top management in the Shari‟ah board‟s 
meeting was similarly perceived as important by 70.8% of the respondents. Thus, most of 
the respondents perceived that the synergy that could result from the participation of the 
top management in the Shari‟ah board‟s meeting, which is also amongst 
recommendations made by the IFSB (please refer to IFSB 2009), as important in 
influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members. Nevertheless, there is also 
evidence to the contrary, as indicated in Table 6.4.3, where 20.8% of the respondents 
regarded it as unimportant and negatively influence the independence of the Shari‟ah 
board members.   
 
Finally, the factor of the remuneration received by Shari‟ah board members was 
perceived as important by 62.5% of the respondents. This finding indicates that most of 
the respondents perceived that the remuneration received by Shari‟ah board members 
could compromise this Shari‟ah governance authority‟s independence; this view is 
consistent with the debate discussed in Chapter Four (see for example Grais and 
Pellegrini 2006; Rammal 2006; Khan 2007). However, some of the evidence in this study 
refutes such claims, as is reflected by a total of 20.8% of the total number of respondents 
(by combining the 12.5% of respondents who perceived it as unimportant and another 
8.3% who perceived it as very unimportant) who considered this factor as unimportant in 
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influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members. In such circumstances, the 
ethical value and the scholarly background of Shari‟ah board members would ensure their 
resistance to the monetary influence and would uphold the integrity and guarantee the 
effective and independent function of Shari‟ah board members.  
 
Meanwhile, analyses by control variables were also conducted but produced significantly 
different results only for the control variable total assets. Table 6.4.4 below presents the 
analysis of the factors influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members by the 
three categories of total assets when tested using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. As can be 
seen from the table, amongst all the factors identified, the only factor that is significantly 
different across the three categories of total assets is the Shari‟ah board‟s clearly defined 
scope of responsibilities, with a p value of 0.037. The respondents from medium-sized 
and large banks thought it of high importance that a clearly defined scope of 
responsibilities would influence the independence of Shari‟ah board members, with mean 
values of 4.92 and 4.63 respectively. On the other hand, respondents from small banks, in 
comparison to those from medium-sized and large banks, perceived a lower importance 
for this factor‟s ability to influence the independence of Shari‟ah board members. It can 
be suggested that the high importance given to the factor in discussion amongst bigger 
banks is a result of the implementation of good governance practice that has witnessed 
the positive effect on Shari‟ah board members‟ independence after investing in 
mechanisms such as a precise Shari‟ah manual, seeking the consultation of external 
experts, as well as support from all relevant parties within the bank for the governance 
function of Shari‟ah board members. In contrast, small banks, while perceiving that a 
clearly defined scope of responsibilities could enhance the independence of Shari‟ah 
board members, might not see this as the dominant factor due to possible constraints on 
making investments of the type discussed for their counterparts. As a result, Shari‟ah 
board members might have multiple tasks regarding their roles and functions whilst at the 
same time preserving and ensuring their independence. 
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Table 6.4.4: Analysis Showing the Factors Influencing Independence of Shari’ah Board Members by Total Assets  
Factors 
Influencing  
Independence 
of Shari’ah 
Boards 
Members  
Total Assets by Category 
Sig. 
Small 
 (Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium  
(between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 
million assets) 
Large 
 (More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Unimportant Uncertain Important Total 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
A clearly 
defined scope of 
responsibility 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 .0 .0% 100.0 4.92 .0 .0 100.0 4.63 *0.037 
The 
remuneration 
received  
50.0 25.0 25.0 2.50 16.7 16.7% 66.7 3.67 12.5 12.5 75.0 3.75 - 
The scholarly 
background  
.0 .0 100.0 4.50 .0 .0% 100.0 4.67 .0 12.5 87.5 4.50 - 
The perceived 
high ethical 
status  
.0 .0 100.0 4.50 .0 .0% 100.0 4.83 .0 12.5 87.5 4.38 - 
Adequate 
powers being 
mandated 
.0 .0 100.0 4.50 .0 8.3% 91.7 4.50 .0 .0 100.0 4.50 - 
Participation of 
top management 
in  the Shari‟ah 
board 's meeting 
25.0 25.0 50.0 3.50 25.0 .0% 75.0 3.83 12.5 12.5 75.0 4.00 - 
Involvement of  
the Shari‟ah 
board as  
Shari‟ah board 
members in 
other industries 
25.0 25.0 50.0 3.25 8.3 16.7% 75.0 4.08 12.5 12.5 75.0 3.88 - 
* Indicates the distribution of responses is statistically different between the three categories of total assets using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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6.4.3 Relevant Parties to which Shari’ah Boards are Accountable  
The esteem and high ethical status of Shari‟ah boards is linked with their role in ensuring 
that the operation of banks offering Islamic financial services is in accordance with the 
Islamic Shari‟ah. As such, the role and function of Shari‟ah boards is of great importance 
to the stakeholders of these banks. In this study, the respondents were invited to indicate 
the importance they perceived of the identified parties to whom they consider Shari‟ah 
boards to be accountable based on a scale ranging from very unimportant (1) to very 
important (5). Table 6.4.5 below shows the analysis of the findings. 
 
 
Table 6.4.5: Analysis Showing the Parties to which Shari’ah Boards are 
Accountable 
 
 
 
As is shown in Table 6.4.5, most of the respondents perceived as important that the 
identified parties to whom Shari‟ah boards are accountable. Based on the responses 
given, a mean value was calculated for each identified party and a ranking given to 
indicate each party‟s importance. It is evident from the table that both the bank‟s board of 
Parties 
Shari’ah 
Boards are 
Accountable 
Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Bank's 
shareholders 
0 .0 0 .0 24 100.0 24 100.0 4.5 3 
Bank's 
consumers 
1 4.2 1 4.2 22 91.7 24 100.0 4.46 4 
Bank's board 
of directors 
0 .0 0 .0 24 100.0 24 100.0 4.63 1 
Public 1 4.2 1 4.2 22 91.7 24 100.0 4.42 5 
Shari‟ah 
Advisory 
Council of 
BNM 
0 .0 0 .0 24 100.0 24 100.0 4.63 1 
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directors and the SAC of BNM scored the highest mean value (4.63) and secured the first 
rank. Both parties were unanimously perceived as important by all respondents. While 
both the bank‟s board of directors and the SAC of BNM are from two different 
organizations, they are undeniably important parties within the SGF of banks offering 
Islamic banking activities. It was discussed in Chapter Four that the board of directors are 
the party within the bank to whom Shari‟ah boards are held accountable to provide 
Shari‟ah advice (Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and Karim 1987; Banaga et al. 
1994; Haniffa and Hudaib 2007), as the former is responsible for the policy making of the 
bank. In addition to the Shari‟ah advisory role, GPS1 also stipulates that Shari‟ah boards 
are required to report directly to their respective board of directors (BNM 2004). Hence, 
the perceived high importance given to Shari‟ah boards‟ accountability to the board of 
directors reflects the functional accountability of Shari‟ah boards and is to be expected.  
 
Meanwhile, the SAC of BNM is the regulator and the supreme authority on Shari‟ah 
governance in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry. Its authority over all Malaysian 
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) is reflected in the recent amendment of the Central 
Bank of Malaysia‟s Act 2009 whereby all resolutions made by the SAC are binding to the 
industry (BNM 2009), as was discussed in Chapter Four. Indeed, the GPS1 clearly 
stipulated that Shari‟ah boards are required to assist the SAC regarding advice, for 
example, by supporting the SAC with relevant Shari‟ah jurisprudential literature from 
established sources when seeking approval for the launch of new Islamic banking 
products and services (BNM 2004). In this regard, the perceived high importance given to 
the SAC as the party to whom Shari‟ah boards are accountable could be described as 
confined to the regulator-regulatee relationship.  
 
After the board of directors and the SAC of BNM, the respondents perceived that the 
bank‟s shareholders come next in importance as the party to whom Shari‟ah boards are 
accountable, with a mean score of 4.50. In Chapter Four it was discussed that Shari‟ah 
boards are expected to perform in the best interest of the shareholders, as it is suggested 
that the former be appointed by the latter (see for example Karim 1990a; Rammal 2006; 
Laldin 2008b). Indeed, matters such as the appointment, remuneration and issuance of 
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Shari‟ah reports of Shari‟ah boards have been recommended by AAOIFI to be subject to 
the shareholders‟ approval (AAOIFI 1997 para. 3). However, Malaysia diverges on this 
issue, as the appointment and remuneration of Shari‟ah board members are the 
prerogative of the board of directors of the IFIs, although subject to approval from the 
BNM (BNM 2004). Similarly, the reporting structure of Shari‟ah boards has been clearly 
stipulated in GPS1 as being direct to the board of directors of their respective IFIs (BNM 
2004). It is due to this regulatory requirement, perhaps, that the respondents perceived 
that it is more important that Shari‟ah boards are held accountable to the board of 
directors than to the bank‟s shareholders.  
 
In order of importance, the following parties to whom Shari‟ah board members are 
perceived accountable are the bank‟s consumers and the public with mean score values of 
4.46 and 4.42 respectively. Clearly, these two parties represent other important 
stakeholders regarding the roles and functions of Shari‟ah board members. However, the 
perceived reduced importance given to these two parties revealed in this study could be 
the result of the apparently reduced direct functional association between Shari‟ah board 
members and these two parties. Additionally, the bank‟s consumers and the public are 
both the end users of Islamic banking products and services. Although Shari‟ah board 
members are responsible for ensuring the confidence of the consumers and the public in 
the operation of banks offering Islamic banking products and services, the Shari‟ah board 
members‟ functional accountability to these two parties is, arguably, less than their 
accountability to the board of directors, the SAC of BNM and the bank‟s shareholders.  
 
Analyses by control variables did not produce significantly different results and, thus, are 
not reported here.  
 
 
6.4.4 The Appointment and Mandated Authority of Shari’ah Board Members 
This study also investigates important issues surrounding the nature of the appointment 
and mandated authority of Shari‟ah boards. The respondents were invited to indicate their 
agreement with selected features surrounding these issues based on a scale that ranged 
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from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Table 6.4.6 presents the analysis of the 
findings.  
  
 
Table 6.4.6: Analysis Showing the Nature of the Appointment and Mandated 
Authority of Shari’ah Board Members  
Nature of 
Appointment and 
Mandated Authority 
of Shari’ah Board 
Members 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean 
Appointment of 
Shari‟ah board is 
based on fit and proper 
criteria 
0 .0 0 .0 24 100.0 24 100.0 4.58 
No conflict on the 
appointment of 
Shari‟ah board 
0 .0 0 .0 24 100.0 24 100.0 4.54 
Shari‟ah board is 
subject to assessment 
by the bank or BNM 
0 .0 0 .0 24 100.0 24 100.0 4.63 
Adequate powers have 
been mandated to 
Shari‟ah board 
2 8.3 1 4.2 21 87.5 24 100.0 4.29 
Existence of reporting 
channel on conflicts 
with Shari‟ah board, 
board of directors or 
management 
3 12.5 3 12.5 18 75.0 24 100.0 3.83 
Proper segregation of 
Shari‟ah board duties  
3 12.5 1 4.2 20 83.3 24 100.0 4.00 
 
 
On the question of whether the appointment of Shari‟ah board members is made based on 
certain „fit and proper‟ qualification criteria, Table 6.4.6 shows that all the respondents 
unanimously indicated their agreement that this feature be exercised in their respective 
banks. The consensus in the literatures seems to suggest that the Shari‟ah board should 
comprise experts from the field of fiqh al-mua‟malat as well as from accounting and 
finance (see for example Gambling et al. 1993; AAOIFI 1997; Grais and Pellegrini 2006; 
Laldin 2008b). In addition, the importance for IFIs, such as banks offering Islamic 
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banking products and services, to establish „fit and proper‟ qualification criteria has been 
laid down by IFSB (see IFSB 2006 para. 52-53). Hence, the findings of this study 
indicate that such an important appointment mechanism is being well exercised across all 
the participating banks in the MIFC.  
 
Next, the respondents were asked whether assurance has been made that the appointment 
of Shari‟ah board members is free from any conflict of interest, such as being substantial 
shareholders or having an intimate relationship with an employee of the bank the board 
serves. Similarly, all respondents indicated their agreement that this requirement be taken 
into account when appointing Shari‟ah board members. Earlier, it was mentioned that it is 
recommended that Shari‟ah board members be appointed by the bank‟s shareholders (see 
for example Karim 1990a; AAOIFI 1997; Rammal 2006; Laldin 2008b). Such an 
appointment mechanism is seen as a way to cater for any possible conflict of interest on 
the role of Shari‟ah board members in supervising and monitoring the Islamic banks‟ 
management in conjunction with that of the bank‟s board of directors. However, the 
Malaysian Islamic banking business environment diverges in the way that Shari‟ah board 
members are appointed by the bank‟s board of directors, but the method is still subject to 
the approval of the regulator, i.e., BNM. Although such an appointment mechanism 
seems to indicate that Shari‟ah board members in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry 
are deprived of the benefit of shareholders‟ endorsement to counter the principal-agent 
conflict, the findings of this study suggest otherwise. With the assurance indicated in this 
study that there is no conflict of interest in the appointment of Shari‟ah board members, it 
is expected that Shari‟ah board members would perform their roles and functions in the 
best interests of the shareholders. In fact, this appointment filtering mechanism at the 
bank level is followed by another filtering mechanism in which the choice of Shari‟ah 
board members by the bank‟s board of directors is subject to the approval of BNM. 
Hence, the need to ensure that Shari‟ah board members would serve in the best interests 
of shareholders is dealt with despite Shari‟ah board members not being appointed by the 
shareholders. 
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Another question of interest is whether Shari‟ah board members are subject to any 
assessment by the bank or BNM. As shown in Table 6.4.6, all the respondents indicated 
their agreement with the existence of such a performance appraisal. This finding clearly 
indicates that Shari‟ah board members in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry are not 
immune from performance evaluation and could simultaneously provide evidence to 
counter criticism, such that they lack of independence (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; 
Rammal 2006; Khan 2007), legitimize dubious operations (Grais and Pellegrini 2006; 
Rammal 2006) and are merely window dressing for Islamic banks (Kahf 2002). 
Additionally, it reflects the effectiveness of the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system 
implemented in Malaysia whereby the existence of such a check and balance mechanism 
on the important role of Shari‟ah board members would ensure that this Shari‟ah 
governance authority would serve in the best interests of all the stakeholders involved.   
 
The respondents were also asked whether they perceived that Shari‟ah board members 
have been mandated with adequate powers to perform the role of the board. On this issue, 
the results shown in Table 6.4.6 reveal that 87.5% of the total respondents indicated their 
agreement with such mandated authority being given to Shari‟ah board members. While 
it can be said that the vast majority of Shari‟ah board members are given the authority to 
carry out their roles and functions, there is also some evidence to the contrary, as can be 
observed with about 12.5% of the respondents. Alternatively, evidence of the lack of 
power to exercise their roles and functions could possibility indicate that Shari‟ah board 
members are unable to perform their perceived high ethical function with absolute 
independence. In such circumstances, the agency problem faced by corporations such as 
Islamic banks is unlikely to be eased even with the existence of an additional layer in the 
role of Shari‟ah governance as played by Shari‟ah board members.   
 
The respondents were also asked about the existence of a reporting channel for Shari‟ah 
board members in the event of any conflict arising between Shari‟ah board members and 
the board of directors or the management of the bank. Such a reporting mechanism is 
deemed crucial, as it would enhance the independence and effective function of the 
Shari‟ah board. Indeed, this question has relevance, as it is consistent with the 
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requirement put forward by IFSB that any conflict of interest on the role of the Shari‟ah 
board among Shari‟ah board members themselves or between Shari‟ah board members 
and the management should be avoided and resolved (IFSB 2009). In response, Table 
6.4.6 reveals that 75.0% of the respondents indicated their agreement whereas 12.5% 
indicated their disagreement. Evidence for the existence of such a mechanism could 
reflect the mechanism developed by the banks to ensure that Shari‟ah board members 
undertake their roles and functions effectively. Nevertheless, evidence to the contrary 
makes apparent that possible disputes between all the important parties within the SGF 
occur at the cost of other stakeholders.   
 
One of the issues discussed in Chapter Four surrounding the appointment of Shari‟ah 
board members is the absence of any proper segregation of Shari‟ah board members‟ 
duties pertaining to their product endorsement function and later when performing the 
Shari‟ah compliance review, as highlighted by Alhabshi and Bakar (2008). Arguably, if 
the same monitoring body, i.e., the Shari‟ah board, was responsible for these two 
functions, there would be concerns regarding the independence of Shari‟ah board 
members and the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah compliance review. The findings of this 
study reveal that 83.3% of the respondents indicated their agreement whereas 12.5% 
indicated otherwise regarding the existence of such an appointment mechanism. Hence, it 
can be said that the vast majority of the banks ensure that there is no duplication of 
Shari‟ah board duties that would jeopardise the independence of this Shari‟ah governance 
authority. On the contrary, evidence in the negative could have a detrimental effect on 
Shari‟ah board members‟ independence, as highlighted by Alhabshi and Bakar‟s (2008) 
argument above.  
 
In addition, analyses by control variables did not produce significantly different results 
and, hence, are not reported here. 
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6.5 The Nature of the Shari’ah Review by Shari’ah Boards 
One of the important roles of the Shari‟ah board which has also been the focus of this 
study is the Shari‟ah review function. This study has examined further the issue of the 
Shari‟ah review by looking into aspects of the structure and implementation of the 
Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board. For this purpose, the following paragraphs offer 
analyses and discussions of the two aforementioned aspects of the Shari‟ah review.  
 
6.5.1 Structure of the Shari’ah Review for Shari’ah Boards 
This study investigates important issues surrounding the structure of the Shari‟ah review 
for Shari‟ah boards. The respondents were invited to indicate their agreement with 
several crucial issues on this subject based on a scale that ranged from strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (5). Table 6.5.1 below provides an analysis of the results. 
 
Table 6.5.1: Analysis Showing the Structure of Shari'ah Review for Shari’ah Boards 
Structure of the 
Shari'ah Review for 
Shari’ah Boards 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean 
Shari‟ah board is 
individual bank's sole 
authority in Shari'ah 
review 
3 12.50 1 4.20 20 83.30 24 100 4.17 
Shari‟ah board is 
prescribed with 
operative procedure on 
its role & function 
2 8.30 1 4.20 21 87.50 24 100 4.13 
Shari‟ah board 
membership comprises 
various experts 
11 45.80 2 8.30 11 45.80 24 100 3.08 
Existence of effective 
communication channel 
to deliberate Shari'ah 
review issues 
2 8.30 2 8.30 20 83.30 24 100 4.13 
Adequate & apparent 
guidelines have been 
issued by Shari‟ah 
Advisory Council of 
BNM 
5 20.80 0 0.00 19 79.20 24 100 3.92 
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First, the respondents were asked whether they perceived the Shari‟ah board to be the 
sole authority on the Shari‟ah review system within individual banks offering Islamic 
banking services; 83.3% of the respondents indicated their agreement whereas 12.5% 
disagreed about the position of Shari‟ah boards as the sole authority in the Shari‟ah 
review system, as indicated in Table 6.5.1. Hence, the vast majority of the respondents 
perceived the Shari‟ah board to be the sole authority in the Shari‟ah review system, 
consistent with its role in ensuring the credibility of Islamic banks by ascertaining the 
Shari‟ah compliance of the bank‟s operations, as discussed in Chapter Four (see for 
example Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 1990b; Karim 
1990a; Banaga et al. 1994; Rammal 2006; Laldin 2008a). Nevertheless, the fact that 
12.5% of the respondents disagreed with this hierarchical position of the Shari‟ah board 
raises concerns on whether the Shari‟ah board members in those banks (three banks) 
delegate some of their functions to other parties within the bank, such as to the bank‟s 
Shari‟ah department officers. Interpreted differently, this result could also mean that the 
Shari‟ah board members were unable to execute their function in absolute independence 
from the management of the bank. In such circumstances, the banks would be exposed to 
Shari‟ah risk as an important component within the Shari‟ah governance system, i.e., 
Shari‟ah board members would be unable to carry out their role and function in ensuring 
the Shari‟ah compliance of the operations of the banks they represent.     
 
Next, the respondents were asked whether the Shari‟ah board had been prescribed the 
appropriate operative procedures on its roles and functions by the bank. Evidence from 
Table 6.5.1 indicates that 87.5% of the respondents agreed whereas another 8.3% 
disagreed. It is worth noting that GPS1 requires IFIs, such as banks offering Islamic 
banking services, to produce a Shari‟ah compliance manual which is subject to 
endorsement by the Shari‟ah board (BNM 2004), as was discussed in Chapter Four. This 
Shari‟ah compliance manual should include, amongst other things, the operative 
procedures for the relevant parties within the bank, including those for the Shari‟ah 
board. Indeed, a similar requirement was put forward by the IFSB (IFSB 2009 principle 
1.2). As such, the finding of this study indicates that the participating banks in the MIFC 
have established a proper structure for the Shari‟ah review in terms of the operative 
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procedure of the Shari‟ah board‟s role and function, although respondents from a few 
banks indicated otherwise.  
 
The following question related to whether membership of the Shari‟ah board in the 
respondents‟ respective banks comprised various experts, the importance of which was 
discussed in Chapter Four (see for example Gambling et al. 1993; AAOIFI 1997; Grais 
and Pellegrini 2006; Laldin 2008b). The findings of this study reveal that there were 
equal percentages of respondents (45.8%) whose Shari‟ah board in their respective banks 
comprised various experts and those which comprised Shari‟ah scholars only. Hence, this 
study provides evidence that the suggestion that Shari‟ah boards should comprise various 
experts has gained acceptance amongst the participating banks in the MIFC. However, it 
should be noted that the present lack of competent Shari‟ah scholars combined with the 
requirement laid down by GPS1 that each scholar can become a Shari‟ah board member 
of only one financial institution within the same industry could have resulted in the trend 
of Shari‟ah boards that include various experts, as found in this study. Evidently, 
membership of Shari‟ah boards that comprise Shari‟ah experts only seems prevalent, as 
indicated by the equivalent numbers of banks whose Shari‟ah board membership 
comprises various experts. These findings suggest that the acceptance amongst banks 
offering Islamic banking services for membership of the Shari‟ah board to comprise 
various experts is on a par with those banks that are being conservative by appointing 
only Shari‟ah scholars as Shari‟ah board members.  
 
In addition, the respondents were asked about the existence of an effective 
communication channel to deliberate Shari‟ah review issues. It was discussed in Chapter 
Four that this communication channel is an important governance mechanism for 
Shari‟ah board members to deliberate Shari‟ah concerns on the operation of Islamic 
banks with all parties within the SGF. Evidence from this study revealed that 83.30% of 
the respondents indicated their agreement whereas only 8.30% indicated their 
disagreement on the existence of such a governance mechanism on Shari‟ah review for 
the Shari‟ah board. Such a high percentage of agreement amongst the respondents reflects 
the commitment of banks offering Islamic banking products and services to establishing 
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the infrastructure necessary to uphold the Shari‟ah governance of this ethical banking 
operation.  
 
Finally, the respondents were also asked whether they perceived that there are adequate 
and apparent guidelines on the pronouncements and resolutions of the SAC of BNM 
issued for use in the Islamic banking industry; 79.2% of the respondents indicated their 
agreement whereas another 20.8% indicated the contrary, as shown in Table 6.5.1 above. 
Although more than three quarter of the respondents agreed on the existence of such 
guidelines by the SAC of BNM a considerable number of respondents perceived it to be 
otherwise. This revelation challenges the role of the SAC, especially when an earlier 
finding, as indicated in Table 6.4.5 above, shows that the SAC was ranked first in 
importance as the party to whom Shari‟ah board members were perceived to be 
accountable. Furthermore, the new amendment to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 
clarified the issue of the mandated powers authorized to the SAC whereby the Shari‟ah 
resolutions issued by the institution are binding upon all Malaysian IFIs (BNM 2009). 
One would argue that with the lack of adequate and apparent guidelines from the SAC, 
there is a communication gap between the important and interrelated parties within the 
Malaysian SGF that serves as a loophole on the effectiveness of the dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system practiced in Malaysia.  
 
In addition, analyses by control variables did not produce significantly different results, 
and, thus, are not reported here. 
 
 
6.5.2 Implementation of the Shari’ah Review by Shari’ah Boards 
Another issue investigated in this study pertains to the implementation of the Shari‟ah 
review by the Shari‟ah board. Thus, the respondents were invited to indicate their 
agreement based on the scale between strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5). Table 
6.5.2 and Table 6.5.3 present analyses of the findings.  
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Table 6.5.2: Analysis Showing the Features on Implementation of the Shari'ah Review by Shari’ah Boards 
 
Implementation of the 
Shari'ah Review by 
Shari’ah Boards 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean 
Shari‟ah board has full 
authority to stop non-Shari'ah 
compliance transactions 
3 12.5 4 16.7 17 70.8 24 100.0 3.96 
Shari‟ah board is given ample 
time for decision making & 
Shari'ah review  
2 8.3 2 8.3 20 83.3 24 100.0 4.17 
Shari‟ah board gets 
professional advice to support 
its function 
0 .0 3 12.5 21 87.5 24 100.0 4.29 
Shari‟ah board has direct 
access to relevant, accurate, 
adequate & timely info 
2 8.3 1 4.2 21 87.5 24 100.0 4.21 
Working part time does not 
hinder effective Shari'ah 
review by the Shari‟ah board 
5 20.8 3 12.5 16 66.7 24 100.0 3.63 
Existence of active 
communication & 
consultation between Shari‟ah 
board, bank & Shari‟ah 
Advisory Council  
3 12.5 8 33.3 13 54.2 24 100.0 3.58 
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The respondents were first asked whether they perceived that the Shari‟ah board has the full 
authority to stop the bank from undertaking non-Shari‟ah compliant transactions. As is evident 
in Table 6.5.2 above, 70.8% of the respondents indicated their agreement whereas only 12.5% 
were in disagreement that such authority has been given to Shari‟ah board members. 
Apparently, the feedback was unexpected, as there are some indications that the respondents 
did not perceive the Shari‟ah board to be the sole authority on the Shari‟ah governance 
mechanism of banks offering Islamic banking services and, thus, as having the full authority to 
stop banks from undertaking transactions that are not consistent with the Shari‟ah. In other 
words, the respondents indicated that even if the bank were known to be indulging in activities 
which are against the Shari‟ah, the Shari‟ah board has no authority to stop the bank from 
proceeding. These findings highlight a severe lack of independence on the part of Shari‟ah 
board members to perform their roles and functions due to the fact that they seem to be under 
the control of other parties within the bank. This finding, although it refers to a small number 
of banks (three banks), triggers concerns about the opportunistic behaviour of the management 
in the light of the agency problem and the crucial ethical role of the Shari‟ah board in 
overcoming this problem and protecting the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders as 
promoted in the stakeholder theory.  
 
Another question that was posed to the respondents was whether they perceived that the 
Shari‟ah board is given ample time for decision making and for the Shari‟ah review. Table 
6.5.2 indicates that 83.3% of the respondents were in agreement whereas only 8.3% were in 
disagreement. Hence, this finding indicates that the vast majority of the respondents were in 
agreement that Shari‟ah board members are given the required amount of time to perform their 
function. However, there is some evidence to the contrary, which corresponds to two banks 
where the respondents considered that their respective Shari‟ah board members are not given 
adequate time to complete their tasks within the given time period. It is argued that the nature 
of the banking business, which requires fast decision making, could have resulted in these 
respondents perceiving that Shari‟ah board members are unable to meet the deadline in making 
their Shari‟ah decisions. Moreover, the fact that Shari‟ah board members work part time in the 
bank could have contributed to this result. Nevertheless, this does not seems to be common, as 
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the majority of respondents perceived that Shari‟ah board members are given ample time for 
the said purpose.  
 
Apart from the consideration on the amount of time given to Shari‟ah board members, another 
question posed to the respondents regarding the issue of the implementation of Shari‟ah review 
was whether the Shari‟ah board gets professional advice to support its functions, such as on 
legal, accounting and finance aspects. It was mentioned in Chapter Four that Shari‟ah boards 
are expected to work closely with various parties within the Islamic banks (Banaga et al. 1994; 
AAOIFI 1998 para. 12). Such a requirement is deemed essential in order for Shari‟ah board 
members to gain clarity on all aspects of the bank‟s operation, which is vital if an objective 
Shari‟ah decision is to be made. The findings of this study reveal that 87.5% of the respondents 
indicated their agreement and there was no evidence to the contrary, as shown in Table 6.5.2. 
These findings demonstrate that the necessary professional support is given to Shari‟ah board 
members, as was perceived by the vast majority of the respondents. It also highlights the 
existence of an established communication and cooperation between all interrelated parties 
within the bank in ensuring the successful implementation of Shari‟ah governance amongst 
banks offering Islamic banking products and services.  
 
Also investigated was the important issue of whether the Shari‟ah board members have direct 
access to relevant, accurate, adequate and timely information when performing their Shari‟ah 
review function. It was found that 87.5% of the respondents indicated their agreement whereas 
8.3% were in disagreement on the provision of such information quality, as indicated in Table 
6.5.2. It was discussed in Chapter Four that the financial institution represented by Shari‟ah 
board members is required to provide the latter with information that has the characteristics  
mentioned (AAOIFI 1998 para. 3; BNM 2004 para. 21). Although the vast majority of the 
respondents provided positive responses to this question, there were responses in the negative 
(two banks), which presents a setback for the banks‟ compliance with the regulatory 
requirement and raises concerns on whether the Shari‟ah governance authority is able to 
perform its function independently and effectively. In addition, accessibility to such 
information has an apparent repercussion on the transparency on the part of financial institution 
and objective Shari‟ah opinion by Shari‟ah board members. The question that could be asked is 
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what could the regulator do, in this case the BNM, to ensure compliance with the requirements 
of the guidelines issued and the action taken for non-compliance.  
 
Another issue of frequent debate is on the part-time working nature of Shari‟ah board 
members. The respondents were invited to indicate whether they perceived that working part 
time does not hinder the production of an effective Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board. As 
indicated in Table 6.5.2, 66.7% of the respondents reported their agreement whereas 20.8% 
reported their disagreement. These findings reveal that most of the respondents perceived that 
working part time does not hinder Shari‟ah board members from performing their roles and 
functions effectively. It also implies that the part-time status and the non-executive role of 
Shari‟ah board members were considered acceptable. However, the fact that 20.8% of the 
respondents took a negative view of this points to the inappropriateness of Shari‟ah board 
members working part time to perform their highly important roles and functions.  
 
Finally, the respondents were asked whether there is active communication and consultation 
between the Shari‟ah board, the bank and the SAC of BNM. The responses, as shown in Table 
6.5.2, indicate that 54.2% of the respondents were in agreement whereas 12.5% were in 
disagreement. As can be seen from the table, these findings show that slightly more than half of 
the total number of respondents were in agreement on the presence of active communication 
and consultation between these three important parties whilst other respondents were either 
uncertain or in disagreement. Such a proportion does not seem to be the level deemed 
satisfactory and might suggest that communication between these three related parties tends to 
be limited to aspects of product approval and Shari‟ah board members‟ appointment, as was 
discussed earlier. Furthermore, the fact that Malaysia implements a dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system in its Islamic banking industry signifies the potential for closing the gap 
between the industries and minimizing the inconsistencies in Islamic banking practices. 
Therefore, the regulator has to utilize the mechanisms in the existing SGF to bring the Islamic 
banking industry into further growth and development.  
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Table 6.5.3: Analysis Showing the Features of Implementation of the Shari'ah Review by Shari’ah Boards by Total Assets 
  
Implementation of 
the Shari'ah Review 
by Shari’ah Boards  
  
  
Total Assets by Category 
Sig. 
Small 
 (Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium 
 (between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 
million assets) 
Large 
(More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
Shari‟ah board  has 
full authority to stop 
non-Shari'ah 
compliance 
transactions 
.0 25.0 75.0 4.00 25.0 16.7 58.3 3.67 .0 12.5 87.5 4.38 - 
Shari‟ah board  is 
given ample time for 
decision making & 
Shari'ah review  
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 16.7 16.7 66.7 4.00 .0 .0 100.0 4.38 - 
Shari‟ah board  gets 
professional advice to 
support its function 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 .0 25.0 75.0 4.25 .0 .0 100.0 4.38 - 
Shari‟ah board  has 
access to relevant, 
accurate adequate & 
timely info 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 16.7 8.3 75.0 4.08 .0 .0 100.0 4.38 - 
Working part time 
does not hinder 
effective Shari'ah 
review by  Shari‟ah 
board   
.0 .0 100.0 4.50 41.7 16.7 41.7 3.00 .0 12.5 87.5 4.13 *0.024 
Existence of active 
communication & 
consultation between 
Shari‟ah board  , 
bank & Shari‟ah 
Advisory Council of 
BNM 
25.0 50.0 25.0 3.00 8.3 41.7 50.0 3.58 12.5 12.5 75.0 3.88 - 
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Additionally, the only control variable that produced significantly different results was 
total assets regarding the factor of respondents‟ perception that working part time does 
not hinder the Shari‟ah board in producing an effective Shari‟ah review. Table 6.5.3 
above presents evidence that this factor was significantly different, with a p value of 
0.024 when tested using the Kruskal-Wallis H test, with the relatively smaller mean value 
of 3.00 for the medium-sized banks compared to that for the small and large banks, which 
had mean values of 4.50 and 4.13 respectively. These findings reveal that the respondents 
from the medium-sized banks were uncertain whether working part time does not hinder 
the production of an effective Shari‟ah review while their counterparts from the other two 
categories perceived to be the case. Interpreted differently, these findings suggest that 
Shari‟ah board members in small and large banks were perceived by the respondents to 
perform their crucial non-executive Shari‟ah roles and functions at the expected level 
despite the fact that board members are attached to the banks on a part-time basis. 
Meanwhile, the respondents from the medium-sized banks doubted the ability of their 
respective Shari‟ah board members to perform their high ethical and crucial Shari‟ah 
roles and functions as a result of being attached on a part-time basis. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the findings from Questionnaire Survey 1 (QS1) derived from 24 
heads of Shari‟ah departments of banks offering Islamic banking and services in the 
MIFC. This position in these banks was found to be dominated by males, largely 
equipped with knowledge of Shari‟ah and fiqh al-mua‟malat and with some also having 
knowledge in non-Islamic fields, such as management, accounting and finance. In 
addition, the size of Shari‟ah department seems to be influenced by the type of its 
operation and size with full-fledged Islamic banks and large banks appearing to have 
more Shari‟ah officers in the Shari‟ah department. Moreover, slightly more than half of 
the heads of Shari‟ah departments were found to have between 0-5 years working 
experience in the Islamic banking arena. These heads of Shari‟ah departments were 
invited to provide their feedback on three significant issues surrounding the governance 
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function of the Shari‟ah board: (1) the role of the Shari‟ah board, (2) the accountability 
and independence of the Shari‟ah board, and (3) the nature of Shari‟ah review by the 
Shari‟ah board.   
 
The banking business, including the Islamic banking industry, seems to be continually 
highly governed and regulated by the government. One significant implication of this is 
that the mandatory regulatory standards and guidelines prevail over the recommended 
ones, as in the case of GPS1, i.e., where the guidelines on the governance of the Shari‟ah 
board issued by BNM seem to prevail over AAOIFI and IFSB standards, which are 
basically best recommended governance practice for the Islamic banking industry. Hence, 
the clarity and comprehensiveness of GPS1, to a certain extent, reflects how robustly the 
Shari‟ah governance system is applied across the participating banks in the MIFC. 
Although these banks would generally implement a Shari‟ah governance system to fulfil 
the requirement of GPS1, any additional measures taken that are consistent with AAOIFI 
and IFSB (but not required by GPS1) would indicate additional initiatives by the bank to 
enhance its Shari‟ah governance mechanism.     
 
The results of QS1 indicate that the Shari‟ah board generally emphasises the Shari‟ah 
advisory role particularly in endorsing the Shari‟ah compliance manual prepared by the 
management and in advising the board of directors and other parties as well as advising 
the Shari‟ah department officers on the scope of the Shari‟ah review. However, the 
Shari‟ah boards do not seem inclined to get involved further in areas such as designing or 
providing training on the Shari‟ah governance system for implementation in the bank. 
Similarly, this study indicates the passive involvement of Shari‟ah boards in the bank‟s 
strategic issues, as most of the heads of Shari‟ah departments responded negatively 
regarding the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in advising and designing the corporate 
objectives of the banks. These findings demonstrate that the scope of Shari‟ah advisory 
undertaken by Shari‟ah boards has not progressed beyond its traditional Shari‟ah advisory 
role and tends to be limited to traditional product and development issues.  
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In fact, when Shari‟ah boards‟ involvement in developing Islamic banking products and 
services was explored further, it seems they give priority to the conception, legal 
documentation and the review stages. Technical aspects of products and services 
development, e.g., the pricing, testing, marketing and designing of Islamic banking 
products and services, were given less attention, as these issues might have been 
delegated to the Shari‟ah department for further action. Nevertheless, the design and 
pricing stages were found to be significantly different in small banks. In explaining these 
significant results and their association with bank size, relevant findings in this study 
indicate that small banks have fewer Shari‟ah officers, suggesting that Shari‟ah board 
members might have an intensive role in these two product and service development 
stages and are fully occupied due to their insights and hence their involvement. 
Meanwhile, the low emphasis given by the Shari‟ah boards on other stages of product and 
service development also demonstrates the delegation of authority to and the important 
role of the Shari‟ah department officers and other relevant parties within the bank.  
 
Minimal and selective involvement amongst Shari‟ah board members on accounting 
related issues was evident. Generally, the Shari‟ah board seems to be emphasising 
accounting issues which have direct Shari‟ah concerns relating to the Islamic banking 
business. These were found to be issues pertaining to (1) validating documents in 
contracts, (2) approving the calculation and distribution of zakat, and (3) endorsing the 
bank‟s annual report. Interestingly, accounting issues such as issuing a Shari‟ah report, 
which is closely associated with the role and function of the Shari‟ah board and which is 
deemed crucial for the ethical and investment decision of the stakeholders, was not 
indicated as being in Shari‟ah boards‟ top accounting involvement category. In such 
circumstances, the Shari‟ah department officers would be the party deemed to be in 
charge of preparing the Shari‟ah report, which would, however, be given to the Shari‟ah 
board for approval and sign-off later. This delegation of duties to the Shari‟ah department 
officers or other relevant parties can be assumed for accounting issues which were 
indicated to receive similar low attention from the Shari‟ah board. They include 
accounting issues pertaining to validating transaction records, approving the accounting 
policy to be applied by the bank and determining the formula for profit distribution. 
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Hence, it could be said that the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in the accounting 
issues of banks offering Islamic banking products and services leaves much to be desired. 
In order for Shari‟ah board members to be cleared from the negative perception of being 
labelled window dressing or offering a rubber stamp to Islamic banks, the Shari‟ah board 
is expected to be more vigilant by giving serious attention to and being more involved in 
the accounting issues surrounding the Islamic banking operation.      
 
The above claim about Shari‟ah boards‟ delegation of duties could be supported by 
related evidence derived from this study in which Shari‟ah boards were found to receive 
high assistance from banks‟ Shari‟ah department officers, management and boards of 
directors. It is argued that the part-time attachment nature of Shari‟ah boards has shown 
the importance of this Shari‟ah governance authority gaining the necessary assistance, 
particularly from Shari‟ah department officers. However, it should be noted that over-
reliance on these parties could result in the Shari‟ah decisions made by the Shari‟ah board 
being influenced and, this would be detrimental to Shari‟ah boards‟ independence. 
Meanwhile, assistance and support from other parties are still wanting, e.g., from the 
audit committee, internal auditor and external auditor. However, evidence indicates that 
assistance from the external auditor was more apparent for large banks than for small and 
medium-sized banks. This revelation reflects the more comprehensive governance 
mechanism within large banks as they were benefiting from more cooperation between 
both financial auditors and the Shari‟ah board.  
 
Additionally, a positive attitude towards consistency in Islamic financing products and 
services was evident as Shari‟ah board members gave importance to engaging themselves 
in workshops and meetings of scholars of fiqh al-mua‟malat. This reflects the prevailing 
concern amongst Shari‟ah board members to standardize Islamic financing products and 
services under the ambit of the dual-layer of the Shari‟ah governance system 
implemented in Malaysia. Alternatively, meeting in such a platform could offer banks 
new to the Islamic banking industry the opportunity to be on a par with mature Islamic 
banks in the market. Indeed, new Shari‟ah board members in the industry could also 
develop skills and knowledge learnt from the more experienced members who attend 
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such platforms. It was also found that this commitment by Shari‟ah board members is 
significant for banks with between 6-10 years of establishment. It is deemed that this 
period after establishment is crucial to the Shari‟ah board members as they would attempt 
to streamline the products and services offered by their banks with that of other banks 
within the industry.  
 
Following the above commitment, Shari‟ah board members seem to be giving priority to 
(1) analysing whether Islamic banking products and services would deliver benefit to the 
ummah before they are launched, and (2) enhancing Shari‟ah review skills by attending 
appropriate training for Shari‟ah board member‟s continuous professional development. 
These findings indicate Shari‟ah board members‟ stakeholder-centric behaviour and 
commitment to enhancing their Shari‟ah review skills especially when they are 
commonly deemed to be specialized in a particular field of knowledge. 
 
Some respondents also indicated some areas where Shari‟ah board members demonstrate 
no commitment: (1) actively engaging in the innovation of Islamic banking products and 
services through discussion with the management, accountants, lawyers and other 
concerned parties; (2) responding to any questions pertaining to pronouncements and 
resolutions issued by the Shari‟ah board through discussion with the shareholders or the 
public or a similar forum; and (3) publishing for the public the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah 
resolutions and rulings and the mechanics of Shari‟ah compliance applied in the Islamic 
bank. It appears that these findings highlight the weak motivation amongst some Shari‟ah 
board members to progress beyond the present emphasis on debt-based financing product 
features offered by the majority of banks in the Islamic banking industry and the lack of 
transparency on the resolutions issued by this Shari‟ah governance authority for use in 
this sphere of Islamic banking operations. It also calls for further guidelines by the 
regulator on enhancing the transparency of the Shari‟ah board‟s roles and functions, 
which could improve stakeholders‟ confidence.  
 
Another interesting finding derived from this study is the importance and influence of the 
Shari‟ah board members‟ principles and how others perceive that the Shari‟ah board has 
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accountability. It was found that the Shari‟ah board‟s ethical values and reputation were 
both ranked first, followed by the Shari‟ah board‟s scholarly background as important 
factors influencing the accountability of Shari‟ah board members. Meanwhile, factors 
that relate to the Shari‟ah board‟s fiduciary duties, e.g., the requirement for the Shari‟ah 
board to ensure the Shari‟ah compliance of the bank as well as stakeholders‟ reliance on 
the Shari‟ah review done by the Shari‟ah board, were perceived to be less important in 
influencing the Shari‟ah board‟s accountability. It was also discovered that the ranked 
first factor, i.e., the Shari‟ah board‟s ethical values, was significantly different, with 
medium-sized banks indicating higher importance than large and small sized bank 
categories, however, with large banks following closely their medium-sized counterparts 
regarding the importance given to this issue. It is argued that, as the size of the banks 
increases, the more important it is for Shari‟ah board members to uphold their ethical 
values when performing their roles and functions. This finding illustrates how the 
integrity of the Shari‟ah governance authority is crucial for the success of financial 
institutions whose establishment and operations are based on ethical values.  
 
It is worth noting that the issue of independence of Shari‟ah board members is usually 
associated with the remuneration received by them, as is frequently discussed in the 
literature. However, this study indicates factors associated with a clearly defined scope of 
responsibilities and, again, the integrity of the Shari‟ah board members as the two most 
crucial factors in influencing the independence of this Shari‟ah governance authority. 
Indeed, the factor of the Shari‟ah board‟s clearly defined scope of responsibilities was 
found to be significantly different for medium-sized and large banks. A possible 
explanation for this could be the positive impact from investment in mechanisms such as 
a precise Shari‟ah manual, seeking consultation with external experts, and having support 
from all relevant parties within the bank on the governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board. Overall, the factors influencing the independence of the Shari‟ah board, in order of 
importance, could be listed as follows: (1) the Shari‟ah board‟s clearly defined scope of 
responsibilities, (2) the perceived high ethical status of the Shari‟ah board, (3) the 
scholarly background of the Shari‟ah board members, (4) adequate powers being 
mandated to the Shari‟ah board, (5) the involvement of Shari‟ah board members in 
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Shari‟ah Committees in other industries, (6) the participation of top management in the 
Shari‟ah board‟s meetings, and finally, (7) the remuneration received by the Shari‟ah 
board.  
 
Interestingly, some of the above findings shed light on the implications that the existing 
Shari‟ah governance policy has for banks offering Islamic banking operations in 
Malaysia. For example, as was highlighted in Chapter Four, amongst the guidelines 
stipulated in GPS1 is the requirement for each scholar to be limited to one Shari‟ah board 
membership in institutions within the same industry. However, this study provides 
evidence that even the involvement of Shari‟ah board members with Shari‟ah boards in 
other industries influences the independence of Shari‟ah board members. Similarly, the 
recommendation put forward by the IFSB for top management to participate in the 
Shari‟ah board‟s meetings was also indicated to have a negative influence on the 
independence of Shari‟ah board members. Hence, these findings have policy implications 
and call for the regulator to revisit the existing SGF used in the industry.  
 
On the question about the relevant parties to whom Shari‟ah boards are deemed 
accountable, the respondents indicated this to be, first, the board of directors and the SAC 
of BNM. It is argued that the fact that GPS1 makes it clear that Shari‟ah board members 
should be appointed by and report to the board of directors and that the SAC of the BNM 
is the regulator and supreme Shari‟ah authority have contributed to such results. After 
these two parties, the respondents indicated the importance of Shari‟ah boards‟ 
accountability to the shareholders, to the bank‟s customers and, finally, to the public. 
Clearly, these results demonstrate the nature of Shari‟ah board members‟ roles and 
functions as being regulator-centric and not shareholder-centric.  
This study also examined several features of the nature of Shari‟ah board appointment 
and mandated authority. It was found that all of the banks represented by the respondents 
had established fit and proper qualification criteria for the appointment of Shari‟ah board 
members. Evidence also indicated that the appointment of Shari‟ah board members is 
made after ascertaining that they are free from any conflict of interest that could raise 
questions about their independence. It was also revealed that Shari‟ah board members are 
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subject to certain performance assessments by the bank or the BNM. Hence, this study 
reports robust features of Shari‟ah board appointment under the ambit of the dual 
Shari‟ah governance system in Malaysia that would ensure the independent and effective 
Shari‟ah governance function of Shari‟ah board members.  
 
On the other hand, there seem to be some flaws in Shari‟ah boards‟ mandated authority.  
This is due to some evidence indicating that Shari‟ah board members are not given 
adequate powers to undertake their roles and functions, although the vast majority of the 
respondents indicated otherwise. Similarly, evidence for the existence of a reporting 
channel for any possible conflict that might arise between Shari‟ah board members and 
the board of directors or the management of the bank seems weak. Moreover, problems 
associated with the absence of any segregation of Shari‟ah board duties that would ensure 
effective Shari‟ah governance, as observed by Alhabshi and Bakar (2008), seems to 
prevail. Although these problems refer to a handful of banks offering Islamic banking 
products and services, the apparent cause that contributes to such practices is deemed to 
be the absence of a clearly mandated requirement from the regulators on the 
implementation of a governance mechanism that would ensure and make transparent the 
Shari‟ah board‟s mandated authority.   
 
Another debate surrounding the issue of Shari‟ah governance which has also been of 
interest in this study is about the structure and implementation of the Shari‟ah review by 
the Shari‟ah board. On several questions pertaining to the structure of the Shari‟ah review 
by the Shari‟ah board, most of the respondents expressed their agreement, although a 
minority indicated otherwise. This includes whether the respondents consider that the 
Shari‟ah board is the sole authority in the Shari‟ah review and whether the Shari‟ah board 
has been prescribed appropriate operative procedures by the bank for its roles and 
functions. The fact that the majority of the respondents agreed on the Shari‟ah review 
structure regarding these two issues indicates an established attitude amongst the relevant 
parties within the SGF that the Shari‟ah board is the highest Shari‟ah authority whose 
needs for an effective Shari‟ah governance function should be supported. However, the 
concern that arises is that a minority of respondents did not agree with the views 
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expressed; this reveals a possible governance crisis within the banks they represent. For 
example, if the Shari‟ah board is not perceived as the sole Shari‟ah governance authority, 
this could imply that the Shari‟ah board has delegated some of its crucial duties to other 
parties within the bank, possibly the Shari‟ah department officers. Alternatively, 
disagreement on the view indicated the possibility of a much worse scenario, where the 
Shari‟ah board was unable to perform its function effectively due to a lack of 
independence. Similarly, the absence of any prescribed appropriate operative procedure 
by the bank on the Shari‟ah board‟s roles and functions would imply an ineffective 
Shari‟ah governance mechanism. This diluted evidence from a minority of the 
respondents should be taken seriously by the regulator and the board of directors of the 
respective banks regarding the need for clear guidelines on these issues and for the urgent 
remedy of the Shari‟ah risk that comes from within. 
 
There are other issues on the structure of the Shari‟ah review which require equal 
attention. For example, the responses to the questionnaire indicated that the number of 
banks whose Shari‟ah board‟s membership comprises various experts was found to be the 
same as the number of banks whose Shari‟ah board‟s membership comprises Shari‟ah 
scholars only. Although the lack of competent scholars in fiqh al-mua‟malat and the limit 
imposed by the regulator for each scholar to hold only one Shari‟ah board membership 
within the same industry, as discussed in Chapter Four, is acknowledged, further 
investigation should be made regarding the increase in the number of non-Shari‟ah 
scholars holding Shari‟ah board membership in an industry the essence of whose business 
operation is based on the Shari‟ah principles and whose Shari‟ah board membership 
depends on Shari‟ah scholars. Furthermore, there seems to be evidence of a lack of 
adequate and apparent guidelines on the pronouncement and resolutions of the SAC for 
use in the industry as perceived by a considerable number of respondents. Further 
investigation in this area is also deemed essential, as it is unclear whether this finding 
stems from a communication gap between the important and related parties within the 
Malaysian SGF, and, hence, highlights the lack of transparency on the role of the SAC, or 
is simply because of the lack of such guidelines. Despite all these assumptions, clearly 
this finding presents a setback for the potential of the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance to 
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exert effective Shari‟ah governance over the Islamic banking industry against its more 
established interest-based banking industry.    
 
Meanwhile, there are also several interesting findings on the aspect of the implementation 
of the Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board. For example, the view that the Shari‟ah 
board has the full authority to stop banks from undertaking Shari‟ah non-compliant 
transactions was not unanimously agreed on by the respondents. While this is deemed to 
have grave repercussions for the independence of Shari‟ah board members, it also 
provides room for the management of the bank to engage in opportunist behaviour. In 
addition, the vast majority of the respondents perceived that the Shari‟ah board is given 
ample time for decision making and for the Shari‟ah review, although there is some 
evidence of respondents indicating otherwise. It is expected that the dynamism of the 
bank combined with the nature of the banking business, which requires fast decision 
making, has resulted in respondents indicating that the Shari‟ah board does not have 
ample time. However, it is argued that the management should provide an adequate time 
frame for the Shari‟ah board to undertake its function effectively and efficiently.  
 
This study also reveals findings that most respondents thought that the Shari‟ah board has 
direct access to relevant, accurate, adequate and timely information, with some evidence 
indicating otherwise. It was discussed in Chapter Four that such a requirement was 
clearly stipulated in the standards and guidelines issued by the regulators, i.e., AAOIFI, 
IFSB and GPS1. Hence, negative responses regarding the quality of such information 
given to the Shari‟ah board clearly indicate a violation of the regulatory requirements, 
and this raises the concern of whether the Shari‟ah board is able to undertake its roles and 
functions independently and effectively. Again, this non-compliance refers to a small 
number of banks, but has an apparent repercussion for the transparency of these financial 
institutions and the objective Shari‟ah opinion of Shari‟ah board members. Similarly 
intriguing is the fact that a considerable number of respondents disagreed on the view that 
working part-time does not hinder the Shari‟ah board in producing an effective Shari‟ah 
review. This finding is significantly different, with a lower mean value of 3.00 
(uncertain) for Shari‟ah board members from medium-sized banks. As such, this 
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revelation highlights possible constraints faced by the respondents on the fulfilment of 
the work load given to the Shari‟ah board in banks which are in the „emerging and 
expanding‟ category. In other words, the respondents in the medium-sized banks did not 
actually foresee that the part-time working attachment could hinder the effectiveness of 
the Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board.  
 
To add to the dilemma, only slightly more than half of the respondents were in agreement 
on the existence of active communication and consultation among the Shari‟ah board, the 
bank, and the SAC of BNM. The remainder of the respondents were either uncertain or in 
disagreement on the more effective synergy that could have taken place between these 
important parties within the Malaysian SGF. This, however, is not the level deemed 
satisfactory, and it points to weak control and monitoring by the regulator. It was 
suggested that the communication and consultation among the three parties does not seem 
to exceed beyond the procedural issue relating to Shari‟ah board members‟ appointment 
and the approval of Islamic banking products and services.  
 
Despite all the deficiencies in the implementation of the Shari‟ah review mentioned 
above, this study discovered that the Shari‟ah board gets professional advice to support 
its function. This revelation by the vast majority of the respondents indicated good 
communication and cooperation among all interrelated parties within the SGF. The 
existence of such support should be the focal point for the Shari‟ah board to meet the 
aspirations of the stakeholders in effectively carrying out its ethical Shari‟ah governance 
function and for the Islamic banking industry, in general, to progress further.  
 
Overall, the findings of QS1 seem to indicate that the Shari‟ah board has not progressed 
beyond its traditional Shari‟ah advisory role, with issues on the accountability and 
independence of Shari‟ah board members being perceived to be highly reliant on the 
integrity of the Shari‟ah board members themselves. Some of the findings of this study 
raise concerns about the lack of emphasis, if not neglect, by important parties within the 
SGF, including that of the SAC of BNM, crucial aspects of Shari‟ah governance that 
hinder the effective governance function of the Shari‟ah board and the Malaysian dual-
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layer Shari‟ah governance system in general. The next chapter discusses all the issues 
under investigation, but from the perspective of the branch managers of banks offering 
Islamic banking services. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY ON 
SHARI’AH BOARDS: EXPECTATIONS OF BANKS’ 
BRANCH MANAGERS  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the overall responses to the second questionnaire survey, 
Questionnaire Survey 2 (QS2). QS2 was distributed and undertaken to elicit the opinion 
of the branch managers of banks offering Islamic banking products and services in the 
Malaysian International Islamic Finance Centre (MIFC) of Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM). Similar to Questionnaire Survey 1 (QS1), QS2 aimed to elicit the opinion of the 
respondents regarding three themes regarding the Shari‟ah governance of the Shari‟ah 
board: (1) its role, (2) accountability and independence, and (3) the nature of the Shari‟ah 
review in banks offering Islamic banking products and services. This chapter contains six 
sections. In section 7.2, the backgrounds of the respondents and the characteristics of the 
banks offering Islamic banking business are provided. The details of the analyses and the 
discussion of the findings pertaining to the three themes mentioned above are presented 
in Section 7.3, Section 7.4 and Section 7.5. Finally, Section 7.6 offers the summary. 
 
 
7.2 Profile of Respondents and Characteristics of Banks  
This section offers an overview of the background of the branch managers whose 
expectations were sought of the Shari‟ah board‟s role, accountability, and independence 
and the nature of Shari‟ah review. In addition, this section provides an analysis of the 
characteristics of the banks represented by the branch managers. By distributing the 
questionnaire to the branch managers, the researcher aimed to compare how the issues 
investigated in the three themes that constituted the questionnaire survey (both QS1 and 
QS2) are actually being practised (according to responses by the heads of Shari‟ah 
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departments as discussed in Chapter Six) and are expected to be practised by the branch 
managers, which is the focus of the present chapter. 
 
7.2.1 Gender and Age Range of Branch Managers 
Table 7.2.1 below provides an analysis of the background of the branch managers by 
gender and age range. It is evident from the table that amongst the 78 branch managers 
who responded to the questionnaire, 54 are male whereas another 24 are female. In 
addition, it was revealed that the age of the branch managers seems to be concentrated in 
the range of 35 to 44 years, with 44 branch managers, while there are 11 branch managers 
in the age range of 25 to 34 years, 22 branch managers in the age range of 45 to 54 years 
and 1 branch manager in the age range of 55 to 64 years.  
 
Table 7.2.1: Analysis Showing Branch Managers’ Gender and Age Range 
 
Branch 
Managers’ 
Gender 
Branch Managers’ Age Range 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Male 8 14.8 28 51.9 17 31.5 1 1.8 54 100.0 
Female 3 12.5 16 66.7 5 20.8 0 0 24 100.0 
Total 11 14.1 44 56.4 22 28.2 1 1.3 78 100.0 
 
 
 
7.2.2 Experience and Level of Education of Branch Managers 
Another important demographic detail that was collected in this study and that could be 
used to explore the quality of the judgments made by the branch managers on the issues 
under investigation pertains to their level of experience and education. In this regard, 
Table 7.2.2 shows an analysis of the years of working experience and the level of 
education attained by the branch managers. As indicated in the table, the majority of the 
branch managers have more than five years working experience. This level of experience 
seems reasonable for one holding a position as the branch manager of a particular bank 
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and considered as possessing the required skills and knowledge of a banking operation 
including that of Islamic banking activities. The second highest range of years of 
experience attained by the branch managers is between 1 to 3 years (21 branch managers) 
and followed by 3 to 5 years (17 branch managers) and, finally, less than 1 year (7 branch 
managers).  
 
Table 7.2.2:  Analysis Showing Level of Experience as Branch Manager and the 
Level of Education  
Experience 
as 
Branch 
Manager 
Level of Education 
Total High 
School 
Dip. 
Bachelor's 
Degree 
Master's 
Degree 
Prof. 
Cert. 
High 
School 
Dip.  
& 
Prof. 
Cert. 
Master's 
Degree 
& 
Prof. 
Cert. 
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. 
Less than 1 
year 
3 4 0 0 0 0 7 
1 to 3 years 4 12 4 0 0 1 21 
3 to 5 years 3 11 2 1 0 0 17 
More than 5 
years 
3 22 5 1 1 0 32 
Total 13 49 11 2 1 1 77 
 
 
Meanwhile, the bachelor‟s degree seems to be the most common level of education 
attained by these branch managers, as 49 out of the 77 responses received indicated this 
level of education
37. Besides the bachelor‟s degree, other branch managers seem to have 
attained education at the high school diploma level (13 branch managers), followed by 
                                                 
37
 1 branch manager did not respond to the question on the level of education and this was regarded as 
missing data by the researcher.  
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the master‟s degree level (11 branch managers), professional certificate level (2 branch 
managers), a combination of high school diploma and professional certificate (1 branch 
manager) and a combination of master‟s degree and professional certificate (1 branch 
manager).  
 
7.2.3 Training Received by the Branch Managers 
In analysing the quality of opinion issued by the branch managers in QS2, the researcher 
also collected details of the aspects of training received by these respondents the findings 
of which are presented in Table 7.2.3 below.  
 
 
Table 7.2.3: Analysis Showing Aspects of Training Received by Branch Managers 
Fields of Training Received by Branch Managers No % 
Shari'ah 3 4.1 
Fiqh al-mua'malat 1 1.4 
Combination of Shari'ah and fiqh al-mua'malat 2 2.7 
Management 15 20.5 
Accounting and Finance 17 23.3 
Combination of Shari'ah or/and fiqh al-mua'malat  
with other  non-Islamic field(s) 
16 21.9 
Economics 7 9.6 
Others 1 1.4 
Combination of non-Islamic Fields 11 15.1 
Total 73 100.0 
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As can be clearly seen from the table, most of the branch managers have been trained in 
three fields, i.e., accounting and finance (17 branch managers), a combination of Shari‟ah 
or/and fiqh al-mua‟malat with other non-Islamic fields (16 branch managers), and 
management (15 branch managers). The high concentration of training received by the 
branch managers in these fields is not surprising, as these fields are deemed highly 
relevant and provide the required skills in managing financial institutions such as banks. 
Furthermore, the high number of scores for training in the field of a combination of 
Shari‟ah or/and fiqh al-mua‟malat with other non-Islamic fields makes it apparent that 
this study is investigating financial institutions that practise Islamic banking and finance 
operations. On the other hand, there are also high scores amongst the branch managers 
who have undertaken training in a combination of other non-Islamic fields (11 branch 
managers) while other individual fields, such as economics, Shari‟ah, fiqh al-mua‟malat 
and others, seem to be less apparent with a score of fewer than 10 branch managers. 
Meanwhile, five branch managers did not respond to the question regarding the 
qualification attained and this was regarded as missing data by the researcher.  
 
Hence, it can be said that the branch managers were highly trained to exercise the role of 
branch manager of a bank. Indeed, the branch managers who had training either in 
Shari‟ah or fiqh al-mua‟malat, which is the Islamic principal underlying the operation of 
the Islamic banking business, constituted more than 20% of the total number of branch 
managers participating in QS2 (after taking into account 3 branch managers who had 
undertaken training in Shari‟ah, 1 branch manager with training in fiqh al-mua‟malat, 2 
branch managers with training in a combination of both Shari‟ah and fiqh al-mua‟malat, 
as well as 16 branch managers with training in a combination of Shari'ah or/and fiqh al-
mua'malat with other non-Islamic field(s)). This finding could suggest that the branch 
managers are highly knowledgeable about Islamic banking operations and the differences 
between conventional banking and Islamic banking. More importantly, it also hints that 
the branch managers are highly likely to be aware of the existence and Shari‟ah 
governance function of the Shari‟ah board.  
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7.2.4.1 Branch Managers by the Type and Ownership of Banks 
Table 7.2.4 presents an analysis of the representativeness of the branch managers by the 
type and ownership of banks. As is evident from the table, the majority of the branch 
managers are from domestic and full-fledged Islamic banks. Briefly, 55 out of the 78 
branch managers who participated in QS2 are from full-fledged Islamic banks whereas 
the remaining 23 are from the banks with an Islamic window. Meanwhile, the branch 
managers from domestic banks constitute 74 out of the total of 78 branch managers 
(94.9%) whereas only 4 branch managers are from foreign banks (5.1%).    
 
Table 7.2.4: Analysis Showing Branch Managers by the Type and Ownership of 
Bank 
Type of Bank 
Ownership of Bank 
Domestic Foreign Total 
No % No % No % 
Full-fledged  
Islamic Bank 
51 92.7 4 7.3 55 100.0 
Bank with Islamic 
Window 
23 100.0 0 .0 23 100.0 
Total 74 94.9 4 5.1 78 100.0 
 
Whilst the statistics given above indicate some representativeness of branch managers 
from both types of bank, i.e. full-fledged Islamic banks and banks with an Islamic 
window, there is an apparent lack of representatives from foreign banks. A possible 
explanation for this could be the limited number of branches of foreign banks‟ networks 
operating in the country. Hence, it can be said that, mainly, the responses received in QS2 
were from branch managers from domestic banks which are more likely to be influenced 
by the domestic guidelines issued by BNM than by international guidelines, e.g., the 
AAOIFI governance standards or the IFSB prudential standards.      
 
  
 223 
7.2.4.2 Branch Managers by Bank’s Total Assets Categorization 
Similar to QS1, in QS2, total assets was used as a proxy to measure size when analysing 
the representativeness of the branch managers by bank size. Table 7.2.5 presents an 
analysis of the representativeness of the branch managers by bank‟s total assets 
categorization. As is evident from the table, the majority of the branch managers 
represented large banks with total assets worth more than RM10, 000 million. They 
account for 47 out of the total number of 78 branch managers (60.3%) who participated 
in QS2. Meanwhile, the second highest representation amongst the branch managers was 
from the medium-sized category, with total assets worth between RM1, 000 million to 
RM10, 000 million, which accounts for 27 branch managers (34.6%). Finally, banks in 
the small size categorization, with total assets worth less than RM1, 000 million were 
represented by 4 branch managers (5.1%).    
 
Table 7.2.5: Analysis Showing Branch Managers by Total Assets 
Branch Managers by Bank’s 
Total Assets Categorization 
No. 
Percentage  
(%) 
Small (less than RM1,000 million assets) 4 5.1 
Medium (between RM1,000 million to 
RM10,000 million assets) 
27 34.6 
Large (more than RM10,000 million assets) 47 60.3 
Total 78 100.0 
 
 
Considering the fact that the large and medium-sized banks were represented by most of 
the branch managers in QS2 and account for 94.9% of the entire branch manager sample, 
it could be said that the operations of the banks represented in QS2 are deemed to be 
extensive. Accordingly, it is expected that such a business operation environment would 
incline the branch managers to consider a rigorous Shari‟ah governance mechanism to be 
implemented on the Islamic banking operation, which includes the important roles and 
functions of the Shari‟ah board.  
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7.3 Branch Managers’ Expectation on the Role of the Shari’ah Board 
The aim of this section is to analyse how the branch managers perceived the expected 
role of the Shari‟ah board amongst participating banks in the MIFC. Hence, the findings 
in this section would be explained in the light of analysing the differences between the 
actual Shari‟ah governance roles and functions of the Shari‟ah board as revealed in QS1 
with the expectations of the stakeholders represented by the branch managers in QS2 on 
the same subject. As was mentioned in Chapter Five, Section A of QS2 contained six 
questions parallel to those of Section A in QS1. Hence, this section discusses the six 
questions in the six following subsections. First, an analysis and discussion of the branch 
managers‟ expectations of the scope of the Shari‟ah advisory by the Shari‟ah board will 
be provided. Second, an analysis regarding the branch managers‟ expectations regarding 
the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in advising and designing the corporate objectives 
of the banks will be discussed. Third, an analysis of the branch managers‟ expectations of 
the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in developing Islamic banking products and 
services will be offered. The next section presents an analysis of the branch managers‟ 
expectations of the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in the accounting issues of the 
bank. This is followed by a subsection which analyzes the branch managers‟ expectations 
regarding the relevant parties that assist in the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board. Finally, an analysis of the branch managers‟ expectations regarding the 
Shari‟ah governance commitment of the Shari‟ah board is provided.  
 
7.3.1 Expectations of Branch Managers on the Scope and Role of Shari’ah 
Boards  
The branch managers were invited to indicate their agreement on the expected scope of 
the Shari‟ah advisory by the Shari‟ah board. Table 7.3.1 displays an analysis of branch 
managers‟ expectations of the scope of the Shari‟ah advisory by the Shari‟ah board 
including a ranking based on the mean value of these respondents‟ levels of agreement as 
expressed on a 5-point Likert scale between strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5). 
Interestingly, the ranking of the branch managers‟ expectations regarding the scope of the 
Shari‟ah advisory by the Shari‟ah board, when analysed with a parallel ranking made in 
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QS1, seems to show that the rank of certain elements of the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah 
advisory does not correspond to their rank in QS1. This highlights the disparity between 
the stakeholders‟ expectations of the scope of the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah advisory and 
how certain elements are actually implemented by the Shari‟ah board. For example, 
advising the board of directors on Shari‟ah matters is ranked first, with a mean value 
score of 4.64 and with 96.2% of the branch managers indicating their agreement while 
this is ranked second based on the responses provided by the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments. After the board of directors, the branch managers seem to consider that the 
next priority for the Shari‟ah board regarding the Shari‟ah advisory is to advise the 
Shari‟ah department on the scope of the Shari‟ah review; this had a mean value score of 
4.49 and was ranked second while it was ranked fourth in QS1. Meanwhile, unlike the 
heads of Shari‟ah departments, preparing a Shari‟ah compliance manual and endorsing 
the Shari‟ah compliance manual were both closely ranked in third and fourth place 
respectively, with corresponding mean values of 4.47 and 4.44. These two elements of 
the Shari‟ah advisory were, on the other hand, ranked last, i.e., seventh and first 
respectively in QS1 by the heads of Shari‟ah departments. It is argued that the branch 
managers consider both preparing and endorsing the Shari‟ah compliance manual to be 
the prerogative of the Shari‟ah board and not of some other parties, as the responses by 
the heads of Shari‟ah departments might have indicated. Meanwhile, reporting to the 
SAC on Shari‟ah matters, assisting other parties on Shari‟ah matters and providing 
training to Shari‟ah department officers were ranked fifth, sixth and seventh respectively, 
with their corresponding mean values of 4.42, 4.36 and 4.33. In contrast, in QS1, 
reporting to the SAC on Shari‟ah matters was similarly ranked fifth whilst assisting other 
parties on Shari‟ah matters and providing training to Shari‟ah department officers were 
ranked third and sixth respectively.  
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Table 7.3.1: Analysis Showing Expectation of Branch Managers on the Scope and Role of Shari’ah Boards 
The Scope and Role of 
Shari’ah Boards  
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No. % No. % No. % No. % Mean Rank 
Advise board of directors on Shari'ah 
matters 
0 0.0 3 3.8 75 96.2 78 100.0 4.64 1 
Assist other parties on Shari'ah matters 0 0.0 8 10.3 70 89.7 78 100.0 4.36 6 
Advise Shari‟ah department officers 
on scope of Shari'ah review 
0 0.0 4 5.1 74 94.9 78 100.0 4.49 2 
Provide training to Shari‟ah 
department officers 
0 0.0 9 11.5 69 88.5 78 100.0 4.33 7 
Report to Shari‟ah Advisory Council 
on Shari'ah matters 
1 1.3 5 6.4 72 92.3 78 100.0 4.42 5 
Prepare Shari'ah compliance manual 1 1.3 5 6.4 72 92.3 78 100.0 4.47 3 
Endorse Shari'ah compliance manual 1 1.3 8 10.3 69 88.5 78 100.0 4.44 4 
 
Table 7.3.2: Test Statistics on Differences in Responses between Heads of Shari’ah Departments (Table 6.3.2) and Branch 
Managers (Table 7.3.1) on the Scope and Role of Shari’ah Boards 
Test Statistics  
Advise Board 
of Directors on  
Shari'ah 
Matters 
Assist Other 
Parties on 
Shari'ah 
Matters 
Advise Shari’ah 
Department 
Officers on Scope 
of Shari'ah 
Review 
Provide 
Training to  
Shari’ah 
Department 
Officers 
Report to 
Shari’ah 
Advisory 
Council on 
Shari'ah 
Matters 
Prepare 
Shari'ah 
Compliance 
Manual 
Endorse 
Shari'ah 
Compliance 
Manual 
Mann-Whitney U 873.500 772.000 876.000 438.000 641.000 290.000 807.000 
Wilcoxon W 1173.500 3853.000 3957.000 738.000 941.000 590.000 3888.000 
Z -.598 -1.442 -.539 -4.210 -2.552 -5.475 -1.167 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .550 .149 .590 .000 .011 .000 .243 
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The above findings from QS2 seem to indicate that the branch managers‟ expectations of 
the scope of the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah advisory are not limited to the commonly 
prescribed Shari‟ah advisory role. Instead, the branch managers seem to consider the 
expected elements of Shari‟ah advisory by the Shari‟ah board to be procedural in nature 
and not limited to Shari‟ah advice only. This can be deduced from the fact that, after the 
elements of advising the board of directors and Shari‟ah department officers, the branch 
managers also emphasised preparing and endorsing the Shari‟ah manual which, as a 
whole, signifies the expected need for the Shari‟ah board to put Shari‟ah advice and the 
Shari‟ah governance mechanism in order. On the other hand, the results highlighted in 
section 6.3.2 of Chapter Six about QS1 revealed evidence that the Shari‟ah board seem to 
emphasise giving Shari‟ah advice only. Hence, there seems to be a disparity between the 
actual and the expected scope of the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah advisory as revealed from 
evidence obtained in both QS1 and QS2.   
 
Meanwhile, when the responses from the branch managers and the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments were analysed using the Mann Whitney U test, significant differences in the 
responses pertaining to three elements of the Shari‟ah advisory were found, as shown in 
Table 7.3.2. These are providing training to the Shari‟ah department officers, preparing 
the Shari‟ah compliance manual and reporting to the SAC of BNM on Shari‟ah matters. 
Both of the first two elements of the Shari‟ah advisory have a p value of almost 0.000, 
which shows highly significant differences between the two groups of respondents, with 
the heads of Shari‟ah departments indicating a lower level of agreement than the branch 
managers, as can be seen from the disparity in their corresponding mean values reported 
in Table 6.3.2 and Table 7.3.1 respectively. Similarly, opinions on reporting to the SAC 
on Shari‟ah matters are significantly different, with a p value of 0.011 and with the heads 
of Shari‟ah departments indicating a lower level of agreement than the branch managers. 
These results show the significant gap in the Shari‟ah governance practices in terms of 
the low involvement of the Shari‟ah board in these three elements of the Shari‟ah 
advisory and the high expectation for them to be undertaken by the Shari‟ah board as 
perceived by the branch managers. 
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In addition, analysis using the Mann Whitney U test also produced significant differences 
in response to the listed elements of the Shari‟ah advisory by the types of banks. As is 
evident from Table 7.3.3 below, opinions on advising the board of directors are 
significantly different, with a p value of almost 0.000 and with the branch managers from 
the full-fledged Islamic banks indicating a higher level of agreement than the branch 
managers from banks with an Islamic window. Earlier, in Table 7.3.1, it was reported that 
the branch managers regarded advising the board of directors on Shari‟ah matters as the 
Shari‟ah board‟s top priority, as reflected by its first ranking position. In this regard, the 
reported significant difference the finding revealed regarding this element of the Shari‟ah 
advisory suggests that the branch managers from the full-fledged Islamic banks regarded 
advising the board of directors on Shari‟ah matters as the utmost priority of the Shari‟ah 
board more than did the branch managers of banks with an Islamic window. Such a claim 
is made in consideration of the difference in how extensive the Islamic banking 
operations of these two types of banks are. The branch managers from the full-fledged 
Islamic banks, whose Islamic banking operation is deemed to be more extensive, seem to 
place more emphasis on the need for the Shari‟ah board to undertake its Shari‟ah 
advisory role to the board of directors. As they are operating Islamic banking to full 
capacity, the branch managers from the full-fledged Islamic banks expressed such a need 
regarding the Shari‟ah advisory role of the Shari‟ah board given that the board of 
directors are the bank‟s policy and decision makers and the Shari‟ah board is the 
authority responsible for ensuring that the Islamic banking operation is Shari‟ah 
compliant.  
 
Moreover, analysis of the branch managers‟ expectations about the elements of the 
Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah advisory by bank size also produced significantly different 
results using the Kruskal Wallis H test. Table 7.3.4 shows that opinion about advising the 
board of directors on Shari‟ah matters differs significantly across the three categories of 
banks. As is evident from the table, the mean value reported for branch managers from 
the large banks indicated a higher level of agreement than for those from the small and 
medium-sized banks. Similar to the above explanation regarding full-fledged Islamic 
banks, the Islamic banking operations in large banks are expected to be more extensive 
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than those in small and medium-sized banks. This could have resulted in the branch 
managers from large banks placing more emphasis on the need for the Shari‟ah board to 
provide Shari‟ah advice to the board of directors than would their counterparts from small 
and medium banks. 
 
Meanwhile, another control variable, namely, the number of years the banks have been 
offering Islamic banking products and services, also produced significantly different 
results using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. As reported in Table 7.3.5, the expected scope of 
the Shari‟ah advisory by the Shari‟ah board was significantly different regarding advising 
the board of directors on Shari‟ah matters (p value of 0.037), providing training to 
Shari‟ah department officers (p value of 0.033), reporting to the SAC of BNM on 
Shari‟ah matters (p value of 0.043) and endorsing the Shari‟ah compliance manual 
produced by the management (p value of 0.037). The table also shows that the mean 
values are higher for banks whose experience in offering Islamic banking products and 
services ranges in the category of 11 to 15 years on three significantly different expected 
elements of the Shari‟ah advisory: advising the board of directors on Shari‟ah matters, 
reporting to the SAC on Shari‟ah matters, and endorsing the Shari‟ah compliance manual 
prepared by the management. However, the mean values are higher for the category 6 to 
10 years experience in offering Islamic banking products and services regarding the 
expected element of Shari‟ah advisory listed as providing training to the Shari‟ah 
department officers.  
 
Arguably, both the 6 to 10 and the 11 to 15 years banking experience in offering Islamic 
banking products and services categories could be regarded as the mid range of Islamic 
banking experience, considering the length of time that the Malaysian Islamic banking 
industry has been established. Hence, the significant differences reported reflect how the 
branch managers from these two Islamic banking experience categories considered four 
expected elements of the Shari‟ah advisory by the Shari‟ah board to be more crucial than 
other elements of the Shari‟ah advisory during these stages of Islamic banking 
experience. As such, the reported three elements of the Shari‟ah advisory found to be 
significantly different in the category of 11 to 15 years of Islamic banking experience 
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suggest that they are considered to be more pertinent to be undertaken by the Shari‟ah 
board as the bank goes through the higher cycle of Islamic banking experience. On the 
other hand, the branch managers represented from the 6 to 10 years of Islamic banking 
experience considered providing training to the Shari‟ah department officers to be more 
pertinent to be undertaken by the Shari‟ah board as the bank starts into the mid category 
of Islamic banking experience or development.  
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Table 7.3.3:  Analysis  Showing  Expectation of Branch Managers on  the  Scope  and  Role  of Shari’ah Boards  by  the  Type  
of Bank   
 The Scope of 
Shari’ah Board Role 
Type of Bank  
Sig. 
 
 
Full-fledged Islamic Banks Bank with Islamic Window 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean 
Advise board of 
directors on Shari'ah 
matters 
.0 1.8 98.2 4.78 .0 8.7 91.3 4.3 *0.000 
Assist other parties on 
Shari'ah matters 
.0 9.1 90.9 4.4 .0 13.0 87.0 4.26 - 
Advise Shari‟ah 
department officers on 
scope of Shari'ah 
Review 
.0 3.6 96.4 4.56 .0 8.7 91.3 4.3 - 
Provide training to 
Shari‟ah department 
officers 
.0 9.1 90.9 4.4 .0 17.4 82.6 4.17 - 
Report to Shari‟ah 
Advisory Council on 
Shari'ah Matters 
.0 5.5 94.5 4.51 4.3 8.7 87.0 4.22 - 
Prepare Shari'ah 
compliance manual 
.0 5.5 94.5 4.49 4.3 8.7 87.0 4.43 - 
Endorse Shari'ah 
compliance manual 
1.8 9.1 89.1 4.49 .0 13.0 87.0 4.3  
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different (using the Mann Whitney U test) 
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Table 7.3.4: Analysis Showing Expectation of Branch Managers on the Scope and Role of Shari’ah Boards by Total Assets 
The Scope and 
Role of 
Shari’ah Boards  
Total Assets by Category 
Sig 
 
Small 
(Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium 
(between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 million 
assets) 
Large 
(More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
Advise board of 
directors on 
Shari'ah matters 
0 0 100 4.25 0 11.1 88.9 4.44 0 0 100 4.79 *0.017 
Assist other 
parties on 
Shari'ah matters 
0 0 100 4.5 0 14.8 85.2 4.19 0 8.5 91.5 4.45 - 
Advise Shari‟ah 
department 
officers on scope 
of Shari'ah 
review 
0 0 100 4.25 0 11.1 88.9 4.33 0 2.1 97.9 4.6 - 
Provide training 
to Shari‟ah 
department 
officers 
0 25 75 4 0 18.5 81.5 4.22 0 6.4 93.6 4.43 - 
Report to 
Shari‟ah 
Advisory Council 
on Shari'ah 
matters 
25 0 75 4 0 14.8 85.2 4.26 0 2.1 97.9 4.55 - 
Prepare Shari'ah 
compliance 
manual 
25 0 75 4 0 11.1 88.9 4.48 0 4.3 95.7 4.51 - 
Endorse Shari'ah 
compliance 
manual 
0 0 100 4.5 0 14.8 85.2 4.33 2.1 8.5 89.4 4.49 - 
*Indicates distribution of responses between the three categories of total assets is statistically significantly different using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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Table 7.3.5: Analysis Showing Expectation of Branch Managers on the Scope and Role of Shari’ah Boards by the Number  of 
Years Banks have been offering Islamic Banking (IB) 
The Scope and Role of Shari’ah Boards  
Number of Years Banks have been Offering IB 
Sig. 
0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 Years 
16 Years and 
above 
Overall Overall Overall Overall 
No Mean No Mean No Mean No Mean 
Advise board of directors on Shari'ah 
matters 
19 4.58 22 4.91 1 5.00 36 4.50 *0.037 
Assist other parties on Shari'ah matters 19 4.26 22 4.45 1 4.00 36 4.36 - 
Advise Shari‟ah department officers on 
scope of Shari'ah review 
19 4.53 22 4.73 1 5.00 36 4.31 - 
Provide training to Shari‟ah department  
officers 
19 4.26 22 4.68 1 4.00 36 4.17 *0.033 
Report to Shari‟ah Advisory Council on 
Shari'ah matters 
19 4.16 22 4.73 1 5.00 36 4.36 *0.043 
Prepare Shari'ah compliance manual 19 4.53 22 4.55 1 4.00 36 4.42 - 
Endorse Shari'ah compliance manual 19 4.63 22 4.64 1 5.00 36 4.19 *0.037 
* Indicates the distribution is significantly different between the four categories of years banks offer Islamic banking products and 
services (using the Kruskal-Wallis H test) 
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7.3.2 Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in 
the Corporate Objectives of the Banks  
This section deals with investigating the perception of the branch managers on the 
expected involvement of the Shari‟ah board in advising and designing the corporate 
objectives of the banks. In this regard, the branch managers were invited to indicate their 
agreement based on a five-point Likert scale between strongly disagree (1) and strongly 
agree (5). Table 7.3.6 shows the analysis of the findings.  
 
 
Table 7.3.6: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards in the Corporate Objectives of the Banks 
Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards 
in the Corporate 
Objectives of the 
Banks 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
No % No % No % Mean Rank 
The bank's mission 3 3.8 11 14.1 64 82.1 4.27 2 
The bank's vision 4 5.1 11 14.1 63 80.8 4.24 3 
The bank's goal 4 5.1 8 10.3 66 84.6 4.23 4 
The bank's 
objectives 
3 3.8 8 10.3 67 85.9 4.29 1 
The bank's 
corporate brand 
value 
5 6.4 12 15.4 61 78.2 4.10 6 
The bank's long-
term strategic 
direction 
5 6.4 7 9.0 66 84.6 4.18 5 
 
 
As is evident from Table 7.3.6, almost all corporate objectives were given an indication 
of a more than 80% level of agreement for the Shari‟ah board to be involved in advising 
or designing the corporate objectives of their respective banks, although some responses 
indicated disagreement. In addition, the table also reports the mean values across all the 
corporate objectives of the banks based on the responses provided by the branch 
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managers. The table above indicates that element of the bank‟s objectives is ranked first, 
as it has the highest mean value (4.29). Meanwhile, the bank‟s mission is ranked second, 
with a mean value of 4.27. On the other hand, the bank‟s vision is ranked third with a 
mean value of 4.24. The following ranking position of the remaining corporate objectives 
and their corresponding mean values are as follows: the bank‟s goal (4.23), the bank‟s 
long-term strategic direction (4.18), and the bank‟s corporate brand value (4.10).  
 
There seems to be some disparity between the actual and the expected involvement of the 
Shari‟ah board in advising and designing the corporate objectives of the banks as reported 
by the heads of Shari‟ah departments in QS1 (Table 6.3.3) and by the branch managers in 
QS2 (Table 7.3.6). First of all, the vast majority of the heads of Shari‟ah departments in 
QS1 indicated that the Shari‟ah board was not actually involved in the corporate 
objectives of their respective banks whereas the branch managers thought otherwise. A 
reference to Table 6.3.3 of QS1 shows that the mean values of responses made by the 
heads of Shari‟ah departments were 3.0 and under, thus indicating uncertainty to 
disagreement. On the other hand, the reported mean values for the branch managers in 
Table 7.3.6 of QS2 are above 4.0, thus indicating agreement to strong agreement on the 
expected involvement of the Shari‟ah board. In addition, the responses of the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments (QS1) and the branch managers (QS2) are significantly different for 
all listed corporate objectives, with a p value of almost 0.000, as shown in Table 7.3.7 
below. These findings show a large gap in the lack of implementation of Shari‟ah 
governance by the Shari‟ah board and how the stakeholders see the required role of the 
Shari‟ah board in matters pertaining to the corporate objectives of banks offering Islamic 
banking products and services. It also gives an insight into what the stakeholders, under 
the stakeholder theory spectrum discussed in Chapter Two, have indicated to be their 
interests and which are perceived to be highly important for the Shari‟ah boards to fulfil.  
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Table 7.3.7: Test Statistics on Differences in Responses between Heads of Shari’ah 
Departments (Table 6.3.3) and Branch Managers (Table 7.3.6) on Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards in the Corporate Objectives of the Banks 
Test Statistics 
The 
Bank's 
Mission 
The 
Bank's 
Vision 
The 
Bank's 
Goal 
The 
Bank's 
Objectives 
The 
Bank's 
Corporate 
Brand 
Value 
The 
Bank's 
Long-term 
Strategic 
Direction 
Mann-Whitney 
U 
346.000 339.000 373.000 374.000 383.500 443.000 
Wilcoxon W 646.000 639.000 673.000 674.000 683.500 743.000 
Z -4.905 -4.950 -4.678 -4.694 -4.548 -4.098 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
 
Second, there also seems to be disparity in terms of the priority actually given by the 
Shari‟ah board and that which the Shari‟ah board is expected to give regarding 
involvement in the corporate objectives of the bank. For example, amongst the Shari‟ah 
boards involved in advising and designing the corporate objectives of the banks, priority 
seems to be given to the bank‟s long-term strategic direction, as this was ranked first, as 
reported in Table 6.3.3. This was followed by the bank‟s objectives (ranked second), the 
bank‟s mission, the bank‟s goal, and the bank‟s corporate brand value (ranked equal 
third), and finally the bank‟s vision (ranked sixth). However, there are differences 
regarding the corporate objectives which the branch managers thought the Shari‟ah board 
should make being involved in a priority. For example, unlike the bank‟s long-term 
direction in QS1, the branch managers thought that the Shari‟ah board should give top 
priority to the bank‟s objectives. These findings show how the branch managers thought 
the bank‟s objectives which, as they are the essence of the Islamic banking business, 
should be accorded top priority by the Shari‟ah board. Meanwhile, unlike the priority 
given by the Shari‟ah board to the bank‟s long-term strategic direction (ranked first in 
Table 6.3.3), this was not seen by the branch managers as being more crucial than other 
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corporate objectives (as it was ranked fifth) regarding the involvement of the Shari‟ah 
board. A possible explanation for this difference is that the branch managers might not 
consider the bank‟s long-term strategic direction as more fundamental than other listed 
corporate objectives to which the Shari‟ah board should give priority.  
 
In addition, analyses by control variables produced significantly different results for types 
of banks, total assets and the number of years the bank has been offering Islamic banking 
products and services. The analyses of the findings by these control variables are reported 
below in Tables 7.3.8, 7.3.9 and 7.3.10 respectively.  
 
As is evident in Table 7.3.8, analysis by the types of banks produced significantly 
different results for three corporate objectives. These corporate objectives and their 
corresponding p values are the bank‟s mission (p value of 0.023), the bank‟s vision (p 
value of 0.027), and the bank‟s objectives (p value of 0.043). The table also shows there 
was a higher level of agreement regarding these three corporate objectives for full-
fledged Islamic banks than for the banks with an Islamic window. A reference to Table 
7.3.6 above indicates that these three corporate objectives represent the first three top 
corporate objectives in which the branch managers expected the Shari‟ah board to be 
involved. Hence, it can be said that expectation of the branch managers in the full-fledged 
Islamic banks for the Shari‟ah board to be involved in these three corporate objectives is 
more pertinent than that of branch managers from banks with an Islamic window. Given 
that the operations of full-fledged Islamic banks are expected to be generally more 
extensive than those of banks with an Islamic window, these significantly different 
findings between the two types of bank seem to be justified.  
 
Meanwhile, analysis by the total assets categorization produced significantly different 
results for the bank‟s mission and the bank‟s vision, as indicated in Table 7.3.9 below. 
These two corporate objectives indicated a higher level of agreement for large banks in 
comparison to the other two categories of bank size, with the bank‟s mission having a p 
value of 0.023 and the bank‟s vision having a p value of 0.031. These findings suggest 
that the branch managers from large banks think that the Shari‟ah board‟s role in advising 
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and designing the bank‟s mission and vision more pertinent than do the branch managers 
from the small and medium banks. Generally, the bank‟s mission and vision define how 
the bank would pursue its strategic planning on matters pertaining to the fundamental 
purpose of its existence and its intended future state respectively. Arguably, large banks 
are deemed to be more determined and focused on achieving such targets and, therefore, 
consider the Shari‟ah board‟s involvement in terms of advising and designing Islamic 
banking aspirations to be more crucial than do small or medium-sized banks. 
 
On the other hand, Table 7.3.10 below presents evidence that the corporate objectives 
which was ranked first as the expected top priority for the involvement of the Shari‟ah 
board, i.e., the bank‟s objectives, is the only factor that produces significantly different 
results when analysed by the number of years the bank has been offering Islamic banking 
products and services. The table reports that banks with 11-15 years of Islamic banking 
experience indicated a higher level of agreement than did banks from other experience 
categorizations, with a p value of 0.035. As described earlier, the 11-15 years of Islamic 
banking experience represents the upper mid range before the bank reaches the Islamic 
banking maturity level. Hence, the significantly different findings on the bank‟s 
objectives amongst branch managers from this level of Islamic banking experience show 
the importance these managers give to the need for the Shari‟ah board to be involved in 
ensuring that the bank does not fail to achieve its corporate objectives.  
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Table 7.3.8: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Corporate 
Objectives of the Bank by Type of Bank  
 
Involvement of 
Shari’ah 
Boards on the 
Corporate 
Objectives of 
the Banks 
Type of Bank 
Sig. Full-fledged Islamic Banks Bank with Islamic Window 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean 
The bank's 
mission 
5.5 7.3 87.3 4.38 .0 30.4 69.6 4.00 *0.023 
The bank's 
vision 
5.5 9.1 85.5 4.36 4.3 26.1 69.6 3.96 *0.027 
The bank's goal 7.3 5.5 87.3 4.31 .0 21.7 78.3 4.04 - 
The bank's 
objectives 
5.5 5.5 89.1 4.38 .0 21.7 78.3 4.09 *0.043 
The bank's 
corporate brand 
value 
7.3 14.5 78.2 4.16 4.3 17.4 78.3 3.96 - 
The bank's long-
term strategic 
direction 
9.1 7.3 83.6 4.22 .0 13.0 87.0 4.09 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the two categories of bank types using the Mann Whitney U test. 
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Table 7.3.9: Analysis Showing the Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Corporate 
Objectives of the Bank by Total Assets Categorization  
 
 
Involvement 
of Shari’ah 
Boards on 
the 
Corporate 
Objectives 
of the Bank 
Total Assets by Category 
Sig. 
Small  
(Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium  
(between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 
million assets) 
Large 
(More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
The bank's 
mission 
.0 75.0 25.0 3.25 .0 18.5 81.5 4.26 6.4 6.4 87.2 4.36 *0.023 
The bank's 
vision 
.0 75.0 25.0 3.25 3.7 14.8 81.5 4.22 6.4 8.5 85.1 4.34 *0.031 
The bank's 
goal 
.0 50.0 50.0 3.50 .0 14.8 85.2 4.26 8.5 4.3 87.2 4.28 - 
The bank's 
objectives 
.0 50.0 50.0 3.50 .0 14.8 85.2 4.30 6.4 4.3 89.4 4.36 - 
The bank's 
corporate 
brand value 
25.0 25.0 50.0 3.00 .0 22.2 77.8 4.15 8.5 10.6 80.9 4.17 - 
The bank's 
long-term 
strategic 
direction 
.0 25.0 75.0 3.75 .0 11.1 88.9 4.22 10.6 6.4 83.0 4.19 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the three categories of total assets using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. 
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Table 7.3.10: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Corporate 
Objectives of the Bank by the Number of Years the Banks have been Offering Islamic Banking (IB) 
 
Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards on 
the Corporate 
Objectives of the 
Banks 
Number of Years Banks have been offering IB 
Sig. 
0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 years 16 Years and above 
Total Total Total Total 
Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean Count Mean 
The bank's mission 19 4.05 22 4.55 1 5.00 36 4.19 - 
The bank's vision 19 4.11 22 4.55 1 5.00 36 4.11 - 
The bank's goal 19 4.00 22 4.50 1 5.00 36 4.17 - 
The bank's objectives 19 4.11 22 4.59 1 5.00 36 4.19 *0.035 
The bank's corporate 
brand value 
19 3.89 22 4.41 1 4.00 36 4.03 - 
The bank's long-term 
strategic direction 
19 4.21 22 4.36 1 4.00 36 4.06 - 
* Indicate the distribution is significantly different (using the Kruskal Wallis H test) 
  
 242 
7.3.3 Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in 
the Development of Islamic Banking Products and Services 
This section is concerned with how the Shari‟ah board is expected to be involved in the 
development of Islamic banking products and services from the point of view of the 
branch managers. Thus, the branch managers were invited to indicate their agreement 
based on a five-point Likert scale between strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5) on 
their expectations regarding the Shari‟ah board‟s involvement in the development of 
selected Islamic banking products and services. Table 7.3.11 below displays the analysis 
of the findings, including the ranking made based on the mean values of the responses 
provided by the branch managers.  
 
As is evident from the table, all stages of Islamic banking products and services 
development reported mean values of higher than 3.0, which indicates that the branch 
managers agree and strongly agree about their expectations regarding the Shari‟ah 
board‟s involvement. Based on these mean values, the branch managers seem to give 
priority to the Shari‟ah board‟s involvement in the conception stage, which has the 
highest mean value (4.47) and secures the first rank. In order of importance, this is 
followed by the legal documentation stage (mean value of 4.35), review stage (mean 
value of 4.26), design stage (mean value of 4.04), implementation stage (mean value of 
3.97), testing stage (mean value of 3.65), pricing stage (mean value of 3.62) and finally, 
marketing stage (mean value of 3.47).  
 
An analysis of the comparison between the results for the expected involvement of the 
Shari‟ah board in this subject as reported in Table 7.3.11 and those of Shari‟ah boards‟ 
actual practice, as reported in Table 6.3.4 of Chapter Six, reveals minor differences in 
terms of the priority indicated by the two parties. For example, the stages of products and 
services development that were ranked first, second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh were 
the same for both the expected and the actual practice of the Shari‟ah board. The only 
differences between the two were indicated for the stages of development ranked in the 
sixth and eighth positions. Based on Table 7.3.11, the testing stage and marketing stage 
correspond to positions six and eight respectively for the expected involvement of the
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Table 7.3.11: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Development of 
Islamic Banking Products and Services 
 Involvement of Shari’ah 
Boards in the Development of 
Islamic Banking Products and 
Services 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Conception stage 1 1.3 5 6.4 72 92.3 78 100.0 4.47 1 
Design stage 6 7.7 8 10.3 64 82.1 78 100.0 4.04 4 
Pricing stage 14 17.9 16 20.5 48 61.5 78 100.0 3.62 7 
Legal documentation stage 2 2.6 3 3.8 73 93.6 78 100.0 4.35 2 
Testing stage 10 12.8 18 23.1 50 64.1 78 100.0 3.65 6 
Marketing stage 16 20.5 20 25.6 42 53.8 78 100.0 3.47 8 
Implementation stage 10 12.8 7 9 61 78.2 78 100.0 3.97 5 
Review stage 1 1.3 5 6.4 72 92.3 78 100.0 4.26 3 
 
Table 7.3.12: Test Statistics on Differences in Responses between Heads of Shari’ah Departments (Table 6.3.4) and Branch 
Managers (Table 7.3.11) on the Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Development of Islamic Banking Products and Services 
Test Statistics 
Conception 
Level 
Design 
Level 
Pricing 
Level 
Legal 
Documentation Level 
Testing 
Level 
Marketing Level 
Implementation 
Level 
Review Level 
Mann-Whitney U 771.00 616.50 489.50 832.50 250.00 762.50 524.00 834.50 
Wilcoxon W 1071.000 916.500 789.500 1132.500 550.000 1062.500 824.000 1134.500 
Z -1.460 -2.726 -3.664 -.909 -5.666 -1.418 -3.427 -.896 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .144 .006 .000 .363 .000 .156 .001 .370 
  
 244 
Shari‟ah board whereas similar positions on the Shari‟ah board‟s actual practice were 
indicated in Table 6.3.4 as the marketing and testing stages. Although these two stages of 
products and services development were not given the top priority, their corresponding 
ranking positions indicate how the two parties differ regarding which is more important. 
In this regard, the Shari‟ah board seems to give more importance to marketing than to 
testing the products whereas the branch managers consider the testing more important 
than the marketing of Islamic banking products and services.  
 
In addition, an analysis of the differences between the responses given by the two parties 
regarding the actual and expected involvement of the Shari‟ah board in the development 
of Islamic banking products and services produced significantly different results using the 
Mann Whitney U test. Table 7.3.12 indicates the stage of development of products and 
services and their corresponding p values. As shown in the table, four stages of products 
and services development are significantly different: design stage (p value of 0.006), 
pricing stage (p value of almost 0.000), testing stage (p value of almost 0.000), and 
implementation stage (p value of 0.001). A cross-examination of the mean values 
reported in Table 6.3.4 and Table 7.3.11 indicated that the mean values on the four 
factors found to be significantly different are higher for the responses from the branch 
managers (in QS2 pertaining to the expected involvement of the Shari‟ah board) than 
those of the heads of Shari‟ah departments (in QS1 pertaining to the actual involvement 
of the Shari‟ah board). As such, it can be said that the branch managers‟ view of the need 
for the Shari‟ah board to be involved in these four stages of products and services 
development is greater than the Shari‟ah board‟s actual involvement.   
 
 
Meanwhile, analysis by the control variable types of banks using the Mann Whitney U 
test produced significantly different results for both design and legal documentation 
stages, as reported in Table 7.3.13 below. These stages of products and services 
development have a p value of 0.034 and 0.016 respectively, with the mean values for 
branch managers from the full-fledged Islamic banks being reportedly higher than those 
of banks with an Islamic window. These results indicate that the branch managers from 
the full-fledged Islamic banks gave more importance to the need for the Shari‟ah board to 
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be involved in these two stages of products and services development than do the branch 
managers from banks with an Islamic window. The importance given to these two stages 
of product development might highlight the branch managers‟ scepticism about the lack 
of emphasis given by the Shari‟ah board to these stages of developing Islamic financing 
products and services.  
 
On the other hand, Table 7.3.14 reports that analysis by the control variable „the number 
of year banks have been offering Islamic banking products and services‟ using the 
Kruskal-Wallis H test also produced significantly different results for the legal 
documentation stage. As is evident from the table, the legal documentation stage had a p 
value of 0.010 with banks with 11-15 years of Islamic banking experience indicating a 
higher stage of agreement than other Islamic banking experience categorizations.  
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Table 7.3.13: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Development of 
Islamic Banking Products and Services by Type of Bank 
 
Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards 
in the 
Development of 
Islamic Banking 
Products and 
Services  
Type of Bank 
Sig. 
Full-fledged Islamic Banks Bank with Islamic Window 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean 
Conception stage .0 7.3 92.7 4.53 4.3 4.3 91.3 4.35 - 
Design stage 7.3 9.1 83.6 4.15 8.7 13.0 78.3 3.78 *0.034 
Pricing stage 14.5 25.5 60.0 3.62 26.1 8.7 65.2 3.61 - 
Legal 
documentation 
stage 
1.8 3.6 94.5 4.45 4.3 4.3 91.3 4.09 *0.016 
Testing stage 12.7 25.5 61.8 3.64 13.0 17.4 69.6 3.70 - 
Marketing stage 18.2 29.1 52.7 3.51 26.1 17.4 56.5 3.39 - 
Implementation 
stage 
14.5 12.7 72.7 3.91 8.7 .0 91.3 4.13 - 
Review stage 1.8 9.1 89.1 4.29 .0 .0 100.0 4.17 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the two categories of bank types using the Mann Whitney U 
test 
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Table 7.3.14: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Development of 
Islamic Banking Products and Services by the Number of Years the Banks have been Offering Islamic Banking (IB) 
Involvement of Shari’ah 
Boards in the 
Development of Islamic 
Banking Products and 
Services 
Number of Years Banks have been offering IB 
Sig. 
0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 Years 16 Years and above 
Overall Overall Overall Overall 
No Mean No Mean No Mean No Mean 
Conception stage 19 4.32 22 4.59 1 5.00 36 4.47 - 
Design stage 19 3.84 22 4.27 1 4.00 36 4.00 - 
Pricing stage 19 3.42 22 3.45 1 3.00 36 3.83 - 
Legal documentation stage 19 4.05 22 4.68 1 5.00 36 4.28 *0.010 
Testing stage 19 3.58 22 3.45 1 2.00 36 3.86 - 
Marketing stage 19 3.16 22 3.45 1 2.00 36 3.69 - 
Implementation stage 19 3.84 22 3.91 1 2.00 36 4.14 - 
Review stage 19 4.05 22 4.36 1 4.00 36 4.31 - 
* Indicates the distribution is significantly different between the four categories of years bank offers Islamic banking products and 
services using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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7.3.4 Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in 
the Accounting Issues  
The aim of this section is to analyse the branch managers‟ expectations regarding the 
involvement of the Shari‟ah board in the accounting issues of the bank. In this regard, the 
branch managers were invited to indicate their agreement based on a five-point Likert 
scale between strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5) on their expectations regarding 
the Shari‟ah board‟s involvement in the development of selected Islamic banking 
products and services. Analysis of the findings is reported in Table 7.3.15 below.  
 
Table 7.3.15 below reveals that, although the vast majority of the branch managers 
indicated agreement on the expected involvement of the Shari‟ah board across all 
selected accounting issues (more than 70%), there were also responses in disagreement 
regarding the Shari‟ah board undertaking such a role. The table also displays the mean 
values of the responses provided by the branch managers, which were used as an 
indication of the priority given by these respondents. As revealed in the table, the branch 
managers seem to give top priority to the Shari‟ah board undertaking the role of 
approving the calculation and distribution of zakat (mean value of 4.35). The accounting 
issue that comes second in priority pertains to validating the documentation on Islamic 
financing contracts (mean value of 4.24). This is followed by issuing the Shari‟ah report 
in third position (mean value of 4.22), approving accounting policy in fourth position 
(mean value of 4.09), determining profit distribution formula in fifth position (mean 
value of 3.99), endorsing the annual report in sixth position (mean value of 3.95) and 
finally, validating Islamic banking transaction records in seventh position (mean value of 
3.82).  
 
Analysis of the differences in the responses provided by the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments and the branch managers regarding the actual and expected involvement of 
the Shari‟ah board in the accounting issues of the bank produced significantly different 
results on three accounting issues using the Mann Whitney U test. As is evident in Table 
7.3.16, these accounting issues and their corresponding p values are as follows: 
determining the profit distribution formula (p value of almost 0.000), approving the 
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Table 7.3.15: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Accounting Issues 
of the Bank 
Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the 
Accounting Issues of the Bank 
 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
No % No % No % Mean Rank  
Determine profit distribution formula 8 10.3 11 14.1 59 75.6 3.99 5 
Approve calculation & distribution of 
zakat 
2 2.6 7 9.0 69 88.5 4.35 1 
Approve accounting policy 5 6.4 11 14.1 62 79.5 4.09 4 
Validate documents in contracts  5 6.4 7 9.0 66 84.6 4.24 2 
Validate transaction records 10 12.8 11 14. 1 57 73.1 3.82 7 
Issue Shari'ah report 4 5.1 5 6.4 69 88.5 4.22 3 
Endorse annual report 8 10.3 12 15.4 58 74.4 3.95 6 
 
Table 7.3.16: Test Statistics on Differences in Responses between Heads of Shari’ah Departments (Table 6.3.7) and Branch 
Managers (Table 7.3.15) on involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Accounting Issues of the Bank 
Test Statistics 
Determine Profit 
Distribution 
Formula 
Approve 
Calculation & 
Distribution of 
Zakat 
Approve 
Accounting 
Policy 
Validate 
Transaction 
Records 
Validate 
Documents in 
Contracts 
Issue Shari'ah 
Report 
Endorse Annual 
Report 
Mann-Whitney U 495.500 847.000 579.500 879.000 747.000 657.000 819.000 
Wilcoxon W 795.500 1147.000 879.500 3960.000 1047.000 957.000 3900.000 
Z -3.625 -.771 -2.952 -.492 -1.585 -2.367 -.977 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .441 .003 .623 .113 .018 .329 
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accounting policy (p value of 0.003), and issuing the Shari‟ah report (p value of 0.018). 
Moreover, a cross-examination of the responses provided by the two groups of 
respondents reported in Table 6.3.7 (of QS1) and Table 7.3.15 (of QS2) revealed that the 
responses of the branch managers regarding these three accounting issues indicated 
higher mean values than those of the heads of Shari‟ah departments. These findings 
clearly indicate that there is a significant gap between the actual and the expected level of 
Shari‟ah board involvement regarding the three accounting issues mentioned. Thus, it can 
be said that the branch managers regarded these three accounting issues as important, and 
hence, expected the level of involvement of the Shari‟ah board to be greater than that 
already undertaken.  
 
In terms of the importance established by the two groups of respondents on the actual and 
expected involvement of the Shari‟ah board in bank‟s accounting issues as indicated by 
the ranking positions in Table 6.3.7 and Table 7.3.15, only slight variations between the 
two can be observed. For example, Table 6..3.7 reported that the Shari‟ah board seems to 
give most importance to validating the documentation on Islamic financing contracts 
whereas the branch managers seem to perceive matters pertaining to approving the 
calculation and distribution of zakat to be more important (ranked first in Table 7.3.15). 
Nevertheless, the differences between the two issues do not seem to have any major 
implications, as the ranking of both accounting issues differs by one ranking position, i.e., 
approving the calculation and distribution of zakat, which branch managers ranked as 
first in importance, was ranked second in importance as regards the Shari‟ah board‟s 
actual practice as reported in Table 6.3.7. Similarly, all of the remaining accounting 
issues, although they do not have parallel positions between the expected and actual 
practice of the Shari‟ah board, were revealed to have differences in ranking of one or two 
positions only.  
 
Meanwhile, analysis by the control variable „bank ownership‟ produced significantly 
different results using Mann Whitney U test. Table 7.3.17 below shows that validating 
Islamic banking transaction records was significantly different, with a p value of 0.039 
and with the branch managers from foreign banks indicating greater expected 
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involvement of the Shari‟ah board than did the branch managers from domestic banks. 
This result shows that the branch managers from the foreign banks give more importance 
to the Shari‟ah board undertaking validation of Islamic banking transaction records than 
do the branch managers from the domestic banks. This finding could demonstrate that 
these branch managers are sceptical about the present level of Shari‟ah boards‟ 
involvement during the important stage of validating Islamic banking transactions.     
 
Similarly, analysis by the control variable total assets produced significantly different 
results using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. Respondents from large banks indicated a greater 
expected involvement of the Shari‟ah board in undertaking approval of the calculation 
and distribution of zakat than did those from other banks, with a p value of 0.044, as 
shown in Table 7.3.18. Earlier, it was discussed that this accounting issue was given the 
top priority on the expected involvement of the Shari‟ah board based on the first ranking 
position as reported in Table 7.3.15. Hence, this significantly different finding indicates 
that this emphasis was more pertinent amongst the branch managers from the large banks 
than those from the small or medium-sized banks.  
 
Another control variable that produced significantly different results using the Kruskal-
Wallis H test was „the number of years the bank has offered Islamic banking products and 
services‟. Table 7.3.19 below shows that two accounting issues were found to be 
significantly different: approving the calculation and distribution of zakat and validating 
the documentation on Islamic banking contracts. The responses for these two accounting 
issues were indicated to be higher for banks with 11-15 years of Islamic banking 
experience than for other categorizations of Islamic banking experience. Hence, it seems 
that the branch managers from this Islamic banking experience categorization 
consistently contradict other branch managers in giving emphasis to the Shari‟ah board 
undertaking involvement in these accounting issues, which are also counted amongst the 
two accounting issues ranked as most important (ranked first and second in Table 7.3.15). 
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Table 7.3.17: Analysis Showing Expectation of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Accounting Issues 
of the Bank by Bank Ownership  
 Involvement of 
Shari’ah Boards in 
the Accounting 
Issues of the Bank 
Ownership of Bank 
Sig. 
Domestic Banks Foreign Banks 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean 
Determine profit 
distribution formula 
9.5 14.9 75.7 4.00 25.0 .0 75.0 3.75 - 
Approve calculation 
& distribution of 
zakat 
2.7 9.5 87.8 4.32 .0 .0 100.0 4.75 - 
Approve accounting 
policy 
6.8 14.9 78.4 4.07 .0 .0 100.0 4.50 - 
Validate documents 
in contracts  
6.8 9.5 83.8 4.20 .0 .0 100.0 5.00 - 
Validate transaction 
records 
13.5 14.9 71.6 3.77 .0 .0 100.0 4.75 *0.039 
Issue Shari'ah report 5.4 6.8 87.8 4.20 .0 .0 100.0 4.50 - 
Endorse annual 
report 
10.8 14.9 74.3 3.95 .0 25.0 75.0 4.00 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the two categories of bank ownership using the Mann Whitney U test 
 
 
  
 253 
Table 7.3.18: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Accounting Issues 
of the Bank by Total Assets Categorization  
 
Involvement 
of Shari’ah 
Boards in the 
Accounting 
Issues of the 
Bank  
Total Assets by Category 
Sig. 
Small 
(Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium 
(between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 
million assets) 
Large 
(More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
Determine 
profit 
distribution 
formula 
25.0 .0 75.0 3.75 3.7 18.5 77.8 4.04 12.8 12.8 74.5 3.98 - 
Approve 
calculation & 
distribution of 
zakat 
.0 25.0 75.0 4.00 3.7 7.4 88.9 4.15 2.1 8.5 89.4 4.49 0.044 
Approve 
accounting 
policy 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 7.4 18.5 74.1 3.93 6.4 12.8 80.9 4.17 - 
Validate 
documents in 
contracts  
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 7.4 18.5 74.1 3.96 6.4 4.3 89.4 4.40 - 
Validate 
transaction 
records 
25.0 .0 75.0 3.75 11.1 22.2 66.7 3.70 12.8 10.6 76.6 3.89 - 
Issue Shari'ah 
report 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 .0 7.4 92.6 4.22 8.5 6.4 85.1 4.21 - 
Endorse 
annual report 
25.0% .0% 75.0% 3.75 3.7% 14.8% 81.5% 4.15 12.8% 17.0% 70.2% 3.85 - 
* Indicates the distribution is significantly different between the three categories of total assets using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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Table 7.3.19: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the Accounting Issues 
of the Bank by the Number of Years Banks have been Offering Islamic Banking (IB)  
  
 Involvement of Shari’ah Boards in the 
Accounting Issues of the Bank  
Number of Years Banks have been Offering IB 
Sig. 
0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 Years 16 Years & above 
Overall Overall Overall Overall 
No Mean No Mean No Mean No Mean 
Determine profit distribution formula 19 3.84 22 3.68 1 3.00 36 4.28 - 
Approve calculation & distribution of zakat 19 3.95 22 4.55 1 5.00 36 4.42 *0.022 
Approve accounting policy 19 3.84 22 4.36 1 3.00 36 4.08 - 
Validate documents in contracts  19 3.84 22 4.68 1 5.00 36 4.17 *0.012 
Validate transaction records 19 3.58 22 4.05 1 4.00 36 3.81 - 
Issue Shari'ah report 19 4.42 22 4.45 1 4.00 36 3.97 - 
Endorse annual report 19 4.00 22 3.82 1 5.00 36 3.97 - 
* Indicates the distribution is significantly different (using the Kruskal-Wallis H test) 
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7.3.5 Expectations of Branch Managers on the Relevant Parties Assisting the 
Shari’ah Governance Function of Shari’ah Boards 
In this section, the branch managers were asked who amongst the relevant parties they 
expect to assist the Shari‟ah board in performing its roles and functions. Thus, they were 
invited to indicate their agreement based on a five-point Likert scale between strongly 
disagree (1) and strongly agree (5) on their expectations regarding the relevant parties 
who should provide assistance to the Shari‟ah board. Analysis of the findings is reported 
in Table 7.3.20 below.  
 
 
Table 7.3.20: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on the Relevant 
Parties Assisting Shari’ah Boards 
 
 
Relevant 
Parties 
Assisting  
Shari’ah 
Boards 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Shari'ah 
department 
0 .0 4 5.1 74 94.9 78 100.0 4.62 1 
Audit 
committee 
6 7.7 14 17.9 58 74.4 78 100.0 3.95 3 
Internal 
auditor 
5 6.4 15 19.2 58 74.4 78 100.0 3.91 4 
External 
auditor 
10 12.8 21 26.9 47 60.3 78 100.0 3.58 6 
Board of 
directors 
9 11.5 15 19.2 54 69.2 78 100.0 3.86 5 
Management 3 3.8 6 7.7 69 88.5 78 100.0 4.23 2 
'Shared 
services' 
9 11.5 28 35.9 41 52.6 78 100.0 3.55 7 
Consultants 13 16.7 24 30.8 41 52.6 78 100.0 3.47 8 
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As can be observed from Table 7.3.20, the vast majority of the branch managers 
expressed agreement with the relevant parties providing assistance to the Shari‟ah board. 
However, except for Shari‟ah department officers, there were objections amongst some of 
the branch managers regarding the need for these relevant parties to assist the Shari‟ah 
board. For instance, Table 7.3.20 indicates that the relevant parties shown to have 
received objections to their assisting the Shari‟ah board were the consultants, the external 
auditor, and shared services as well as the board of directors. Nonetheless, Table 7.3.20 
reveals Shari‟ah department officers to be the most important party expected to assist 
Shari‟ah board members in undertaking their roles and functions, and this corresponds to 
the highest assistance actually received by the Shari‟ah board (similarly ranked first) as 
reported in Table 6.3.8 of Chapter Six. Such consistency underlines the crucial role of the 
Shari‟ah department officers within the Shari‟ah governance mechanism of banks 
offering Islamic banking products and services.  
 
In addition, both Table 6.3.8 and Table 7.3.20 make it apparent that the management and 
the internal auditor were consistently ranked second and fourth as the relevant parties to 
assist the Shari‟ah board based on the responses given by the two groups of respondents.  
 
Other than these three parties, both tables reported differences in the importance 
attributed to the relevant parties as can be seen by the differences in their ranking 
positions, including that of the board of directors. Interestingly, Table 6.3.8 indicates that 
the board of directors is ranked third whereas Table 7.3.20 ranks these directors fifth, i.e., 
below the position of the audit committee and the internal auditor. This suggests that the 
branch managers consider the latter two as more important in assisting the Shari‟ah 
governance function of the Shari‟ah board. One possible explanation for the assumed 
superiority of these two parties over the board of directors is deemed to be their auditing 
role, which would complement the ex ante audit and ex post audit function of the 
Shari‟ah board.  
 
Meanwhile, Table 7.3.21 below reports that the analysis of the differences in the 
responses provided by the two groups of respondents produced significantly different 
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findings using the Mann Whitney U test for three relevant parties: the audit committee (p 
value of 0.001), internal auditor (p value of 0.044) and external auditor (p value of 0.012) 
were found to produce significantly different responses from the branch managers, 
achieving a higher mean value than with the heads of Shari‟ah departments. These 
findings reveal the existence of a significant gap between the actual and expected 
assistance these three parties provide to the Shari‟ah board. The results derived from this 
analysis seem to indicate that the branch managers expected that the audit committee, 
internal auditor and external auditor would provide greater assistance to the Shari‟ah 
board than they actually contribute.   
 
On the other hand, analysis by the control variable types of banks on the relevant parties 
who should assist the Shari‟ah board produced a significantly different result for Shari‟ah 
department officers, with a p value of 0.001 using the Mann Whitney U test. As is evident 
in Table 7.3.22 below, the branch managers from the full-fledged Islamic banks expected 
greater assistance from the Shari‟ah department officers than did the branch managers 
from the banks with an Islamic window. It is suggested that the nature of Islamic banking 
operations in full-fledged Islamic banks, which are deemed to be more extensive than that 
of the banks with Islamic windows, contributed to this result.  
 
Similarly, Shari‟ah department officers were the only relevant party found to be 
significantly different when an analysis of differences was conducted by the control 
variable total assets, with a p value of 0.019 using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. Table 7.3.23 
below reports that the mean value of the responses was highest for the branch managers 
from large banks, indicating that greater assistance from Shari‟ah department officers was 
expected amongst branch managers from this bank size than amongst other 
categorizations of bank size.  As suggested above, the prospect of Islamic banking 
operations being more extensive is also deemed to be a contributing factor for why 
branch managers from large banks expect greater assistance from the Shari‟ah department 
officers than do branch managers from other sized banks.     
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Table 7.3.21: Test Statistics on Differences in Responses between Heads of Shari’ah Departments (Table 6.3.8) and Branch Managers 
(Table 7.3.20) on the Relevant Parties Assisting Shari’ah Boards 
Test Statistics 
Shari'ah 
Department 
Audit 
Committee 
Internal 
Auditor 
External 
Auditor 
Board of 
Directors 
Management 
'Shared 
Services' 
Consultants 
Mann-Whitney U 859.000 527.500 697.000 636.000 846.500 829.500 759.000 821.000 
Wilcoxon W 3940.000 827.500 997.000 936.000 1146.500 3910.500 1059.000 1121.000 
Z -.749 -3.391 -2.011 -2.507 -.748 -.928 -1.466 -.946 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .454 .001 .044 .012 .454 .353 .143 .344 
 
 
Table 7.3.22: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on the Relevant Parties Assisting Shari’ah Boards by Type of Bank 
Relevant Parties 
Assisting  
Shari’ah Boards 
Type of Bank 
Sig. 
Full-fledged Islamic Banks Bank with an Islamic Window 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean 
Shari'ah department .0 3.6 96.4 4.75 .0 8.7 91.3 4.30 *0.001 
Audit committee 7.3 20.0 72.7 3.95 8.7 13.0 78.3 3.96 - 
Internal auditor 7.3 20.0 72.7 3.91 4.3 17.4 78.3 3.91 - 
External auditor 10.9 30.9 58.2 3.55 17.4 17.4 65.2 3.65 - 
Board of directors 12.7 21.8 65.5 3.80 8.7 13.0 78.3 4.00 - 
Management 5.5 9.1 85.5 4.20 .0 4.3 95.7 4.30 - 
'Shared services' 14.5 38.2 47.3 3.45 4.3 30.4 65.2 3.78 - 
Consultants 14.5 36.4 49.1 3.44 21.7 17.4 60.9 3.57 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the two categories of bank types using the Mann Whitney U test 
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Table 7.3.23: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on the Relevant Parties Assisting Shari’ah Boards by the 
Total Assets 
 
Relevant 
Parties 
Assisting 
Shari’ah 
Boards 
Total Assets by Category 
Sig. 
Small  
(Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium  
(between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 
million assets) 
Large 
 (More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
Shari'ah 
department 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 .0 7.4 92.6 4.44 .0 4.3 95.7 4.74 *0.019 
Audit 
committee 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 7.4 18.5 74.1 3.85 8.5 19.1 72.3 3.98 - 
Internal 
auditor 
.0 25.0 75.0 4.00 3.7 22.2 74.1 3.81 8.5 17.0 74.5 3.96 - 
External 
auditor 
25.0 .0 75.0 3.75 11.1 33.3 55.6 3.56 12.8 25.5 61.7 3.57 - 
Board of 
directors 
.0 .0 100.0 4.00 7.4 18.5 74.1 3.96 14.9 21.3 63.8 3.79 - 
Management .0 .0 100.0 4.25 .0 7.4 92.6 4.30 6.4 8.5 85.1 4.19 - 
'Shared 
services' 
25.0 .0 75.0 3.50 .0 37.0 63.0 3.85 17.0 38.3 44.7 3.38 - 
Consultants 50.0 .0 50.0 3.00 18.5 25.9 55.6 3.56 12.8 36.2 51.1 3.47 - 
* Indicates the distribution is significantly different between the three categories of total assets using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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7.3.6 Expectations of Branch Managers on Commitments of Shari’ah Board 
Members 
The branch managers were also invited to indicate their agreement on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) regarding their expectations 
on whether Shari‟ah board members should undertake selected commitments similar to 
those which were posed to the heads of Shari‟ah departments, as discussed in section 
6.3.7 of Chapter Six. Table 7.3.24 below reports the analysis of the findings.  
 
Generally, the vast majority of the branch managers expressed their agreement that the 
Shari‟ah board should undertake the selected commitments, although a small number of 
them (a maximum of two branch managers) also indicated disagreement, as revealed in 
Table 7.3.24. In addition, the table shows that the mean values of the responses are higher 
than 4.00, indicating that the branch managers agree to strongly agree that the Shari‟ah 
board should undertake these commitments. When the mean value for each commitment 
in Table 7.3.24 was compared with its corresponding mean value in Table 6.3.10, it was 
found that the mean value reported in the former was higher. Moreover, an analysis of the 
difference in responses provided by the two groups of respondents produced significantly 
different results using the Mann Whitney U test. Table 7.3.25 below shows four of the 
selected commitments to be significantly different: publish resolutions to the public (p 
value of almost 0.000), engage in innovation of Islamic banking products and services (p 
value of almost 0.000), analyze how Islamic banking products and services would benefit 
ummah before they are launched (p value of 0.042), and responding to questions through 
discussions with the shareholders and the public (p value of 0.005).  
 
Further examination of Table 6.3.10 and Table 7.3.24 reveals that the mean values 
reported for each commitment showed a consistent pattern both for the expected and the 
actual commitments undertaken by the Shari‟ah board in terms of their positions. For 
example, Table 7.3.24 reveals that the highest mean value was reported for branch 
managers‟ expectations regarding commitments pertaining to Shari‟ah board members 
engaging in workshops and meetings of scholars of fiqh al-mua‟malat to promote 
consistency in Islamic banking products and services. Apparently, this same commitment 
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gains the highest mean value, as reported in Table 6.3.10. Indeed, other commitments 
reported in the two tables were also revealed to be consistent in their respective mean 
value positions. Thus, both parties seem to be aware of and to recognize the importance 
of these commitments, which Shari‟ah board members fulfil in accordance with their 
priority as suggested by their mean value position. Hence, these findings provide a 
positive indication of the success of the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system 
implemented in Malaysia in addressing this agenda.  
 
Meanwhile, analysis by the control variable types of banks produced significantly 
different results using the Mann Whitney U test. Table 7.3.26 below reports that the 
commitment pertaining to publishing resolutions to the public was significantly different, 
with a p value of 0.022 and with the branch managers from the full-fledged Islamic banks 
indicating higher expectations regarding Shari‟ah board members‟ commitment than do 
the branch managers from banks with an Islamic window, as revealed by the higher mean 
value of the former compared to the latter.  
 
In addition, analysis by the control variable „the number of years the bank has been 
offering Islamic banking products and services‟ also produced significantly different 
results using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. As is evident in Table 7.3.27 below, the two 
commitments found to be significantly different are engaging in workshops and meetings 
of scholars of fiqh al-mua‟malat to promote consistency in Islamic banking products and 
services (p value of 0.004) and analysing whether Islamic banking products and services 
would deliver any benefit to the ummah before they are launched (p value of 0.005). 
Apparently, based on the highest mean value reported, the branch managers of banks with 
11-15 years of Islamic banking experience indicated a higher expectation for these two 
commitments to be undertaken by the Shari‟ah board than did branch managers from 
other Islamic banking experience categorizations.  
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Table 7.3.24: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Commitments of the Shari’ah Boards  
Shari’ah Board Members’ 
Commitment 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean 
Publish resolutions to the public 2 2.60 5 6.40 71 91.00 78 100.00 4.32 
Engage in innovation of IB products & 
services 
2 2.60 6 7.70 70 89.70 78 100.00 4.35 
Engage in effort to promoting consistency 
of IB products & services 
1 1.30 4 5.10 73 93.60 78 100.00 4.47 
Analyze how IB products & services 
would benefit ummah before they are 
launched 
1 1.30 6 7.70 71 91.00 78 100.00 4.45 
Enhance Shari'ah review skills  by 
attending training 
0 0.00 6 7.70 72 92.30 78 100.00 4.4 
Respond to questions through discussions 
with the shareholders & the public 
2 2.60 12 15.40 64 82.10 78 100.00 4.15 
 
 
 
Table 7.3.25: Test Statistics on Differences in Responses between Heads of Shari’ah Departments (Table 6.3.10) and Branch 
Managers (Table 7.3.24) on Commitments of the Shari’ah Board  
Test Statistics 
Publish Resolutions 
to the Public 
Engage in 
Innovation of IB 
products & 
Services 
Promote Consistency of 
IB products & Services 
Analyze how IB Products 
& Services would Benefit 
Ummah Before They are 
Launched 
Enhance Shari'ah 
Review Skills  by 
Attending Training 
Respond to 
Questions through 
Discussions with 
the Shareholders & 
the Public 
Mann-Whitney U 339.500 527.500 810.500 703.000 746.500 603.000 
Wilcoxon W 639.500 827.500 1110.500 1003.000 1046.500 903.000 
Z -5.011 -3.488 -1.110 -2.032 -1.649 -2.806 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .267 .042 .099 .005 
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Table 7.3.26: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Commitments of the Shari’ah Board by Type of Bank 
 
Shari’ah Board 
Members’ 
Commitment 
Type of Bank 
Sig. 
Full-fledged Islamic Banks Bank with an Islamic Window 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean 
Publish resolutions to 
the public 
1.8 1.8 96.4 4.47 4.3 17.4 78.3 3.96 *0.022 
Engage in innovation of 
IB products & services 
1.8 7.3 90.9 4.40 4.3 8.7 87.0 4.22 - 
Engage in effort on 
promoting consistency 
of IB products & 
services 
.0 5.5 94.5 4.56 4.3 4.3 91.3 4.26 - 
Analyze how IB 
products & services 
would benefit ummah 
before they are launched 
.0 7.3 92.7 4.55 4.3 8.7 87.0 4.22 - 
Enhance Shari'ah review 
skills  by attending 
training 
.0 9.1 90.9 4.44 .0 4.3 95.7 4.30 - 
Respond to questions 
through discussions with 
the shareholders & the 
public 
1.8 14.5 83.6 4.25 4.3 17.4 78.3 3.91 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the two categories of bank types using the Mann Whitney U test. 
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Table 7.3.27: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Commitments of the Shari’ah Board by the Number of 
Years Banks have been Offering Islamic Banking (IB) 
Shari’ah Board Members’ 
Commitment 
Number of Years Banks have been Offering IB 
Sig. 
0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 Years 
16 Years 
 & above 
Overall Overall Overall Overall 
No Mean No Mean No Mean No Mean 
Publish resolutions to the public 19 4.11 22 4.45 1 5.00 36 4.33 - 
Engage in innovation of IB products & 
services 
19 4.11 22 4.64 1 5.00 36 4.28 - 
Promote consistency of IB products & 
services 
19 4.37 22 4.86 1 5.00 36 4.28 *0.004 
Analyze how IB products & services 
would benefit ummah before they are 
launched 
19 4.05 22 4.77 1 5.00 36 4.44 *0.005 
Enhance Shari'ah review skills by 
attending training 
19 4.32 22 4.68 1 5.00 36 4.25 - 
Respond to questions through 
discussions with the shareholders & 
the public 
19 3.95 22 4.45 1 4.00 36 4.08 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is statistically different between the four categories of years banks have been offering banking 
products and services using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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7.4 Expectation of Branch Managers on the Accountability and 
Independence of Shari’ah Boards 
This section investigates the branch managers‟ expectations regarding the issue of 
accountability and independence of the Shari‟ah board. It offers the researcher an 
understanding of these two important issues from the perspective of the stakeholder, 
which in this case is the branch manager of banks offering Islamic banking products and 
services. Similar to section 6.4 of Chapter Six, this section comprises four relevant 
subsections: in the first two subsections an analysis of the expected factors influencing 
the Shari‟ah board‟s accountability and independence respectively are provided and these 
are followed by a subsection on the analysis of the expected relevant parties to whom 
Shari‟ah board members are deemed accountable and, finally, an analysis of the expected 
nature of Shari‟ah board appointment and mandated authority.  
 
 
7.4.1 Expectations of Branch Managers on Factors Influencing Accountability 
The branch managers were invited to indicate the level of importance based on scale 
between very unimportant (1) to very important (5) on 5 crucial factors that are believe to 
influence the accountability of Shari‟ah board members. Table 7.4.1 below provides 
analysis of the findings on the level of importance on the factors influencing the 
accountability of Shari‟ah board members.   
 
As can be observed from Table 7.4.1 below, the vast majority of the branch managers 
provided feedback in the important category, although evidence also indicates that one 
branch manager responded in the negative to both of the listed factors that are deemed to 
influence the accountability of the Shari‟ah board. Analysis based on the mean value of 
the responses provided revealed that the Shari‟ah board‟s ethical value had the highest 
mean value of 4.69 and, therefore, was considered by the branch managers to be the most 
important factor influencing the Shari‟ah board‟s accountability. The Shari‟ah board‟s 
ethical value was similarly ranked first in importance by the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments as influencing the Shari‟ah board‟s accountability, as reported in Table 
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6.4.1.The factor that comes next in importance to the branch managers appears to be 
inconsistent with that cited by the heads of Shari‟ah departments. As is evident in Table 
7.4.1, the requirement for the Shari‟ah board to ensure the Shari‟ah compliance of the 
bank was ranked second in importance, with a mean value of 4.68. It is worth 
remembering that, in addition to giving the position of most important factor, like the 
branch managers, to the Shari‟ah board‟s ethical value, the heads of Shari‟ah departments 
also perceived that the Shari‟ah board‟s reputation, which scored the same mean value of 
4.75, was ranked equal first, as reported in Table 6.4.1. This means that the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments give equal weight to the Shari‟ah board‟s ethical value and the 
Shari‟ah board‟s reputation, considering them the two most important factors influencing 
the accountability of the Shari‟ah board. The branch managers, however, considered the 
Shari‟ah board‟s reputation, which scored a mean value of 4.51, to be fourth in 
importance after the Shari‟ah board‟s scholarly background, which scored a mean value 
of 4.53. Finally, the stakeholders‟ reliance on the Shari‟ah board was considered by both 
the branch managers and the heads of Shari‟ah departments to be the least important 
factor, with the responses from the former group having a mean value score of 4.23.   
 
Meanwhile, an analysis of the differences in the responses provided by the branch 
managers and the heads of Shari‟ah departments did not produce significantly different 
results, and, thus, is not reported here. However, analysis by the control variable „the 
number of year bank has been offering Islamic banking products and services‟ produced 
significantly different results using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. Table 7.4.2 below shows 
two factors were found to be significantly different; their respective p values are as 
follows: the Shari‟ah board‟s ethical value has a p value of 0.036 and the Shari‟ah 
board‟s scholarly background has a p value of 0.034. As is evident in the table, branch 
managers from banks with 11-15 years of Islamic banking experience accorded greater 
importance to these two significance factors than did branch managers from banks of 
other Islamic banking experience categorizations.  
 
Analyses by other control variables did not produce significantly different results and, 
thus, are not reported here.  
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Table 7.4.1: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Factors Influencing Accountability of Shari’ah Boards 
Members  
Factors Influencing  
Accountability of Shari’ah Boards Members  
Unimportant Uncertain Important Overall 
No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Shari‟ah board's ethical value 0 .0 3 3.8 75 96.2 4.69 1 
Shari‟ah board's scholarly background 1 1.3 6 7.7 71 91.0 4.53 3 
Shari‟ah board's reputation 0 .0 7 9.0 71 91.0 4.51 4 
Stakeholders' reliance to Shari‟ah board 1 1.3 14 17.9 63 80.8 4.23 5 
Shari‟ah board's requirement to ensure Shari'ah 
compliance 
0 .0 1 1.3 77 98.7 4.68 2 
 
Table 7.4.2: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Factors Influencing Accountability of Shari’ah Board 
Members by the Number of Years Banks have been Offering Islamic Banking (IB) 
Factors Influencing 
Accountability of Shari’ah 
Board Members  
Number of Years Banks have been Offering IB 
Sig. 
0-5 years 6-10 Years 11-15 years 16 Years & Above 
Overall Overall Overall Overall 
No Mean No Mean No Mean No Mean 
Shari‟ah board's ethical value 19 4.58 22 4.95 1 5.00 36 4.58 *0.036 
Shari‟ah board's scholarly 
background 
19 4.32 22 4.86 1 5.00 36 4.42 *0.034 
Shari‟ah board's reputation 19 4.42 22 4.77 1 5.00 36 4.39 - 
Stakeholders' reliance to 
Shari‟ah board 
19 4.16 22 4.36 1 4.00 36 4.19 - 
Shari‟ah board's requirement 
to ensure Shari'ah compliance 
19 4.58 22 4.86 1 4.00 36 4.64 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is statistically different between the four categories of number of years banks have been offering 
banking products and services using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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7.4.2 Expectations of Branch Managers on Factors Influencing Independence 
Besides the issue of accountability discussed above, the branch managers were also 
invited to indicate their perception of the level of importance based on a five-point Likert 
scale from very unimportant (1) to very important (5) on seven crucial factors thought to 
influence the independence of Shari‟ah board members. An analysis of the findings on 
the level of importance as perceived by the branch managers is provided in Table 7.4.3 
below.  
 
Table 7.4.3: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Factors 
Influencing Independence of Shari’ah Boards Members  
 
 
In Table 7.4.3, the responses of the branch managers are provided including the 
corresponding mean values of the responses regarding all the factors as well as their 
Factors Influencing 
Independence of 
Shari’ah Board 
Members  
Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean Rank 
A clearly defined scope 
of responsibility 
0 0 3 3.8 75 96.2 78 100 4.51 1 
The remuneration 
received  
15 19.2 22 28.2 41 52.6 78 100 3.41 7 
The scholarly 
background  
1 1.3 7 9 70 89.7 78 100 4.40 3 
The perceived high 
ethical status  
0 0 7 9 71 91 78 100 4.45 2 
Adequate powers being 
mandated  
0 0 6 7.7 72 92.3 78 100 4.36 4 
Participation of the top 
management in the 
Shari‟ah board‟s 
meetings 
1 1.3 13 16.7 64 82.1 78 100 4.12 6 
Involvement of Shari‟ah 
board members in 
Shari‟ah boards in other 
industries 
3 3.8 8 10.3 67 85.9 78 100 4.22 5 
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importance ranking based on the mean values derived. The responses reported in this 
table reveal that the perceived importance given by the branch managers of all factors 
influencing the independence of Shari‟ah board members seems to be consistent with that 
of the heads of Shari‟ah departments, as the ranking order in Table 7.4.3 is similar to that 
in Table 6.4.3. In addition, the branch managers seem to give more weight to the 
importance of these factors, which results in the mean values reported in Table 7.4.3 
being generally higher than the responses of the heads of Shari‟ah departments, as 
reported in Table 6.4.3. However, no significantly different results were found when an 
analysis was conducted of the differences between the responses of the two groups of 
respondents, and, hence this is not reported here. 
 
The Shari‟ah board‟s clearly defined scope of responsibilities was similarly ranked first 
as a factor influencing the independence of the Shari‟ah board. Indeed, the importance 
given in the responses of 96.2% of the total number of branch managers regarding this 
factor stresses its importance to the independence of the Shari‟ah board as the foundation 
for establishing the board‟s accountability. Meanwhile, Shari‟ah board members‟ 
integrity were emphasised as an important factor which influences the independence of 
Shari‟ah board members. The perceived high ethical status of Shari‟ah board members 
and their scholarly background were ranked second and third in importance, where 91.0% 
and 89.7% of the total number of branch managers respectively perceived them as being 
important in influencing the independence of the Shari‟ah board. In addition to being 
consistent with the findings of Abdul Rahman et al. (2005) and supporting the Shari‟ah 
board‟s ethical  requirement argument made by Karim (1990a), the responses regarding 
the last two factors also similarly highlight the need for a code of conduct for Shari‟ah 
board members.  
 
On the other hand, Table 7.4.3 also indicates that the factors of adequate powers being 
mandated to Shari‟ah board members, the involvement of the Shari‟ah board members as 
the Shari‟ah board in other industries, the participation of top management in the Shari‟ah 
board‟s meeting and the remuneration received by the Shari‟ah board were ranked fourth, 
fifth, sixth and seventh respectively in importance in influencing the independence of the 
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Shari‟ah board. As can be seen from the table, the factor of adequate powers being 
mandated to Shari‟ah board members was perceived as important by 92.3% of the 
respondents. Meanwhile, the last three ranking positions, while recording high 
percentages for their perceived importance, also show responses in the negative. Of the 
total number of branch managers 3.8% considered as unimportant the involvement of 
Shari‟ah board members in Shari‟ah Committees in other industries; the participation of 
top management in the Shari‟ah board‟s meetings recorded 1.3%, and the remuneration 
received by the Shari‟ah board recorded 19.2%   
 
Analysis by other control variables did not produce significantly different results except 
for the control variables bank ownership and the number of years the bank has been 
offering Islamic banking products and services. Table 7.4.4 below indicates that the 
factor of the Shari‟ah board being mandated with adequate powers was significantly 
different using the Mann Whitney U test, with a p value of 0.045. As is evident from the 
table, the branch managers from foreign banks gave greater importance to this factor 
influencing the independence of the Shari‟ah board than did branch managers from the 
domestic banks. This finding demonstrates how branch managers from foreign banks 
emphasize the need for the Shari‟ah board, as the Shari‟ah governance authority of banks 
offering Islamic banking business, to be mandated with adequate powers. Hence, such 
mandated powers would allow this authority to exercise its roles and functions 
independently in the best interests of the stakeholders without coming under pressure 
from the management or other parties.  
 
On the other hand, Table 7.4.5 below indicates that the factor of the scholarly background 
of the Shari‟ah board was significantly different when tested using the Kruskal-Wallis H 
test, with a p value of 0.044. As is evident from the table, the branch managers from 
banks with 11-15 years of Islamic banking experience gave greater importance to this 
factor than did branch managers from other Islamic banking experience categorizations.  
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Table 7.4.4: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Factors Influencing Independence of Shari’ah Boards 
Members by Bank Ownership 
Factors Influencing 
Independence  of 
Shari’ah Board 
Members  
Ownership of Bank 
Sig. 
Domestic Foreign 
Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Unimportant Uncertain Important Overall 
% % % % % % % Mean 
A clearly defined 
scope of 
responsibility 
.0 4.1 95.9 4.51 .0 .0 100.0 4.50 - 
The remuneration 
received  
18.9 29.7 51.4 3.41 25.0 .0 75.0 3.50 - 
The scholarly 
background  
1.4 9.5 89.2 4.39 .0 .0 100.0 4.50 - 
The perceived high 
ethical status  
.0 9.5 90.5 4.42 .0 .0 100.0 5.00 - 
Adequate powers 
being mandated  
.0 8.1 91.9 4.32 .0 .0 100.0 5.00 *0.045 
Participation of top 
management in 
Shari‟ah board's 
meeting 
1.4 17.6 81.1 4.11 .0 .0 100.0 4.25 - 
Involvement of 
Shari‟ah board 
members in Shari‟ah 
boards in other 
industries 
2.7 10.8 86.5 4.24 25.0 .0 75.0 3.75 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the two categories of bank ownership using the Mann Whitney U test 
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Table 7.4.5: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers on Factors Influencing Independence of Shari’ah Board 
Members by the Number of Years Banks have been Offering Islamic Banking (IB) 
Factors Influencing 
Independence of 
Shari’ah Board 
Members  
Number of Years Banks have been Offering IB 
Sig. 
0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 Years 16 Years & Above 
Overall Overall Overall Overall 
No Mean No Mean No Mean No Mean 
A clearly defined scope 
of responsibility 
19 4.47 22 4.68 1 5.00 36 4.42 - 
The remuneration 
received  
19 3.16 22 3.36 1 2.00 36 3.61 - 
The scholarly 
background  
19 4.21 22 4.73 1 5.00 36 4.28 *0.044 
The perceived high 
ethical status  
19 4.42 22 4.64 1 5.00 36 4.33 - 
Adequate powers being 
mandated  
19 4.32 22 4.55 1 5.00 36 4.25 - 
Participation of top 
management in Shari‟ah 
board's meeting 
19 4.05 22 4.27 1 4.00 36 4.06 - 
Involvement of Shari‟ah 
board members in 
Shari‟ah boards in other 
industries 
19 4.05 22 4.41 1 4.00 36 4.19 - 
* Indicates the distribution is significantly different between the four categories of number of years the bank has offered Islamic 
banking products and services using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. 
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7.4.3 Expectations of Branch Managers on Relevant Parties to whom 
Shari’ah Board Members are Accountable  
When undertaking their Shari‟ah governance roles and functions, the Shari‟ah board 
receives assistance from several parties within the bank. This study invited the branch 
managers to indicate the importance they perceived as having the relevant parties, similar 
to those in section 6.43 of Chapter Six, to whom the Shari‟ah board are deemed 
accountable based on a five-point Likert scale from very unimportant (1) to very 
important (5). Table 7.4.6 below shows analysis of the findings.  
 
Table 7.4.6: Analysis Showing the Parties to whom the Branch Managers Perceived 
Shari’ah Board Members to be Accountable  
 Parties 
Shari’ah 
Board 
Members are 
Accountable 
Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean Rank 
Bank's 
shareholders 
7 9.00 7 9.00 64 82.10 78 100 4.15 5 
Bank's 
consumers 
5 6.40 5 6.40 68 87.20 78 100 4.19 4 
Bank's board 
of directors 
4 5.10 8 10.30 66 84.60 78 100 4.21 3 
Public 1 1.30 8 10.30 69 88.50 78 100 4.41 2 
SAC BNM 1 1.30 6 7.70 71 91.00 78 100 4.46 1 
      
Table 7.4.7: Test Statistics on Differences in the Responses between Heads of 
Shari’ah Departments (Table 6.4.5) and Branch Managers (Table 7.4.6) on Parties 
to whom Shari’ah Board Members are Perceived to be Accountable  
Test Statistics 
Bank's 
Shareholders 
Bank's 
Consumers 
Bank's Board 
of Directors 
Public SAC BNM 
Mann-Whitney U 804.000 769.000 681.000 923.000 847.500 
Wilcoxon W 3885.000 3850.000 3762.000 4004.000 3928.500 
Z -1.138 -1.448 -2.212 -.115 -.800 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .255 .148 .027 .909 .424 
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As can be seen from Table 7.4.6 above, the vast majority of the branch managers 
regarded as important all the selected relevant parties to whom the Shari‟ah board is 
deemed to be accountable. However, there is also some evidence which shows that some 
perceived these relevant parties to be unimportant, particularly the bank‟s shareholders 
(9.00%), the bank‟s consumers (6.40%) and the bank‟s board of directors (5.10%).  
Additionally, the mean values calculated in accordance with the responses shown in this 
table were used to develop ranking positions regarding parties to whom the Shari‟ah 
board is deemed to be accountable. As is evident from the table, the branch managers 
recognized the SAC of BNM as the most important party to whom the Shari‟ah board is 
accountable. As with the heads of Shari‟ah departments, the SAC was ranked first, with a 
reported mean value of 4.46 and with 91.00% of the total number of branch managers 
perceiving it as important. It is worth noting that Table 6.4.5 of Chapter Six reported that 
the responses from the heads of Shari‟ah departments similarly ranked the SAC first, 
though it shared the position with the bank‟s board of directors. 
 
On the other hand, the bank‟s board of directors was ranked by the branch managers as 
third in importance after the public. The public, which was ranked second in importance, 
was considered important by 88.50% whereas the bank‟s board of directors, which comes 
next, was considered important by 84.60%. Moreover, contrary to the responses of the 
heads of Shari‟ah departments, the bank‟s board of directors was also perceived as 
unimportant by the branch managers, as mentioned earlier. Indeed, the bank‟s board of 
directors is the only relevant party that was found to be significantly different when 
analyses of the differences in the responses of the branch managers and the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments were conducted using the Mann Whitney U test. The statistical 
summary reported in Table 7.4.7 shows that the bank‟s board of directors is significantly 
different, with a p value of 0.027 while analyses of the comparison between the reported 
mean values in Table 6.4.5 and Table 7.4.6 indicates that the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments perceived the bank‟s board of directors as being more important than did the 
branch managers. The difference in importance shown by the position of the public and 
the board of directors might reflect the nature of Islamic banking exposure between these 
two groups of respondents. As the secretariat to the Shari‟ah board and being accountable 
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to the board of directors themselves, the heads of Shari‟ah departments recognize the 
board of directors as being the more important party to whom the Shari‟ah board is 
accountable than the public. This is due to the fact GPS1 clearly states that the Shari‟ah 
board reports to the board of directors (BNM 2004), as the latter is responsible for the 
policy and decision making of the bank. However, the branch managers as the front line 
managers might perceive the role of the Shari‟ah board to have greater importance to the 
public as the reason for the former‟s establishment is to cater to the need for an 
alternative banking which is consistent with the Islamic principles of Muslims as a whole.  
 
Meanwhile, the bank‟s consumers were consistently ranked fourth with responses similar 
to those of the heads of Shari‟ah departments, as reported in Table 6.4.5. As shown in 
Table 7.4.6, 87.20% of the total number of branch managers perceived the bank‟s 
consumers as being important whereas 6.40% considered this party as unimportant. 
Surprisingly, there seems to be a discrepancy in the perceived importance of the bank‟s 
shareholders by both the heads of Shari‟ah departments and the branch managers, as the 
former ranked it third in importance whereas that same party was ranked last in 
importance by the latter. Evidence in Table 7.4.6 indicates that the bank‟s shareholders 
were considered important by 82.10% of the total number of branch managers while 
9.00% consider the party unimportant. The fact that the importance of the bank‟s 
shareholders was ranked last seems to indicate that the branch managers consider the 
fiduciary duties of the Shari‟ah board in ensuring that the activities of the bank are in 
compliance with Shari‟ah to be relevant and important to the parties concerned in 
accordance with their position as shown in Table 7.4.6. 
 
In addition, analyses by other control variables produced no significantly different results 
and, thus, are not reported here.  
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7.4.4 Expectations of Branch Managers Relating to the Appointment and 
Mandated Authority of Shari’ah Board Members  
Table 7.4.8 below presents an analysis of the selected feature on the issues of Shari‟ah 
board members‟ appointment and mandated authority where the branch managers have 
indicated their agreement based on a five-point Likert scale between strongly disagree (1) 
and strongly agree (5).  
 
As is evident in Table 7.4.8 below, 93.6% of the branch managers indicated their 
agreement with the appointment of the Shari‟ah board being based on certain „fit and 
proper‟ qualification criteria while 1.3% disagreed and another 5.1% were indifferent 
about such an appointment mechanism. Although the responses of the branch managers 
were not in absolute agreement, as compared to the responses of the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments reported in Table 6.4.6, the mean value of the responses of the former (4.46) 
was almost the same as those of the latter (4.58). Thus, both groups of respondents can be 
said to demonstrate a common agreement regarding Shari‟ah board members being 
appointed in accordance with certain „fit and proper‟ qualification criteria; this was 
indicated by both groups as being skewed towards the strongly agree perception.  
 
Another question posed to the branch managers was regarding the requirement that there 
should be no conflict of interest on the appointment of Shari‟ah board members, such as 
them being substantial shareholders or having an intimate relationship with an employee 
of the bank the board serves. While the vast majority of the branch managers seem to 
agree on these appointment criteria, there was also some evidence which indicated 
otherwise. Table 7.4.8 reports that 87.2% of the branch managers responded that they 
agreed whereas 2.6% disagreed and another 10.3% were indifferent to such requirements. 
Unlike the responses of the heads of Shari‟ah departments, the evidence seems to 
demonstrate a division among the perceptions of the branch managers. Nevertheless, the 
overall mean value of the responses of the former, (4.54), as reported in Table 6.4.6 is 
very nearly the same as that reported for the latter in Table 7.4.8 (4.41).   
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Table 7.4.8: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers Relating to the Appointment and Mandated Authority of 
Shari’ah Board Members  
 
 
 
Table 7.4.9: Test Statistics on Differences in Responses between Heads of Shari’ah Departments (Table 6.4.6) and Branch 
Managers (Table 7.4.8) on the Appointment and Mandated Authority of Shari’ah Board Members 
Test Statistics 
Appointment of the 
Shari’ah board is based 
on 
‘Fit and Proper’ 
Criteria 
No Conflict on the 
Appointment of the 
Shari’ah Board 
The Shari’ah 
Board is Subject to 
Assessment by the 
Bank or BNM 
Adequate Power 
has been 
Mandated to the 
Shari’ah Board 
Channels Exist to 
Report Conflicts  
Proper Segregation 
of Shari’ah Board 
Duties Exists 
Mann-Whitney U 881 902 658.5 898.5 746.5 863 
Wilcoxon W 3962 3983 3739.5 3979.5 1046.5 1163 
Z -0.496 -0.303 -2.434 -0.327 -1.621 -0.625 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.62 0.762 0.015 0.743 0.105 0.532 
Nature of Shari’ah Board Members 
Appointment and Mandated Authority 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean 
Appointment of Shari‟ah board is based on fit and 
proper criteria 
1 1.3 4 5.1 73 93.6 78 100 4.46 
No conflict surrounding the appointment of Shari‟ah 
board 
2 2.6 8 10.3 68 87.2 78 100 4.41 
Shari‟ah board is subject to assessment by the bank 
or BNM 
3 3.8 6 7.7 69 88.5 78 100 4.21 
Adequate power has been mandated to Shari‟ah 
board 
0 0 8 10.3 70 89.7 78 100 4.37 
Reporting channel exists to report conflicts  2 2.6 9 11.5 67 85.9 78 100 4.32 
Proper segregation of Shari‟ah board duties exists 0 0 12 15.4 66 84.6 78 100 4.28 
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Meanwhile, 88.5% of the branch managers agreed while 3.8% disagreed and another 
7.7% were indifferent on the question of whether the Shari‟ah board should be subject to 
assessment by the bank or BNM, as reported in Table 7.4.8 below. As with the above 
issue, these results of the branch managers differ from those of the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments, with the latter demonstrating absolute agreement, as shown in Table 6.4.6. 
In terms of the mean values of the responses of both groups of respondents, Table 7.4.8 
reports it as being 4.21 for the branch managers whereas Table 6.4.6 reports it as being 
4.63 for the heads of Shari‟ah departments. It is worth noting that this is the only question 
which produced significantly different results when an analysis of the differences in the 
responses of both groups of respondents were conducted using the Mann Whitney U test. 
Table 7.4.9 above indicates that the issue of the need for the Shari‟ah board to be 
assessed by the bank or BNM gave a significantly different result, with a p value of 
0.015. The mean values of the two groups of respondents mentioned earlier seem to 
indicate that the heads of Shari‟ah departments had a higher level of agreement than did 
the branch managers. This suggests that the implementations of the assessment of 
Shari‟ah board members by the bank or BNM were at a higher level than the branch 
managers desired. It also demonstrates that the mechanism for the appointment of the 
Shari‟ah board is far more rigorous than expected and that the quality of the Shari‟ah 
board‟s Shari‟ah governance has been emphasized in the Malaysian Shari‟ah governance 
framework (SGF).  
 
On the other hand, 89.7% of the branch managers agreed while another 10.3% were 
indifferent on the need for Shari‟ah board members to be mandated with adequate power, 
as shown in Table 7.4.8 above. While there was no disagreement reported in the 
responses of the branch managers, this was not the case for the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments. Table 6.4.6 reported that 8.3% of the heads of Shari‟ah departments 
indicated their disagreement while another 4.2% were indifferent when responding to the 
same question. Nevertheless, the mean value of the responses of the branch managers and 
the heads of Shari‟ah departments were 4.37 and 4.29 respectively, which could be 
considered as being very similar. 
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Next, when asked to indicate their agreement on the need for a reporting channel in order 
for Shari‟ah board members to report any conflict that might arise between Shari‟ah 
board members and the board of directors or with the management of the bank, 85.9% of 
the branch managers agreed while 2.6% disagreed and another 11.5% were indifferent. A 
similar division on the perception amongst the heads of Shari‟ah departments was also 
revealed. As reported in Table 6.4.6, 75.0% of the heads of Shari‟ah departments 
indicated their agreement while disagreement and uncertainty each accounted for 12.5% 
of the responses. Although the mean value of the responses reported for the branch 
managers is relatively higher (4.32) than that of the heads of Shari‟ah departments (3.83), 
this is not significantly different, as indicated earlier. Nevertheless, it suggests that the 
branch managers, generally, were more in favour of the existence of such a reporting 
mechanism to resolve possible conflicts between important parties within the SGF.   
 
Finally, 84.6% of the branch managers agreed while another 15.4% were indifferent on 
the question of whether there should be a proper segregation of Shari‟ah board duties. 
However, amongst the heads of Shari‟ah departments, 83.3% agreed, 12.5% disagreed 
and 4.2% responded with indifference. In addition, the responses of the branch managers 
produced a mean value of 4.28 while the mean value was slightly lower for the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments (4.00). This suggests that the branch managers give more 
importance to a proper segregation of Shari‟ah board duties consistent with the argument 
proposed by Alhabshi and Bakar (2008) than is actually exercised, as indicated in the 
responses of the heads of Shari‟ah departments. Nevertheless, the responses of the two 
groups of respondents regarding this question were not significantly different.    
 
In addition, an analysis by the control variables types of banks, total assets and number of 
years the bank has been offering Islamic banking products and services on the responses 
of the branch managers produced significantly different results. On the control variable 
types of banks, Table 7.4.10 below shows that three aspects of Shari‟ah board‟s 
appointment and mandated authority were found to be significantly different using the 
Mann Whitney U test. First, the requirement that there be no conflict of interest in the 
appointment of the Shari‟ah board was significantly different, with a p value of 0.031. 
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The table shows that the branch managers from the full-fledged Islamic banks indicated a 
higher level of agreement (mean value of 4.55) than did the branch managers from banks 
with an Islamic window (mean value of 4.09). Second, the issue of the need for Shari‟ah 
board members to be assessed by the bank or BNM was significantly different, with a p 
value of 0.002. As is evident from the table, the branch managers from the full-fledged 
Islamic banks indicated a higher level of expectation (mean of 4.40) than did the branch 
managers from banks with an Islamic window (mean of 3.74). Next, the requirement for a 
channel for the Shari‟ah board to report possible conflicts between Shari‟ah board 
members and the board of directors or the management also gave a significantly different 
result, with a p value of 0.029. Similarly, the branch managers from the full-fledged 
Islamic banks indicated a higher level of agreement (mean value of 4.45) than did branch 
managers from banks with an Islamic window (mean value of 4.00). 
 
Meanwhile, Table 7.4.11 below shows the results when an analysis by the control 
variable total assets was conducted. As is evident from the table, the only significantly 
different result derived using the Kruskal-Wallis H test was regarding the issue of 
Shari‟ah board members being subject to assessment by the bank or BNM, with a p value 
of 0.015. The table indicates that the branch managers from large banks indicated a 
higher level of agreement than did the branch managers from the small and medium-sized 
banks.   
 
On the other hand, Table 7.4.12 below presents the findings of the analysis by the control 
variable the number of years the bank has offered Islamic banking products and services. 
As shown in the table, the issue regarding the need to ensure that there is no conflict 
surrounding the appointment of the Shari‟ah board, and Shari‟ah board members being 
subject to assessment by the bank or BNM, were found to be significantly different using 
the Kruskal-Wallis H test, with p values of 0.005 and 0.003 respectively. Regarding both 
issues, the branch managers of banks with 11 to 15 years of Islamic banking experience 
indicated a higher level of agreement than did branch managers from other categories of 
Islamic banking experience.  
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Table 7.4.10: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers Relating to the Appointment and Mandated Authority of 
Shari’ah Board Members by the Type of Bank  
Nature of the 
Shari’ah Board 
Members 
Appointment and 
Mandated Authority 
Type of Bank 
Sig. 
Full-fledged Islamic Banks Banks with an Islamic Window 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Disagree Uncertain Agree Total 
% % % Mean % % % Mean 
Appointment of 
Shari‟ah board is 
based on fit and 
proper criteria 
1.8 3.6 94.5 4.53 .0 8.7 91.3 4.30 - 
No conflict on the 
appointment of 
Shari‟ah board 
.0 9.1 90.9 4.55 8.7 13.0 78.3 4.09 *0.031 
Shari‟ah board is 
subject to assessment 
by the bank or BNM 
.0 7.3 92.7 4.40 13.0 8.7 78.3 3.74 *0.002 
Adequate power has 
been mandated to 
Shari‟ah board 
.0 10.9 89.1 4.42 .0 8.7 91.3 4.26 - 
Reporting channel 
exists to report 
conflicts  
.0 10.9 89.1 4.45 8.7 13.0 78.3 4.00 *0.029 
Proper segregation of 
Shari‟ah board duties 
exists 
.0 16.4 83.6 4.33 .0 13.0 87.0 4.17 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the two categories of bank types using the Mann Whitney U test 
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Table 7.4.11: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers Relating to the Appointment and Mandated Authority of 
Shari’ah Board Members by Total Assets  
Nature of Shari’ah 
Board Members 
Appointment and 
Mandated 
Authority  
Total Assets by Category 
Sig. 
Small 
 (Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium 
 (between RM1,000 million to RM10,000 
million assets) 
Large 
 (More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
Appointment of 
Shari‟ah board is based 
on fit and proper 
criteria 
.0 .0 100.0 4.00 .0 7.4 92.6 4.44 2.1 4.3 93.6 4.51 - 
No conflict on the 
appointment of 
Shari‟ah board 
.0 25.0 75.0 4.00 7.4 11.1 81.5 4.26 .0 8.5 91.5 4.53 - 
Shari‟ah board is 
subject to assessment 
by the bank or BNM 
.0 .0 100.0 4.00 11.1 11.1 77.8 3.85 .0 6.4 93.6 4.43 *0.015 
Adequate power has 
been mandated to 
Shari‟ah board 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 .0 7.4 92.6 4.33 .0 12.8 87.2 4.40 - 
Reporting channel 
exists to report 
conflicts with Shari‟ah 
board, Board of 
directors or 
Management 
25.0 .0 75.0 3.75 3.7 11.1 85.2 4.15 .0 12.8 87.2 4.47 - 
Proper segregation of 
Shari‟ah board duties 
exists 
.0 .0 100.0 4.25 .0 11.1 88.9 4.26 .0 19.1 80.9 4.30 - 
* Indicates the distribution is significantly different between the three categories of total assets using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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Table 7.4.12: Analysis Showing Expectations of Branch Managers Relating to the Appointment and Mandated Authority of 
Shari’ah Board Members by the Number of Years Banks have been Offering Islamic Banking (IB) 
Nature of Shari’ah Board Members Appointment 
and Mandated Authority 
Number of Years Banks have been Offering IB 
Sig. 
0-5 Years 6-10 Years 11-15 Years 16 Years & Above 
Overall Overall Overall Overall 
No Mean No Mean No Mean No Mean 
Appointment of Shari‟ah board is based on fit and 
proper criteria 
19 4.22 22 4.59 1 5.00 36 4.39 - 
No conflict on the appointment of Shari‟ah board 19 4.32 22 4.86 1 5.00 36 4.17 *0.005 
Shari‟ah board is subject to assessment by the bank or 
BNM 
19 3.84 22 4.64 1 5.00 36 4.11 *0.003 
Adequate power has been mandated to Shari‟ah board 19 4.47 22 4.55 1 5.00 36 4.19 - 
Reporting channel exist to report conflicts  19 4.32 22 4.50 1 5.00 36 4.22 - 
Proper segregation of Shari‟ah board duties exist 19 4.42 22 4.50 1 5.00 36 4.08 - 
* Indicates the distribution is significantly different between the four categories of years bank offers Islamic banking products and services 
using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
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7.5 Perceptions of Branch Managers Regarding the Nature of the 
Shari’ah Review by Shari’ah Boards 
This section deals with important issues surrounding the perceptions of the branch 
managers regarding the Shari‟ah review function of the Shari‟ah board. It is worth 
remembering that the questions raised on these issues correspond to Section C of QS2 
and most of the questions are unique to the branch managers. Thus, comparison of the 
responses of the branch managers with those of the heads of Shari‟ah departments is 
limited to questions that are similar to both groups of respondents. However, the scope of 
the Shari‟ah review the researcher wished to investigate with the branch managers 
remains the same, i.e., the structure and implementation of the Shari‟ah review by the 
Shari‟ah board. The next subsections offer analyses and discussions of these two aspects 
of the Shari‟ah review regarding the responses of the branch managers.   
 
7.5.1 Perceptions of Branch Managers Regarding the Structure of the 
Shari’ah Review  
The branch managers were invited to indicate their agreement based on a five-point 
Likert scale between strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (2) on several crucial issues 
on this subject. Table 7.5.1 below provides an analysis of the results. 
 
The branch managers were first asked whether they perceived the Shari‟ah board as being 
the sole authority on the Shari‟ah review system within individual banks offering Islamic 
banking services. It is worth noting that the same question was also posed to the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments. From the results, it seems that both groups of respondents gave 
responses of a similar pattern in which responses in all categories of agreement were 
evident. Table 7.5.1 shows that 74.4% of the branch managers agreed while 16.7% 
disagreed and another 9% were indifferent. In contrast, Table 6.5.1 reports that the 
responses of the heads of Shari‟ah departments showed that 83.3% agreed, 12.5% 
disagreed and another 4.2% were indifferent. Additionally, the mean value of the 
responses of the branch managers and the heads of Shari‟ah departments are 3.9 and 4.17 
respectively and so do not differ much from one another. Thus, it can be said that there is 
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no apparent gap between the expectations of the branch managers for the Shari‟ah board 
to be considered as the sole authority in the Shari‟ah review and what was actually being 
exercised by Shari‟ah board members as indicated in the responses of the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments. In addition, there were responses of disagreement from the branch 
managers just as there were from the heads of Shari‟ah departments. In Section 6.5.1 of 
Chapter Six, it was discussed that the perception of disagreement produced by the heads 
of Shari‟ah regarding this question might suggest that Shari‟ah board members have 
delegated some of their functions to other parties within the bank. Similarly, 
disagreement amongst the branch managers on this issue could indicate that the these 
branch managers were not in favour of the governance mechanism in which Shari‟ah 
board members act as the sole authority on the Shari‟ah review system of the bank. 
Although these indications of disagreement represents a minority view among both the 
branch managers and the heads of Shari‟ah departments, it also suggests that it would not 
be possible for Shari‟ah board members to be totally in charge when undertaking the 
Shari‟ah review system. It seems that the Shari‟ah board would need to entrust other 
parties within the bank to cooperate with them in performing such an important role.  
 
Viewing the same issue from a slightly different perspective, the branch managers were 
asked whether adequate and apparent guidelines on the pronouncements and resolutions 
should be issued by the SAC of BNM for use in the Islamic banking industry. In 
response, 84.6% of the branch managers agreed whereas another 15.4% were indifferent. 
Table 7.5.1 also reports that the mean value of the responses to this question is 4.14, an 
indication of strong agreement. A similar question was posed to the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments. Table 6.5.1 reported that 79.2% of this group of respondents agreed while 
20.8% disagreed and the mean value was 3.92. Hence, it can be said that the branch 
managers place greater importance on the role of the SAC to provide an established 
constitution to which the Shari‟ah board can refer when undertaking their Shari‟ah review 
function. It is worth noting that the high expectation expressed by the branch managers 
for the SAC of BNM to provide the necessary Shari‟ah governance guidelines has a true 
basis. As the bank‟s branch managers, their responses reflect the confidence they place in 
and, therefore, the reliance the industry places on this institution, which acts as the 
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supreme authority of the Shari‟ah governance system of all Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) in Malaysia including Islamic banks. Indeed, such authority was further 
emphasized when the recent Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 clearly stipulated the 
mandated power of the SAC in which the Shari‟ah resolutions issued by the SAC are 
binding to all Malaysian IFIs (BNM 2009).  
 
Table 7.5.1: Analysis Showing Perceptions of Branch Managers Regarding the 
Structure of the Shari'ah Review for Shari’ah Boards 
 
 
 
Next, Table 7.5.1 presents evidence that 89.7% of the branch managers agreed whereas 
another 10.3% were indifferent when asked whether the role of the SAC enhances the 
standardization of Islamic banking practices. These responses by the branch managers 
represent the stakeholders‟ perception; the vast majority seem to provide support for the 
ability of the supreme authority in the SGF to curb the problem facing the Islamic 
banking business, i.e., inconsistencies in Islamic banking practices.  Hence, the dual-layer 
 Structure of the Shari'ah 
Review for Shari’ah 
Boards 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean 
Shari‟ah board is individual 
banks‟ sole authority in 
Shari'ah review 
13 16.7 7 9 58 74.4 78 100 3.9 
Adequate & apparent 
guidelines should be issued 
by Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council of BNM 
0 0 12 15.4 66 84.6 78 100 4.14 
Shari‟ah Advisory Council 
enhances standardization of 
IB practices 
0 0 8 10.3 70 89.7 78 100 4.26 
Dual-layer Shari'ah 
governance system in 
Malaysia effective in 
ensuring stability of IB 
industry 
0 0 18 23.1 60 76.9 78 100 4.06 
Dual-layer Shari'ah 
governance system 
harmonizes IB practices in 
Malaysia and across 
countries 
0 0 19 24.4 59 75.6 78 100 4.06 
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Shari‟ah governance system implemented in Malaysia, with the SAC as the regulator 
overseeing the Shari‟ah governance implementation of the participating IFIs, evidently 
contributes to minimizing inconsistencies in Malaysian Islamic banking practices. This 
revelation signifies that a central Shari‟ah governance authority such as the SAC is 
crucial to bridge the gap resulting from differences in Shari‟ah opinion issued by the 
respective Shari‟ah boards of individual banks offering Islamic banking products and 
services.   
 
The branch managers were also asked to indicate their level of agreement with whether 
the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system implemented in Malaysia is effective in 
ensuring the stability of the Islamic banking industry. In response, 76.9% of the branch 
managers agreed while another 23.1% were indifferent, as shown in Table 7.5.1. With the 
percentage of agreement slightly above three quarters of the total number of branch 
managers and most of the remaining quarter being uncertain, the table indicates that the 
mean value of the branch managers‟ responses is just above 4.00, i.e., 4.06, an indication 
of overall agreement. Thus, the vast majority of the branch managers perceived that the 
dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system implemented in Malaysia has managed to ensure 
the stability of the Islamic banking industry. This finding provides further evidence 
regarding the advantages of the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system; the branch 
managers perceive it as promoting the stability of the Islamic banking industry which has, 
to date, been in place in the Malaysian business scene for almost 20 years.   
 
The last question posed to the branch managers on the structure of the Shari‟ah review 
was regarding whether these respondents perceived that the dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system as being capable of harmonizing Islamic bank practices in Malaysia 
and across national boundaries. The response received was similar to the response pattern 
in the preceding question in which almost three quarter of the branch managers indicated 
their agreement (75.6%) while almost another quarter were indifferent (24.4%). Indeed, 
the mean value of the responses reported for this question was similar to the mean value 
reported for the preceding question, i.e., 4.06. As such, the branch managers seem to 
indicate that, to some extent, the dual-layers of Shari‟ah governance system have realized 
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their potential in harmonizing the Islamic banking practices in Malaysia and across 
national boundaries.  
 
Meanwhile, analysis by the control variable types of banks produced significantly 
different findings using the Mann Whitney U test. As shown in Table 7.5.2 below, the 
mean value of the responses to the question on whether adequate and apparent guidelines 
on the pronouncements and resolutions of the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of BNM should 
be issued for use in the Islamic banking industry was significantly different, with a p 
value of 0.044. Furthermore, the branch managers from the full-fledged Islamic banks 
indicated a higher level of agreement than the branch managers from banks with an 
Islamic window, as the reported mean value for the former (4.24) is higher than that of 
the latter (3.91). In addition, an analysis by the control variable total assets also produced 
significantly different results using the Kruskal-Wallis H test. Table 7.5.3 below presents 
evidence that responses regarding whether adequate and apparent guidelines on the 
pronouncements and resolutions of the SAC of BNM should be issued for use in the 
Islamic banking industry are similarly significantly different with a p value of 0.027. 
Also, the branch managers from the large banks indicated a higher level of agreement 
(mean value of 4.30) than did branch managers from other bank size categorizations.   
 
The significantly different results from both the control variables above suggest that the 
branch managers from large full-fledged Islamic banks place greater emphasis on the 
need for such guidelines by the SAC as the basis for Islamic banking practices in 
Malaysia. This demonstrates that branch managers from banks whose Islamic banking 
activities are extensive, as is the case with full-fledged Islamic banks and large banks, 
regard the proper installation of the Shari‟ah governance mechanism as a crucially 
important directive from the SAC. Hence, the SAC, which acts as the supreme authority 
for the Islamic banking industry, has to ensure that clear and transparent guidelines will 
be issued for use in this emerging industry.  
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Table 7.5.2: Analysis Showing Perceptions of Branch Managers on the Structure of Shari'ah Review for Shari’ah Boards by 
the Type of Bank  
Structure of the 
Shari'ah Review for 
Shari’ah Boards  
Type of Bank 
Sig. 
Full-fledged Islamic Banks Banks with an Islamic Window 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean 
Shari‟ah board is 
individual banks‟ 
sole authority in 
Shari'ah review 
16.4 7.3 76.4 3.93 17.4 13.0 69.6 3.83 - 
Adequate & apparent 
guidelines should be 
issued by Shari‟ah 
Advisory Council of 
BNM 
.0 12.7 87.3 4.24 .0 21.7 78.3 3.91 *0.044 
Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council enhances 
standardization of IB 
practices 
.0 10.9 89.1 4.29 .0 8.7 91.3 4.17 - 
Dual-layer Shari'ah 
governance system 
in Malaysia effective 
in ensuring stability 
of IB industry 
.0 21.8 78.2 4.15 .0 26.1 73.9 3.87 - 
Dual-layer Shari'ah 
governance system 
harmonizes IB 
practices in Malaysia 
and across countries 
.0 23.6 76.4 4.15 .0 26.1 73.9 3.87 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the two categories of bank types using the Mann Whitney U test 
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Table 7.5.3: Analysis Showing Perceptions of Branch Managers Regarding the Structure of Shari'ah Review for Shari’ah 
Boards by Total Assets  
Structure of the 
Shari'ah 
Review for 
Shari’ah 
Boards  
Total Assets by Category 
Sig. 
Small 
 (Less than RM1,000 million assets) 
Medium (between RM1,000 million to 
RM10,000 million assets) 
Large  
(More than RM10,000 million assets) 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean % % % Mean 
Shari‟ah board  is 
individual bank's 
sole authority in 
Shari'ah review 
50.0 .0 50.0 3.25 11.1 11.1 77.8 3.96 17.0 8.5 74.5 3.91 - 
Adequate & 
apparent guidelines 
should be issued by 
Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council of BNM 
.0 25.0 75.0 3.75 .0 22.2 77.8 3.93 .0 10.6 89.4 4.30 *0.027 
Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council enhances 
standardization of 
IB practices 
.0 .0 100.0 4.00 .0 14.8 85.2 4.15 .0 8.5 91.5 4.34 - 
Dual-layer Shari'ah 
Governance System 
in Malaysia 
effective in 
ensuring stability of 
IB industry 
.0 .0 100.0 4.00 .0 22.2 77.8 4.04 .0 25.5 74.5 4.09 - 
Dual-layer Shari'ah 
governance system 
harmonizes IB 
practices in 
Malaysia and across 
countries 
.0 .0 100.0 4.00 .0 22.2 77.8 4.07 .0 27.7 72.3 4.06 - 
* Indicates the distribution is significantly different between the three categories of total assets using the Kruskal-Wallis H test 
  
 291 
7.5.2 Perceptions of Branch Managers Regarding the Implementation of the 
Shari’ah Review  
This study also invited the branch managers to indicate their agreement on issues 
regarding the implementation of the Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board. Thus, the 
respondents were invited to indicate their agreement based on a five-point Likert scale 
between strongly disagree (1) and strongly agree (5). Table 7.5.4 below shows analysis of 
the findings.  
 
 
Table 7.5.4: Analysis Showing Perceptions of Branch Managers Regarding the 
Implementation of the Shari'ah Review  
 
Implementation of 
the Shari'ah Review  
 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean 
Shari‟ah board has full 
authority to stop non-
Shari'ah compliance 
transactions 
7 9.0 11 14.1 60 76.9 78 100.0 4.14 
Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council should adopt 
rigorous procedures to 
examine & endorse 
application of IB 
industry 
0 .0 11 14.1 67 85.9 78 100.0 4.10 
Working part time 
does not hinder 
effective Shari'ah 
review by the Shari‟ah 
board 
10 12.8 16 20.5 52 66.7 78 100.0 3.73 
Shari'ah compliance is 
adequately reflected in 
Shari'ah report by 
Shari‟ah board 
3 3.8 16 20.5 59 75.6 78 100.0 3.94 
Shari'ah report by 
Shari‟ah board 
satisfactorily discloses 
accounting issues of 
IB 
5 6.4 19 24.4 54 69.2 78 100.0 3.79 
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The first question posed to the branch managers was regarding whether they thought that 
the Shari‟ah board should have the full authority to stop banks from undertaking non-
Shari‟ah compliant transactions. Table 7.5.4 above shows that 76.9% of the total number 
of branch managers agreed while 9.0% disagreed and another 14.1% were indifferent. 
Hence, it can be said that the vast majority of the branch managers seem to support the 
argument for the Shari‟ah board to have full authority to stop banks from undertaking 
non-Shari‟ah compliant transactions. Indeed, this was also the extent of the authority 
exercised by the Shari‟ah board as indicated by the responses derived from the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments when a similar question was posed to them. In response to the same 
question, Table 6.5.2 of Chapter Six shows that 70.8% of the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments indicated their agreement while 12.5% were in disagreement and another 
16.7% were indifferent. A comparison of the percentages from the two groups of 
respondents does not reveal any major differences. Moreover, the mean values of the 
responses from these two groups of respondents were relatively close (3.96 in QS1 and 
4.14 in QS2). 
 
The following question was about whether the branch managers thought the SAC of 
BNM should adopt rigorous procedures to examine and endorse Islamic financial 
products submitted by banks offering Islamic banking services. In response, Table 7.5.4 
above reports that 85.9% of the branch managers agreed while another 14.1% were 
indifferent. With a mean value of 4.10, it can be said that the vast majority of the branch 
managers agreed for such a rigorous mechanism from the SAC of BNM. It has been 
mentioned before that an individual bank offering Islamic banking services which seeks 
to launch new products or services to its customers is required to secure the approval of 
the SAC. Hence, noting that the SAC has the authority to determine which Islamic 
financial products and services are to be made available in the market, this finding 
suggests that this authoritative body has ensured the installation of such rigorous 
procedures.  
 
Meanwhile, another question similar to one posed to the heads of Shari‟ah departments 
was posed to the branch managers regarding whether the latter consider that Shari‟ah 
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board members working part time in banks does not hinder their production of an 
effective Shari‟ah review of the operation of banks offering Islamic banking services. 
Table 7.5.4 shows that 66.7% of the branch managers agreed while 12.8% disagreed and 
another 20.5% were indifferent. It seems that the view of the branch managers that the 
Shari‟ah board members‟ part time status does not hinder their production of an effective 
Shari‟ah review was at almost the same level as for the heads of Shari‟ah departments 
who, to the same question, responded with 66.6% in agreement and 20.8% in 
disagreement with another 12.5% being indifferent. Additionally, the mean values of the 
responses of the branch managers and the heads of Shari‟ah departments was 3.73 and 
3.63 respectively. These mean values show that both groups of respondents have a 
moderate view that the part time working nature of the Shari‟ah board does not hinder the 
production of an effective Shari‟ah review.  
 
Regarding the quality of the Shari‟ah report, the branch managers were invited to indicate 
whether they thought that the Shari‟ah compliance of the bank is adequately reflected in 
the Shari‟ah report issued by the Shari‟ah board. From Table 7.5.4, it can be seen that 
75.6% of the branch managers expressed their agreement while 3.8% disagreed and 
another 20.5% were indifferent. In Chapter Four, it was discussed that the Shari‟ah report 
serves as the capstone where the Shari‟ah board summarizes and discloses its roles and 
functions with the emphasis on disclosing the Shari‟ah compliance of the bank‟s 
activities to the users of the report. Hence, with a reported mean value of 3.94, as shown 
in Table 7.5.4, the branch managers indicated that they generally perceived that the 
Shari‟ah report issued by the Shari‟ah board met its objective in disclosing the 
information regarding the Shari‟ah compliance of the activities of the bank they 
represented. 
 
In addition to the question about Shari‟ah compliance above, the branch managers were 
also asked to indicate whether the Shari‟ah report satisfactorily discloses the accounting 
issues of the bank. In response, 69.2% of the branch managers indicated their agreement 
while 6.4% disagreed and another 24.4% were indifferent. It was discussed in Chapter 
Four that the Shari‟ah report should include a clear statement about the examination of 
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IFI‟s transactions, the profit earned and the approval of the IFI‟s calculation of zakat as 
well as declaring that the earnings realized from sources prohibited in Islam have been 
disposed of to charitable causes (AAOIFI 1998 para. 10-25). With a mean value of 3.79 
as well as almost a quarter of the total number of branch managers indicating either 
uncertainty or disagreement, it seems that these respondents were moderately satisfied 
that the accounting issues were disclosed in the Shari‟ah report by the Shari‟ah board.  
 
Meanwhile, the only control variable that produced significantly different results was 
types of banks. Table 7.5.5 below reveals that the question of whether the SAC of BNM 
should adopt rigorous procedures to examine and endorse the application of Islamic 
financial products submitted by banks offering Islamic banking services was found to be 
significantly different using the Mann Whitney U test, with a p value of 0.029. As shown 
in the table, the branch managers from the full-fledged Islamic banks indicated a higher 
level of agreement than did the branch managers (mean value of 4.20) from the banks 
with an Islamic window (mean value of 3.87). Hence, it can be said that, as the Islamic 
banking operations of full-fledged Islamic banks are relatively more extensive, the branch 
managers from these banks perceived that rigorous procedures from the SAC on the 
examination and endorsement of new applications of Islamic banking products by banks 
as being more important than did branch managers from banks with an Islamic window.     
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Table 7.5.5: Analysis Showing Perceptions of Branch Managers Regarding the Implementation of the Shari'ah Review by the 
Type of Bank  
Implementation of 
Shari'ah Review  
Type of Bank 
Sig. 
Full-fledged Islamic Banks Banks with an Islamic Window 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall Disagree Uncertain Agree Overall 
% % % Mean % % % Mean 
Shari‟ah board has full 
authority to stop non-
Shari'ah compliance 
transactions 
7.3 12.7 80.0 4.20 13.0 17.4 69.6 4.00 - 
Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council should adopt 
rigorous procedures to 
examine & endorse 
application of IB 
industry 
.0 10.9 89.1 4.20 .0 21.7 78.3 3.87 *0.029 
Working part time does 
not hinder effective 
Shari'ah review by the 
Shari‟ah board 
16.4 16.4 67.3 3.73 4.3 30.4 65.2 3.74 - 
Shari'ah compliance is 
adequately reflected in 
Shari'ah report by 
Shari‟ah board 
5.5 16.4 78.2 4.02 .0 30.4 69.6 3.74 - 
Shari'ah report by 
Shari‟ah board 
satisfactorily discloses 
accounting issues of IB 
7.3 23.6 69.1 3.84 4.3 26.1 69.6 3.70 - 
* Indicates distribution of responses is significantly different between the two categories of bank  types using the Mann Whitney U test 
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7.5.3 The Branch Managers’ Perceptions of Relevant Stakeholders within the 
Shari’ah Governance Framework 
The Shari‟ah governance of banks offering Islamic banking activities sees the involvement of 
interrelated parties within the bank and the regulator. Thus, the branch managers were invited 
to rank between 1 (very unimportant) to 5 (very important) on the relevant stakeholders in the 
SGF for the Islamic banking industry according to their degree of importance. These parties 
are the SAC of BNM, the Shari‟ah board, the Shari‟ah department of the bank, the board of 
directors, and the management of the bank.  Table 7.5.6 below presents an analysis of the 
results.  
 
Table 7.5.6: The Branch Managers’ Perceptions of Relevant Stakeholders within the 
Shari’ah Governance Framework 
 
 
As is evident from Table 7.5.6 above, the SAC of BNM is ranked first as the most important 
party within the SGF, with a mean value of 4.14. It is suggested that this finding reflects the 
importance the branch managers give to the position of the SAC as the supreme authority 
over the Malaysian SGF for the Islamic finance services industry. Indeed, it has been 
 Important 
Parties 
Within the 
Shari’ah 
Governance 
Framework 
Unimportant Uncertain Important Total Overall 
No % No % No % No % Mean 
Shari‟ah 
Advisory 
Council of 
BNM 
9 11.5 8 10.3 61 78.2 78 100 4.14 
Shari‟ah 
board 
11 14.1 6 7.7 61 78.2 78 100 4.12 
Shari‟ah 
department 
7 8.9 13 16.7 58 74.4 78 100 4.10 
Board of 
directors 
9 11.5 15 19.3 54 69.2 78 100 3.81 
Management 12 15.4 12 15.4 54 69.2 78 100 3.78 
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discussed before that many aspects of the Islamic banking operations are subject to the 
authority of the SAC, including the appointment of Shari‟ah board members and the 
endorsement of Islamic financial products and services to be launched to customers. More 
crucially, the resolutions issued by the SAC are binding to all Malaysian IFIs (BNM 2009). 
Hence, the utmost importance given to the SAC by the branch managers shows the former‟s 
vital role in the Malaysian Islamic financial services‟ SGF.    
 
The Shari‟ah board of individual banks was revealed as the second most important party 
within the SGF after the SAC of BNM, scoring the second highest mean value of 4.12, as 
reported in Table 7.5.6. Throughout the discussion on the Shari‟ah governance of banks 
offering Islamic banking services, it has been emphasised that the Shari‟ah board ensures the 
credibility of an Islamic bank by ascertaining the Shari‟ah compliance of the bank‟s 
operations (see for example Briston and El-Ashker 1986; Tomkins and Karim 1987; Karim 
1990b; Karim 1990a; Banaga et al. 1994; Rammal 2006; Laldin 2008a). Its position as next 
after the SAC of BNM demonstrates how the branch managers conceded to the fact that the 
Shari‟ah board is under the domination of the SAC. 
 
With a reported mean value of 4.10, as shown in Table 7.5.6, the Shari‟ah department of the 
bank was perceived by the branch managers as ranking third in importance within the SGF 
for banks offering Islamic banking services. It was mentioned in Chapter Four that GPS1 
clearly states that the Shari‟ah officer serves as the secretariat to the Shari‟ah board. Amongst 
the crucial roles of the Shari‟ah department officers is helping to organize the Shari‟ah issues 
for action by the Shari‟ah board. Besides this, the Shari‟ah department also acts as the 
intermediary with other interrelated parties within the bank to ensure that the Shari‟ah 
decisions made by the Shari‟ah board are being communicated to and implemented by these 
parties. Thus, it is apparent that the authority of the Shari‟ah board is superior to the Shari‟ah 
department, and, hence, the former has been positioned one rank higher in importance than 
the latter by the branch managers.  
 
Meanwhile, the bank‟s board of directors ranks fourth in importance within the SGF. As is 
apparent in Table 7.5.6, the mean value of the branch managers‟ responses was 3.81. Despite 
the Shari‟ah board being accountable to the board of directors (BNM 2004), the latter was 
perceived as important by the branch managers after the Shari‟ah board and the Shari‟ah 
department. The fact that the Shari‟ah department was perceived by the branch managers to 
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have greater importance than the board of directors identifies the former as the internal party 
deemed to be the most important within the SGF. Alternatively, this finding suggests that the 
role of the board of directors is less significant than the Shari‟ah board and the Shari‟ah 
department officers regarding the SGF of banks offering Islamic banking services. This could 
be attributed to the fact that the board of directors is bound to implement the Shari‟ah 
decisions made by the Shari‟ah board in which the Shari‟ah department officers, as the 
secretariat to the Shari‟ah board and equipped with the necessary knowledge and experience 
in Islamic banking, also serve as the intermediaries between these two parties.  
 
Table 7.5.6 also reports that the mean value of the responses of the branch managers 
regarding the management was 3.78. This makes the management of the bank the least 
important amongst all the selected parties within the SGF. Although the management is 
responsible for the implementation of Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board, this 
study suggests that the management comes last and next only after the Shari‟ah department 
officers and the board of directors in its importance with respect to the SGF. The above 
explanation regarding the significance of the Shari‟ah department over the board of directors 
in terms of the SGF can also be used to explain the rank of the management. Furthermore, in 
the light of the principal-agent relationship discussed in Chapter Two, one function of the 
board of directors is to monitor the management, due to the information asymmetry problem 
experienced by the latter, in order to protect the interests of the shareholders. The same 
applies when discussing corporations, such as Islamic banks whose activities are restricted to 
compliance with the Islamic Shari‟ah. Hence, this finding reflects that the board of directors 
were perceived by the branch managers as being more important than the management in 
terms of the SGF, as the former protects the Shari‟ah legitimacy needs of the shareholders.  
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides discussions on analyses of the Questionnaire Survey 2 (QS2) findings 
from 78 branch managers of banks offering Islamic banking services in the MIFC. The 
findings in QS2 shed light on the interest of the stakeholders under the spectrum of 
stakeholder theory regarding the three significant issues surrounding the governance function 
of the Shari‟ah board: (1) the role of the Shari‟ah board, (2) the accountability and 
independence of the Shari‟ah board, and (3) the nature of the Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah 
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board. In essence, the findings derived from QS2 were interpreted as the branch managers‟ 
anticipation of how the issues under investigation should be carried out. These findings were 
then analysed and contrasted with the responses by the heads of Shari‟ah departments in 
Questionnaire Survey 1 (QS1). Meanwhile, regarding the background of the branch managers 
who participated in QS2, 55 (70.5%) were from full-fledged Islamic banks while another 23 
(29.5%) were from banks with an Islamic window. On the other hand, examining the 
composition of the sample of branch managers on the basis of the bank‟s ownership indicates 
that 74 (94.9%) of the branch managers were from domestic banks while another 4 (5.1%) 
branch managers were from foreign banks. Mostly males, these branch managers generally 
had plenty of experience as branch managers since only a small number of branch managers 
(seven) were found to have less than one year‟s experience. Moreover, 60.3% of the branch 
managers were found to be from large banks while 34.6% and 5.1% were from medium and 
small-sized banks respectively. In addition, being designated as the bank‟s branch manager, 
most of them were trained, especially in the field of accounting and finance (17 branch 
managers), a combination of Shari‟ah and/or fiqh al-mua‟malat with other non-Islamic 
field(s) (16 branch managers) and management (15 branch managers).    
 
The results regarding the scope of Shari‟ah advisory by the Shari‟ah board showed that the 
branch managers expected priority to be given to the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah advisory role 
similar to the results derived from QS1. However, the branch managers seemed to emphasise 
a different element of the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah advisory role. There are differences 
between what the heads of department considered the top three most important roles and 
those that the branch managers considered important. The heads of Shari‟ah departments, in 
QS1, indicated that the Shari‟ah board gave priority to endorsing the Shari‟ah compliance 
manual, advising the board of directors on Shari‟ah matters and assisting other parties on 
Shari‟ah matters. Meanwhile, the branch managers, in QS2, focused on advising the board of 
directors on Shari‟ah matters, advising the Shari‟ah department officers on the scope of the 
Shari‟ah review and preparing the Shari‟ah compliance manual. These contrasting results 
suggest that the branch managers called on the Shari‟ah board to undertake a Shari‟ah 
advisory role essentially to those whose Shari‟ah governance function is fundamental and to 
equip the structure of Shari‟ah governance by preparing the Shari‟ah compliance manual. 
Such emphases are expected to have resulted from a pragmatic approach, as the branch 
managers themselves are dealing with day-to-day banking business operations. Moreover, an 
analysis of the differences in the responses in QS1 and QS2 on the scope of the Shari‟ah 
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advisory by the Shari‟ah board revealed three elements of the Shari‟ah advisory to be 
significantly different, with the branch managers giving them greater emphasis: providing 
training to the Shari‟ah department officers, preparing the Shari‟ah compliance manual and 
reporting to the SAC of BNM on Shari‟ah matters. In addition, the branch managers did not 
seem inclined to accept the involvement of the Shari‟ah board in areas such as designing or 
providing training on the Shari‟ah governance system for implementation in the bank.  
 
Despite the passive involvement of the Shari‟ah board in the bank‟s strategic issues revealed 
in QS1, the branch managers indicated high expectations regarding the involvement of the 
Shari‟ah board in advising and designing the corporate objectives of the bank. Indeed, all the 
listed corporate objectives were significantly different when an analysis of the differences 
was conducted on the responses of the branch managers and those of the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments. Amongst the corporate objectives to which the branch managers gave great 
importance regarding the Shari‟ah board‟s involvement were the bank‟s objectives, the 
bank‟s mission and the bank‟s vision.  
 
Meanwhile, both the heads of Shari‟ah departments and the branch managers were consistent 
regarding the role of the Shari‟ah board in developing Islamic banking products and services. 
This is because the importance exercised by the Shari‟ah board in their involvement at 
different stages of developing Islamic banking products and services as indicated by the 
former were found to conform with the importance expected from the Shari‟ah board as laid 
down by the latter. Despite this similarity, there were some evident gaps indicated on the 
level of importance given by these respondents, particularly in four different stages of 
development of Islamic banking and services which were found to be significantly different 
and to which the branch managers gave greater importance, namely, design stage, pricing 
stage, testing stage, and implementation stage. This suggests that the Shari‟ah board had 
exercised low involvement in the development of these stages of Islamic banking products 
and services and should attempt to increase that involvement in order to meet the branch 
managers‟ expectations. On the other hand, the branch managers from the full-fledged 
Islamic banks indicated higher expectations regarding the involvement of the Shari‟ah board, 
specifically on the design and legal documentation stage than did the branch managers from 
banks with an Islamic window, which is deemed to correspond to how extensive the Islamic 
banking operations were in these banks. Evidently, this shows the gap in the importance 
perceived by the branch managers of these two types of bank.  Also, the branch managers 
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from banks with 11-15 years of experience of the Islamic banking business showed 
significantly different results for expectations of the Shari‟ah board‟s involvement in the legal 
documentation stage. 
  
On the bank‟s accounting issues, there seems to be a slight variance in the priority given 
between the expected and the actual involvement of the Shari‟ah board, as indicated by the 
branch managers and the heads of Shari‟ah departments respectively. For example, approving 
the calculation and distribution of zakat was ranked first as an accounting issue, where the 
involvement of the Shari‟ah board was expected by the branch managers while this same 
issue was ranked second in importance where the Shari‟ah board was actually involved, 
based on the responses of the heads of Shari‟ah departments. Similarly, the ranking positions 
pertaining to other bank‟s accounting issues, which signify the perceived importance of 
Shari‟ah board involvement, showed no great difference between the branch managers and 
the heads of Shari‟ah departments. However, differences were apparent regarding the degree 
of importance given, as was indicated by the significantly different results in the responses of 
both groups of respondents. These accounting issues, where the expectation the branch 
managers had of the Shari‟ah board‟s involvement was higher than the Shari‟ah board‟s 
actual involvement, as indicated by the heads of Shari‟ah departments, were as follows: 
determining the profit distribution formula, approving the accounting policy, and issuing 
Shari‟ah report. In addition, other significantly different results were derived for validating 
Islamic banking transaction records, validating documentation on Islamic banking contracts, 
and approving the calculation and distribution of zakat. For instance, validating Islamic 
banking transaction records was significantly different, with branch managers from foreign 
banks indicating a higher expectation than the branch managers from the domestic banks. 
Meanwhile, approving the calculation and distribution of zakat showed a significant 
difference, with the branch managers from large banks indicating a higher expectation than 
the branch managers from the small and medium-sized banks. Also, approving the calculation 
and distribution of zakat and validating documentation of Islamic banking contracts were 
both significantly different for branch managers whose banks had 11 to 15 years experience 
of Islamic banking business in contrast to other categorizations of Islamic banking business 
experience.  
 
Similar to the heads of Shari‟ah departments, the branch managers also recognized the 
significant role of the Shari‟ah department officers. The Shari‟ah department was ranked in 
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the first position of relevant parties whom the branch managers expected to assist the 
Shari‟ah board; this is similar to the highest assistance received by the Shari‟ah board, as 
indicated by the heads of Shari‟ah departments. In addition, when analyses of differences by 
control variables were conducted, it was found that the views of branch managers from the 
full-fledged Islamic banks and from large banks were significantly different thereby 
indicating that more importance was given by them than was given by the branch managers 
from other categorizations. This demonstrates that the support from the Shari‟ah department 
in banks whose Islamic banking activities are deemed extensive is characterised by the 
branch managers in these findings as apparently eminent. Meanwhile, the ranking positions 
indicate that the branch managers seem to have a higher expectation of, and hence give more 
importance to parties such as the audit committee, internal auditor and external auditor to 
provide assistance than these parties actually contribute, as indicated by the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments. Indeed, analysis of the differences in the responses provided in QS1 and QS2 
revealed that these three relevant parties were significantly different, with the branch 
managers‟ expectations regarding assistance being greater than the actual assistance offered 
by these parties.  
 
QS2 of this study also evaluated branch managers‟ perception of the Shari‟ah board‟s 
involvement in several commitments aimed at strengthening the Shari‟ah governance of the 
Islamic banking industry. Although there was some evidence of disagreement, the branch 
managers generally indicated high agreement with Shari‟ah board members undertaking these 
commitments. Indeed, analysis of the differences in the responses received in QS1 and QS2 
shows that many of these commitments were significantly different, with the branch 
managers indicating higher agreement than the heads of Shari‟ah departments. Two of the 
commitments to which the branch managers gave apparent importance were Shari‟ah board 
members engaging in workshops and meetings of scholars of fiqh al-mua‟malat to promote 
consistency in Islamic banking products and services as well as analysing whether Islamic 
banking products and services would deliver benefit to the ummah before they are launched. 
Similarly, section 6.3.7 of Chapter Six pointed out that Shari‟ah board members were highly 
committed to these two issues. In addition, significantly different results were obtained when 
analyses by control variables were conducted. Firstly, analysis by the types of banks 
produced a significantly different result for commitment regarding publishing the Shari‟ah 
board‟s Shari‟ah resolutions and rulings as well as for the mechanics of Shari‟ah compliance 
as applied in Islamic banks‟ dealings with the public, with the branch managers from the full-
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fledged Islamic banks indicating higher agreement than the branch managers from banks with 
an Islamic window. Secondly, analysis by the number of years the bank has offered Islamic 
banking products and services produced significantly different results, with branch managers 
of banks with 11 to 15 years experience of Islamic banking business indicating higher 
agreement than others regarding two commitments: (1) actively engaging in meetings of the 
scholars of fiqh al-mua‟malat to promote consistency in Islamic banking products and 
services, and (2) adequately analysing whether Islamic banking products and services would 
deliver benefit to the ummah before they are launched.  
 
Another section of QS2 was dedicated to determining the branch managers‟ perception of 
issues pertaining to the accountability and independence of the Shari‟ah board. On the 
question concerning factors influencing the accountability of the Shari‟ah board, the 
responses of the branch managers, in order of importance, were (1) the ethical values of the 
Shari‟ah board, (2) Shari‟ah board‟s requirement to ensure the Shari‟ah compliance of the 
bank, (3) the scholarly background of the Shari‟ah board, (4) the Shari‟ah board‟s reputation, 
and (5) the stakeholders‟ reliance on the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah review. It is worth noting 
that the factors that ranked first and last corresponded to similar positions in the responses of 
the heads of Shari‟ah departments in QS1. Hence, these similarities give compelling evidence 
of the factors deemed most crucial as well as least influential regarding the accountability of 
the Shari‟ah board. Of particular importance is the result on the significant influence of the 
ethical values of the Shari‟ah board, which underlines how the integrity of this Shari‟ah 
governance authority is crucial for the success of the Islamic banking industry, as discussed 
in Chapter Six. Meanwhile, there were inconsistencies between the ranking positions of the 
remaining factors as derived from the responses in QS1 and QS2. On the other hand, the 
ethical values and the scholarly background of the Shari‟ah board were significantly different 
when analysis by the number of years the bank has offered Islamic banking products and 
services was conducted. It was apparent that the branch managers from banks with 11 to 15 
years experience of Islamic banking business gave greater importance to this than did branch 
managers from other Islamic banking business experience categorizations. 
 
The branch managers were also asked about the factors influencing Shari‟ah board members‟ 
independence. Interestingly, the branch managers‟ perceived importance of all factors 
influencing the independence of the Shari‟ah board seems to be consistent with that of the 
heads of Shari‟ah departments in QS1. This is due to the fact that the ranking order derived in 
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QS2 was similarly positioned in QS1. In order of importance, these factors were: (1) a clearly 
defined scope of responsibility, (2) the perceived high ethical status of the Shari‟ah board, (3) 
the scholarly background of the Shari‟ah board, (4) adequate powers being mandated to the 
Shari‟ah board, (5) involvement of the Shari‟ah board members‟ in Shari‟ah board in other 
industries, (6) the participation of top management in the Shari‟ah board's meeting, and (7) 
the remuneration received by the Shari‟ah board. In addition, analysis by bank ownership 
produced significantly different results for the factor on adequate powers being mandated to 
the Shari‟ah board, with the branch managers from foreign banks indicating higher 
importance than the branch managers from domestic banks. Also, the factor on the scholarly 
background of the Shari‟ah board members was significantly different when analysed by the 
number of years the bank has been offering Islamic banking products and services, with the 
branch managers from banks with 11 to 15 years of Islamic banking business experience 
indicated higher importance than branch managers from other Islamic banking business 
experience categorizations. 
 
On the question about the relevant parties to whom the Shari‟ah Board is deemed 
accountable, similar to the heads of Shari‟ah departments in QS1, the branch managers gave 
highest importance to the role of the SAC of BNM. It is apparent that the branch managers 
also gave credence to the role of the SAC as the supreme authority in the Malaysian Islamic 
banking industry, which implied their supposition that the Shari‟ah board should be subject to 
the regulations and resolutions issued by the SAC. However, the branch managers then took a 
holistic view by citing the general aim of the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board, and indicated that the public was next in importance. It appears that the board of 
directors, who GPS1 clearly indicated as the party to which the Shari‟ah board is accountable 
(BNM 2004), and who in QS1, ranked joint first with the SAC as the party perceived to have 
the highest importance, was given less importance by the branch managers. This is due to the 
fact that the board of directors was ranked third in importance by the branch managers as the 
party to whom the Shari‟ah board is accountable. Indeed, the board of directors was the only 
party found to be significantly different when an analysis was conducted of the responses in 
QS1 and QS2, with the heads of Shari‟ah departments indicating higher importance than did 
the branch managers. Meanwhile, the bank‟s consumers and the bank‟s shareholders were 
revealed as the parties considered fourth and last in importance by the branch managers.  
 
  
 305 
To ascertain the Shari‟ah board‟s accountability and independence, the branch managers were 
also asked about their perception of several features regarding the nature of the Shari‟ah 
board‟s appointment and mandated authority. The responses on most of the features listed 
indicated reported mean values which signified almost similar levels of agreement with the 
heads of Shari‟ah departments in QS1. These features were (1) the need to establish „fit and 
proper‟ qualification criteria for the appointment of Shari‟ah board members, (2) the 
appointment of Shari‟ah board members is free from any conflict of interest, (3) adequate 
powers being mandated to the Shari‟ah board to perform its role, (4) the existence of a 
reporting channel for Shari‟ah board members to report possible conflict that might arise 
between Shari‟ah board members and the board of directors or the management of the bank, 
and (5) the existence of proper segregation of Shari‟ah board duties. Analysis of the 
differences between the responses in QS1 and QS2 found only one significantly different 
result, which corresponds to the feature of Shari‟ah board members being subject to certain 
assessments by the bank or the BNM. It emerged that the heads of Shari‟ah departments 
indicated higher agreement for the Shari‟ah board to possess this feature than did the branch 
managers.  
 
In addition, there were also several significantly different results derived from analyses by 
control variables which were conducted regarding features on the nature of the Shari‟ah 
board‟s appointment and mandated authority. Analysis by the types of banks produced 
significantly different results, with branch managers from full-fledged Islamic banks 
indicating higher agreement than those from banks with an Islamic window for features of (1) 
no conflict of interest on the appointment of Shari‟ah board, (2) Shari‟ah board members are 
subject to assessment by the bank or BNM, and (3) the existence of a reporting channel to 
report conflicts between the Shari‟ah board and the board of directors or the management. 
Meanwhile, the second commitment was also significantly different for branch managers 
from large banks compared to those from small and medium-sized banks. On the other hand, 
analysis by the number of years the bank has been offering Islamic banking products and 
services produced significantly different results for the first and the second commitment 
amongst branch managers from banks with a mid range of Islamic banking business 
experience in comparison to bank managers from other experience categorizations.  
 
This study was also interested in examining the branch managers‟ perceptions on the nature 
of the Shari‟ah review in banks offering Islamic banking and services. Similar to QS1, the 
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branch managers were asked about the structure and implementation of the Shari‟ah review 
by the Shari‟ah board. Basically, there was no indication of disagreement from the branch 
managers on all the structures of the Shari‟ah review except on one particular question. This 
particular question, which was subject to considerable amount of disagreement amongst the 
branch managers, was on the issue of whether these respondents thought that the Shari‟ah 
board was the sole authority in the Shari‟ah review.  Indeed, this negative reply came as a 
surprise, as the Shari‟ah board was deemed to be the bank‟s sole authority in the Shari‟ah 
review. It is worth noting that in QS1, the heads of Shari‟ah departments similarly responded 
to this question in the negative, though to a smaller extent. Furthermore, it was highlighted 
that this negative response of the heads of Shari‟ah departments could suggest that the 
Shari‟ah board had delegated some of its crucial duties to other parties within the bank. 
Alternatively, the negative response of the heads of Shari‟ah departments hinted at a possible 
Shari‟ah governance crisis in which the Shari‟ah board might not able to function 
independently. It appears that indicating that the Shari‟ah board is unable to execute its 
function independently, as has been pointed out when discussing the responses of the heads 
of Shari‟ah departments, is not justified. The fact that the branch managers were also 
opposing the view of the Shari‟ah board as the sole authority in Shari‟ah review signifies that 
the Shari‟ah board could not be the only authority executing the Shari‟ah review. This 
demonstrates the need for internal party(ies) within the bank to assist the Shari‟ah review 
function of the Shari‟ah board, which is highly likely to become the role of the Shari‟ah 
department officers. 
 
Meanwhile, other features on the structure of Shari‟ah review received responses indicating 
agreement by the branch managers. For example, the question on whether adequate and 
apparent guidelines on the pronouncements and resolutions should be issued by the SAC of 
BNM for use in the Islamic banking industry, which was similarly asked to the heads of 
Shari‟ah departments, was responded favourably by most of the branch managers; this was 
particularly evident for those from full-fledged Islamic banks and large banks. On another 
question regarding the SAC, slightly more than 90% of the branch managers responded in 
agreement regarding the capability of the SAC to enhance the standardization of Islamic 
banking practices. These two findings regarding the SAC demonstrate the important role of 
this governing authority in the overall structure of the Shari‟ah review for banks offering 
Islamic banking products and services. They also lend support to arguments advocating the 
establishment of a central or national Shari‟ah board as the supreme Shari‟ah reference 
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institution for IFIs such as Islamic banks. In the meantime, the branch managers were also 
asked two questions regarding the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system, which received 
positive responses and thus, consolidated earlier findings on the SAC. Specifically, these 
questions were whether the branch managers perceived that (1) the dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system implemented in Malaysia is effective in ensuring the stability of the 
Islamic banking industry, and (2) the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system is capable of 
harmonizing Islamic bank practices in Malaysia and across national boundaries. In both 
questions, slightly more than three quarter of the respondents indicated agreement.   
 
On the implementation aspects of the Shari‟ah review, the responses indicated some division 
amongst the branch managers regarding their agreement on several questions. For example, 
almost 10% of the branch managers were in disagreement that the Shari‟ah board should have 
the full authority to stop banks from undertaking Shari‟ah non-compliant transactions, 
although three quarters thought otherwise. Interestingly, this evidence of disagreement, 
although not substantial, seems to suggest that the respective branch managers believe that 
the Shari‟ah board should not assume full authority over the Shari‟ah governance of banks 
offering Islamic banking products and services. Interpreted differently, these branch 
managers were inferring that the Shari‟ah board should not retain the final say on everyday 
Islamic banking operations. It is worth noting that the heads of Shari‟ah departments were 
asked a similar question in QS1, in which evidence of disagreement was also reported. These 
indications of disagreement from both groups of respondents are intriguing and depart from 
the general consensus on the absolute and unchallenged authority of the Shari‟ah board.  
 
Meanwhile, the branch managers seem to have high expectations regarding the role of the 
SAC, specifically regarding adopting rigorous procedures to examine and endorse Islamic 
financial products submitted by banks offering Islamic banking services. This is due to the 
fact that this is the only question where the branch managers did not respond in the negative 
and it was evidently significant for branch managers from the full-fledged Islamic banks. In 
addition, similar to QS1, the branch managers were asked whether working part time does not 
hinder the production by Shari‟ah board members of an effective Shari‟ah review of the 
operations of banks offering Islamic banking services. Apparently, the responses received 
were very similar to those in QS1 where, despite the fact that the branch managers have a 
moderate view of the effect of part-time status of the Shari‟ah board members, a considerable 
number of the branch managers were also evidently in disagreement. Hence, the part-time 
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status of the Shari‟ah board remains in the spotlight due to its implications for the quality of 
the Shari‟ah review by this Shari‟ah governance authority.   
On the other hand, the branch managers seem to indicate their satisfaction on the level of 
Shari‟ah compliance disclosure shown within the Shari‟ah report of the bank the Shari‟ah 
board represented. The evidence showed slightly more than three quarters of the branch 
managers indicated their agreement while only a few did not. The branch managers also 
expressed a similar satisfaction that the Shari‟ah board discloses the accounting issues of the 
bank, as reflected in their responses, which were very similar to those to the preceding 
question. These findings illustrate the quality of the Shari‟ah report in which the Shari‟ah 
board concludes its Shari‟ah review function as perceived by the branch managers.  
 
This study also revealed the parties whom the branch managers perceived as important in the 
Shari‟ah governance of banks offering Islamic banking services. It appears that the SAC of 
BNM was considered as the most important party, which indicates its role as the supreme 
authority in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry. This is followed by the Shari‟ah board 
as the Shari‟ah governance authority in charge at the bank level. Next, in order of importance, 
were the Shari‟ah department officers, the board of directors and the management of the 
bank.  
 
Overall, the findings of QS2 reveal how the issues under investigation, i.e., (1) the role of the 
Shari‟ah board, (2) the accountability and independence of the Shari‟ah board, and (3) the 
nature of the Shari‟ah review in banks offering Islamic banking products and services, were 
expected to be exercised or undertaken by the Shari‟ah board from the branch managers point 
of view. Evidently, some of the results derived clearly indicated the branch managers‟ 
departure from the results obtained in QS1. This means that some aspects of the issues 
investigated were perceived differently and, hence, signify the branch managers‟ deviation 
from how they were actually exercised by the Shari‟ah board, as indicated in QS1. In other 
cases, there are similarities in the perceptions of both groups of respondents which, on the 
other hand, gave credence to the responses derived earlier in QS1. In particular, the branch 
managers seem to recognize clearly the role of the SAC, and the dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system implemented in Malaysia was positively appraised. In an attempt to 
provide further evidence concerning these tentative findings, a series of in-depth interviews 
have been undertaken. An outline of the responses from these interviews is provided in the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: ANALYSIS OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The results from both questionnaires provide a valuable insight into the issues surrounding 
the role of the Shari‟ah board, in terms of Islamic banking practice amongst the banks 
offering Islamic banking products and services, and expectations of it from the perspective of 
the branch managers. In an attempt to gain an understanding of the Shari‟ah governance 
processes of the Shari‟ah board, a series of in-depth interviews were undertaken with the 
Shari‟ah board members38 and relevant parties in the Shari‟ah governance framework (SGF). 
These were, namely, the heads of Shari‟ah Departments, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and senior executives of Islamic banks, the Shari‟ah Advisory Council (SAC) of Bank 
Negara Malaysia (BNM) and the BNM officers. In addition, similar to the questionnaire 
surveys, these in-depth interviews focused on the issues relating to the role, independence 
and effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board. Details of the interview schedules were provided in 
Table 5.5 in Chapter Five.  
 
 
8.2 Perceptions on the Shari’ah Governance and Its Implementation 
It has been discussed throughout this thesis that the unique distinction of the Islamic banking 
industry lies in the requirement for the market players within it to ensure that their business 
operations adhere to the Shari‟ah law. In this regard, it is crucial for banks offering Islamic 
banking products and services to establish Shari‟ah governance mechanisms that uphold the 
Shari‟ah law, as this would establish the credibility of its banking business. From the series of 
in-depth interviews undertaken, it seems that the participants place a great deal of importance 
on the Shari‟ah governance of the Islamic banking industry. As the Shari‟ah is very much 
integral to Islamic banks and because these banks‟ activities have to adhere to the Shari‟ah, 
the interviews revealed the use of an expression that described the intimate association 
between the Shari‟ah and the Islamic banks‟ activities. For example, the CEOs of two Islamic 
banks described their banking operations by labelling them as „faith banking‟, in appreciation 
                                                 
38
 The Shari‟ah Committee (SC) is the term widely used in Malaysia to refer to the Shari‟ah board. This is 
consistent with the designation used in the Malaysian regulatory guidelines such as the guidelines issued by the 
BNM. Hence, during the interview sessions most of the participants designated the Shari‟ah board as Shari‟ah 
Committee. 
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of Shari‟ah governance. It is assumed that, with such statements given by their respective 
banks, these top managers would be determined to ensure adequate and proper Shari‟ah 
governance mechanisms. This could include securing the effectiveness of the role and 
function of the Shari‟ah board. 
 
Meanwhile, a CEO of a large-sized Islamic bank indicated that the role of Islamic banks is 
similar to the conventional bank, except for the fact that Islamic banks are required to operate 
in accordance with the Shari‟ah and to serve as an alternative banking choice to customers. 
Arguing on the distinction requirement for the Islamic banking operation to be Shari‟ah 
compliant and to meet the Shari‟ah banking needs of the customers, the CEO remarked: 
 “Islamic finance is simply intermediating between the „haves‟ and the „have 
nots‟, meaning the distribution of wealth to ensure that the economic activity 
is authored. Whether it is conventional or Islamic, the work is the same. I can 
intermediate by way of debt financing or equity financing but, in Islamic 
finance, I do it in a Shari‟ah compliant manner, for both debt and equity.”  
 
 
Meanwhile, interview participants also indicated the importance of Shari‟ah governance by 
explaining the implication of Shari‟ah non-compliance to the bank. It has been mentioned in 
Chapter Four that the responsibility to ensure that the operation of Islamic banks is Shari‟ah 
compliant lies in the hand of the banks‟ management. In this light and, with the view that 
Shari‟ah non-compliance would result in negative repercussions on the banks‟ wellbeing, the 
CEO of a medium-sized Islamic bank remarked on the risk associated as:  
“Mitigating Shari‟ah non-compliance is very important. It is your credibility, 
your integrity, your „everything‟. You cannot run an Islamic bank knowing 
that there are areas that are Shari‟ah non-compliant. That‟s why I am saying, 
as far as the management is concerned, whatever we do, we ensure Shari‟ah 
compliance” 
 
Nevertheless, interviews held with the Shari‟ah board members revealed that some of them 
expressed concerns about the dedication of the management in adhering to the Shari‟ah. 
Rather, the management was seen by some of the Shari‟ah board members as indulging in 
opportunistic behaviour to fulfil their own self-interests, a concept that has been discussed in 
Chapter Two. Meanwhile, others see the management‟s involvement in Shari‟ah banking as a 
business opportunity for widening the market share of its banking operation. Regarding the 
first concern, the Shari‟ah board of one Islamic bank remarked:   
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“The fatwa issued by the SC concerns the product structure, the legal 
documentation and anything related to its operation. However, sometimes the 
bank does not say everything about the Shari‟ah, either purposely or 
unintentionally. They might consider the matter as insignificant when, 
actually, the fatwa involves our understanding of the subject matter.”  
 
On the other hand, the concerns that the management may lack dedication to the Shari‟ah and 
consider Islamic banking to be purely a business opportunity is expressed by the Shari‟ah 
board of another Islamic bank, who remarked: 
“The management does not really want the Shari‟ah. They just adhere to it 
because there is a demand from the customers for Islamic products. In my 
view they do not actually appreciate the real spirit of the Shari‟ah.”   
 
In light of the above, it is apparent that the important parties within banks offering Islamic 
banking products and services seem to recognise Shari‟ah governance as important in 
ensuring the viability of the Islamic banking industry. Despite this outlook, the above 
findings also revealed that the Shari‟ah board was being pessimistic about the bank 
management‟s inclinations towards Shari‟ah governance; this was due to the possibility of 
self-interested, opportunistic behaviour by the management. Hence, it is expected that the 
findings from the following sections could be explained based on the above behavioural 
approaches of the participants towards Shari‟ah governance.   
 
 
8.3 The Role of Shari’ah Boards  
This section deals with the discussion of the role of the Shari‟ah board within the SGF. The 
in-depth interviews held with the participants revealed emerging issues relating to the role of 
the Shari‟ah board, which are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
 
8.3.1 Qualifications of the Shari’ah Board Members  
It has been discussed in Chapter Four that the governance standards and the guidelines issued 
by the BNM, i.e. „Guidelines on the Governance of the Shariah Committee for the Islamic 
Financial Institutions‟ or GPS1, clearly stipulate that membership of the Shari‟ah board is not 
restricted only to individuals experienced in the field of Islamic commercial law, or fiqh al-
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mua‟malat, but also includes those from the fields of law, accountancy, economics and 
others. Ideally, the Shari‟ah board should comprise of members who hold a Shari'ah 
qualification and are well-versed in banking operations (Gambling et al. 1993; Grais and 
Pellegrini 2006; Laldin 2008b). It became apparent from discussion with the participants that 
such diverse appointment qualifications seems to have influenced the role and function of the 
Shari‟ah board and contributed to the development of the Islamic banking industry. The 
importance of diverse expertise in the Shari‟ah board has been pointed out by the Shari‟ah 
board chairman of an Islamic bank, who is a non-Shari‟ah expert, as follows: 
“Shari‟ah is a dynamic discipline. When it comes to mua‟malat, the Shari‟ah 
principles state that it is something which is open to interpretation and, thus, 
open to dispute. I mean everything is allowed. „Al-aslu fil uqud al-ibahah‟- 
everything is considered permissible, unless there is clear evidence in the 
Qur‟an or in the hadith that prohibits such transactions. Moreover, mostly the 
banks are not just applying murabahah as the standalone contract, rather it is 
combined with many other contracts, together with many added principles, 
which require clear parameters and clear understanding of what the Shari‟ah 
requirements and guidelines are. Fundamentally, this works very well when 
you have a composition of the Shari‟ah board consisting of individuals from 
different backgrounds.”  
 
 
The Shari‟ah board chairman of a conventional bank offering Islamic banking window shared 
a similar sentiment about the importance of diverse expertise amongst the Shari‟ah board 
members by associating this with the ability of the Shari‟ah board to explore new concepts 
beyond classical Islamic financial products, such as mudharabah and murabahah, which 
dominate the current Islamic banking markets. The Shari‟ah board chairman who is a non-
Shari‟ah expert remarked: 
“Sometimes the SC is too purely Shari‟ah, being made up of all those with 
classical views, who cannot go a step beyond classical Islamic financial 
products. They do not even consider the contemporary issues in fiqh al-
mua‟malat. This is possibly the reason why the SC limits itself in such a way 
that they only follow existing products in the market.” 
 
In addition, the discussions with the interview participants make it apparent that the 
appointment of Shari‟ah board members is tailored strategically to the bank‟s business 
mission. As the Shari‟ah board holds the Shari‟ah advisory role, the bank seeks the 
appointment of Shari‟ah board members who are able to advise the bank in all spectra of 
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banking business activities. For example, the CEO of a large-sized Islamic bank, in support 
of the Shari‟ah board membership being comprised of various experts, remarked: 
“When it is in terms of who we appoint, it is subject to what we need. We 
essentially need people who are able to advise us on all aspects of the business 
in relation to Shari‟ah. For example, you cannot have someone who is simply 
au fait with commercial types of activities and not the law. So, you need to 
have different people, with different focuses, in their own fields.”  
 
The interview also made apparent the concern of the participants that, although the Shari‟ah 
board may be comprised of scholars from a diverse background, it is crucial for the Shari‟ah 
decisions to be issued by Shari‟ah experts. However, an important requisite for successful 
implementation of such a mechanism means that the cooperation and consolidation between 
the Shari‟ah experts and the non-Shari‟ah experts amongst the Shari‟ah board members are 
essential. The Shari‟ah board chairman of a conventional bank offering Islamic banking 
window, who comes from a Shari‟ah background, highlighted this point and remarked:  
“I always emphasise that one who wants to become a Shari‟ah advisor has to 
possess the necessary skills and sufficient knowledge in Shari‟ah. If one does 
not have sufficient knowledge in the Shari‟ah how would one be able to give a 
Shari‟ah opinion or decision, even if one possesses a banking qualification?” 
 
Interestingly, the concept of Shari‟ah board membership comprising of diverse expertise does 
not seem to be appealing to some Shari‟ah board members, particularly amongst the Shari‟ah 
experts, as well as the banks‟ Shari‟ah officers. They seem to advocate that Shari‟ah board 
membership should be composed of Shari‟ah experts only, due to concerns about the quality 
of the fatwa or Shari‟ah decisions issued. For instance, the methodology of deriving Islamic 
jurisdiction involves the use of classical Islamic manuscripts, which are written in Arabic. In 
this regard, individuals with a Shari‟ah background are likely to have proficiency in Arabic; 
hence, they would be able to make reference to these manuscripts for their Shari‟ah decisions. 
The Shari‟ah board member of an Islamic bank, whose bank‟s headquarters is in the Middle 
East, remarked: 
“The SC really needs to communicate with the people in the bank‟s 
headquarters and the documents are either in Arabic or English. Secondly, we 
have to understand the Shari‟ah issue and do research, which means we need 
to know Arabic, as we have to refer to classical manuscripts. To me, if asked 
about the SC, they have to be from the field of Shari'ah. Even from degree 
level, the SC candidate should have studied in the field of Shari'ah and they 
must know Arabic.”  
  
 314 
It became apparent from the discussions held with the participants that, notwithstanding the 
stance expressed above for the Shari‟ah board to comprise of Shari‟ah experts only, these 
Shari‟ah experts recognised the importance of experts from other fields, however, as they 
could contribute to the Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah board by offering a different 
approach. One of the recommendations put forward was for the non-Shari‟ah experts to 
contribute by acting as consultants to the Shari‟ah board. Emphasising that the Shari‟ah board 
should comprise of Shari‟ah experts only, while recognising the importance of expertise from 
other fields, the Shari‟ah board member above remarked:  
“To me, some people‟s claims about the Shari‟ah experts not knowing 
everything are undeniable. What I mean is that, in majmak fiqh (fiqh league), 
for example, besides the Shari‟ah experts there are also experts from other 
fields. This means that one commission or committee, comprising of experts 
in certain fields, could be specifically established and, so, could be appointed 
as consultants to the bank.”  
 
The head of Shari‟ah department of an Islamic bank shared a similar sentiment, arguing that 
it would be unbefitting for a non-Shari‟ah expert to authorise Shari‟ah rulings for Islamic 
banking operations. The head of Shari‟ah department remarked: 
“When this happens, it is like asking a fireman to carry out surgery in a 
hospital, which, at the end of the day, he does not know how to do. Similarly, 
if you ask the Shari‟ah people to do the treasury or accounting work, they will 
tend to make mistakes. Therefore, we still need expertise from other fields. 
The Shari‟ah people still need experts in accounting, risk management, 
treasury and law; however, they should work within their own specialisation. 
For example, the legal expert should specialise in clause provision, on how to 
draft legal documentation, while the accountant specialises in the accounting 
treatment.”  
 
From the above arguments, it could be said that the Shari‟ah board member is suggesting that 
experienced outsiders, having a background with no Shari‟ah qualifications, could be 
appointed as consultants to the bank. However, for them to become a Shari‟ah board member 
would be inappropriate, as issuing a fatwa is too great a responsibility. Furthermore, the 
concern expressed about the Shari‟ah boards‟ membership above is related to the ability of 
the Shari‟ah board to undertake its roles and functions and, notably, the quality of Shari‟ah 
decisions it issues. It was discussed in Chapter Four that the Shari‟ah board members are 
perceived to be people of high ethical standards (Karim 1990a; Laldin 2008b). More crucial 
is the fact that the bank is held accountable for implementing Shari‟ah decisions issued by 
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this Shari‟ah governance authority. This explanation sheds light on the authoritative qualified 
party within the Shari‟ah board deemed to be most appropriate in issuing the fatwa, or 
Shari‟ah ruling, for the Islamic banking industry. In other words, the quality of the fatwa or 
Shari‟ah decision issued by Shari‟ah boards is depended on the membership of the board. The 
implication of the type of Shari‟ah board membership on the quality of fatwa it issues has 
been pointed by the Shari‟ah board chairman of an investment bank offering Islamic banking, 
who remarked:  
“Imagine if the SC was comprised of only one Shari‟ah expert and the other 
two were experts from a non-Shari‟ah background, it would definitely not be 
giving a Shari‟ah viewpoint. Therefore, the non-Shari‟ah experts can sit in the 
SC meetings but only as additional members to the minimum requirement of 
three. The three must be strictly from a Shari‟ah background.” 
 
It is apparent from the above argument that the view of the majority of the Shari‟ah board 
members could not be considered as a Shari‟ah view if the majority of its board members was 
comprised of non-Shari‟ah experts. Additionally, the Shari‟ah board chairman of the 
investment bank above seems to advocate the idea that the inclusion of non-Shari‟ah experts 
as Shari‟ah board members should constitute a subset of a larger Shari‟ah board member pool 
comprised of Shari‟ah experts. Moreover, the Shari‟ah board chairman also recommended 
that the number of Shari‟ah board members should be expanded beyond the minimum 
requirement of three members, as laid down by BNM in its GPS1.  
 
8.3.2 The Importance of Relevant Experience  
In addition to the qualifications of the Shari‟ah board members, the interview also makes 
apparent another important requirement for a quality Shari‟ah decision. The interview 
participants emphasised that the quality of the decisions made by the Shari‟ah board was 
associated with the ability of its members to expand their paradigm beyond their theoretical 
framework. In the case where the Shari‟ah board members are comprised of three members, 
with one being a Shari‟ah expert and the remaining two being non-Shari‟ah experts, a 
manager from the Department of Islamic Banking and Takaful of BNM remarked:   
 
 
  
 316 
“Even if one of the members is from the Shari‟ah background his tassawur 
(understanding of the subject matter) might still be right or wrong. On the 
other hand, the tassawur of the other two Shari‟ah board members, although 
they aren‟t from a Shari‟ah background, might be right.”  
 
Another important criterion in the appointment of the Shari‟ah board, which became apparent 
from the discussions with the participants, is the experience of the Shari‟ah board candidates. 
In support of the Shari‟ah board members comprising of Shari‟ah experts, the head of the 
Shari‟ah department of a development financial institution offering Islamic banking 
highlighted a requirement for quality fatwa in the appointment of Shari‟ah board members 
being from amongst Shari‟ah experts with relevant banking experience. The head of the 
Shari‟ah department remarked: 
“Being simply a university academic would not make much of a contribution 
whereas knowing both the banking practice and the fiqh would enable much 
more accurate conclusions. Also, knowing the current issues in mua‟malat by, 
for example, being involved in consultancy work and participating in seminars 
on Shari‟ah banking is important.”  
 
A senior executive of a large-sized Islamic bank similarly put forward the need for adequate 
banking experience as a requisite for a Shari‟ah board member in contributing to the Shari‟ah 
governance of the bank, remarking: 
“Theory is not something which is dynamic. Only things that are practiced are 
dynamic. I see Shari‟ah board members without much banking experience 
finding it difficult to understand and, sometimes, hardly even participating. I 
see it as there being no contribution from them.”  
 
Hence, the Shari‟ah board members are expected to understand business dynamism by being 
able to handle banking business issues and to be proactive in assisting the business 
development process. In this regard, the CEO of a medium-sized Islamic bank clarified how 
an inspiring Shari‟ah board member, combined with relevant experience, could alleviate 
some of the challenges faced by the Islamic banking industry. The CEO remarked:  
“If you look at the Islamic banks in general, the level of product innovation is 
lacking. The level of compliance to the requirements of the Shari‟ah is also 
lacking. In order for you to raise that bar higher, not only must the 
management of the Islamic bank want to do it, but you must also have the 
assistance of your Shari‟ah Committee. Crucially, the Shari‟ah Committee 
members should also understand the industry issues and then they can make 
their decisions in line with, or by taking into consideration, these issues.”  
  
 317 
The above discussions point to how the management of banks offering Islamic banking 
products and services perceived relevant experience as crucial for scholars to hold 
governorship on the Shari‟ah board. Indeed, the importance of relevant experience amongst 
the Shari‟ah board members, highlighted by the interview participants above, might explain 
the reason why banks participating in the MIFC were indicated as having developed a pattern 
of having a Shari‟ah board comprised of diverse experts. This is as indicated in Section 6.5.1 
of Chapter Six on the structure of Shari‟ah review for Shari‟ah board in Questionnaire Survey 
1 (QS1). 
 
8.3.3 Image Building and Standardisation of Islamic Banking Practice  
It became apparent from the discussions with the participants that the Shari‟ah board is 
regarded as the insurer of the banks‟ ethical operation and its establishment is seen as 
carrying the image of the bank's commitment. On this, the CEO of a large-sized Islamic bank 
remarked: 
“I think image plays a key part. We have marketed the fact that we are a pure 
Shari‟ah committee bank and we hold Shari‟ah‟s high principles in our day to 
day activities.”  
 
 
In addition, the interviews disclosed that the image-building element mentioned above is 
allied with the appointment of prominent international figures for the banks‟ commercial 
reasons. For example, the interview participants discussed that the appointment of several 
international figures as Shari‟ah board members was intended as a marketing tool to capture 
the market share in those different jurisdictions. In this regard, the domain of profit 
maximisation amongst the management seems to remain intact, even in matters such as the 
appointment of Shari‟ah board members. The CEO of another large-sized Islamic bank 
provides evidence in this light, remarking: 
“I‟m now looking for someone who is based in Indonesia, because I have a 
keen interest in expanding my business in Indonesia. There are many qualified 
people in Indonesia that I can tap into as SC members. So, I will not 
necessarily bring that person in due to their Shari‟ah qualification, but because 
there are other commercial reasons behind the selection of SC members.” 
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The interview also revealed that the appointment of a prominent international figure as a 
Shari‟ah board member could result in the bank gaining the advantage of minimising the gap 
in terms of product offering, as well as allowing domestic products and services to penetrate 
different national jurisdictions. The Shari‟ah board member of a similar Islamic bank to the 
one run by the CEO above remarked: 
“The appointment of an international figure as an SC member is very good 
because, by this appointment, we can understand the problems faced by the 
international Islamic banking industry. These people know what the 
international perspective is and they might tell us not to offer some of the 
existing Malaysian products. At the end, what we want is to minimise the gap 
between the boundaries.”  
 
On a similar note, a senior executive of a large-sized Islamic bank also pointed out that the 
bank had taken the initiative to appoint a prominent international figure as the Shari‟ah board 
member in order to consolidate the bank's mission of becoming the leading Islamic bank in 
the world. This is clearly indicated below: 
“Our vision stated that we want to become the world leader in Islamic 
banking. One of the missions in accomplishing this vision is to develop and 
innovate products based on a globally accepted concept. As such, the bank 
must develop the appropriate infrastructure to assist in the accomplishment of 
this. An element of this is the SC, which is why the SC now has additional 
„blood‟ whose views and experiences are from the Middle East.” 
 
 
Hence, it became apparent from discussions with the participants that the Shari‟ah board 
members, though responsible for ensuring the ethical aspect of the banking operation by the 
Shari‟ah compliance assurance they provided, also generated goodwill for the financial 
institutions on the basis that their appointment gives additional benefits to the business. 
However, a precaution, related to the business motive behind the appointment of Shari‟ah 
board members mentioned above, is for them to remain vigilant against the possible 
opportunistic behaviour of the management when undertaking their Shari‟ah governance 
function.   
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8.3.4 Shari’ah Advisory Role of Shari’ah Boards  
Despite the existence of a prescribed general scope of the Shari‟ah board‟s role, stipulated in 
the GPS1 and AAOIFI standard, the interviews held with the participants revealed that the 
level of Shari‟ah board members‟ involvement in undertaking these roles appeared to vary 
from one bank to another. Among the factors contributing to the differences in Shari‟ah board 
members‟ levels of involvement are: the ability of the Shari‟ah board member to undertake 
the task, as reflected by the composition of the Shari‟ah board, the capacity of the Shari‟ah 
department in assisting the Shari‟ah board and the rigour of the Shari‟ah governance 
mechanism developed by the bank. The types of banks, either a fully-fledged Islamic bank or 
a conventional bank offering Islamic banking window, and the specification of the scope of 
the Shari‟ah boards‟ roles and functions, as prescribed in the banks‟ Shari‟ah manual also 
play a part. The following sub-sections discuss further results from the in-depth interviews. 
 
8.3.4.1 Dynamism of the Shari’ah Boards’ Shari’ah Decisions 
Consistent with the findings in QS1, the in-depth interviews revealed that the Shari‟ah board 
was mainly advising on matters relating to approving the Islamic banking products to be 
offered to the customers. As has been discussed in Chapter Four, the dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system implemented in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry implies that 
banks wanting to offer Islamic banking products have to firstly seek approval from their 
respective Shari‟ah boards. If the boards give their approval this would have to be followed 
with agreement from the SAC of BNM. In approving the Islamic banking products, the 
Shari‟ah board would have to take into consideration many issues before any Shari‟ah 
decision could be made. It would have to be made in accordance with the Shari‟ah principles 
laid down in the Qur‟an and hadith, as well as the ijtihad (legal opinion) of the Muslim 
jurists, who would issue their argument based on the principles deduced from the Shari‟ah. 
Interestingly, the in-depth interviews also revealed that the Shari‟ah board placed importance 
on the bank‟s dynamism for Shari‟ah decision considerations. For instance, in the case where 
there is no other Islamic banking product alternative, the Shari‟ah board chairman of an 
Islamic bank issued a decision to endorse a particular product, on evaluation of the bank‟s 
financial health, in spite of it being controversial. The Shari‟ah board chairman remarked: 
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“When we talk about liquidity, it is a something that can cost the bank 
severely in terms of its solvency level. In one situation, the bank needed to 
enter into a transaction or else it would have a liquidity risk problem. So, in 
that case, the Shari‟ah board allowed the bank to use a particular controversial 
product.”  
 
 
As clearly indicated in the above, an important facet in Shari‟ah decision making is for the 
Shari‟ah board to draw a line encircling the principles of the Shari‟ah and the justification of 
need should be based on the fulfilment of maqasid al-Shari‟ah (objectives of the Shari‟ah), 
i.e., in the public interest. It has been discussed in Chapter Three that, in determining the 
public interest, judgement has to be made based on whether the subject matter is considered 
as daruriyyat (the essentials), hajiyyat (the complimentary requirements) or tahsiniyyat (the 
desirables). The in-depth interviews revealed that the Shari‟ah board is usually confronted 
with the need to base its judgement on the three aforementioned concepts when issuing 
Shari‟ah decisions. Included in the domain of protecting the public interest, instances are 
revealed where the Shari‟ah board carefully examined the underlying contract on the Islamic 
banking products offered to the customers and its related legal documentation to ensure that 
any possibility of customer exploitation would be avoided and their rights protected. 
However, the ability of the Shari‟ah board members to assess and to make a distinction on 
what constitutes public interest is argued to be delicate and can only be appreciated by one 
who is knowledgeable in the Shari‟ah. In this regard, the Shari‟ah board member of an 
Islamic bank, who is also a Shari‟ah expert, remarked:  
 
“Many people talk about maqasid (objective of the Shari‟ah) but they do not 
understand what it means. The economist talks about it but, when we analysed 
what he said, he cannot differentiate between daruriyyat (the essentials) and 
maslahah (public interest). Sometimes they claim that they are securing the 
interests of the Islamic banking industry, but shareholders‟ or investors‟ 
interests are not the same as the public interest.”    
 
 
As such, the above remark gives rise to concerns about the fatwa quality issued by the 
Shari‟ah board and the issues revolving around the fitness of the Shari‟ah board members to 
issue the fatwa, as discussed in section 8.3.1 above. Additionally, the in-depth interviews also 
revealed that the majority of the Shari‟ah board members and the SAC of BNM members, 
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generally, do not limit themselves to opinions deduced from the Shafi‟i39 Islamic legal school 
when issuing Shari‟ah decisions, but rather are open to interpretations from all Islamic legal 
schools. The participants emphasise the fact that matters of fiqh al-mua‟malat, in modern 
applications such as in Islamic banks, are concerned with meeting the maslahah (public 
interest) and that confining themselves to one particular Islamic legal school would not 
resolve the issue at stake and face the risk of limiting the potential of the Islamic banking 
industry.  
 
 
8.3.4.2 Accounting and Finance Influence in the Product Approval Decisions of the 
Shari’ah Board 
Another important finding revealed from the in-depth interviews is the diverse level of the 
Shari‟ah boards‟ involvement in developing Islamic banking products and services. It is 
apparent from the discussions with the Shari‟ah board members that aspects of product 
concept, its design, the legal documentation and marketing level are the stages of product 
development where the Shari‟ah board members are commonly involved. At the concept 
level, the Shari‟ah board members are presented with the challenge of developing classical 
Shari‟ah financial products with modern Islamic banking features that will ultimately meet 
the demands of current customers. It was revealed that, most of the time, the Shari‟ah board 
members were presented with a challenge to devise a product that does not feature 
straightforwardly classical Shari‟ah elements or, as they are more commonly known, „plain 
vanilla‟ products, such as mudharabah and murabahah. Rather, the Shari‟ah board members 
would have to apply several Shari‟ah principles to devise a particular Islamic financial 
contract or, as it is more commonly known, the „hybrid‟ product that will result in the 
economic effects demanded by the customers. Hence, it is apparent that the design of modern 
Islamic banking products entails not only the necessary Shari‟ah knowledge but also 
includes, for example, knowledge in the accounting and finance fields.  
 
The accounting concerns in designing Islamic banking products also expands beyond 
determining the financial impact that would produce the required economic effect to also 
include issues pertaining to the sequence of the transactions, the nature of the assets involved 
                                                 
39
 It is worth noting that the Muslim majority in Malaysia practice the Shafi‟i Islamic legal school of Islamic 
thought. 
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and the transfer of risks and ownership between the seller and the buyer. In this regard, the 
Shari‟ah board chairman of an Islamic bank remarked:  
“We don‟t only look at the structure. The management can present to the SC 
beautifully and justify all the principles. However, the most important thing is 
what is next. What is the underlying contract? Is there a real transfer of 
ownership? Are there real assets involved? Is it a valued asset? How does the 
issue of delivery take place? All these are Shari‟ah issues that need to be 
addressed for each particular contract.” 
 
In another instance, the Shari‟ah board chairman above expressed how accounting can be an 
important tool in justifying the management‟s accounting treatment choice for a particular 
Islamic financial contract. Quoting an example of an Islamic financial contract on ijarah 
mawsufah fi al-zimmah, or „forward lease‟, the Shari‟ah board chairman explains that the 
Shari‟ah allows for the lessor (the bank) to charge rental in advance as income even though 
lessee‟s usufruct will only be transferred later. Although the recognition of this rental as 
income, which will then be portrayed as profit in the bank‟s financial statement, seems to be 
biased towards the management‟s compensation plan, the accounting system could be 
adjusted to change this to a liability. Therefore, the income collected would be returned in 
total to the customer if the usufruct could not ultimately be transferred. Explaining that the 
Shari‟ah allows rental in advance on this contract to be recognised as income, the Shari‟ah 
board chairman remarked:  
“Whether you want to recognise the income now or later, or you want to take 
it as liability, it is something that is, for me, Shari‟ah compatible, as long as 
the principles are clear. I am sure this can be done through accounting and if 
the accounting can be done, from the Shari‟ah point of view, there is no 
problem. This is one case where, if there is a contradiction between the 
Shari‟ah and accounting, the Shari‟ah will prevail.” 
 
The above argument highlighted some of the Shari‟ah boards‟ accounting concerns when 
designing Islamic banking products. Issues such as those mentioned above on the transfer of 
ownership and the existence of real assets („form over substance‟) are deemed fundamental 
when ascertaining the legitimacy of an Islamic financial contract. Indeed, it has been 
described in the above that accounting plays an important role in justifying the management‟s 
choice of accounting treatment of a particular Islamic financial contract. Importantly, the 
above explanation of ijarah mawsufah fi al-zimmah, provides one example of how an Islamic 
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financial contract could give rise to accounting implications encompassing aspects of 
recognition, measurement and disclosure of accounting information in the financial 
statement. In the case of the above, it was indicated that any fault in the implementation of 
the Islamic banking product could result in the transaction being Shari‟ah non-compliant, 
meaning that the profit derived from that transaction would be considered as impermissible.  
 
8.3.4.3 Catering for the Financial Needs of Muslims and Protecting the Customers 
The in-depth interviews also revealed that the Shari‟ah board would have to accommodate 
the dynamism of business operation whilst ensuring that the Shari‟ah decisions it issues 
would protect the public interest. For instance, in the case where the customers are unable to 
repay financing instalments due to personal reasons, such as job loss, the Shari‟ah board 
could authorize a moratorium, which in a conventional bank would result in the customer 
being penalised with interest charges. In another instance, the Shari‟ah board member of an 
Islamic bank showed tolerance by authorising customer financing involving a non-
permissible source of funds as encouragement for participation in Islamic banking operation, 
with the aim of purifying the customer‟s income. The Shari‟ah board member remarked:    
“One Malay40 customer wanted to invest with his non-halal gaming house 
income. For me, I allowed it because the small proportion of the non-halal 
income, when pooled with the bigger proportion, became between 10% and 
20% of the fund, so the whole fund become halal again. The aim of this was to 
give him his returns with halal income and to encourage him to invest in an 
Islamic bank, rather than to go to a non-Islamic or conventional bank.” 
 
Furthermore, the discussions with the interview participants also made apparent the concerns 
of the Shari‟ah board in protecting the customers, as well as the banks‟ staff, from receiving 
or providing misleading information. A mechanism to ensure such protection was disclosed 
during the interviews, where the Shari‟ah board has established the product‟s operational 
framework that serves as the Shari‟ah compliance manual for the bank and will be used at a 
later stage for Shari‟ah review and audit. This revelation highlights the importance of the 
operational aspects of the Islamic financial products and, thus, the significance of the 
implementation stage, after the product has been approved. This is because the operational 
issues will be continuous, whereas the Shari‟ah board will only deal with the product 
                                                 
40
 Malay is the Muslim ethnic majority in Malaysia. 
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approval once. Additionally, this finding also sheds light on the reason why the direct 
involvement of Shari‟ah boards during the implementation stage was indicated to be low in 
QS1 (as reported in Section 6.3.4 of Chapter Six), as the boards have already developed a 
mechanism, such as the aforementioned product‟s operational framework, to be carried out 
by the management of the bank. Meanwhile, the Shari‟ah boards‟ involvement in reviewing 
the operational aspects of the product and the Shari‟ah governance mechanisms established 
by the bank to ensure that the operation of the product is Shari‟ah compliant is explained in 
the section on the Shari‟ah boards‟ role in the Shari‟ah review below. 
 
 
8.3.4.4 Other Shari’ah Advisory Roles of Shari’ah Boards  
The interviews also disclosed that the Shari‟ah boards‟ Shari‟ah advisory role advances 
beyond banking product matters. For example, it has been revealed that the Shari‟ah board 
also provides lectures and training to the banks‟ staff, as well as to the high-level 
management. Besides this, the Shari‟ah board members also expressed that their board 
received great respect from the board of directors and that they were also consulted on 
matters such as the selection of the bank‟s CEO and new Shari‟ah board members.  
 
8.3.5 Shari’ah Review Role of Shari’ah Boards 
One of the critical aspects of the Shari‟ah governance mechanism of the Islamic banking 
operation is the requirement for the Shari‟ah board to ensure the implementation of the 
Shari‟ah decisions it makes, i.e., the Shari‟ah review. The following subsections provide 
further understandings on the implementation of Shari‟ah review amongst the participants.  
 
8.3.5.1 The Shari’ah Review Approach 
As mentioned before, one of the regulatory requirements stipulated in the GPS1 for the 
Shari‟ah governance of banks offering Islamic banking services is for these banks to appoint 
Shari‟ah officers to act as the secretariat to the Shari‟ah board. In this regard, the discussions 
held with the interview participants revealed that the Shari‟ah board mainly appeared to 
depend on the assistance of the Shari‟ah department when assuming its role in Shari‟ah 
review. For example, the Shari‟ah board member of an Islamic bank remarked:   
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“We have not been directly involved with Shari‟ah review. We are given 
certain indications that the Shari‟ah officers have actually prepared the 
financial report. From that, we understand the various Shari‟ah products and 
others that are available. Because the Shari‟ah review is basically just 
endorsing what they have done, they will come to us and request endorsement 
that the whole exercise is Shari‟ah compliant.”  
 
In fact, the interviews also disclosed instances where the Shari‟ah board members considered 
that the Shari‟ah review was not within their jurisdiction. Instead, the Shari‟ah board 
members had entrusted the responsibility for the Shari‟ah compliance review to the Shari‟ah 
department officers of the bank. For example, the Shari‟ah board member of a development 
financial institution offering Islamic banking remarked:  
“We, the SC members, are not involved in the Shari‟ah review. We merely 
give our approval and the Shari‟ah officers proceed with its implementation. 
They do not report to us and we do not ask any questions. We ask the Shari‟ah 
officers to carry out the implementation of the Shari‟ah decisions and we trust 
them.”  
 
Furthermore, the interviews also highlighted instances where the bank‟s Shari‟ah compliance 
manual specified that the Shari‟ah department officers, instead of the Shari‟ah board, were 
the party responsible for undertaking the Shari‟ah review task. In such circumstance, the 
Shari‟ah board is merely responsible for approving the Shari‟ah review burden of the 
Shari‟ah department officers, as a means to satisfy the GPS1 requirement of the Shari‟ah 
board‟s Shari‟ah review role. Indicating that the Shari‟ah review is not the sole authority of 
the Shari‟ah board, the head of the Shari‟ah department of an Islamic bank remarked:  
 “In our bank, the SC delegates the Shari‟ah review function to the Shari‟ah 
department. The SC just double-checks the review and provides the sign-off. 
Therefore, most of the SC work is performed by the Shari‟ah department.”  
 
The discussions held with the participants also make it apparent that the Shari‟ah review 
exercise of the Shari‟ah board is deemed to be more significant for non fully-fledged Islamic 
banks. This is due to the fact that the Islamic banking operations of these banks are either (1) 
an Islamic banking subsidiary to a conventional parent bank, or (2) operating on a dual 
platform alongside the conventional banking (Islamic window). As such, there is a possibility 
that handling of the funds of these banks will be comingled with those from the conventional 
banking operations. Also likely is that the documentation process of the Islamic banking 
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operation will tend to replicate those of the conventional banking practice. Explaining this 
fact, the Shari‟ah board chairman of an Islamic bank, whose parent company is a 
conventional bank, remarked:   
“We give our approval on all the instruments at the early stage but, operation-
wise, we do not know whether the management implement them or not. Our 
parent bank, for example, is a conventional bank and that is quite a problem. 
Once, I checked one of the forms and it still had written the term „interest‟ on 
it because they simply change it from „loan‟ to „finance‟ and „interest‟ to 
„profit‟.”  
 
Evidence on the lack of Shari‟ah board‟s involvement in the Shari‟ah review exercise 
provided in the above example is argued as being because the GPS1 is silent on the 
procedures of how Shari‟ah review is to be carried out. This has resulted in banks having the 
discretion to define their own Shari‟ah governance mechanism, which is usually tailored to 
the size and nature of their banking operation. The interview disclosed an instance where an 
Islamic bank, which is a subsidiary to a conventional parent bank, established a Shari‟ah 
compliance unit that monitors the operation of the Islamic bank and its links with other banks 
within the group as a whole. The CEO of this large-sized Islamic bank remarked:  
“We internalise Shari‟ah compliance responsibility to each individual banker 
within the group. Our compliance framework clearly requires each division 
essentially to confirm that they are Shari‟ah compliant. This has to be verified 
on a sampling basis by the Group Compliance department and, finally, 
reported to the SC on periodic basis. Therefore, the SC role is very much in 
relation to broad policies and the direction of the business. We leave the day-
to-day issues to the management.”  
 
However, the discussions with the participants also made it apparent that there are banks 
whose internal Shari‟ah governance mechanism is robust. For instance, the internal Shari‟ah 
governance mechanism of a pioneer fully-fledged Islamic bank is structured as two 
platforms, in which one acts as the filtering mechanism before proceeding to the other. The 
manner in which this internal Shari‟ah governance mechanism operates is that the higher 
level platform is exclusively comprised of Shari‟ah board members, while the lower level 
platform is comprised of the internal Shari‟ah officers combined with representatives 
amongst the Shari‟ah board members. Describing this internal Shari‟ah governance structure, 
the Shari‟ah board member of this Islamic bank remarked: 
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“Our Shari‟ah Committee Review is established to review and detail the 
Shari‟ah aspects from the beginning. This includes examining the 
documentation of any financial contracts prepared, word by word. If the 
committee is satisfied then this will be given the go-ahead and will proceed to 
the Shari‟ah Supervisory Council. There the decision will be finalised and 
approval will be granted.”  
 
The above discussions provide evidence of the state of the Shari‟ah review practice in the 
interview participants‟ respective banks. In addition, the interviews disclosed that the internal 
Shari‟ah governance mechanism of the bank, such as provided by its Shari‟ah department 
officers, plays a significant role in assisting the Shari‟ah boards‟ Shari‟ah review function. In 
fact, there were circumstances where the Shari‟ah board was highlighted as merely depending 
on the Shari‟ah department to ensure implementation of Shari‟ah decisions issued by the 
board and, hence, the bank‟s overall Shari‟ah compliance. This revelation could shed light on 
why a minority of the respondents in both questionnaire surveys (heads of Shari‟ah 
departments in QS1 and branch managers in QS2 (Questionnaire Survey 2), as reported in 
Section 6.5.1 of Chapter Six and Section 7.5.1 of Chapter Seven respectively) responded with 
disagreement when asked whether they perceived the Shari‟ah board as being the sole 
authority on the Shari‟ah review system within individual banks offering Islamic banking 
services. The next subsection examines further the Shari‟ah review of banks offering Islamic 
banking products and services on issues pertaining to previous Shari‟ah decisions and zakat.  
 
8.3.5.2 Review of Previous Shari’ah Decisions and Zakat 
In addition to sound internal Shari‟ah governance structures, the robustness of the Shari‟ah 
governance mechanism is also apparent from the extensiveness of the Shari‟ah review scope 
it practices. Indicating that the bank‟s Shari‟ah review also covers decisions made over a 
decade ago, the Shari‟ah board member of the Islamic bank with two Shari‟ah governance 
structures, mentioned above, remarked: 
 
 “We instructed the Shari‟ah department officers to perform Shari‟ah 
compliance reviews, including those of past decisions, because we were afraid 
that the decisions might have gone outside of the Shari‟ah. When we first 
established the bank we might have made decisions in a situation that were 
seemingly Shari‟ah compliant at that point in time, so, we wanted to check if 
there was anything that we had mistakenly decided.” 
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If past Shari‟ah decisions were indeed decided mistakenly by the Shari‟ah board members, 
this could mean that the accounting information presented in the bank‟s historical financial 
statements would have to be adjusted. Hence, the emerging issue arising from the above is 
the question of whether the Shari‟ah decisions made by the Shari‟ah board can be challenged. 
Interestingly, this issue also opens a new dimension of Shari‟ah audit, i.e., whether the 
Shari‟ah board has accurately concluded Shari‟ah decisions. Explaining this, the head of the 
Shari‟ah department of an Islamic bank remarked:  
“Sometimes the SC gives a ruling on financial aspects of the bank without full 
understanding of the matter. Sometimes, they feel that the business is too 
difficult to handle and this will worsen if the SC members are old and do not 
understand business operations. They give their approval merely based on the 
explanations provided by the business.”  
 
The interviews also disclosed circumstances where a change in Shari‟ah ruling by the 
Shari‟ah authority, on certain Islamic financial contracts, could raise possible accounting 
implications. As the Islamic financial contract involves decisions made based on the ijtihad 
of the scholars and because Islamic banking and finance is a relatively new and emerging 
industry, it is possible that the permissibility of Islamic financial contracts will experience a 
change over time. In this light, the head of the Shari‟ah department above remarked:   
“When the SAC approved bay‟ al-‟inah back in the 1980s, the justification 
given was because, at that juncture, the bay‟ al-‟inah contract could be 
considered as darurrah (essential). However, at present, there are lots of other 
alternatives but the bank still keeps going with bay‟ al-‟inah. Therefore, the 
auditor would have to ask, „is this valid? Should this be automatically „null 
and void‟? Should we declare that this contract be terminated?”  
 
Besides the complicated accounting implications and avenues for Shari‟ah audit above, the 
interview also disclosed the Shari‟ah boards‟ role on matters pertaining to zakat. It became 
apparent that the management‟s acceptance of the Shari‟ah boards‟ concern about zakat 
varies. For example, the interview disclosed instances where the Shari‟ah board of an Islamic 
bank was consulted to give an opinion as to whether the bank should offer zakat and to whom 
it should be given. Meanwhile, the Shari‟ah board of another Islamic bank gets involved to 
the extent of confirming the calculation of zakat by the bank. However, the management 
refused to accept the Shari‟ah board‟s recommendation for the zakat to be calculated based 
on the method proposed by AAOIFI. The Shari‟ah board remarked: 
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“We found that the management was not at ease when we asked them to 
calculate zakat using AAOIFI‟s calculation method because this would result 
in much higher zakat being paid than with the calculation method by the 
Selangor zakat authority (a Malaysian State Islamic authority). So, we 
resolved this by using the calculation method issued by the Selangor zakat 
authority and not AAOIFI.” 
 
On the other hand, the interview also revealed an instance where the management refused to 
accept the Shari‟ah board‟s advice on zakat payment, despite the GPS1 clearly having 
mandated the management to comply with the Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah 
board. The Shari‟ah board chairman of an Islamic bank remarked: 
“I have been emphasising corporation zakat for three or four years, since I‟ve 
been with this bank, but this has never been accepted. It does not matter 
whether the zakat is on behalf of the shareholders or the bank‟s customers; it is 
an Islamic bank and is, therefore, liable to pay corporation zakat.” 
 
 
The next subsection looks at an inter-related issue, i.e., the decisiveness of the Shari‟ah 
board‟s Shari‟ah review decision 
 
8.3.5.3 The Decisiveness of Shari’ah Board’s Shari’ah Review Decision 
The discussion held with the interview participants also revealed that it would be premature 
to conclude the Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board without further investigation. 
For example, as a result of reviewing the operation of banks offering Islamic banking 
products, the Shari‟ah board might come out with the verdict that the bank is being Shari‟ah 
non-compliant due to breach of Shari‟ah principles in the activities of the bank. However, this 
decision is inconclusive until the Shari‟ah board gains clarification, from the respective 
parties, on the reasons behind the decision of Shari‟ah non-compliance. The head of the 
Shari‟ah department of an Islamic bank remarked:  
“The SC only approves the Shari‟ah reviews undertaken by the Shari‟ah 
department. When we find Shari‟ah non-compliance issues we will list down 
all the issues, prepare the report and arrange an exit meeting with the 
respective departments. We will ask the department why it has resulted in 
Shari‟ah non-compliance and, after gathering feedback, we might drop several 
issues which we had initially misunderstood.”  
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Similarly, the interviews also disclosed the fact that the management could not carry out all 
of the Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board immediately. Hence, evidence of 
Islamic banking practices contrary to the decisions initially issued by the Shari‟ah board 
would not necessarily mean management‟s opposition to the Shari‟ah board but could be 
because of possible constraints that caused its implementation to be delayed. The head of the 
Shari‟ah department of another Islamic bank remarked:  
“If the SC issues a decision to stop a particular financial contract this cannot 
be in effect immediately. It does not mean that the management does not abide 
by the SC decisions, but because there might be some constraint. For example, 
the system might not be ready. So, it is necessary to give period of grace.”  
 
It is apparent from the above discussions that a conclusive Shari‟ah compliance decision 
would require the Shari‟ah board to gain sufficient information and carry out sufficient 
deliberation on how Shari‟ah issues are being implemented with all concerned parties in the 
bank. In addition, the fact that the banks‟ Shari‟ah officers play a significant role in the 
Shari‟ah review exercise and, hence, signify the inter-dependence of the Shari‟ah board with 
the function of the former, would suggest the prerequisite mentioned as being more crucial.    
 
 
8.3.5.4 Disposal of Profits from Shari’ah Non-Compliant Activities 
The Shari‟ah review role of Shari‟ah boards also has important implications for the Shari‟ah 
governance of banks offering Islamic banking products and services. As has been discussed 
in Chapter Four, the Shari‟ah board will manifest the conclusion of its Shari‟ah review task in 
the Shari‟ah report, which is usually included in the banks‟ annual report, prepared every 
financial year end. Hence, the bank would want to ensure that its operations are in accordance 
to the Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board, as a report of Shari‟ah non-compliance 
issued by this governance authority would have a negative implication for the bank. 
However, if the Shari‟ah review task has identified that any of the bank‟s revenue is derived 
from activities regarded as Shari‟ah non-compliant, this non-compliance will have to be 
reported in the Shari‟ah report and the Shari‟ah board is required to instruct the disposal of 
the profit for charity causes and to disclose this fact in the bank‟s Shari‟ah report (AAOIFI 
1998). Explaining the effect if certain conditions of the Islamic financial contract are not 
followed, the Shari‟ah board member of an Islamic bank remarked:  
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 “If the Islamic financial contract conditions are not followed, we need to carry 
out a review. This means that, in terms of profit, we cannot take that profit and 
the money gained through that kind of process cannot be considered as 
income. In the accounting statement, it is just revenue and not profit and we 
need to channel it to charitable bodies.”  
 
This section has provided the explanation of the Shari‟ah advisory and Shari‟ah review 
process undertaken by the Shari‟ah board and other relevant parties within the bank. It also 
provides an indication of the effectiveness level of the Shari‟ah review task entrusted to the 
Shari‟ah board. The next section offers the interview findings that explore the effectiveness 
of the Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah board in further detail. 
 
 
8.4 The Effectiveness of the Shari’ah Boards’ Shari’ah Governance Function  
This section discusses the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah board.   
While the previous sections have provided an explanation concerning issues that indicate the 
effectiveness of Shari‟ah board, this section attempts to identify further factors derived from 
the interviews held with the participants that might support or impair the Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board.  
 
8.4.1 Factors that Support the Shari’ah Governance Role of Shari’ah Boards 
This subsection looks at factors that support the Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah 
board.  
 
8.4.1.1 Accountability Driven Paradigm 
The results of QS1 and QS2, reported in Chapters Six and Seven respectively, revealed that 
both the heads of the Shari‟ah departments and branch managers perceived the integrity 
factor, such as the ethical value of the Shari‟ah board members, as important in influencing 
the accountability of the Shari‟ah board. In relation to this, and as the salient feature of the 
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) is the requirement to adhere to the principles of the 
Shari‟ah, the accountability dimension that better reflects the parties in the SGF is perceived 
to be „ethical accountability‟. The interview sessions held with the participants clearly 
indicated the perceived ethical accountability they hold in preserving the Shari‟ah aspects of 
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the Islamic banking industry. For example, the Shari‟ah board member of an Islamic bank 
remarked: 
“As SC member, our accountability is first and foremost to Allah. People like 
us have one leg in Hell and the other leg in Heaven. If we make an incorrect 
decision or a decision for our own interest, this will bring about certain severe 
consequences. If this is your primary concern, you are not afraid that your 
tenure will not be renewed.”  
 
In addition, the regulatory settings within which the Islamic banking industry resides also 
made apparent the accountability of the Shari‟ah board from the regulatory perspective. It has 
been discussed in Chapter Four that the new amendment to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 
2009 has made it clear that the resolutions and pronouncements of the SAC should be binding 
on all interested parties, including the Shari‟ah board. This, ultimately, makes clear the 
Shari‟ah reference role of the SAC in matters pertaining to the Shari‟ah governance of the 
IFIs, including that of the Islamic banking industry. In this regard, the Shari‟ah board 
member of another Islamic bank remarked:  
 “Being a Muslim professional, we are answerable to God. Of course, we also 
exist in a regulatory framework and we are bound by the regulations saying 
that we are accountable to the SAC of Bank Negara. This has been stated 
clearly in the recent amendment to the Central Bank Act.”  
 
Moreover, the interviews held with the participants also indicated that the Islamic banking 
industry has a higher level of regulatory requirement on the part of the management, which 
stems from the aforementioned ethical accountability concept. This is because the Islamic 
banking industry does not just comply with policies that apply to conventional banks but also, 
arguably, a higher standard of requirements that are imposed by the Shari‟ah system‟s 
regulatory requirements, which allow for additional protection for the customers who opt for 
this form of alternative banking. Comparing the governance between conventional banking 
and Islamic banking, a senior executive of an Islamic bank remarked:  
“You don‟t necessarily see the Shari‟ah requirement as a burden. It is just 
additional „value-add‟ and additional quality control in the overall banking 
process. It will create a greater level of assurance on the part of customers, 
stakeholders and shareholders that things are being carried out in accordance 
with what is required. Of course, it means that we have to ensure that we are 
always dotting the „i‟s‟ and crossing the „t‟s‟.”   
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From the above discussions, it is apparent that the existence of a clear accountability 
paradigm amongst all relevant parties within the SGF is crucial for the effective Shari‟ah 
governance function of the Shari‟ah board. Arguably, this accountability paradigm will be the 
foundation on which additional values for the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board role should 
be built. It will also serve as an important filtering mechanism without which the industry 
players will devote themselves to the pursuit of profit at the expense of Islamic banks‟ ethical 
establishment objectives, and hence will act in a manner that is contrary to the stakeholder-
centric governing feature of the industry. More importantly, this accountability factor will be 
the focal point for all relevant parties to provide ongoing support to the role of the Shari‟ah 
board.  
 
8.4.1.2 Support from Relevant Parties with Islamic Banking Experience 
The SGF encompasses the significant role of many of the relevant parties responsible in 
ensuring the Shari‟ah compliance of the Islamic banking operation. Besides the Shari‟ah 
board, other parties that are deemed crucial in the Shari‟ah governance of Islamic banks are 
the Shari‟ah department officers, the management, the board of directors, the audit 
committee, the risk management committee, the internal and external auditor. The interviews 
held with the participants revealed that these parties would contribute to the role of the 
Shari‟ah board and, hence, strengthen the Shari‟ah governance of the bank if they are 
equipped with relevant experience in the field of Islamic banking. For example, a manager 
from the Department of Islamic Banking and Takaful of the BNM disclosed that designating 
inexperienced Shari‟ah officers as the secretariat to the Shari‟ah board could result in 
Shari‟ah issues not being deliberated adequately and, ultimately, risk the potential of Shari‟ah 
non-compliance. The manager remarked:  
“The Shari‟ah issues in banking and finance are not stand-alone issues. They 
do not arise from something which is known and which could be understood 
from the beginning. They need deliberation, as only then would the Shari‟ah 
issues emerge. So, if the banks do not have the right Shari‟ah officers and do 
not deliberate the issues adequately, they would tend to overlook this matter.” 
 
Besides the Shari‟ah officers, another party highlighted by the interview participants as 
deemed better able to contribute to the Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah board, if 
equipped with relevant and adequate Islamic banking experience, is the management. It has 
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been mentioned in Chapter Four, that the SGF signifies that the management is held 
responsible for the implementation of the Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board. 
Hence, in addition to the requirement for the management to possess high aspirations for the 
advancement of the Islamic banking industry and a clear accountability paradigm, as 
discussed before it is argued that the management better able to fulfil the responsibilities 
mentioned if they have relevant experience in Islamic banking. The Shari‟ah board chairman 
of an investment bank offering Islamic banking remarked:  
“Although the bank is owned by non-Muslims they are concerned with the 
operation of Islamic banking. We have three officers who are highly capable 
in managing our Islamic banking operation. This is crucial as, if they do not 
brief us or raise the Shari‟ah issues with us, we could be making misleading 
decisions.” 
 
In addition, the interviews also disclosed the practice of some banks who hired an external 
consultant to improve the Shari‟ah governance of the bank and to assist the Shari‟ah 
governance role of the Shari‟ah board. Amongst the jurisdictions of this consultant revealed 
were using the consultant‟s expertise to improve the Shari‟ah compliance manual of the bank, 
undertaking Shari‟ah research into the Islamic banking products to be offered to customers, 
as well as vetting the product proposal by the bank. Arguing that the assistance of this 
external consultant would enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Shari‟ah board, the 
Shari‟ah board chairman of another Islamic bank remarked:  
“After the consultant has done the vetting, the issue would be brought to the 
SC. This will make the SC‟s work easy so that they would not spend as much 
time discussing all the details. Therefore, I, as the chairman, would first ask 
the consultant whether they had a look at the matters. If they said, „yes‟, then 
the SC would provide the approval or else the SC would not proceed.” 
 
 
It was mentioned previously that one of the current challenges facing the Islamic banking 
industry is to find scholars who are well versed in the Shari‟ah and have accounting and 
finance related knowledge. The above discussions seem to indicate that this dilemma could 
be eased if the financial institution supplemented the Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah 
board with the necessary functional support, in the form of a team with relevant experience in 
the field of Islamic banking. Such an alliance is argued as able to merge the theoretical 
perspective of the Shari‟ah board and the practical experience of the supporting parties, 
  
 335 
which would ultimately exert effective Shari‟ah governance mechanisms within the bank. 
However, the interview also disclosed that IFIs face similar challenges in appointing 
competent and experienced staff to assume the role of Shari‟ah officers in the bank. In light 
of this, the CEO of a medium-sized Islamic bank remarked: 
“Many Islamic banks, especially the subsidiaries within the group, are really 
product engines. Basically, the marketing is done by the conventional side of 
the banks. Meanwhile, Islamic banking is growing rapidly and is pushing out 
many products to the market. Musharakah mutanaqisah, for example, is a new 
product and not many people are conversant with it. Typically, what you find 
is that the conversant people, who do know this product, tend to move from 
one place to another.”  
 
Hence, the interviews highlighted that the infrastructure for Shari‟ah governance, 
demonstrated by the presence of a competent and dedicated internal Shari‟ah officer team, 
would enhance the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board, which is the backbone of the Shari‟ah 
governance of IFIs.  
 
 
 8.4.1.3 Holistic Approach to Shari’ah Governance  
The Islamic banking industry exhibits pertinent concerns in relation to Shari‟ah as the 
intrinsic value governing all aspects of the Islamic banking operation, empowered by the 
Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah board. As such, it is crucial for all parties within the 
bank to inspire mutual interest in developing and operating the bank in a manner consistent 
with principles of Shari‟ah. Arguably, this would essentially require application of the 
Shari‟ah in the operational frameworks of banks offering Islamic banking products and 
services encompassing all aspects of the banking activities and which meet the demanding 
needs of the customers. The interviews held with the participants revealed that some banks 
have taken the initiative to build up the Shari‟ah knowledge of their employees, including 
amongst non-Muslims, via training and certification. Such investment in Shari‟ah knowledge 
acquisition is deemed able to enhance the bank employees‟ awareness on matters such as a 
basic understanding of the Shari‟ah and, simultaneously, pave the way for appreciation of 
Shari‟ah compliance as the underlying ethical value governing the Islamic banking operation. 
Explaining the motive behind the Shari‟ah training provided to the bank‟s employees, the 
CEO of a medium-sized Islamic bank remarked: 
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“I make sure that my product developers and marketing people understand 
basic Shari‟ah so that when they interact with the SC members it is a 
meaningful discussion. If the SC members mention certain concepts, my 
product developer also understands these concepts and so the gap between the 
SC members and the practitioners becomes very, very small.” 
 
The above remark highlighted the importance of the concern that the Shari‟ah should not just 
be the domain of Shari‟ah scholars or certain departments, for example, Shari‟ah departments 
only. Indeed, exposing Shari‟ah knowledge and instilling the importance of Shari‟ah 
compliance amongst all levels of bank employees is deemed to result in the gap between 
Shari‟ah board members and bank employees being minimised. In addition, interviews held 
with the participants revealed instances, in the case where the Islamic banking operates under 
the ambit of the conventional banking of its parent company, where the Shari‟ah has 
influenced the modus operandi of the conventional banking system as well. In this light, the 
CEO of a large-sized Islamic bank remarked:  
“The approach in Islamic finance has been assimilated into the conventional 
business of our bank holding. Our conventional business has adopted the 
Islamic banks approach to liquidation exercises, in terms of negotiating on 
how we can help the customers to meet their obligation rather than simply 
going in and selling the house just because they are not able to pay for three 
months.”  
 
Additionally, the discussions held with the participants make apparent how the banks‟ 
management, particularly those with countrywide branch networks, have made concerted 
efforts in organising visits and lectures for the employees to ensure that the operation of the 
bank and aspirations of the employees are in tandem with the Shari‟ah decisions issued by the 
Shari‟ah board. It was highlighted that, during such efforts, the management emphasised that 
the marketing of Islamic financial products is conducted by articulating correct information, 
as any misleading information given could affect the Shari‟ah compliancy of the products. 
Hence, the holistic approach demonstrated through the operational framework of 
accountability and good business practice, consistent with the Shari‟ah, lends support to the 
Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board.  
 
Despite the above, the interview also draws attention to an interesting revelation. It became 
apparent from discussion with the participants that another challenge facing the Islamic 
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banking industry is the fact that the banks‟ operation seems to be in the shadow of 
conventional banking. The interviews highlighted the difficulties faced by the management 
and the SAC of BNM in producing Islamic financial products without referring to the modus 
operandi of conventional banking practice. Mandatory requirements for Islamic financial 
contracts to be legally well covered and the expectation of consumers for these contracts to 
have similar economic effects and benefits as the conventional ones represent examples 
highlighted as contributing to the conventional banking frame of reference for Islamic 
products. In this light, the CEO of a large-sized Islamic bank remarked: 
“The pressure from society causes you to move towards conventional types of 
products, or ones that look as if they are conventional but are not. Firstly, this 
is because of regulatory pressure. The Regulator wants your products to be 
well covered legally and from a security viewpoint. Secondly, it is because of 
the customer. They want the upsides and not the downsides in that they want 
to gain profit but they do not want to incur losses. Thirdly, it is down to the 
readiness of bankers to do all this.” 
 
 
The above remark seems to indicate that the practice of Islamic banks tends to be influenced 
by the more established conventional banking practice. The pressures highlighted in the 
CEO‟s remark above demonstrate the direct evidence of the market forces determining the 
functioning of Islamic banks. Furthermore, the inclination of the concerned parties mentioned 
in the above also appear to be contrary to the entrepreneurship attributes and the profit and 
loss sharing principles underlying Islamic financial contracts, such as mudharabah and 
musharakah, as discussed in Section 3.3.5.5 and Section 3.3.5.6 of Chapter Three. Hence, it 
can be argued that the conventional banking mindset seems to be prevalent amongst the 
regulators, customers and operators of banks offering Islamic banking products and services. 
The interview also disclosed that producing Islamic financial contracts with conventional 
features could be a complicated task for the Shari‟ah board and the product developers within 
the bank, as well as for the SAC of BNM, as the results must be Shari‟ah compliant. A 
member of the SAC of BNM remarked: 
“To replicate a conventional product because of market attitude wanting a 
product similar to a conventional one, but Shari‟ah compliant, is a challenge. 
Some of the conventional products are too conventional and could not be 
replicated Islamically in a way that would be satisfactory to the Shari‟ah 
Committee and to the market players. It is as if you want to have halal meat 
but you want it to have a flavour like a non-halal food product. If it is halal 
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and it is chicken it should taste like chicken, not taste like pork, for example. 
So, it is matter of market perception, expectations and appetite.” 
 
Hence, it is apparent that the Malaysian business environment demonstrates a holistic 
Shari‟ah approach to its Islamic banking industry, with the Shari‟ah board and all concerned 
parties endeavouring to implement and apply the Shari‟ah to ensure that the Islamic ethical 
values of the industry remain intact. However, the evidence derived from the interview also 
indicates that the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia tend to be driven by the market forces 
and operates under the shadow of conventional banking practices. 
 
 
8.4.1.4 Concerted Shari’ah Governance Mechanisms 
Depending on the size and nature of the business, banks establish their own Shari‟ah 
governance mechanism, with the Shari‟ah board serving as the highest Shari‟ah authority. It 
became apparent from the discussions held with the participants that the governance 
mechanisms established by the banks has a direct influence on the function of the Shari‟ah 
board. It is argued that support of the management by the role of the Shari‟ah board would 
improve Shari‟ah governance by fostering appreciation of the Shari‟ah and its motivation to 
ensure Shari‟ah compliance. It could be expected that such concerted efforts would result in 
all involved parties within the banks having the same concerns as the Shari‟ah board in 
ensuring that the banks‟ activities are in accordance with Shari‟ah principles, which is the 
focal point underlying the establishment of the Shari‟ah board. Illustrating the Shari‟ah 
governance mechanism of the bank, a senior executive of a large-sized Islamic bank 
remarked:     
“There is a Shari‟ah compliance risk unit within the Shari‟ah department and a 
formalised Shari‟ah audit within the internal audit department. Two of our SC 
members sit on the board‟s Risk Committee and two board members sit on the 
SC as permanent invitees. One is the chairman of the board‟s Risk Committee, 
because he takes care of the risk, and the other is the chairman of the Audit 
Committee, because any of the Shari‟ah non-compliance issues would go the 
audit department. When they all sit for meetings, you can see the cross-
participation between the parties.”  
 
 
Meanwhile, the interviews also disclosed an instance where the bank supported the function 
of the Shari‟ah board by establishing various checkpoints within the bank as a filtering 
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mechanism in ensuring Shari‟ah compliance. These checkpoints also serve as the feedback 
mechanism that receives and provides operational information amongst all concerned parties 
within the SGF. Explaining this, the CEO of a medium-sized Islamic bank remarked: 
“We have an operational risk framework and various checkpoints within the 
bank holding where Shari‟ah risk is treated almost like a subset of the 
operational risk. Every month a form from these checkpoints has to be filled in 
and this form is electronically captured on the central database and reported to 
an operational risk management committee, who sit every month. There, our 
Shari‟ah compliance framework will be rolled up. The bank has this procedure 
in almost all the touch points within the bank.”  
 
 
In addition, the interviews also made apparent the situation where a Shari‟ah board member 
is appointed as a member of the bank‟s board of directors. This appointment, besides, 
presents another example of the bank‟s appreciation of the role of the Shari‟ah board and also 
paves the way for bridging the gap that is frequently debated between the board of directors 
and the Shari‟ah board, the two important parties within the SGF. It has been argued that the 
gap between the board of directors and the Shari‟ah board could result in the former 
authorising decisions and policies that might discount the Shari‟ah concerns of the latter. 
Analysing their ability to participate in the decision-making process and performance 
monitoring at banks‟ highest level, the appointment of Shari‟ah board members onto the 
board of directors of the bank could be seen as enhancing the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah 
board.  
 
 
8.4.1.5 Efficient Regulatory Framework for Islamic Banking 
It has been discussed in Chapter Four that the Malaysian business environment exhibits a 
regulatory framework in support of the Islamic banking industry with the establishment of 
several enactments, such as the Islamic Banking Act of 1983, and incentives promoting the 
industry, such as the MIFC. Malaysia also serves as one of the countries that regulates the 
role of Shari‟ah board members through the introduction of BNM‟s guidelines, as in the 
GPS1, which specifies important regulations of the role of this Shari‟ah governance authority. 
The discussion with the interview participants makes it apparent that the role of the Shari‟ah 
board has achieved significant improvements through the Malaysian authority‟s regulatory 
support, since the establishment of the first Islamic bank in 1983. In this regard, a SAC 
member of BNM remarked: 
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“When we started with Islamic banking, the Shari‟ah advisors were not 
familiar with financial markets and the financial markets were also not 
familiar with Shari‟ah issues. However, as the market grows, you can see that 
Shari‟ah advisors are better versed with how the financial market works. 
Similarly, bankers also have more experience with the Shari‟ah advisors. They 
know what the Shari‟ah issues are.” 
 
Arguably, the above remark presents the learning curve amongst the market players in the 
Islamic banking industry. As is evident from the above, during the early stages of the 
establishment of Islamic banking there were divergences apparent amongst the Shari‟ah 
board members and the industry practitioners. Hence, the implication of such circumstances 
relates to the view of the accuracy of the Shari‟ah pass decisions issued by the Shari‟ah 
board. This is due to the possibility that the Shari‟ah board might misunderstand some of the 
financial issues as the Islamic bankers might think that there are no Shari‟ah issues in the 
prevailing matter, when actually there are. Moreover, Shari‟ah board members also issue 
their decisions based on what is presented to them and as a result, the Shari‟ah board might 
not have been able to see the whole picture of the Islamic banking operation, as it might not 
have been presented to them. However, as the industry progressed, the SAC of BNM 
remarked that there existed a better understanding of the Islamic banking issues, resulting in 
an improved Shari‟ah governance of the industry.  
 
In addition, the regulatory environment in Malaysia has experienced recent amendments to 
the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, which gives a mandate to the Shari‟ah resolutions 
and pronouncements issued by the SAC of BNM to be binding on the court and arbitrators. 
Accordingly, the strongest possible effect to this legislation is that the Act makes it 
mandatory for the judge to refer to the written rulings of the SAC, to the extent that the court 
has to refer to the SAC‟s decisions on any decisions related to Islamic finance. The profound 
effect of such a requirement is that there will be consistency in the country‟s legislation and 
in the interpretation of the Shari‟ah with regard to the Islamic banking products approved for 
marketing, as well as the products‟ basic Shari‟ah parameters. Hence, the Malaysian Islamic 
banking regulatory framework provides the necessary regulatory support for the operation of 
the Islamic banking industry and strengthens the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board. Another SAC member of BNM, who has evaluated the Islamic banking 
regulatory framework to this effect, remarked:    
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“Islamic finance is now recognised as a financial system in Malaysia. It means 
that it is there in the Act now that Islamic finance is a system whereas before 
the Act did not recognise Islamic finance as a system. The implication is that 
anyone, or any government, who comes after this cannot say that they do not 
want Islamic finance. Islamic finance is here to stay.”  
Moreover, the interview also disclosed the importance laid down by the regulator in giving 
priority to, and ensuring the provision of, the infrastructure required to support the operation 
of the Islamic banking industry. Explaining the industry‟s unique Shari‟ah governance 
feature, which serves an additional layer of governance that is overarching to the regulatory 
framework of the industry, a manager from the Department of Islamic Banking and Takaful 
of BNM remarked: 
“As much as we can we have to ensure that we are very serious in developing 
the infrastructure for Islamic finance. Under the current governance, you have 
Shari‟ah governance and you have corporate governance as a subset of it. That 
means Shari‟ah is overarching. Our approach is that we are really serious in 
ensuring Shari‟ah compliance.”  
The interview also revealed recognition of the Shari‟ah board members‟ views on the 
regulator‟s role in resolving issues of main concern to the Islamic banking industry. 
Explaining the implications of the amendment to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 on 
the Islamic banking practice, the Shari‟ah board chairman of an Islamic bank remarked: 
“I felt that the SAC had been mandated with immense authority. The SC, in 
any banks offering Islamic banking, could not disagree with the SAC of Bank 
Negara (BNM), whereas in the past this was allowed, as the nature of Shari‟ah 
is based on ijtihad therefore, you could have narrow differences here and 
there. However, now, if you have differences with the SAC of Bank Negara 
(BNM), you will be fined.”  
   
 
In addition, the interviews disclosed that the participants view the repercussions, resulting 
from failure to comply with the regulations imposed by the authority, as a mechanism to 
strengthen the Shari‟ah governance of the Islamic banking industry. In light of this, the 
Shari‟ah board member of another Islamic bank remarked:  
“Islamic banking under the Bank Negara (BNM) is among the most well-
regulated and the Bank Negara is the strictest regulator in the world. This is 
partly because of the political will and the awareness of the regulators. If there 
are any Shari‟ah issues, or if certain minimum requirements of Shari‟ah 
compliancy are not adhered to, the regulator will not continue the Islamic 
financial institution‟s license.”  
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On the other hand, the interviews also raised an emerging issue pertaining to the dual-layer 
Shari‟ah governance system for the Islamic banking industry implemented in Malaysia. The 
discussions with the participants revealed that the requirement for financial institutions 
offering Islamic banking products to seek approval from both the in-house Shari‟ah board 
and, later, the SAC of BNM has been criticised as this impedes the fast decision-making 
required by businesses. More crucially, as the number of financial institutions participating in 
the MIFC keeps increasing, the product approval process and the deliberation of Shari‟ah 
issues relating to the banking products, and how these are implemented, are expected to take 
much longer. In such circumstances, the interviews make apparent the need for the SAC of 
BNM to focus on issues concerning the industry at large and the industry itself should be 
given the flexibility to relax the rigidity on the need to present issues seeking approval in 
front of the SAC of BNM. The Shari‟ah board chairman of a conventional bank offering 
Islamic banking window highlighted this requirement and remarked:  
“Why don‟t the SAC provide the industry with more Shari‟ah parameters and 
guidelines? Any issues raised could also be discussed at the national level and 
then forwarded to the industry. So, rather than asking the industry to come to 
the Central Bank (BNM) and present in front of the SAC, why doesn‟t the 
SAC just give the industry its approval?” 
 
 
In summary, the interviews with the participants indicated that the Malaysian Islamic banking 
regulatory framework enhances the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board. It is evident that the Islamic banking industry has secured a place within the 
Malaysian business regulatory framework and the legislative and regulatory infrastructure 
that has been addressed provides the impetus required in Shari‟ah governance towards the 
advancement of the industry, driven by the Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah board. 
 
8.4.2 Factors that Limit the Shari’ah governance role of Shari’ah Boards 
This subsection looks at the factors that limit the Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah 
board.  
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8.4.2.1 The Drawback of the Functional Independence of Shari’ah Boards 
The issue of Shari‟ah board independence is one of particular concern because stakeholders 
rely on the function of the Shari‟ah board in ensuring that the operation of Islamic banks is 
compliant with the Shari‟ah. The above discussion on Shari‟ah board members‟ 
transcendental accountability to God, for example, could suggest that this Shari‟ah 
governance authority would undertake its roles and functions with utmost responsibility and 
independence. Similarly, the regulatory framework set out in the GPS1 stipulates that a 
Shari‟ah board member is limited to holding Shari‟ah board membership in only one 
industry. However, besides the perceived accountability paradigm of the Shari‟ah board and 
the structural independence provided by the regulatory framework, several operational issues 
have arisen in different aspects of the Shari‟ah boards‟ independence. Arguably, the Shari‟ah 
boards‟ heavy reliance on the function of the Shari‟ah officers when undertaking Shari‟ah 
review, as discussed in Section 8.3.5 above, posed a threat to the independence of the 
Shari‟ah board. The Shari‟ah board member of an Islamic bank remarked: 
“The independence of the SC is actually on the issuance of the fatwa. The 
manner in which the fatwa is issued should not be because it is being 
requested, or the SC is being pressurised, by the bank. Independence is about 
it being the SC‟s own decision.” 
 
 
In addition, the interviews also revealed situations where the Shari‟ah board was asked by the 
management to explain their Shari‟ah concerns on matters relating to the financial products 
per se, although the Shari‟ah board was endeavouring to ensure that all aspects of the banking 
activities complied with the Shari‟ah. The Shari‟ah board member above remarked: 
“I see the bigger issue of the independence of the Shari‟ah board is in the 
willingness of the management to comply with the Shari‟ah itself. Sometimes 
the management do not really want to listen. They ask the SC to give their 
concerns on product matters only and not to get involved in other banking 
activities. The management once questioned us, asking „Is your jurisdiction on 
products only or for all the bank‟s activities?‟ The management is not happy if 
we say it is for all banking activities.” 
    
 
Moreover, the interviews also disclosed instances where the top management‟s participation 
in Shari‟ah boards meetings could result in the board‟s Shari‟ah decisions being influenced 
by the former, despite the argument that such an exercise would provide the platform to 
deliberate Shari‟ah issues in greater depth amongst the parties concerned with the SGF. This 
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revelation sheds light on the results from QS1, where a minority of the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments responded that participation of top management was unimportant in influencing 
the independence of the Shari‟ah board members (as reported in Section 6.4.2 of Chapter 
Six). Explaining the complications over the issue of the Shari‟ah board‟s independence from 
the conduct of the Shari‟ah board meeting in his bank, the head of the Shari‟ah department of 
a development financial institution offering Islamic banking, remarked:  
“When the top management joins the meeting they influence lots of the 
Shari‟ah decisions made by the SC. Things that at first were not permissible 
can suddenly become permissible. When the SC tried to say something, the 
management would interrupt, saying „No. It should be like this…‟”   
 
 
Another set of circumstances where the independence of the Shari‟ah board is at stake is 
when the Shari‟ah board itself does not undertake its roles and functions as professionally as 
it should, while the management attempts to justify profit as a means to an end in its 
operation at every possibility, regardless of Shari‟ah permissibility concerns. For example, 
the head of the Shari‟ah department of an Islamic bank remarked: 
 “Businesses will try to find a thousand and one excuses for a Shari‟ah non-
compliant business to keep going. The bank will find as many views as 
possible to say that things can be approved and they can be done. When they 
talk about business, it is just about money to the bank. This has reached the 
point where the Shari‟ah department found a Shari‟ah non-compliance issue 
but the SC merely commented that it might have overlooked it and did not 
dare to say „stop‟.” 
 
On the other hand, the interviews also disclosed the participants‟ concerns about the 
hierarchical position of the Shari‟ah board, in which it is made accountable to the board of 
directors of the bank. It has been explained in Chapter Four that the Malaysian Islamic 
banking regulatory framework, as stipulated in GPS1, exhibits that the procedure of the 
appointment of the Shari‟ah board is within the authority of the banks‟ board of directors. 
Similarly, the GPS1 also clearly stated the Shari‟ah board as being responsible for reporting 
directly to the board of directors. Such regulatory frameworks reflect the hierarchical position 
of the Shari‟ah board as being directly subordinate to the board of directors. This 
appointment and reporting approach, however, appeared to be contrary to AAOIFI‟s 
recommendation for Shari‟ah board members to be appointed by, and report to, the banks‟ 
shareholders during the Annual General Meeting. This contradictory approach between the 
Malaysian regulatory requirement and AAOIFI‟s recommendation has raised concerns about 
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the independence of the Shari‟ah board members. This is especially intriguing considering 
both the board of directors and the Shari‟ah board are the banks‟ decision makers, however, 
with different concerns and coming from different hierarchical positions. Explaining the 
concerns about the Shari‟ah board‟s independence when the board of directors, which is at a 
higher hierarchical position but is required to seek approval from the Shari‟ah board, which is 
subordinate to it, the head of the Shari‟ah department of an Islamic bank remarked:  
“In the Middle East, the SC reports to the General Assembly whereas, in 
Malaysia, it reports to the board (board of directors). Therefore, the board, as 
and when necessary, might ask the SC‟s view on a particular issue. If the 
board says that there is no need to ask the SC, this means that the SC cannot 
influence the board‟s decision.”  
 
The above remark highlighted the hierarchical position of the Shari‟ah board, which 
evidently is not at the same level as the board of directors. As indicated in the head of the 
Shari‟ah department‟s remark above, the independence of the Shari‟ah board has been 
jeopardised due to the gap resulting from the different hierarchical positions of the two 
authorities. Emphasising that a better approach to the appointment of the Shari‟ah board is 
when the shareholders appoint the Shari‟ah board member, as this would instil accountability 
and independence from the board of directors and the Shari‟ah board respectively, a Shari‟ah 
board chairman of an Islamic bank remarked: 
 
“A good model is where the SC is appointed and answerable to the 
shareholders. This is because the SC is protecting the shareholders, the 
stakeholders and the customers, who want assurance from the SC that the 
products are Shari‟ah compliant.” 
 
The above discussions signify emerging dimensions for consideration when interpreting 
factors that influence the independence of the Shari‟ah board. Their significance in impairing 
the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board in undertaking its roles and functions are deemed 
equally important with the more established argument of the Shari‟ah board being influenced 
because of material gain.  
 
 
8.4.2.2 Ineffective Shari’ah Governance Functions of Shari’ah Boards 
Despite the perception of the role of the Shari‟ah board being held in high esteem, the 
interviews also disclosed the concerns raised by the participants about the ineffective 
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Shari‟ah governance function of some of the Shari‟ah board members. For example, the 
interviews revealed that some Shari‟ah board members were not being professional in 
undertaking their function to the meet the expectations of the parties within the bank. This is 
because some of the Shari‟ah board members were seen as unable to actively participate in 
Shari‟ah boards meetings due to lack of understanding of the issues raised and not being well 
prepared enough to attend. As a result, the Shari‟ah board was viewed as not contributing to 
the bank and, therefore, the risk was posed that these parties would not view the Shari‟ah 
aspects of the banks‟ operation as being a matter of importance. Explaining this in light of the 
ineffective Shari‟ah governance by the Shari‟ah board, the head of the Shari‟ah department of 
a development financial institution offering Islamic banking, remarked:  
“Actually, it is the Shari‟ah department that does all the work. The SC merely 
gives its approval based on research done by the Shari‟ah department, without 
any supporting source justifying its approval. For example, there is no 
Qur‟anic verse, hadith or stories of the companion to the prophet to strengthen 
the SC‟s decision.”    
 
Another concern raised by the interview participants is the lack of incentive amongst the 
Shari‟ah board members to carry out their responsibilities beyond their traditional and 
confined role in Islamic banking product matters, though the management is very determined 
to ensure Shari‟ah compliance in the whole of the Islamic banking operation. Such conduct 
amongst the Shari‟ah board members could have a detrimental effect on the Shari‟ah 
governance of the bank as matters contributing to Shari‟ah compliance encompass a wide 
range of the Islamic banking operation, as has been discussed throughout the role of the 
Shari‟ah board. In this regard, the CEO of a medium-sized Islamic bank remarked:  
“Maybe the Shari‟ah advisors are too focused on looking at the products that I 
think they forget that their role is very much more important than that. 
Actually, they have to look at the overall view, including the audited accounts. 
When they sign them off and say that they are Shari‟ah compliance it means 
that they are endorsing the entire operation, A to Z, as being Shari‟ah 
compliant. I think this is something to which they are not fully alert.”  
 
Furthermore, the interviews also disclosed the concerns of the management on the possibility 
of Shari‟ah non-compliance risk due to the lack of interest and indifferent attitudes amongst 
the Shari‟ah board members in probing further the reports tabled to them by the Shari‟ah 
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department. The CEO above continues by highlighting the low accountability of the Shari‟ah 
board and remarked: 
“When the SC endorsed the Shari‟ah report were they actually confirming that 
it is all Shari‟ah compliant? Does the SC ask all the relevant questions? Have 
the management given the SC enough information? I would like to know if the 
SC knows what they are getting themselves into when they sign off the 
Shari‟ah report.”  
 
In addition, it has been discussed above that the management considers appointing Shari‟ah 
scholars who are high dignitaries, such as the muftis, and foreign Shari‟ah scholars as being 
driven by commercial reasons and image building for the Islamic banking institutions. 
However, interviews held with the participants revealed that Shari‟ah scholars having such 
attributes, although prominent, were unable to contribute effectively to the Shari‟ah 
governance of the bank, as they did not have enough time to undertake their responsibilities. 
Hence, it appears that the selection of such Shari‟ah board members could equally be 
detrimental to the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. In 
this light, the Shari‟ah board chairman of an Islamic bank, who is also a high dignitary 
Shari‟ah scholar in Malaysia, remarked:  
“Because of my responsibilities, I did not have much time. I depended on the 
other three SC members, who are academicians and carry out research. 
Therefore, when I attended the SC meeting, I would just read the documents 
and sometimes I did not even understand them. I would ask, „Who is going to 
present?‟ and the top management would present. Then I would ask the other 
three SC members, „What is your opinion?‟ If all three were in agreement, 
then I would take that up as the Shari‟ah decision.”  
 
 
It is worth noting that the results from both questionnaire surveys indicate that a considerable 
number of respondents were not in agreement when asked whether working part-time is not a 
hindrance to effective Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board (as reported in both Section 
6.5.2 of Chapter Six and Section 7.5.2 of Chapter Seven). Indeed, the part-time working 
nature of the Shari‟ah board was further disclosed by interview participants as the main 
obstacle and was why this Shari‟ah authority has been criticised, as has been described above. 
The part-time working attachment of the Shari‟ah board to the bank, although it serves as a 
mechanism to instil independence from the board, could actually be a setback. This is 
because they are not able to assume their role beyond what is perceived as the minimum 
required from them, which corresponds to the confined role of approving Islamic banking 
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products to be offered to the customers. In this regard, the Shari‟ah board of an Islamic bank 
remarked: 
“As for now, the role of the SC is limited to giving approval; in terms of 
supervision, that is still beyond our function. If the regulator put that as our 
function, it would be almost impossible because we only serve on a part-time 
basis, unless we are a fulltime SC member.”  
 
Similarly, the head of the Shari‟ah department of an Islamic bank highlighted the inability of 
the Shari‟ah board to keep pace with the fast decision making requirements of the business. 
The head of the Shari‟ah department remarked:   
 “Our SC only serves part-time. Sometimes, we send them our advertisement 
materials or collateral, which have already been vetted and ascertained as 
being Shari‟ah compliant, and we ask for their email approval. For things as 
simple as that you still need to allow time to get their reply as it may take a 
week or two weeks.”  
 
More damagingly, the time limitation factor was revealed as affecting key governance 
aspects that are vital in determining the Shari‟ah compliance of the banking institution. For 
example, the interviews disclosed that the Shari‟ah board did not access the banks‟ relevant 
documents as part of the Shari‟ah review process before concluding the Shari‟ah compliance 
of the Islamic banking activities, despite the authority mandated to them and the willingness 
of the bank to cooperate. Explaining about the review of business documents practiced by the 
Shari‟ah board, the head of the Shari‟ah department of another Islamic bank remarked: 
“If we go back to the theory, of course they can review the documents but, 
implementation-wise, they do not have the time, though they have the power. 
Maybe, the SC does not want to get itself into trouble as whatever the business 
is proposing has caused them a headache. So, what more about looking at 
these documents.” 
 
 
The interviews also explain the ineffective Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board from a different perspective. The discussions held with the participants revealed that a 
Shari‟ah board member, as an Islamic religiously conscious person, might be carried away 
with the husnul-zan character (good expectation of others), in which others expected them to 
undertake their tasks ethically and with full responsibility. However, such practice could 
undermine the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board, in the 
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manner that the Shari‟ah board has not undertaken a critical Shari‟ah review of the banking 
business operation. A manager in the Department of Islamic Banking and Takaful of BNM 
remarked: 
“These Shari‟ah scholars usually have husnul-zan, (a good expectation of 
others). When they behave like this they cannot be a filtering mechanism. That 
is why behaving with husnul-zan also has its own implications. By right, the 
SC should counter-argue, to question and cross examine the bank in return.” 
 
Indeed, the interviews revealed that the problem of the ineffective Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board is also perturbing the higher Shari‟ah authority, i.e., the SAC 
of BNM, who regarded some Shari‟ah board members as not being keen to assume the 
Shari‟ah board role, as their appointment was merely to fill the Islamic banks‟ Shari‟ah board 
membership. A member of the SAC of BNM remarked:  
“There are SC members who have knowledge but do not have the courage. 
They do not make the effort to learn, to improve themselves. Therefore, these 
people are there just to fill the seat, to make up the quorum. The bank also 
does not have a choice as they have just grabbed the Shari‟ah scholar since 
they fulfil the criteria.”  
 
It is apparent from the above that the ineffective Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board is a drawback to the overall strength of the Islamic banking institution in ensuring that 
its operation is Shari‟ah compliant. Indeed, the failure of the Shari‟ah board members to 
undertake their roles and functions effectively could present a denial to the responsibilities 
entrusted upon them and hamper the development of a promising industry against its more 
established counterpart, i.e., conventional banking. 
 
 
8.4.2.3 Inadequate Regulatory Support and the Ineffective Function of Designated 
Institutions  
The Islamic banking business, like any banking business, is a highly regulated industry. In 
such circumstances, the regulator should provide the necessary infrastructure for the effective 
governance function of the Shari‟ah board, as well as the concerned parties within the SGF. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, amongst its regulatory intervention in the banking business is 
the provision of the necessary legislation and imposition of certain enforcement within the 
industry. In this regard, it is argued that the Shari‟ah board is able to undertake its roles and 
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functions effectively if the environment within the business it represents exhibits regulatory 
support for the conducive operation of the business and the smooth functioning of the 
Shari‟ah board. However, the interviews held with the participants revealed that regulatory 
support in critical areas of the Shari‟ah boards‟ function seems to be inadequate. For 
example, the interviews disclosed the Shari‟ah boards‟ concern over the opportunistic 
behaviour of the banks‟ management and the absence of Shari‟ah audit enforcement. The 
Shari‟ah board member of an Islamic bank remarked: 
“The problem with our industry is that, if the Bank Negara does not come out 
with the regulation, the management does not consider it an important one. 
They do not consider Shari‟ah compliance audit as important whereas, if the 
bank is found to be Shari‟ah non-compliant, it will affect the industry, the 
whole industry.” 
 
Indeed, the interviews disclosed that most banks offering Islamic banking products and 
services underwent minimal or no Shari‟ah board involvement in Shari‟ah auditing of the 
operation. In fact, the interviews revealed that banks who perform audits undertake them 
using methods discretionary to the bank. Explaining this, the Shari‟ah board chairman of an 
investment bank offering Islamic banking remarked: 
“Until now, there is no agreed-upon standard on how to conduct a Shari‟ah 
audit. Even the Bank Negara (BNM) has not got a standard of its own, we are 
still looking for it. Internally, we do our own auditing. However, the question 
on which standard to follow would be better if it was answered by the Bank 
Negara.”  
 
Meanwhile, in an effort to support the Islamic banking industry, several institutions have also 
been setup to promote research, education and training in the fields of Islamic banking and 
finance, as well as for the Takaful industry. Institutions of this kind are the INCEIF 
(International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance), ISRA (International Shari‟ah 
Research Academy for Islamic Finance), IBFIM (Islamic Banking and Finance Institute 
Malaysia) and AIBIM (Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia). Their presence 
should be seen as a positive effort in strengthening the Islamic banking industry, which is still 
considered in its infancy in comparison to the more established conventional banking 
industry. Indeed, the training and exposure in the field of Shari‟ah and banking that these 
institutions provide could be seen as enhancing the level of Shari‟ah governance amongst 
banks offering Islamic banking products and services, hence elevating the effectiveness of the 
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Shari‟ah board role. Despite these assumptions, several interviews held with the participants 
expressed their disappointment in the functions of the institutions mentioned. For example, 
the Shari‟ah board chairman of an Islamic bank remarked: 
“There should be a change in paradigm so that Bank Negara would consider 
taking those who really have potential and who are still young so that these 
people could be trained, becoming proficient, and could make an impact on 
the people at the lower level. At first, I thought ISRA would be the one who 
would gather the people for that purpose. Similarly, we also have IBFIM but it 
does not work either. These institutions are becoming a new business, which is 
why we see they are busy producing degrees, including those for overseas 
students. They do organise a forum here and there, but nothing material 
happens.” 
 
In addition, the interviews also disclosed the participants‟ concerns about the lack of 
leadership in the circle of Islamic scholars, especially amongst the SAC of BNM, who acts as 
the supreme authority and the Shari‟ah reference role for the Islamic banking industry. 
Arguing on the basis that the SAC is comprised of members with diverse expertise, mostly 
aged scholars, and the lack of research conducted by them, the interview participants revealed 
their scepticism about the ability of this Shari‟ah governance authority to influence the 
Islamic banking industry and its practice. This concern, as well as the lack of regulatory 
enforcement in critical areas, as discussed above for Shari‟ah audit, could not only lead to 
possible morally hazardous behaviour of the management, but could also risk the potential of 
Shari‟ah non-compliance in the bank.  
 
8.4.2.4 The Absence of Shari’ah Audit and its Implication on the Shari’ah Report 
It has been mentioned before that one of the important instruments in the Shari‟ah 
governance mechanism of an Islamic banking institution is the bank‟s Shari‟ah compliance 
manual. This Shari‟ah governance instrument serves as the operational framework, which 
specifies on matters, including those ranging from product structuring to product offering and 
the responsibilities of the different parties within the bank from the aspect of its Shari‟ah 
governance. In addition, this operational framework could be used as the Shari‟ah review 
procedure for the implementation of Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board and as 
the guidelines for auditing purposes. Interestingly, the in-depth interviews also made it 
apparent that some participants were unclear as to what constituted a Shari‟ah review as 
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required in the GPS1. Similarly, the participants found that the distinction between Shari‟ah 
review and Shari‟ah audit was ambiguous and they were confused as to which of the two falls 
under the jurisdiction of the Shari‟ah board. For instance, the head of the Shari‟ah department 
of an Islamic bank remarked: 
“Is Shari‟ah review the same as auditing or is it just to ensure that Shari‟ah 
decisions issued by the SC are being implemented? So far, the regulator has 
used these terms interchangeably. If Shari‟ah review means the same as 
auditing, it ties back to another issue. They, the SC, are the ones who approve 
the Shari‟ah decisions so how could they, at the same time, do the auditing?”  
 
Additionally, it was discussed earlier in Chapter Four that what constitutes a Shari‟ah review 
cannot be confined to Islamic banking product matters only. Ideally, the Shari‟ah board 
should undertake a holistic Shari‟ah review evaluation of all aspects of the Islamic banking 
operation. However, the associated challenge with this task is the question of whether the 
Shari‟ah board, whose membership is usually comprised of scholars who are well versed in a 
particular field only, is capable of undertaking such responsibilities. Interestingly, this issue 
of competency of the Shari‟ah board in undertaking Shari‟ah review relates to another 
emerging issue. The interviews held with the participants revealed that, because of the 
Shari‟ah board members inability to undertake aspects of Shari‟ah review, the Shari‟ah report 
issued by the Shari‟ah board is indicated as providing only partial Shari‟ah compliance 
assurance to its users. Explaining in light of this, the Shari‟ah board member of an Islamic 
bank remarked: 
 “There might be something that the bank did not refer to us, for example, on 
the accounting or the systems side. I also understand that, if I were to log into 
the system, I would not be able to command as well because I do not know 
about the system. As a result, the SC only endorses whatever matters that have 
come to us as being Shari‟ah compliant.” 
 
Indeed, the fact that the Shari‟ah review task of the Islamic banking institution is mainly 
undertaken by the Shari‟ah officers of the bank and the Shari‟ah board only provides an 
overview of the results, as discussed in Section 8.3.5 above, aggravated the question over the 
quality of the Shari‟ah report aforementioned. The Shari‟ah officers‟ role, in respect of the 
Shari‟ah review task, and the close ties between Shari‟ah review and the Shari‟ah report that 
is issued by the Shari‟ah board means that it could be viewed as a Shari‟ah report prepared by 
the Shari‟ah officers but, however, approved by the Shari‟ah board. Hence, these arguments 
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give rise to another fundamental issue on the need for an independent party to undertake 
Shari‟ah audit to assess the Shari‟ah compliance of the Islamic banking operations. Equally 
intriguing is the question of whether the Shari‟ah report issued by the Shari‟ah board is truly 
independent and, thus, whether the Shari‟ah board could be considered as the appropriate 
party to issue such a report. In this regard, an ex-SAC of BNM remarked: 
“Although the bank is an Islamic bank and the customers are confident 
because of the existence of the SC, however, the SC only goes through 
Shari‟ah review. If the SC is expected to give its approval only, then it means 
audit would not have a place, as whatever is being tabled in the SC‟s meeting 
would be approved straight away. So, there must be some other party who 
carries out the audit work.”    
 
 
It is apparent from the above discussions that the current SGF gives rise to occurrences of the 
Shari‟ah boards‟ over-reliance on the Shari‟ah officers‟ function concerning the Shari‟ah 
compliance review task and, thus, poses questions about the effectiveness of Shari‟ah boards‟ 
role. Associated with this problem is the question of the quality of the Shari‟ah board report 
and the Shari‟ah compliance assurance it gives to the users. The interview sessions held with 
the participants indicate the need to revamp the mechanism for Shari‟ah review as well as to 
ensure immediate implementation of Shari‟ah audits in the Islamic banking industry.  
 
 
8.5 The Impact of the Dual-Layer Shari’ah Governance System on 
Standardisation of Malaysian Islamic Banking Practices 
It has been discussed previously that the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system implemented 
in the Malaysian Islamic banking industry features the Shari‟ah governance authority role of 
the Shari‟ah board and that of the SAC of BNM. With the SAC as the Shari‟ah apex body 
and the provision for this authority to act as the Shari‟ah reference role, resulting from the 
amendment to the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, the mechanism for the Shari‟ah 
governance system implemented in Malaysia is deemed able to minimise inconsistencies with 
regard to the Shari‟ah application of the Islamic banking products. The results from QS2 
indicated that the vast majority of the branch managers perceived that the role played by the 
SAC enhances the standardisation of Islamic banking practices in Malaysia. Moreover, the 
branch managers also perceived that the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system in Malaysia 
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was effective in ensuring the stability of the Islamic banking industry and in harmonising the 
Islamic banking practice in Malaysia and across national boundaries. The discussions held 
with interview participants emphasised further the contribution of the SAC and the dual-layer 
Shari‟ah governance system to the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia.  
 
The interview disclosed that the elements of the Shari‟ah that are open to differences in 
interpretation are limited, whereas the basics and fundamentals are commonly agreed upon. 
Notwithstanding differences in these limited matters, the Shari‟ah scholars would generally 
aim at issuing their fatwa based on what is more convenient and in the best interest of the 
Muslims. In this light, a SAC member of BNM remarked: 
“The Shari‟ah has some fixed elements and some flexible elements. 
Obviously, we cannot change the fact that riba (interest) is haram 
(impermissible) and gharar (uncertainty) should be avoided. However, based 
on circumstances and needs, certain things can be changed. I think all the 
Shari‟ah advisors would want to make the industry flexible as this is the 
sunnah (practice) of Prophet Muhammad. Where the prophet is given a choice 
between two things, he would choose the easier of the two so that it would be 
easy for the ummah (nation), as Islam comes to bring benefits and rahmah 
(mercy) and not hardship to the people.” 
 
 
Indeed, the interviews make apparent that, in the case of the Islamic banking industry, 
standardisation of the Shari‟ah, as within the conscience of Islam, benefits the Muslims and 
removes prejudice amongst the nations in the country. This is despite the fact that there are 
differences in opinions about the interpretation of the Shari‟ah amongst the four main Islamic 
legal schools, i.e., the Shafi‟i; Hanafi; Maliki and Hanbali, as well as amongst contemporary 
Islamic scholars. In this regard, another member of the SAC of BNM remarked:  
“I believe that Islam recognises a State as an entity. Currently, the Bank 
Negara (BNM) has the final say. If Bank Negara says „No‟ then it is not 
approved; there is only one voice in Malaysia.”     
 
 
Meanwhile, the discussions with the participants also make it apparent how the Shari‟ah 
pronouncements by the SAC of BNM are issued. The interviews disclosed that the AAOIFI‟s 
Shari‟ah standards serve as the first point of reference for the SAC. These AAOIFI standards 
will later be determined for their application to suit Malaysian circumstances, as the 
Malaysian Islamic banking market might have different peculiar needs, circumstances, 
  
 355 
different laws and different customs that should be looked at. In this light, a SAC member of 
BNM remarked:  
“We refer to the reasons or the grounds for the decisions made by AAOIFI 
because their standards include the mustanad (sources on how and why the 
rulings are derived). We will deliberate on that and apply it to the Malaysian 
scenario. Then we will see whether to apply the AAOIFI decision or go for a 
different opinion, depending on the strengths of the arguments and various 
policy considerations.” 
 
Indeed, the interviews held with majority of the SAC of BNM members disclosed that the 
pronouncements issued by the SAC were also made with reference to the Shari‟ah decisions 
issued by several other bodies, including the OIC‟s (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) 
Fiqh Academy and Dar al Barakah (resulting from the Multaqa Dallah al-Barakah forum). 
Such associations were emphasised by the interview participants as marking the Malaysian 
regulator‟s effort in standardising the Shari‟ah with the international Muslim community and 
as a basis for producing Islamic banking products that are globally accepted. In addition, 
these SAC members also revealed initiatives taken by the BNM to standardise Islamic 
banking practices in the regions close to Malaysia. It has been disclosed that ISRA, under the 
patronage of BNM, has organised several annual gatherings of Muzakarah Cendekiawan 
Shari‟ah Nusantara (MCSN), whose objective has been mentioned before, in Section 4.6 of 
Chapter Four.  
 
In addition, discussions with the interview participants also make apparent the standardisation 
of Islamic banking practice at the national level. For example, the interviews disclosed the 
contribution of the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM) in 
promoting consistency amongst banks in Malaysia by issuing a standardised Master 
Agreement for interbank transactions, such as the Interbank Murabahah Master Agreement 
(IMMA), the Corporate Murabahah Master Agreement (CMMA) and the Wakalah Placement 
Agreement (WPA) for Interbank and Corporate. Similarly, the SAC of BNM has developed a 
series of Shari‟ah parameters, known as the Shari‟ah Parameter Reference, aimed at 
promoting operational efficiency and best practices amongst industry players in the country. 
These Shari‟ah parameters comprise of a minimum standard guidance on applying the 
respective Shari‟ah contracts in Islamic finance contracts, which has been prepared by 
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gaining feedback from the industry players.
41
 The significance of the Shari‟ah parameters in 
harmonising Malaysian Islamic banking practices has been highlighted by the Shari‟ah board 
chairman of an Islamic bank, who remarked:  
“On basic elementary matters, the Bank Negara (BNM) has developed 
Shari‟ah parameters. In doing so, the Bank Negara referred to the banks and, 
accordingly, the Shari‟ah parameters were designed. I believe that this is a 
good move towards ensuring efficient Islamic banking practices in the future.” 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the interviews also disclosed some of the dilemmas faced by the 
Malaysian regulator. The fact that some of the pronouncements issued by the SAC are not 
consistent with the Shari‟ah standards issued by Shari‟ah bodies, such as AAOIFI and the 
OIC‟s Fiqh Academy, has resulted in Malaysia being labelled as liberal in its Islamic banking 
operation. Such a perception is made due to circumstances where the permissibility of certain 
Islamic banking products authorised by the SAC of BNM are considered as actually being 
impermissible, especially by Shari‟ah scholars from the Middle Eastern countries. It has been 
mentioned in Chapter Four that some of the Islamic banking products approved by the SAC, 
such as bay‟ bithaman ajil and bay‟ al-‟inah, are seen as controversial as these products are 
not approved in the Middle Eastern market by their respective Shari‟ah scholars. However, 
the interviews make apparent the justifications for permissibility of these two products. A 
member of the SAC of BNM remarked: 
“We were criticised for approving bay‟ bithaman ajil and bay‟ al-‟inah. 
However, we argued that we implement them because there are references 
based on the Shafi‟i (one of the Islamic legal schools). We take the position 
that should we continue to be in vice, in riba, when actually, with bay‟ al-
‟inah it is more a‟haf (permissible, though controversial)? So, we ask 
ourselves, which one should we choose? Do we choose to be in major 
elements of sin or lesser ones and we decided to choose the lesser ones.”    
 
 
Meanwhile, the interviews also make apparent an interesting revelation. The decree on bay‟ 
bithaman ajil and bay‟ al-‟inah resulted in them being given the mandate but, in order to 
promote consistency with the international Islamic banking practice, they are not preferred by 
the SAC and, hence, by the BNM. In addition, the Malaysian authority has taken the position 
that the market players should consider these Islamic financial contracts as the last resort of 
                                                 
41
 List of all Shari‟ah Parameter References developed by Bank Negara Malaysia can be found at 
http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=menu_know_principal&pg=menu_know_principals_intro.  
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Islamic banking products offered to the customers. Besides their controversial nature, other 
reasons why the BNM would be keen not to favour them is due to the availability of other 
Islamic financial contracts, such as murabahah, musharakah mutanaqisah and others. 
However, the interviews disclosed the concerns amongst the regulators that bay‟ bithaman 
ajil and bay‟ al-‟inah have became the default financial contracts amongst the Islamic 
banking market players. A member of the SAC of BNM remarked:    
“Some people say we are liberal. I will say that, before any decision is made, 
there is a thorough study of the particular issue. We might prefer certain views 
to others and, in certain circumstances, the bank can go for the exception but 
the bank is given a time limit for that. However, sometimes the exception has 
become the default.” 
 
 
Another significant revelation derived from the interviews is that the existence of the SAC, 
the supreme Shari‟ah authority that monitors and controls application of the Shari‟ah across 
the Malaysian Islamic banking industry, is perceived by the participants as not limiting the 
creativity and flexibility of the industry. This is due to the fact that the Shari‟ah board could 
be more stringent, by opting to refuse management proposals to develop Islamic banking 
products based on controversial contracts (as in bay‟ bithaman ajil and bay‟ al-‟inah), 
although they are permitted by the SAC. Indeed, the Shari‟ah board and all concerned parties 
within the bank could be more creative by innovating contemporary Islamic banking products 
based on globally accepted Islamic financial contracts. Alternatively, the interviews revealed 
that the lack of regulation at the international level has contributed to conflicting views 
amongst the Shari‟ah scholars on the operation of Islamic banking activities and associated 
difficulties in cross-border transactions. The CEO of a large-sized Islamic bank remarked:    
“All the Islamic finance problems you find today are caused by the GCC (the 
Gulf Cooperation Council). I am not being biased because I have operations in 
the GCC. I cannot do business in the GCC, not because I don‟t have the 
product, but because I‟m not confident about doing business there. Any Tom, 
Dick and Harry can just come and say that your product is not right and my 
experience tells me that, every time I come out with a new product there, it is 
non-halal, but a few months later it becomes halal.”  
 
In conclusion, the discussions with the interview participants revealed their support for a 
dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system as contributing to standardisation and consistency in 
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Islamic banking practices in Malaysia, although there are apparent challenges towards this 
effort. 
 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
Overall, the interview results presented above have provided an in-depth understanding of the 
role, independence and Shari‟ah review effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board issues 
investigated in this study. It became apparent from the discussions with the participants that 
the parties concerned within the SGF placed high importance on Shari‟ah governance as the 
mechanism to ensure the Shari‟ah compliance of the Islamic banking operation, however, 
with evidence of business connotations amongst the management, as indicated in the 
selection of Shari‟ah board members. The appointment of Shari‟ah board members has been 
discussed as having a direct association with the Shari‟ah boards‟ roles and functions. 
Interesting findings also emerged regarding the appointment of the Shari‟ah board members 
as to whether the Shari‟ah board membership should only be comprised of Shari‟ah scholars 
or those with diverse qualifications. The arguments about the Shari‟ah board membership led 
to further debate on its association with the quality of the Shari‟ah decisions issued by this 
Shari‟ah governance authority.  
 
It has also been highlighted that the Shari‟ah board remains dominated within its Shari‟ah 
advisory role to the extent that some Shari‟ah board members consider the Shari‟ah review 
task as the sole purview of the Shari‟ah officers and that the Shari‟ah board only provides 
approval to the Shari‟ah review carried out by these officers. Although this poses a question 
on the functional independence of the Shari‟ah board, this study also revealed the challenges 
faced by the Shari‟ah board, in contributing beyond its Shari‟ah advisory capacity, as mainly 
due to its part-time attachment to the bank. In addition, the interviews held with the 
participants also revealed the Shari‟ah review effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board by 
discussing the factors that support, as well as limit, the Shari‟ah governance function of the 
Shari‟ah board. The factors revealed as supporting the role and function of the Shari‟ah board 
are the accountability driven paradigm, the support from relevant parties with Islamic 
banking experience, the holistic approach to Shari‟ah governance, concerted Shari‟ah 
governance mechanisms and the efficient regulatory framework for Islamic banking. On the 
other hand, the factors revealed as limiting the Shari‟ah governance role of the Shari‟ah board 
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are the drawbacks of the functional independence of the Shari‟ah board, its ineffective 
Shari‟ah governance function, inadequate regulatory support, the ineffective functions of 
designated institutions and the absence of Shari‟ah audit and its implications for the Shari‟ah 
board‟s Shari‟ah report. Finally, this chapter ends with the apparent support of the interview 
participants for the role of dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system in standardising the Islamic 
banking practice in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
9.1 Summary and Review of Findings 
Chapter One of this thesis outlined the rationale and objectives of this study. Chapter Two 
discussed the corporate governance of banks and explained selected theoretical frameworks 
on the subject of corporate governance. Because the failure of the banking system could lead 
to the downfall of the economy, Chapter Two also discussed the important role of the 
regulator and specifically looked into the function of several international regulatory bodies 
in promoting best practices through the issuance of policies, standards and guidelines for use 
in the industry.  
 
Chapter Three, meanwhile, focused on the corporate governance of Islamic banks. The 
significance of ijtihad (legal reasoning) as the dynamic tool for the development of Islamic 
banking and finance has been discussed and a detailed explanation on the Islamic principles 
of the Shari‟ah, which governs the operation of Islamic banks, has been provided. In essence, 
the Islamic Shari‟ah prohibits transactions involving interest and investment into activities 
that feature the characteristics of being uncertain, or gharar, besides others that have been 
clearly laid down in the Shari‟ah as impermissible, such as alcohol, gambling, casino 
activities, pork production, pornographic production, etc. In addition, this chapter also drew 
attention to two important concepts influencing the Islamic banking practice, namely 
accountability and the maqasid al-Shari‟ah (objectives of the Shari‟ah). As a matter of 
interest, the diverse classical Islamic financial contracts deduced from the Shari‟ah have been 
highlighted and the issue of Shari‟ah compliance of Islamic banks has been explained. 
Additionally, as this study discusses the Shari‟ah governance system implemented in the 
Malaysian Islamic banking industry, this chapter also throws light on the Malaysian Islamic 
banking environment.  
 
The emphasis of Chapter Four is on the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board, 
whose establishment stems from the requirement for the board to ensure that the operations of 
the Islamic bank are Shari‟ah compliant. The role of the Shari‟ah board has been discussed 
individually as the Shari‟ah advisory role and the Shari‟ah review role. Accordingly, relevant 
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regulatory standards and guidelines on the two spheres of the Shari‟ah boards‟ role have been 
detailed. Besides critically reviewing the research surrounding the issues of the role of the 
Shari‟ah board, this chapter also provides a brief overview of the Shari‟ah governance system 
for the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia. It has been explained that the Shari‟ah 
governance framework (SGF) for Malaysian Islamic banking exhibits a dual-layer Shari‟ah 
governance system where, besides the Shari‟ah board, Shari‟ah supervision is also 
undertaken at the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) level by the Shari‟ah Advisory Council 
(SAC), who act as the supreme Shari‟ah authority, governing the whole Islamic banking 
industry. Hence, the bureaucracy presented by the Malaysian Islamic banking SGF requires 
approval at two stages, firstly, by the bank‟s Shari‟ah board and, subsequently, by the SAC of 
the BNM.  
 
It is against this background that this study has explored the role, independence and 
effectiveness of the Shari‟ah boards‟ Shari‟ah governance function, in the context of 
Malaysian SGF, by adopting a mixed strategy approach to data collection; the methodology 
adopted for this strategy is presented in Chapter Five. The quantitative approach, through 
questionnaire surveys, represents the first stage of data enquiry, aimed at establishing a 
general understanding of the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board. Two sets of 
questionnaire surveys were undertaken: (1) questionnaire survey 1- QS1; and (2) 
questionnaire survey 2- QS2. QS1 is aimed at assessing the Shari‟ah governance functions of 
the Shari‟ah board from the perspective of the banks‟ head of Shari‟ah departments. Acting 
as the Shari‟ah boards‟ secretariat, it is expected that the responses from the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments would provide useful insights into the level of Shari‟ah boards‟ involvement in 
Shari‟ah governance of the bank and other important issues relevant to the Shari‟ah boards‟ 
roles and functions. Meanwhile, QS2 is aimed at obtaining the perceptions of the banks‟ 
branch managers on how the same issues presented in QS1 are expected to be undertaken by 
the Shari‟ah board. In order to make a meaningful analysis of comparison between the two 
questionnaire surveys‟ findings, the content of QS2 comprises similar questions to those in 
QS1, however, with some alterations tailored to the differences in the Shari‟ah governance 
exposure in the two respondents‟ groups. In the second stage of data enquiry, in-depth 
interviews were conducted with concerned parties within the SGF, i.e. the Shari‟ah board 
members, heads of Shari‟ah departments, CEOs and senior executives of Islamic banks, the 
SAC of BNM and BNM officers. These series of in-depth interviews were aimed at gaining 
further understanding of the results derived from the questionnaire surveys and discovering 
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the „social process‟ that is involved in the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board. Hence, by incorporating both the quantitative and qualitative research approach, this 
study is deemed able to provide an overall picture of the Shari‟ah boards‟ issues under 
investigation. The data analysis and findings of the two questionnaire surveys are presented 
in Chapters Six and Seven, while Chapter Eight presents the results of the in-depth interview.  
 
Chapters Six and Seven analysed and discussed the responses to QS1 and QS2 respectively. 
In QS1, the perceptions of 24 heads of Shari‟ah departments, who responded to a series of 
questions on the issues studied, were analysed based on overall analysis and by control 
variables (types of banks, ownership of banks, size and the number of years experience of the 
Islamic banking operation). Meanwhile, QS2 analysed the responses of 78 branch managers, 
who participated in the survey, in the same manner as QS1. 
 
The QS1 in Chapter Six revealed that the vast majority of banks in the Malaysian 
International Islamic Finance Centre (MIFC) were adopting the mandatory guidelines issued 
by the BNM, i.e., the „Guidelines on the Governance of the Shariah Committee for Islamic 
Financial Institutions‟ or GPS1, as against AAOIFI‟s recommended governance standards 
and that the heads of Shari‟ah departments were mainly from the Shari‟ah and fiqh al-
mua‟malat background. These two findings placed significance on the nature of the Islamic 
banking operation being, in a way, consistent with the Malaysian regulatory requirement. In 
fact, the finding on the qualification background of the heads of Shari‟ah departments had the 
impression of having the same Shari‟ah concerns with the Shari‟ah board, thus could be 
relied upon by the board and, indeed, by the banks‟ management. The fact that the Shari‟ah 
boards were found to be mainly involved in endorsing the Shari‟ah compliance manual, 
advising the board of directors as well as advising the Shari‟ah officers, signifies the concern 
and the limited Shari‟ah advisory role of the Shari‟ah board. Indeed, Shari‟ah boards‟ 
involvement in developing Islamic banking products and services tends to be limited to 
crucial areas where Shari‟ah concern may arise, namely the conception, the legal 
documentation and the review levels. In terms of accounting-related issues in the Islamic 
banking operation, the Shari‟ah boards were found to give minimal and selective 
involvement, particularly in validating documents in contracts, approving calculation and 
distribution of zakat and endorsing the banks‟ annual reports. Interestingly, issuing Shari‟ah 
report, as a function closely associated to the Shari‟ah boards‟ role in articulating the banks‟ 
Shari‟ah compliance, was not indicated as the Shari‟ah boards‟ top accounting involvement.  
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The impression from the above findings was that the Shari‟ah boards in Malaysian MIFC had 
not advanced beyond areas of Shari‟ah concern associated with approval of Islamic banking 
products and the need to ensure that the income generated and reported in the banks‟ annual 
reports is from Shari‟ah compliant activities. The explanation for this limitation rests in the 
revelation that the Shari‟ah boards receive the greatest assistance from the Shari‟ah 
department officers. This, combined with the fact above that the heads of Shari‟ah 
departments are mainly knowledgeable in Shari‟ah and fiqh al-mua‟malat, gives the 
opportunity for the Shari‟ah boards to delegate conveniently the task entrusted with them to 
the Shari‟ah officers of the bank. After the Shari‟ah department officers, the relevant parties 
who had given most assistance to the Shari‟ah boards were indicated as the management, 
followed by the board of directors. In addition, evidence of assistance from external auditors 
was significantly apparent for large-sized banks, hence revealing implementation of a more 
comprehensive Shari‟ah governance mechanism than in their counterparts, i.e. the small and 
medium-sized banks. 
 
In relation to the Shari‟ah boards‟ commitments, the Shari‟ah governance authority has given 
priority to efforts towards standardising Islamic banking practices by engaging in workshops 
and meetings of scholars of fiqh al-mua‟malat, with apparent emphasis given by the Shari‟ah 
boards on banks in the mid range of the establishments. This is followed by commitments to: 
(1) analysing whether Islamic banking products and services would deliver benefit to the 
ummah before they are launched and (2) enhancing Shari‟ah review skills by attending 
appropriate training. Meanwhile, evidence also indicates weak inspiration amongst the 
Shari‟ah boards in innovating Islamic banking products and their dilemma in revealing 
important Shari‟ah decisions pertaining to the Islamic banking operation. This is because 
some of them were not involved in: (1) publishing the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah resolutions 
and rulings and the mechanics of Shari‟ah compliance applied in the Islamic banks; (2) 
responding to any questions pertaining to pronouncements and resolutions issued by the 
Shari‟ah board through discussion with the shareholders or the public; and (3) efforts in 
innovation of Islamic banking products and services through discussion with relevant parties 
within the bank.  
 
Regarding accountability and independence, issues on how the Shari‟ah boards can be 
influenced by the two elements, as well as their reflection in the nature of the Shari‟ah 
boards‟ appointment and mandated authority, were investigated. Overall, factors referring to 
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the integrity of the Shari‟ah board members were given more importance than the Shari‟ah 
boards‟ fiduciary duties in influencing its accountability and independence. For example, 
Shari‟ah board members‟ ethical value and reputation were both revealed most and equally 
important as factors influencing the accountability of this Shari‟ah governance authority. This 
is followed by the Shari‟ah boards‟ Shari‟ah scholarly background, making all three elements 
representative of the Shari‟ah boards‟ integrity. Next, are the factors relating to the Shari‟ah 
boards‟ fiduciary duties, which, in order of importance, are the requirement for Shari‟ah 
boards to ensure Shari‟ah compliance and, subsequently, the stakeholders‟ reliance on the 
Shari‟ah review done by the Shari‟ah boards. Similarly, integrity factors have high 
importance in influencing the independence of the Shari‟ah board. The factor perceived as 
most important is the Shari‟ah board members‟ clearly defined scope of responsibilities, 
followed by the integrity attributes of the Shari‟ah board members, i.e., the perceived high 
ethical status and the scholarly background of the Shari‟ah board members. Next, in order of 
importance, are: adequate powers being mandated to the Shari‟ah board; involvement of 
Shari‟ah board in the same way as the Shari‟ah board in other industries; participation of top 
management in Shari‟ah board meetings; and, finally, the remuneration received by the 
Shari‟ah board. These findings are also worth considering from the regulatory point of view. 
Although the factors pertaining to the involvement of the Shari‟ah board being the same as 
the Shari‟ah board in other industries and the participation of top management in Shari‟ah 
board meetings were given less importance they, nevertheless, call for a review of the 
relevant regulatory guidelines, as both are generally practiced in banks offering Islamic 
banking operations.   
 
In addition, the parties to whom the Shari‟ah board is perceived as being most accountable 
are the board of directors and the SAC of BNM, where the response was that both were equal 
in importance. Evidently, these two main parties form the reporting line of the Shari‟ah 
board, as depicted by the SGF of the Malaysian Islamic banking operation. After these two 
parties, next in importance are the shareholders, followed by the banks‟ consumers and, 
finally, the public. 
 
On the nature of the Shari‟ah board members‟ appointment and mandated authority, it was 
revealed that the appointment of Shari‟ah board members is made based on „fit and proper‟ 
criteria and after ascertaining that there is no conflict of interest in their appointment. In 
addition, the Shari‟ah board members were indicated as being subject to certain performance 
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assessments by the bank or the BNM. However, several findings relating to the Shari‟ah 
boards‟ mandated authority require attention. For example, there are indications that the 
Shari‟ah board members were not given adequate power and there was an absence of a 
reporting channel to address conflict between important Shari‟ah governance parties within 
the bank, as well as an absence of segregation of the Shari‟ah boards‟ duties. Hence, although 
regulations relating to the Shari‟ah boards‟ appointment seem to have been addressed, it 
leaves the allowance of the Shari‟ah boards‟ authority to report possible disputes in its 
Shari‟ah governance role as questionable.   
 
Regarding the structure and implementation of Shari‟ah review by the Shari‟ah board, the 
overall impression provided from the answers by the respondents are that both have been 
properly and adequately satisfied by the banks. For example, the responses derived indicated 
an established perception amongst the respondents on the Shari‟ah boards that they were the 
sole authority for the Shari‟ah review and that this Shari‟ah governance authority has been 
prescribed with the appropriate operative procedure in its roles and functions by the bank. 
However, the answers amongst the minority of the respondents sparked a concern of possible 
governance crisis. This is due to the evidence from a small minority of the respondents, who 
dismissed the claim that the Shari‟ah boards are the sole authority in the Shari‟ah review 
exercise and who reported the absence of the aforementioned procedure. Also relevant is the 
fact that there is equal number of banks whose Shari‟ah board comprised of Shari‟ah scholars 
only as those comprising of diverse expertise. The increase in non-Shari‟ah scholars‟ 
participation as Shari‟ah board members, although it signalled an apparent challenge facing 
the Islamic banking industry relating to the lack of competent Shari‟ah scholars, also calls for 
an investigation into the possible implications of such an uprising. Meanwhile, another 
division amongst the perceptions of the heads of Shari‟ah departments is regarding the 
existence of an adequate and obvious guideline on the pronouncements and resolutions of 
SAC for use in the industry. While the respondents largely agreed on the establishment of 
such guidelines from the SAC, a small number of respondents indicated otherwise. In short, 
the findings of this study reported an established structure for the execution of Shari‟ah 
review by the Shari‟ah board, which also sheds light on the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah 
review function of the Shari‟ah board. However, there is also evidence highlighting concerns 
about the Shari‟ah boards‟ independence and possible compromises on the quality of the 
Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board, although these views were only represented 
by a minority of respondents. 
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On the implementation side, the general perception from the respondents‟ answers was that 
the Shari‟ah boards effectively carried out the Shari‟ah review function; however, apparent 
challenges were noted, with evidence from the small minority indicating complications in the 
execution of this crucial task. For example, the respondents generally perceived that the 
Shari‟ah boards have been given full authority to stop Shari‟ah non-compliant transactions. In 
addition, ample time for decision making and carrying out their Shari‟ah review function was 
indicated as having been provided. Moreover, the Shari‟ah boards have generally been 
perceived as having access to the required information and were furnished with the existence 
of active communication and consultation between the Shari‟ah board and the SAC of BNM. 
Disturbingly, this study also witnessed evidence that dismissed all the features mentioned. 
Moreover, although this contrary evidence represents only a small portion of the respondents, 
they raise concerns about the independence of the Shari‟ah board and call for further 
investigation into these matters. In addition, this study also discovered that the Shari‟ah board 
receives the professional advice required to support the implementation of its Shari‟ah review 
function.  
 
Interestingly, this study also highlighted evidence on a known challenge to the function of the 
Shari‟ah board, which is detrimental to Shari‟ah governance but remains unresolved, i.e., the 
part-time working nature of the Shari‟ah board. It appeared that a considerable number of 
respondents refute the claim that Shari‟ah boards‟ part-time working nature does not hinder 
the Shari‟ah review effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board. This revelation is alarming and 
imposed questions about the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah boards‟ Shari‟ah governance 
function. An important issue that emerged is about the quality of Shari‟ah compliance 
assurance that the Shari‟ah boards provide to the users of the Shari‟ah report. Despite the 
revelation of the above findings on the infrastructure support and the provision of the 
authority required, this study indicated that the Shari‟ah boards were unable to contribute an 
effective amount of time for reviewing the implementation of Shari‟ah decisions made 
previously by the Shari‟ah board. Hence, this study suggests that the part-time working 
nature of the Shari‟ah board and its effective Shari‟ah review could not possibly be attuned 
and emphasises the call for Shari‟ah audit by an independent Shari‟ah auditor, similar to the 
external financial auditor.  
 
The QS2 of Chapter Seven, on the other hand, revealed that most of the branch managers are 
trained in the field of accounting and finance, as well as a combination of Shari‟ah and fiqh 
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al-mua‟malat with other non-Islamic field(s). These training backgrounds reflect the 
relevance of the responses provided for discussion and for comparison with decisions derived 
from QS1 of Chapter Six. The responses provided indicated that the branch managers placed 
similar highest expectations on the Shari‟ah advisory capacity of the Shari‟ah board; 
however, this was with emphasis on advising the board of directors, advising Shari‟ah 
department officers on the scope of the Shari‟ah review and preparing the Shari‟ah 
compliance manual. These contrasting emphases demonstrate the pragmatic approach of the 
branch managers resulting from dealing with the day-to-day banking business operation. The 
branch managers also expressed their expectations on the Shari‟ah boards‟ involvement in 
advising and designing the corporate objectives of the bank and highlighted the areas of 
primary concern to them as being the banks‟ objectives, mission and vision.  
 
In relation to the Shari‟ah boards‟ involvement in developing Islamic banking products and 
services, the results revealed consistency in priority areas between what is expected by the 
branch managers and what is actually being exercised by the Shari‟ah board. These refer, in 
order of importance, to the conception, the legal documentation, the review, the design, the 
implementation and the pricing levels. However, results also indicated that the branch 
managers expected greater involvement by the Shari‟ah board, especially in the design, the 
pricing, the testing and the implementation levels. Also revealed was the greater emphasis for 
the Shari‟ah boards‟ involvement in the design and implementation levels amongst the branch 
managers from full-fledged Islamic banks, as compared with Islamic window banks, and for 
the implementation level for those from the mid range Islamic banking experience, as 
compared with other levels of Islamic banking operation experience.  
 
Regarding involvement in the accounting issues of the bank, priority areas expected by the 
branch managers from the Shari‟ah boards are relatively similar. Apparent emphases 
highlighted were the branch managers‟ concerns about the Shari‟ah boards‟ higher 
involvement in determining the profit distribution formula, approving accounting policy and 
issuing Shari‟ah reports. In addition, branch managers from foreign banks had greater 
concerns about the Shari‟ah boards‟ involvement in validating Islamic banking transaction 
records than those in domestic banks. Moreover, the branch managers from the large-sized 
banks also placed greater concern on issues pertaining to approving the calculation and 
distribution of zakat from the small and medium-sized banks. This same accounting issue, as 
well as another pertinent to validating documents in Islamic banking contracts, were also of 
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higher concern amongst those from the mid range Islamic banking experience, in comparison 
to their counterparts.     
 
The results in QS2 also indicated similar recognition of the role of Shari‟ah department 
officers as the party perceived as most important in assisting the role of the Shari‟ah board; 
however, this apparently received more emphasis amongst branch managers from the fully-
fledged Islamic banks, as compared with those from Islamic window banks. Also revealed 
was the greater importance placed on the role of audit committee, internal auditor and 
external auditor to assist the Shari‟ah board than these parties actually provided. The 
impression from QS2 on commitments to strengthen the Shari‟ah governance of the banks 
was that the Shari‟ah boards were not giving the level of involvement expected from them. 
For example, branch managers showed greater concern for the Shari‟ah boards‟ commitments 
on: (1) publically publishing Shari‟ah resolutions and rulings and the mechanics of Shari‟ah 
compliance applied in the Islamic bank; (2) engaging in innovation of Islamic banking 
products and services through discussions with concerned parties within the bank and (3) 
analysing how Islamic banking products and services would benefit the ummah before they 
are lunched. In addition, the first commitment mentioned was given more emphasis by the 
branch managers from fully-fledged Islamic banks as against those from Islamic window 
banks. Meanwhile, the third and further commitment, to actively engage actively in 
workshops and meetings of the scholars of fiqh al-mua‟malat to promote consistency in 
Islamic banking products and services, were both given more emphasis by branch managers 
from the mid range of Islamic banking experience, when compared with its counterparts.  
 
Regarding the factors influencing the Shari‟ah boards‟ accountability and independence, it 
was revealed that the branch managers emphasise the integrity of the Shari‟ah board 
members in a similar way to the heads of Shari‟ah departments. Interestingly, the factor of 
the Shari‟ah boards‟ requirement to ensure Shari‟ah compliance, which represents one of the 
Shari‟ah boards‟ fiduciary duties, was placed second among the factors influencing 
accountability of the Shari‟ah board members. While the branch managers reiterated the 
importance of integrity factors, this study also indicates that the branch managers additionally 
place importance on the accomplishment of the Shari‟ah boards‟ role in providing Shari‟ah 
compliance assurance as influencing the accountability of the Shari‟ah governance authority. 
In addition, the factors of the ethical value and the scholarly background of the Shari‟ah 
board were given more importance by branch managers amongst banks from the mid range of 
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Islamic banking experience when compared with its counterparts. Meanwhile, on factors 
influencing the Shari‟ah board members‟ independence, the overall results were that the 
branch managers place similar importance with the heads of Shari‟ah departments, as these 
factors were positioned in the same way as in QS1. However, it was revealed that the branch 
managers from the foreign banks placed more importance on adequate power being mandated 
to the Shari‟ah board than those in domestic banks. In addition, the scholarly background of 
the Shari‟ah board was revealed to have more importance amongst branch managers from 
banks in the mid range of Islamic banking experience as compared with their counterparts. 
 
Meanwhile, the parties to whom the branch managers deem the Shari‟ah boards accountable 
were slightly different from those perceived by the heads of Shari‟ah departments; however, 
this was with apparent importance given by the branch managers on the need to secure public 
interest. This is because, although both respondents agreed on the SAC of BNM as being the 
most important party deemed accountable by the Shari‟ah boards, the branch managers 
expressed concern that next most important is the public and that this is followed by the 
board of directors. In contrast, the heads of Shari‟ah department were more concerned with 
the board of directors, as they shared the same position with the SAC of BNM as the most 
important party deemed accountable, while the public was perceived as being least important. 
On the other hand, the banks‟ consumers and shareholders were perceived as least important 
by the branch managers.  
 
In addition, investigation into the nature of the Shari‟ah board members‟ appointment and 
mandated authority, as a reflection of the accountability and independence of the Shari‟ah 
board members, revealed almost identical emphasis given by the two respondent groups. 
Nevertheless, the heads of Shari‟ah departments made a higher claim for the Shari‟ah board 
members to be subjected to assessment by the bank or the BNM than was expected by the 
branch managers. Moreover, the features of (1) no conflict of interest in the appointment of 
the Shari‟ah board; (2) Shari‟ah board members being subject to assessment by the bank or 
BNM, and (3) the existence of reporting channels to report conflicts with the Shari‟ah board, 
board of directors or the management were apparently more important amongst the branch 
managers from fully-fledged Islamic banks than to those from Islamic window banks. 
Furthermore, the second feature was also given more importance amongst those from large-
sized banks when compared to those from small and medium-sized banks. In addition, the 
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first and the second feature were given more importance by branch managers from the mid 
range Islamic banking experience when compared to its counterparts.   
 
Regarding the structure of Shari‟ah review, the general impression of the perceptions of the 
branch managers was the support on the establishment of all the structures featured. For 
example, most of the branch managers indicated their agreement for the Shari‟ah boards to be 
the sole authority in the Shari‟ah review task; however, there was evidence from a minority 
of the respondents dismissing such a call. Indeed, this is the only feature in the structure of 
Shari‟ah review where the branch managers expressed their disagreement. In addition, the 
branch managers also emphasised the need for the SAC of BNM to carry out the Shari‟ah 
reference role for the Islamic banking industry and for adequate and explicit guidelines for 
use in the industry to be provided by this supreme authority. In fact, the call for these 
guidelines has been given greater emphasis amongst branch managers from the fully-fledged 
and large-sized Islamic banks. Moreover, these branch managers also perceived that the dual-
layer of Shari‟ah governance system implemented in Malaysia is effective in ensuring the 
stability of the Islamic banking industry operation and is capable of harmonising Islamic 
banking practice.  
 
Meanwhile, on the topic of the implementation of Shari‟ah review, the responses received 
from the branch managers generally supported all the investigated features, although there is 
evidence indicating division of perceptions amongst these respondents. For example, the 
branch managers call for the Shari‟ah board to be given full authority to stop banks from 
undertaking Shari‟ah non-compliant transactions, although a small minority of the branch 
managers also reportedly dismissed such a notion. In addition, the branch managers also 
called for the SAC to adopt rigorous procedures to examine and endorse Islamic financial 
products submitted by banks offering Islamic banking products. Indeed, this is the only one 
of the Shari‟ah boards‟ Shari‟ah review implementation features where there is no dismissal 
amongst the branch managers and where those from the fully-fledged Islamic banks placed 
greater emphasis. Furthermore, there was also a division of perceptions amongst the branch 
managers on the notion of whether working part-time hinders the effectiveness of the 
Shari‟ah board. Nevertheless, this dismissal represents only the small minority of the branch 
managers, whereas the larger sample considered it in the affirmative. Moreover, the QS2 also 
revealed that the branch managers mainly perceived that the Shari‟ah compliance and 
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accounting issues have been adequately disclosed in the Shari‟ah report, although the 
minority of respondents presented evidence to the contrary. 
 
Meanwhile, on the ranking of importance amongst the parties concerned with the Shari‟ah 
governance of banks offering Islamic banking services, the responses provided by the branch 
managers revealed in first place the SAC of BNM. Relevant parties from within the bank 
follow, starting primarily with the Shari‟ah board and then the Shari‟ah department officers. 
Subsequently, the board of directors follow in the ranking and, finally, the management.  
 
In relation to the in-depth interview, the responses were presented and discussed in Chapter 
Eight. Overall, the interview results provided an in-depth understanding of the role, 
independence and the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah governance function 
issues investigated.  
 
It became apparent from the discussion with the participants that the concerned parties within 
the SGF placed high importance on Shari‟ah governance as the mechanism to ensure the 
Shari‟ah compliance of the Islamic banking operations, however with evidence of a business 
connotation amongst the management, as indicated in the selection of Shari‟ah board 
members. It emerged that the appointment of Shari‟ah board members has direct association 
with the board‟s roles and functions. The interview revealed the apparent division amongst 
the participants on the qualifications of the Shari‟ah board members on whether the board 
should comprise of only Shari‟ah scholars or should have a membership of scholars with 
diverse qualifications. Moreover, associated with this qualification is the interview 
participants‟ argument of its unique contribution to the Shari‟ah governance, which 
qualifications from another background would not be able to match. For example, the 
proponents of the Shari‟ah board with diverse qualifications justified this based on the 
Shari‟ah being dynamic and matters such as mua‟malat, and its application in modern 
banking, is open to interpretation. Hence, diverse qualifications amongst the Shari‟ah board 
members is associated with the ability to innovate Islamic banking products, which is usually 
complicated and hybrid in nature, with various Islamic financial contracts being linked 
together. In addition, the participants also revealed the need for the Shari‟ah board to advise 
the bank on its Shari‟ah advisory capacity in all spectrums of the banks‟ activities; hence, the 
argument was made for the Shari‟ah board not to be limited to Shari‟ah scholars only.  
  
 372 
On the other hand, the proponents of the Shari‟ah board comprising only of Shari‟ah scholars 
are basically the Shari‟ah scholars amongst the Shari‟ah boards themselves and the banks‟ 
heads of Shari‟ah departments. Their arguments are on the basis that the Shari‟ah scholars 
usually master the Arabic language and, hence, are able to read the classical Arabic 
manuscripts for research purposes; understand maqasid al-Shari‟ah (objectives of the 
Shari‟ah) better; and, therefore, arrive at solid Shari‟ah decisions. As such, it is apparent that 
they defend the view that Shari‟ah decisions are the prerogative of Shari‟ah scholars and 
place their justification on the implication that the qualifications of Shari‟ah board members 
have an impact on the quality of Shari‟ah decisions made. Nonetheless, it was revealed that 
this group of interview participants recognised the need for non-Shari‟ah experts; however, 
this was in their designation as consultants to the Shari‟ah board and not as the Shari‟ah 
board itself. Others who relaxed the rigidity on the Shari‟ah board membership compromised 
by agreeing to the inclusion of non-Shari‟ah scholars but, however, were of the opinion that 
the majority of the Shari‟ah board members should be amongst the Shari‟ah scholars.  
 
The interview also revealed the importance of relevant Islamic banking experience amongst 
the Shari‟ah board members. It became apparent from the interviews with the BNM officers 
and heads of Shari‟ah departments that a requisite for quality Shari‟ah decisions is the need 
for Shari‟ah board members to expand their view beyond theoretical framework, without 
which the Shari‟ah board is perceived to be unable to contribute to the Shari‟ah governance 
of the bank. Indeed, the management of the banks perceive the Shari‟ah board members who 
possess relevant experience as being able to alleviate challenges associated with innovation 
of Islamic banking products and increasing the level of Shari‟ah compliance of the banking 
operation.    
 
In addition, the interview also indicated that the appointment of Shari‟ah board members has 
an image-building and commercial reasoning facet for the banks. This is apparent from the 
appointment of Shari‟ah board members amongst local Shari‟ah dignitaries and prominent 
international figures. Besides establishing the image as insurer of the banks‟ ethical 
operations, the appointment of these Shari‟ah board members also has been highlighted as 
having an aim of tapping their knowledge in relation to Islamic banking product offering and 
penetration into the international financial market.  
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Regarding the Shari‟ah advisory role, the Shari‟ah boards have been revealed as being 
involved in mainly, but not limited to, issues surrounding Islamic banking products to be 
offered to customers. It has become apparent that, in approving Islamic banking products, 
justification for the Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board is made not merely on the 
principles laid down in the Qur‟an and hadith, but also by giving consideration to the needs 
of the Muslims and by making evaluations of the dynamism of the banking operation. A 
typical example of this condition was revealed as the approval of controversial Islamic 
banking products due to the absence of alternative Islamic banking products. Also 
highlighted by the participants was the accounting and finance concerns during the design 
and implementation stages of developing Islamic banking products. Among other factors, this 
included the accounting implications brought by the sequence of transactions, the nature of 
assets involved and the transfer of risks and ownership between the contracting parties. 
Indeed, it has been revealed that accounting is an important tool in justifying the legality of 
the timing choice for income recognition, by the management, from the Shari‟ah perspective.  
 
Meanwhile, the interview makes it apparent that the Shari‟ah boards‟ involvement in the 
Shari‟ah review function is minimal and inconclusive. Although the Shari‟ah board members 
interviewed concurred with the importance of Shari‟ah review, with more apparent emphasis 
given by the Shari‟ah boards whose parent bank is a conventional bank, it has been indicated 
that the Shari‟ah officers of the bank are primarily undertaking the Shari‟ah review function 
of the Shari‟ah board. Explanation for such lack of commitment amongst the Shari‟ah board 
was highlighted as being due to time limitation factors resulting from the Shari‟ah boards‟ 
part-time attachment to the bank and an absence of clear guidelines from the regulator on the 
mechanism for implementation of the Shari‟ah review. The latter has resulted in banks 
developing a Shari‟ah compliance manual, which specifies that the Shari‟ah review task is to 
be undertaken by the Shari‟ah officers and the Shari‟ah boards only provide their approval.  
 
In addition, the interview also makes apparent a new avenue of Shari‟ah review. The Shari‟ah 
board members and the Shari‟ah officers interviewed revealed that Shari‟ah review of 
previous Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board also took place in their respective 
banks. If the previous Shari‟ah decision was indeed mistakenly concluded and, if a change of 
Shari‟ah ruling is made by the Shari‟ah board, the emerging issue that arises is whether the 
Shari‟ah decisions issued by the Shari‟ah board can be challenged. Interestingly, these issues 
also open a new dimension on Shari‟ah audit, such as whether Shari‟ah decisions issued by 
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the Shari‟ah board have been accurately concluded and what the accounting implications are 
of such review exercises on the banks' reported income. Also discovered was the issue of the 
decisiveness of the Shari‟ah review decisions made by the Shari‟ah board. The interview 
participants highlighted the need for Shari‟ah boards to gain clarification from all relevant 
parties within the bank, as to the possibility of Shari‟ah non-compliance findings by the 
Shari‟ah boards, before this Shari‟ah governance authority could reach any verdict.  
 
It has also been discussed in Chapter Eight that the interview makes apparent factors 
contributing to as well as, conversely, hindering the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah boards‟ 
Shari‟ah governance function. The discussion with interview participants highlighted a clear 
accountability paradigm amongst the concerned parties within the bank, the support of 
relevant parties with experience in Islamic banking, the holistic approach to Shari‟ah 
governance, the concerted Shari‟ah governance mechanism and efficient regulatory 
framework as factors contributing to the effectiveness of the Shari‟ah boards‟ Shari‟ah 
governance function. On the other hand, the factors that hinder the effectiveness of the 
Shari‟ah boards‟ Shari‟ah governance function, highlighted in the interviews, were the 
drawbacks of the functional independence of the Shari‟ah board and Shari‟ah governance 
tasks being undertaken ineffectively by the Shari‟ah board. Additional factors were 
inadequate regulatory support, ineffective functioning of designated institutions and, finally, 
the absence of Shari‟ah audit and its concern about the quality of the Shari‟ah reports.  
 
With regard to the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system, the discussion held with the SAC 
members and the BNM officers makes it apparent that the SAC of BNM, as the Shari‟ah apex 
body and the Shari‟ah reference for the Malaysian Islamic banking industry, issue their 
Shari‟ah resolutions by first making reference to Shari‟ah standards issued by international 
regulatory and Shari‟ah reference bodies, such as AAOIFI, OIC‟s Fiqh Academy and Dar al 
Barakah (resulting from Multaqa Dallah al-Barakah forum). However, these interview 
participants revealed that the SAC does not restrict itself to these Shari‟ah standards. In 
addition, the interview makes apparent the initiative by the BNM and other concerned parties 
to standardise Islamic banking practice at the national, as well as at the regional, level. 
Examples of effort at the national level are: establishing Shari‟ah parameters in Islamic 
banking products and a standardised master agreement for interbank transactions while, at the 
regional level, it is the annual gathering of prominent Shari‟ah scholars from the south-east 
Asian countries.  
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The interview with the SAC members also highlighted that the council does not limit itself to 
interpretations of the Shari‟ah based on the Shafi‟i‟s school of Islamic thought, despite the 
majority of the Muslims in Malaysia subscribing to them. Such apparent flexibility of 
approach undertaken by the SAC was meant to ensure that banks could offer Islamic banking 
products and services that would cater for the financial needs of the Muslims and for the 
Muslims to commit themselves to a banking system that is consistent with the Shari‟ah. The 
discussions held with the Shari‟ah board, SAC and BNM officers also made apparent their 
dismissal of the thought that the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system implemented in 
Malaysia would tend to limit the creativity and innovation of Islamic banking products. This 
is because, although the SAC takes a flexible approach in issuing its Shari‟ah resolutions, the 
Shari‟ah board at the bank level could be more stringent by opting to refuse controversial 
Islamic banking products permitted by the SAC. Indeed, the Shari‟ah board could issue new 
Islamic banking products that, after being scrutinised and permitted by the SAC, would be 
able to launch it to their customers.  
  
9.2 Theoretical Implications and Recommendation for Practice  
At the heart of Islamic banking objectives, it appears that the relevant theoretical framework 
underlying the operation of Islamic banks is the stakeholder theory. Further, when the 
concept of Islamic accountability is put together into this theoretical framework, the 
stakeholders are deemed to be ultimately interested in ascertaining the realization of an 
Islamic banking operation and the provision of its products and services that are Shari‟ah 
compliant. In this regard, the Shari‟ah boards play a significant role in the SGF of the Islamic 
banking industry as the external and independent party responsible for providing the Shari‟ah 
compliance assurance required by the stakeholders. However, there is some flaw on the task 
of providing that assurance, as demonstrated through the Shari‟ah review role of these 
Shari‟ah boards. This study revealed that, in most cases, the Shari‟ah review is undertaken by 
the banks‟ Shari‟ah department officers, and its results are then presented to the Shari‟ah 
board for approval. Furthermore, there is some evidence indicating that there is no due 
diligence on the part of Shari‟ah board members when undertaking this task. Hence, the 
effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board in carrying out this crucial Shari‟ah review task does not 
seem to get enhanced under the Malaysian dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system, although 
this study reported the existence of an established structure for the Shari‟ah review. 
Nonetheless, the governance alliance promoted by the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system 
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between that of the Shari‟ah boards and the SAC of BNM has demonstrated an advance in 
Islamic banking practices that is standardized.  
 
Additionally, this study discovered that the appointment of Shari‟ah board members had an 
image building facet as well as to serve the business motives of Islamic banks. This, 
combined with the drawback of the governance function of the Shari‟ah board addressed 
above, added to the potential for this Shari‟ah authority to be used as the vehicle for serving 
the opportunistic behaviour of the management. Meanwhile, the pressure imposed by the 
market and the regulator for Islamic banks to feature products and services that would 
safeguard investment of the investors and depositors points to the fact that the operation of 
Islamic banks does not advance beyond ensuring a positive return to these parties. These facts 
seem to have let the Islamic banking industry emphasis shift from a stakeholders‟ to an 
agency theoretical framework of operation as the interests of shareholders and depositors 
remain the focal point of the operation of Islamic banks.  
 
Meanwhile, the apparent loophole in the Shari‟ah review function of the Shari‟ah board 
mentioned above jeopardises the independence of this Shari‟ah governance authority, and 
hence compromises the credibility of the Shari‟ah report issued by the Shari‟ah board. It is 
therefore suggested that until, and unless, Shari‟ah audit is taken up by an external and 
independent Shari‟ah auditor other than the Shari‟ah board, the present role and function of 
the Shari‟ah board will be merely to rubber stamping the work already undertaken by the 
banks‟ internal Shari‟ah governance mechanisms. In this regard, it is recommended that 
Shari‟ah audit should be conducted by external Shari‟ah auditors, similar to auditing of 
financial statements. Accordingly, this means that the Shari‟ah report issued by the Shari‟ah 
board should be regarded as similar to the director‟s report in other corporations. In addition, 
verification of the true and fair presentation of this Shari‟ah report, similar to that undertaken 
by the external auditor of financial statements prepared by the management, is deemed 
crucial. This implies that the Shari‟ah compliance assurance, that the shareholders and 
stakeholders seek to find, would be attained from external verification of the Shari‟ah report 
instead of the Shari‟ah board‟s report itself. All in all, this would enhance the credibility of 
the Shari‟ah report. However, an important repercussion from the above recommendation is 
the requirement for regulatory guidelines on the Shari‟ah audit framework for both the 
internal and external Shari‟ah auditor which currently do not exist.  
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This study has also introduced possible avenues regarding Shari‟ah boards‟ Shari‟ah 
governance function, where the Shari‟ah audit could be carried out, including the auditing of 
the Shari‟ah decisions of the Shari‟ah board. Implementation of the latter offers a new 
dimension to Shari‟ah audit, where external Shari‟ah auditors are given the authority to 
question the accuracy of decisions made by the Shari‟ah board, hence assigning 
accountability to the Shari‟ah board for the decisions it makes. While it has been discussed 
throughout the thesis that Shari‟ah decisions are the sole authority and prerogative of each 
Shari‟ah scholar, evidence derived from this study has made apparent the radical need for this 
esteemed Shari‟ah governance authority to be held accountable for any of its malfunctions. 
Interpreted differently, this recommendation and the recommendation for verification of 
Shari‟ah reports by an external Shari‟ah auditor mentioned above, implies the importance of 
establishing classification of Shari‟ah decisions, issued by the Shari‟ah board, into those 
derived from deep Shari‟ah knowledge and the wisdom of the Shari‟ah board members, 
which should not be questioned, and those that could be challenged. Not least in importance 
are the calls for audit firms to take up the challenge in establishing or strengthening their 
Shari‟ah audit capacity by focusing on a relatively young but promising sector, i.e., Islamic 
financial institutions, including Islamic banks, and by developing the talent pool and the 
competency required for the task.  
 
In addition, the regulator, in this case BNM, should consider enhancing the independence of 
Shari‟ah board members by mandating a shift in the approach to Shari‟ah board members‟ 
appointments. Consistent with AAOIFI‟s governance standard, the Shari‟ah board members 
are recommended to be appointed by the shareholders instead of the board of directors. This 
appointment mechanism would ensure that the Shari‟ah board is made accountable and has a 
reporting line to the shareholders. In addition, the trend of the present Shari‟ah boards‟ 
membership seems to indicate that banks recruit Shari‟ah board members based on their 
experience in the operation of Islamic banking, but not on their Shari‟ah expertise in Islamic 
finance, hence having possible implications on the quality of Shari‟ah decisions issued by the 
Shari‟ah board, as has been discussed previously. It remain to be seen whether the 
requirement set in the new SGF, which became effective on 1
st
 January 2011, for Shari‟ah 
board members to number a minimum of 5, with at least 3 from a Shari‟ah background, will 
enhance the Shari‟ah governance of the Islamic financial institutions. In ensuring the quality 
of Shari‟ah decisions, it is recommended that, besides ensuring that the majority of the 
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Shari‟ah board membership is from the Shari‟ah background, the Shari‟ah boards‟ chairman 
position should also be entrusted to a Shari‟ah board member from the same background.  
 
Given the prosperous growth of the Islamic banking market share, it seems that the industry 
has the prospect of becoming more established in the mainstream banking system, while 
more conventional banks are expected to integrate Islamic banking operations. Hence, it is 
expected that the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board will become more 
crucial and, aligned with the above recommendation, its role will firmly emphasise on the 
Shari‟ah advisory capacity, while assurance of Shari‟ah compliance rests with the external 
Shari‟ah auditor. Meanwhile, the role of the central Shari'ah advisory board, such as the SAC, 
is becoming more essential for standardising Islamic banking practices. In the light of fast 
decision-making requirements by businesses such as banks, standardisation mechanisms, 
such as the existing Shari‟ah parameter developed by the SAC of BNM or the Master 
Agreement by AIBIM, are recommended to be expanded to include other Islamic banking 
products and operations.  
 
 
9.3 Limitations and Scope for Further Research  
This study is a two-stage research design in which the aim of the in-depth interview 
conducted at the second stage was not intended to check the validity of the questionnaire 
survey findings in the first stage. It was, rather, to provide a deeper understanding of the 
process involved in the issues surrounding the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah 
board under investigation. In addition, the in-depth interviews with Shari‟ah board members, 
heads of Shari‟ah departments, the CEOs and senior executives of banks were conducted 
based on convenience sampling and, thus, limited only to several banks participating in the 
MIFC. Although these methodological concerns limit the generalisability of the findings, it is 
argued that the findings derived from the two-stage design of this study enhance the validity 
of the overall analysis by producing a more complete picture of the Shari‟ah governance 
function of the Shari‟ah board.   
 
Secondly, the scope of the current study is confined to the operation of banks encompassing 
Islamic banking activities, although some of these banks are also involved in Shari‟ah-
compliant investment in the Malaysian Islamic capital market, which is subject to the 
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Securities Commission‟s guidelines. Hence, reference to the guidelines on the Shari‟ah 
governance function of the Shari‟ah boards used for the questionnaire survey and in-depth 
interview are limited to those issued by BNM. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive 
evaluation of the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board, it is recommended that 
future research should expand the current study by also examining issues investigated in this 
study taking into account the regulatory framework and guidelines of the Securities 
Commission. Indeed, such a study could provide a more comprehensive assessment of the 
dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system, as the Malaysian Islamic capital market similarly 
operates a dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system, under the auspices of the SAC of the 
Securities Commission, as the supreme Shari‟ah authority governing the Malaysian Islamic 
capital market industry.    
 
Thirdly, the two questionnaire surveys were designed to gain a general understanding of the 
Shari‟ah board issues under investigation. Because the Shari‟ah boards‟ roles and functions 
are influenced by the nature of the Islamic banking operation, several control variables have 
been used to analyse the data for this study, namely factors attributing to the banks‟ size, 
type, ownership and Islamic banking experience. However, the fact that the respondents‟ 
exposure to the Shari‟ah governance function of the Shari‟ah board varies could result in the 
perceptions cast on the issues highlighted in the questionnaire being prematurely concluded. 
For example, in the case of QS2, the Shari‟ah governance exposure of a branch manager from 
a standalone, fully-fledged Islamic bank is assumed to be more extensive than that of a 
branch manager from another fully-fledged Islamic bank whose parent bank operates a dual 
banking system, i.e., both conventional and Islamic banking. This limitation, although it 
affected the aim of the current questionnaire survey, offers further investigation into 
variations in the Islamic banking operation segments for future research.   
 
Finally, this study highlights that the Shari‟ah review of banks offering Islamic banking in 
Malaysia was found not to have been effectively undertaken by Shari‟ah boards and that the 
Shari‟ah report issued by the board was reported to have nearly depended on investigations 
by the bank‟s Shari‟ah department officers. This shows that the Shari‟ah department officers 
play a vital role in the Shari‟ah governance of the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia. 
However, since the focus of the present study is to purely investigate aspects of the 
governance function of the Shari‟ah board there are, nevertheless, other aspects surrounding 
the role of Shari‟ah department officers such as their independence and effectiveness which 
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could be part of the future research agenda. In addition, this study examined the governance 
function of Shari‟ah boards in the context of the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system 
practiced in Malaysia which is recognised to be the most established and comprehensive in 
the Islamic world. Future research could extend the findings of this study by investigating the 
dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system practiced in other countries thus providing valuable 
insights into practices elsewhere in the Islamic world.  
 
Despite its many caveats, the current study establishes evidence on the role, independence 
and effectiveness of the Shari‟ah board‟s Shari‟ah governance function in the context of the 
Malaysian dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system for the Islamic banking industry. It 
contributes to the existing literature by providing rich empirical data relating to all concerned 
parties within the SGF and other stakeholders, hence it stands out beyond the surface 
understanding of the issues investigated.   
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A Research Survey on the Shari’ah Board of the 
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General Instructions and Information 
 
1. Please answer the questions in each section by placing a tick in the appropriate box or 
by circling the appropriate number.  
2. You can be assured that the details you provide will be treated in the STRICTEST OF 
CONFIDENCE. Any disclosure of results will be done in aggregate form and individual 
Islamic banks or organisations will not be identified. 
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Department of Accounting and Finance    Cardiff University 
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sheikhhassanAF@cardiff.ac.uk  
 
 
 
  
 
Questionnaire to the Heads of Shari’ah Department (QS1): 
 
Section A: The Role of the Shari’ah Committee (SC) 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following roles of the SC in 
banks offering Islamic banking services and the associated procedures used in performing 
these roles by placing a circle in the appropriate box based on the scale from 1 to 5 where: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree 
(SD) 
Disagree (D) Uncertain (U) Agree (A) Strongly Agree 
(SA) 
 
1. In my view, the procedures used by the SC are consistent with the following standards and 
guidelines: 
Guidelines on the role of SCs SD D U A SA 
a) Governance standards issued by the AAOIFI 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) Prudential standards issued by the IFSB 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) Guidelines on the governance of the Shari‟ah 
Committee for Islamic Financial Institutions issued by 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM/ GPS 1) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. The role of the SC in your bank could be defined as including the following:  
The Role and Scope of the SC  SD D U A SA 
a) Advise the Board of Directors on Shari‟ah matters 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) Assist other parties on Shari‟ah matters1  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) Advise the Shari‟ah Department officer on the scope of 
Shari‟ah review required  
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Provide training to the Shari‟ah Department officers to 
ensure effective Shari‟ah review by the latter  
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Report to the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of Bank 
Negara Malaysia on Shari‟ah matters. 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) Prepare the Shari‟ah compliance manual to be used in 
the Islamic bank 
1 2 3 4 5 
g) Endorse the Shari‟ah compliance manual prepared by 
the management of the bank 
1 2 3 4 5 
      
 
                                                 
1
 For example, having discussions with legal advisers and accountants when developing an Islamic bank‟s 
products and services or assisting external auditors during auditing periods 
  
 
3. The SC in your bank is involved in advising and designing the following corporate objectives 
of the bank by incorporating Shari‟ah values or ensuring its compatibility with the Islamic 
Shari‟ah: 
Corporate Objectives of Islamic Banks SD D U A SA 
a) The bank‟s mission 1 2 3 4 5 
b) The bank‟s vision 1 2 3 4 5 
c) The bank‟s goals 1 2 3 4 5 
d) The bank‟s objectives 1 2 3 4 5 
e) The bank‟s corporate brand value 1 2 3 4 5 
f) The bank‟s long-term strategic direction  1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. The SC in your bank is involved in the following stages of developing the Islamic banking 
products and services: 
Development of Islamic Banking Products and Services SD D U A SA 
a) Conception level2  1 2 3 4 5 
b) Design level3 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Pricing level 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Legal documentation level 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Testing level4  1 2 3 4 5 
f) Marketing level 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Implementation level  1 2 3 4 5 
h) Review level  1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. The SC in your bank is involved in the following important accounting issues: 
Accounting Issues of Banks SD D U A SA 
a) Determining the formula for profit distribution 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Approve the calculation and distribution of zakat  1 2 3 4 5 
c) Approve the accounting policy to be applied 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Validating documentation used on Islamic financing 
contracts 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Validating the Islamic banking transaction records 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Issuing the Shari‟ah compliance report of the bank 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Endorsing the annual report prepared by the 
management of the bank 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
                                                 
2
 For example, arriving at an agreement on the concept of the Islamic banking products or services based on the 
Shari‟ah principles 
3
 For example, designing the product or service to be launched to consumers based on initial agreement on its 
concepts  
4
 For example, computer programming (or IT) testing and simulation of the Islamic banking products and 
services. 
  
 
6.    When performing its roles and duties, the SC in your bank receives assistance from the 
following relevant parties:  
 
 Relevant Parties who Assist SC  SD D U A SA 
a) Shari‟ah Department  1 2 3 4 5 
b) Audit Committee  1 2 3 4 5 
c) Internal auditor  1 2 3 4 5 
d) External auditor  1 2 3 4 5 
e) Board of Directors  1 2 3 4 5 
f) The management  1 2 3 4 5 
g) „Shared services‟5 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Consultants 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 7.     The SC in your bank undertakes the following commitments:  
General Commitment  SD D U A SA 
a) Publishing the SC‟s Shari‟ah resolutions and rulings 
and the mechanics of Shari‟ah compliance applied in 
the Islamic bank to the public  
1 2 3 4 5 
b) Actively engaging in innovation of the Islamic banking 
products and services through discussion with the 
management, accountants, lawyers and other concerned 
parties to fulfil the more demanding needs of 
consumers 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) Actively engaging in workshops and meetings of the 
ulamma of fiqh almua‟malat to present and debate 
existing and new Shari‟ah resolutions in order to 
promote consistency in Islamic banking products and 
services 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Adequately analysing whether Islamic banking 
products and services would deliver benefit to the 
ummah before they are launched  
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Enhancing Shari‟ah review skills by attending 
appropriate training for SC‟s continuous professional 
development.  
1 2 3 4 5 
f) Responding to any questions pertaining to 
pronouncements and resolutions issued by the SC 
through discussion with the shareholders or the public 
in a general assembly or similar forum  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 For example, oversight committee such as auditors and support services such as accountants 
  
 
Section B: Accountability and Independence of the Shari’ah Committee (SC) 
 
Please indicate below the level of importance of the factors that influence the accountability and 
independence of the SC in banks offering Islamic banking services. 
 
1. In my view, the accountability of the SC members is influenced by the following factors:  
 Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Uncertain Important 
Very  
Important 
a) The ethical values of the 
SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The scholarly background 
of the SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The reputation of the SC 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Stakeholders‟ reliance on 
Shari‟ah review of the SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) The requirement for the 
SC to ensure the Shari‟ah 
compliance of the bank  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
2. In my view, the independence of the SC members is influenced by the following factor(s): 
 
 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Uncertain Important 
Very  
Important 
a) A clearly defined scope of 
responsibilities   
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The remuneration 
received by the SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The scholarly background 
of the SC  
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The perceived high ethical 
status of the SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Adequate powers being 
mandated to the SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) Participation of top 
management in SC‟s 
meeting 
1 2 3 4 5 
g) Involvement of SC as 
Shari‟ah committee in 
other industry 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Please indicate below the level of importance concerning the parties to whom the SC members are 
accountable. 
 
3. In my view, the SC members are accountable to the following parties: 
 Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Uncertain Important 
Very  
Important 
a) The bank‟s shareholders 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The bank‟s consumers 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The bank‟s Board of 
Directors  
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The public  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council of Bank Negara 
Malaysia  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following aspects of SC members‟ 
appointment and the SC‟s mandated authority in performing their Shari‟ah review role in banks 
offering Islamic banking services by placing a circle in the appropriate box based on the scale from 1 
to 5 where: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree 
(SD) 
Disagree (D) Uncertain (U) Agree (A) Strongly Agree (SA) 
 
4. The SC members in your bank possess the following appointment and Shari‟ah review features:  
Nature of SC Appointment and Mandated Authority SD D U A SA 
a) The appointment of SC members is made based on certain „fit and 
proper‟ qualification criteria  
1 2 3 4 5 
b) There is no conflict of interest on the appointment of SC members6 1 2 3 4 5 
c) The SC members are subject to certain assessment by the bank or 
the Bank Negara Malaysia 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Adequate power has been mandated to the SC to perform its role  1 2 3 4 5 
e) There is a reporting channel for SC members if any conflict arises 
between the SC members and the Board of Directors or the 
management of the bank 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) There is proper segregation of SC duties, as in giving endorsement 
to an Islamic banking product and the Shari‟ah compliance review 
of the product 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Such as being substantial shareholders or having an intimate relationship with an employee of the bank it 
serves 
 
  
 
Section C: The Nature of Shari’ah Review by the Shari’ah Committee (SC) 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following nature of the SC‟s 
Shari‟ah governance function by placing a circle in the appropriate box based on the scale from 1 to 
5 where: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree 
(SD) 
Disagree (D) Uncertain (U) Agree (A) Strongly Agree (SA) 
 
1. The structure for Shari‟ah review by the SC in your bank could be described as include the 
following features: 
The Structure for Shari’ah Review by the SC SD D U A SA 
a) The SC is the sole authority on the Shari‟ah review system 
within individual bank that offers Islamic banking services 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The SC has been prescribed the appropriate operative 
procedures on its roles and functions by the bank  
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The membership of the SC comprises various experts such as 
Shari‟ah scholars, accountants, lawyers, etc.  
1 2 3 4 5 
d) There are effective communication channels to deliberate 
Shari‟ah review issues in banks offering Islamic banking 
services 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Adequate and apparent guidelines on the pronouncements and 
resolutions of the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara 
Malaysia has been issued for use in Islamic banking industry.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. The implementation of Shari‟ah review by the SC in your bank could be described as include the 
following features: 
The Implementation of Shari’ah Review by the SC SD D U A SA 
a) The SC has the full authority to stop banks from undertaking 
non-Shari‟ah compliant transactions 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The SC has been given ample time in their decision making 
process and review function 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The SC gets professional advice to support its functions such as 
on legal, accounting and finance aspects 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The SC has direct access to relevant, accurate, adequate and 
timely information 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) The fact that SC members work part time in banks does not 
hinder effective Shari‟ah review of the operation of banks 
offering Islamic banking services. 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) There has been active communication and consultation between 
the SC and the bank with the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of 
Bank Negara Malaysia. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Section D: Demographic information about you. 
 
Please tick () where appropriate: 
 
1. What is your gender? 
  Male  Female 
 
2. Which of these age ranges do you fall into? 
  25-34    35-44 
 45-54                                                         55-64 
 65 and above 
 
3.   How long have your been in the Islamic banking industry? 
  0-5 years  6-10 years 
 11-15 years  16 years and above 
 
4.   How long have your banking institution been offering Islamic banking products and 
services? 
  0-5 years  6-10 years 
 11-15 years  16 years and above 
 
5. What is the highest level of education that you have achieved? 
   High school diploma  Bachelor‟s degree 
 Master‟s degree  PhD 
 Professional certificate    Other  
 
6.  Which aspect of training have you attained? 
  Shari‟ah  Fiqh almua‟malat 
 Management  Accounting and Finance 
 Economics  Law  
 Others, please specify ......................... 
 
7.    Which other organisational bodies are you affiliated to? 
  Bank Negara Malaysia  AAOIFI  
 IFSB  Malaysian Accounting Standard Board  
 None of the above   
 
8. Is any of your Shari‟ah Board Committee simultaneously a member of any other Islamic 
bank‟s Shari‟ah Board Committee abroad? 
 Yes   No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
GENERAL INFORMATION: 
 
Islamic Bank‟s/Organisation‟s Name:  __________________________ 
 
Approximate numbers of internal Shari‟ah audit/Shari‟ah Department staff:______________ 
 
What is your job title and department? 
Job title   :  
Department : 
 
Would you be willing, if necessary, to grant an interview?    
  Yes   No 
If the answer is Yes, please provide your name, contact number and address: 
 
Name   : 
Contact Number : 
Contact Address : 
Email Address : 
 
If there is anything else you want to add or comment that you think may help us to 
understand the Shari‟ah governance in Malaysian banks that offer Islamic banking services, 
please include them in the spaces provided below:  
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION  
 
  
 
Questionnaire to the Banks’ Branch Managers (QS2): 
 
Section A: Perceptions on the Role of Shari’ah Committee (SC) 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following role of the SC in 
banks offering Islamic banking services and the associated procedures used in performing 
these roles by placing a circle in the appropriate box based on the scale from 1 to 5 where: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree (SD) Disagree (D) Uncertain (U) Agree (A) Strongly Agree 
(SA) 
 
1.  In my view, the role of the SC should be defined as including the following:  
 
The Role and Scope of the SC  SD D U A SA 
a) Advise the Board of Directors on Shari‟ah matters 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) Assist other parties on Shari‟ah matters1  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) Advise the Shari‟ah Department officer on the scope of 
Shari‟ah review required  
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Provide training to the Shari‟ah Department officer to 
ensure effective Shari‟ah review by the latter  
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Report to the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of Bank 
Negara Malaysia on Shari‟ah matters. 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) Prepare the Shari‟ah compliance manual to be used in 
the Islamic bank 
1 2 3 4 5 
g) Endorse the Shari‟ah compliance manual prepared by 
the management of the bank 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2.    In my view, the SC should be involved in advising and designing the following corporate  
objectives of the bank by incorporating Shari‟ah values or ensuring its compatibility with the 
Islamic Shari‟ah: 
 
Corporate Objectives of Islamic Banks SD D U A SA 
a) The bank‟s mission 1 2 3 4 5 
b) The bank‟s vision 1 2 3 4 5 
c) The bank‟s goals 1 2 3 4 5 
d) The bank‟s objectives 1 2 3 4 5 
e) The bank‟s corporate brand value 1 2 3 4 5 
f) The bank‟s long-term strategic direction  1 2 3 4 5 
                                                 
1
 For example, having discussions with legal advisers and accountants when developing an Islamic banking 
products and services or assisting external auditors during auditing periods 
  
 
3. In my view, the SC should be involved in the following stages of developing Islamic banking 
products and services: 
 
Development of Islamic Banking Products and Services SD D U A SA 
a) Conception level2  1 2 3 4 5 
b) Design level3 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Pricing Level 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Legal Documentation level 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Testing level4  1 2 3 4 5 
f) Marketing level 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Implementation level  1 2 3 4 5 
h) Review level  1 2 3 4 5 
 
4 In my view, the SC should be involved in the following important accounting issues: 
 
Accounting Issues of Banks SD D U A SA 
a) Determining the formula for profit distribution 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) Approving calculation and distribution of zakat by 
Islamic banks 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) Approve the accounting policy to be applied 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Validating documentation on Islamic financing 
contracts 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Validating the Islamic banking transaction records 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) Issuing the Shari‟ah compliance report of the Islamic 
bank 
1 2 3 4 5 
g) Endorsing the annual report prepared by the 
management 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 For example, arriving at an agreement on the concept of the Islamic banking products or services based on the 
Shari‟ah principles. 
3
 For example, designing the product or service to be launched to consumers based on initial agreement on its 
concepts.  
4
 For example, computer programming (or IT) testing and simulation of the Islamic banking products and 
services. 
 
  
 
5.     In my view, the SC receives assistance from the following relevant parties when performing 
its roles and duties:  
 
 Relevant Parties who Assist SC  SD D U A SA 
a) Shari‟ah Department 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Audit Committee  1 2 3 4 5 
c) Internal auditor  1 2 3 4 5 
d) External auditor  1 2 3 4 5 
e) Board of Directors  1 2 3 4 5 
f) The management  1 2 3 4 5 
g) „Shared services‟5 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Consultants 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 6.     In my view, the SC should undertake the following commitments:  
 
General Commitment  SD D U A SA 
a) Publishing the SC‟s Shari‟ah resolutions and rulings as 
well as the mechanics of Shari‟ah compliance applied 
in the Islamic bank to the public  
1 2 3 4 5 
b) Actively engaging in innovation of the Islamic banking 
products and services to fulfil the more demanding 
needs of consumers 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) Actively engaging in meetings of the ulamma of fiqh 
almua‟malat to promote consistency in Islamic banking 
products and services 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Adequately analysing whether Islamic banking 
products and services would deliver benefit to the 
ummah before they are launched  
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Enhancing Shari‟ah review skills by attending 
appropriate training for SC‟s continuous professional 
development.  
1 2 3 4 5 
f) Responding to questions pertaining to pronouncements 
and resolutions issued by the SC through discussion 
with the shareholders or the public  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 For example, oversight committee such as auditors and support services such as accountants 
 
  
 
Section B: Accountability and Independence of the Shari’ah Committee 
(SC) 
 
Please indicate below the level of importance of the factors that influence the independence 
and accountability of the SC in banks offering Islamic banking services. 
 
1. In my view, the accountability of the SC members is influenced by the following factors:  
 Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Uncertain Important 
Very  
Important 
a) The ethical values of the 
SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The scholarly background 
of the SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The reputation of the SC
  
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Stakeholders‟ reliance on 
the Shari‟ah review of the 
SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) The requirement for the 
SC to ensure the Shari‟ah 
compliance of the bank  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
2  In my view, the independence of the SC members is influenced by the following factor(s): 
 
 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Uncertain Important 
Very  
Important 
a) A clearly defined scope 
of responsibilities   
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The remuneration 
received by the SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The scholarly background 
of the SC  
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The perceived high ethical 
status of the SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
e) Adequate powers being 
mandated to the SC 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) Participation of top 
management in SC‟s 
meeting 
1 2 3 4 5 
g) Involvement of SC as 
Shari‟ah committee in 
other industry 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Please indicate below the level of importance of the parties to whom the SC members are 
accountable. 
 
3. In my view, the SC members should be accountable to the following parties: 
 Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Uncertain Important 
Very  
Important 
a) The bank‟s shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 
b) The bank‟s consumers 1 2 3 4 5 
c) The bank‟s Board of 
Directors  
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The public 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Shari‟ah Advisory 
Council of Bank Negara 
Malaysia  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following aspects of SC members‟ 
appointment and the SC‟s mandated authority in performing their Shari‟ah review role in Islamic 
banks by placing a circle in the appropriate box based on the scale from 1 to 5 where: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree 
(SD) 
Disagree (D) Uncertain (U) Agree (A) Strongly Agree (SA) 
 
4. In my view, the SC members should possess the following appointment and Shari‟ah review features:  
Nature of SC Appointment and Mandated Authority SD D U A SA 
a) The appointment of SC members is made based on certain „fit and 
proper‟ qualification criteria  
1 2 3 4 5 
b) There is no conflict of interest on the appointment of SC members6  1 2 3 4 5 
c) The SC members are subject to certain assessment by the bank or 
the Bank Negara Malaysia 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) Adequate power has been mandated to the SC to perform its role  1 2 3 4 5 
e) There is a reporting channel for SC members if any conflict arises 
between the SC members and the Board of Directors or 
management of the bank 
1 2 3 4 5 
f) There is proper segregation of SC duties, as in giving endorsement 
to an Islamic banking product and the Shari‟ah compliance review 
of the product 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Such as being substantial shareholders or having an intimate relationship with an employee of an Islamic bank 
it serves 
  
 
Section C: Perceptions of the Nature of Shari’ah Review in Banks Offering 
Islamic Banking Services 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following aspects of 
Shari‟ah review by placing a circle in the appropriate box based on the scale from 1 to 5 
where: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree 
(SD) 
Disagree (D) Uncertain (U) Agree (A) Strongly Agree (SA) 
 
1. In my view, the structure of Shari‟ah review mechanism of banks offering Islamic banking services in 
Malaysia demonstrates the following features: 
The Structure of Shari’ah Review Mechanism SD D U A SA 
a) The SC should be the sole authority on the Shari‟ah review 
within individual bank that offers Islamic banking services 
1 2 3 4 5 
b) Adequate and apparent guidelines on the pronouncements and 
resolutions of the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara 
Malaysia should be issued for use in Islamic banking industry  
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The Shari‟ah reference role of the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of 
Bank Negara Malaysia enhances the standardization of Islamic 
banking practices  
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The two layers of the Shari‟ah governance system implemented 
in Malaysia are effective in ensuring the stability of the Islamic 
banking industry  
1 2 3 4 5 
e) The two layers of the Shari‟ah governance system are capable of 
harmonising Islamic banking practices in Malaysia and across 
national boundaries  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. In my view, the implementation of Shari‟ah review mechanism of banks offering Islamic banking 
services in Malaysia demonstrates the following features: 
The Implementation of Shari’ah Review Mechanism SD D U A SA 
a) The SC should have the authority to stop banks from undertaking 
non-Shari‟ah compliant transactions  
1 2 3 4 5 
b) The Shari‟ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia should 
adopt rigorous procedures to examine and endorse the application 
of Islamic financial products submitted by banks offering Islamic 
banking services 
1 2 3 4 5 
c) The fact that SC members work part time in banks does not hinder 
effective Shari‟ah review of the operation of banks offering 
Islamic banking services. 
1 2 3 4 5 
d) The Shari‟ah compliance of the banks is adequately reflected in 
the Shari‟ah report issued by the SC  
1 2 3 4 5 
e) The Shari‟ah report by the SC satisfactorily disclose accounting 
issues of banks offering Islamic banking services  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
 
Please rank the degree of importance you attach to the following parties in the Shari‟ah 
governance of banks offering Islamic banking services, where 1 is very unimportant and 5 is 
very important. 
 
3. How do you regard the importance of the following parties in the Shari‟ah governance of banks 
offering Islamic banking services?  
 
Parties involve in the Shari’ah Governance of Banking 
Institutions 
Please rank (1-5) in 
order of importance 
a) Shari‟ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Shari‟ah Committee of the bank 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Shari‟ah Department of the bank 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Board of Directors of the bank 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Management of the bank 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Section D: Demographic information about you. 
 
Please tick () where appropriate: 
 
1. What is your gender? 
  Male  Female 
 
2. Which of these age ranges do you fall into? 
  25-34    35-44 
 45-54                                                         55-64 
 65 and above 
 
3. What is the highest level of education that you have achieved? 
   High school diploma  Bachelor‟s degree 
 Master‟s degree  PhD 
 Professional certificate  
 
4.  Which aspects of training have you attained? 
  Shari‟ah  Fiqh almua‟malat 
 Management  Accounting and Finance 
 Economics  Law  
 Others, please specify ______________ 
 
5.    How long have you been the depositor or customer of this bank? 
  Less than 1 year  1 to 2 years  
 3 to 4 years  5 years and above   
 
 
 
 
  
 
GENERAL INFORMATION: 
 
Islamic Bank‟s/Organisation‟s Name:  __________________________ 
 
Approximate number of internal Shari‟ah audit/Shari‟ah Department staff:______________ 
 
What is your job title and department? 
 
Job title   :  
 
Department : 
 
Would you be willing, if necessary, to grant an interview?    
  Yes   No 
 
If the answer is Yes, please provide your name, contact number and address: 
 
Name   : 
Contact Number : 
Contact Address : 
Email Address : 
 
 
 
If there is anything else you want to add or comment that you think may help us to 
understand the Shari‟ah governance in Malaysian banks that offer Islamic banking services, 
please include them in the spaces provided below:  
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION  
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A Study on the Shari’ah Governance Function of the 
 Shari’ah Committee in the Malaysian Islamic Banking Industry 
 
Interview Memoirs 
 
Introduction  
Thanks for time  
Mention nature and relevance of research  
Assure interviewee of absolute confidentiality 
 
Background Information 
Organisation name:    
Name of participant:       Position: 
No. of years in the organisation: 
 
 
Interview Questions to the Shari’ah Committee members:- 
1. How many Shari‟ah Committee members are there in your bank/Islamic bank?  
2. What are the criteria and mechanism on the appointment of the Shari‟ah Committee in 
your bank/Islamic Bank? 
3. What is the current role of the Shari‟ah Committee in your bank/Islamic bank? 
4. How does the Shari‟ah Committee preserve its integrity and independence whilst 
performing the Shari‟ah supervision function in your bank/Islamic bank? 
5. What are the Shari‟ah governance mechanisms in your bank/Islamic bank? 
6. What are the guidelines used for Shari‟ah governance mechanisms in your bank/Islamic 
bank? 
7. How does the Shari‟ah Committee interact with other parties within your bank/Islamic 
bank? 
8. How does the Shari‟ah Committee seek balance between the profit maximization motive 
of the management to the bank/Islamic banks and Shari‟ah compliance? 
9. How does the Shari‟ah Committee resolve possible conflict with the Board of Directors 
or the management of your bank/Islamic bank? 
10. What are the mechanisms of Shari‟ah compliance review in your bank/Islamic bank? 
11.  How does the Shari‟ah Committee of your bank/Islamic bank interact with the Shari‟ah   
 Advisory Council? 
12. What are the reporting process of Shari‟ah Committee of your bank/Islamic bank? 
 
 
 
  
 
Interview Questions to the Shari’ah Department Officers:- 
1. How many Shari‟ah Officers and Shari‟ah Committee members are there in your 
bank/Islamic bank?  
2. What are the criteria and mechanism on the appointment of the Shari‟ah Committee 
Members in your bank/Islamic Bank? 
3. What is the current role of the Shari‟ah Committee in your bank/Islamic bank? 
4. What are the Shari‟ah governance mechanisms in your bank/Islamic bank? 
5. What are the guidelines used for Shari‟ah governance mechanisms in your bank/Islamic 
bank? 
6. How does the Shari‟ah Committee member interact with other parties within your 
bank/Islamic bank? 
7. How does the Shari‟ah Committee resolve possible conflict with the board of directors or 
the management of your bank/Islamic bank? 
8.   What are the mechanisms of Shari‟ah compliance review in your bank/Islamic bank? 
9. How does the Shari‟ah Committee of your bank/Islamic bank interact with the Shari‟ah 
Advisory Council? 
10. What is the reporting process of Shari‟ah Committee of your bank/Islamic bank? 
 
 
Interview Questions to the CEO of Islamic Banks:- 
1. How important is the role of Shari‟ah Committee members to Islamic Bank?  
2. How do you perceive about the dynamism of Islamic banks and the importance of the 
Shari‟ah governance mechanism in Islamic banking operation?   
3. What are the criteria and mechanism on the appointment of Shari‟ah Committee 
members in Islamic Bank? Is there any preference on the criteria of a person to become a 
Shari‟ah Committee member of your Islamic bank? 
4. What is the current role of Shari‟ah Committee members to Islamic Bank? 
5. How is the Shari‟ah Committee members associated with Islamic Bank‟s customers and 
depositors?  
6. How is the management involved in the Shari‟ah governance of Islamic Bank?  
7. How will the recent Prudential Shari‟ah Governance Framework announced by Bank 
Negara Malaysia influence Islamic Bank? 
8. How crucial is the Shari‟ah non-compliance risk to Islamic Bank? 
  
 
Interview Questions to the Bank Negara Malaysia Officers 
1. When was the Shari‟ah secretariat of the Jabatan Perbankan Islam dan Takaful, Bank 
Negara Malaysia been established? 
2. What is the motive of the establishment of the Shari‟ah secretariat of the Jabatan 
Perbankan Islam dan Takaful, Bank Negara Malaysia? 
3. How many staffs are there in the Shari‟ah secretariat of the Jabatan Perbankan Islam dan 
Takaful, Bank Negara Malaysia? 
4. What is the qualification background of the Shari‟ah secretariat staffs from the Jabatan 
Perbankan Islam dan Takaful, Bank Negara Malaysia? 
5. How does the Shari‟ah secretariat of the Jabatan Perbankan Islam dan Takaful, Bank 
Negara Malaysia associated with the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara 
Malaysia? 
6. How does the Shari‟ah secretariat of the Jabatan Perbankan Islam dan Takaful, Bank 
Negara Malaysia associated with the banks offering Islamic banking services in 
Malaysia? 
7. What is the relationship between the Shari‟ah secretariat with other parties within the 
Jabatan Perbankan Islam dan Takaful, Bank Negara Malaysia? 
8. How is the role of the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia significant to 
the regulators? 
9. How does the dual-layer Shari‟ah governance of Islamic banks as practice in Malaysia 
help to promote stability and coherent in the Islamic banking industry? 
10. What are the role of the regulators in harmonizing the Islamic banking practice between 
Islamic banks in Malaysia and other countries? 
11. What are the channel of communication between the regulator and Islamic banks? 
12. What are the mechanisms taken to mitigate the Shari‟ah non-compliance risk arising from 
Islamic banks‟ operation? 
13. How crucial is Shari‟ah non-compliance risk of Islamic banks?  
14. How important is the Shari‟ah Advisory Council and Shari‟ah Committee to be 
regulated? 
15. How do the standards and guidelines promulgated by AAOIFI and IFSB influence the 
Shari‟ah governance of Islamic banks in Malaysia? 
16. What are the mechanisms taken to enhance the transparency and disclosure amongst 
Islamic banks in Malaysia? 
  
 
17. What is the general evaluation on the implementation of Shari‟ah governance framework 
amongst the banks that offer Islamic banking services in Malaysia? 
18. What is the general evaluation on the function of Shari‟ah Committee members of banks 
that offer Islamic banking services in Malaysia? 
 
 
 
Interview Questions to the Shari’ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia 
1. What is the current role of the Shari‟ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia?  
2. What is the mechanism for the Shari‟ah Advisory Council to come out with a Shari‟ah 
resolution?  
3. How do the standards and guidelines promulgated by AAOIFI and IFSB influence the 
Shari‟ah governance of banks offering Islamic banking services in Malaysia?  
4. How does the Shari‟ah Advisory Council interact with banks offering Islamic banking 
services in Malaysia?  
5. How does the Shari‟ah Advisory Council interact with the regulators on Shari‟ah 
governance issue of Islamic banks?  
6. What is your opinion on the present function of the Shari‟ah Committee members of 
banks offering Islamic banking services?  
7. What is your opinion on the present dual-layer Shari‟ah governance system for the 
Islamic banking industry as practice in Malaysia?  
8. What are the challenges facing the Shari‟ah Advisory Council members?  
9. How does the new Central Bank Act of Malaysia 2009 influence the Shari‟ah 
governance practice of the Islamic financial institutions?  
10. How does the role of the Shari‟ah Advisory Council promote to the growth and prospects 
of the Islamic banking industry in Malaysia?  
 
 
